ITT Continental Baking Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 9, 1981

253 N.L.R.B. 1174 (N.L.R.B. 1981)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ITT Continental Baking Company, American Bak-
eries Company, Inc. and Willie Walker. Case
9-CA-13136
January 9, 1981
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND
TRUESDALE
On April 30, 1980, Administrative Law Judge
John C. Miller issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed
exceptions and a supporting brief and Respondent
filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's
conclusion that the walkout by three employees to
protest bun pans that were too hot to handle would
be protected concerted activity but for the terms of
the collective-bargaining agreement. Contrary to
our dissenting colleague, we agree with the Admin-
istrative Law Judge's finding that the grievance
and arbitration provisions of the agreement are
clearly applicable to the dispute herein and contain
an unambiguous obligation not to strike over such
matters at any stage of the grievance-arbitration
procedures.
Section 2, article 2 of the agreement provides
that the parties to the agreement "recognize that it
is mutually advantageous to work together to
maintain . . . safe healthful working conditions"
and section 3 provides that "[the parties] further
agree to cooperate to the fullest extent in obtaining
the above-mentioned results." Article 21, which
deals with the grievance procedure, provides that
"any complaint or dispute arising out of the inter-
pretation or application of the terms of the agree-
ment shall be handled" in the prescribed manner.
(Emphasis supplied.) The last section of article 21
provides that, if no settlement of the dispute has re-
sulted after completion of the prescribed steps,
either party may "submit the grievance to arbitra-
' Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products.
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951) We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
253 NLRB No. 149
tion as hereinafter provided" pursuant to article 22.
Article 22 specifies the arbitration procedures that
will be used "upon failure to adjust any dispute or
grievance through the procedure above outlined"
in article 21. Section 5, article 22, contains an ex-
plicit promise not to strike "during such proceed-
ings."
Thus, it is clear that health and safety disputes
are covered by the contract and must be dealt with
under the grievance and arbitration provisions.
Indeed, the record contains evidence that similar
complaints have been handled by the grievance
procedure in the past.
The grievance and arbitration provisions must be
read together; they refer to each other and must be
considered as a whole. The grievance procedure is
a required prerequisite for arbitration. The no-
strike clause refers to "such proceedings" and obvi-
ously applies to both the arbitration and grievance
proceedings.
The employees were required to submit their
complaint to the grievance procedure and abide by
their obligation not to strike. Thus, their concerted
activity was in breach of contract and therefore un-
protected. This is the only logical interpretation of
these contract provisions and we find no ambiguity
in them.
Our dissenting colleague, however, finds that
section 5, article 22, is ambiguous. He then resolves
the ambiguity he sees by concluding that the no-
strike clause applies only after a grievance reaches
arbitration. Under this view employees could strike
throughout the grievance procedure, which is a re-
quired prerequisite to arbitration, and then must
cease doing so the minute arbitration begins. Clear-
ly, such a situation does not comport with the
labor relations realities of industrial life. Thus, the
dissent resolves a purported ambiguity to create an
absurd situation.
Accordingly, we agree with the rationale of the
Administrative Law Judge and find that the com-
plaint should be dismissed in its entirety.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the complaint be, and it hereby
is, dismissed in its entirety.
MEMBER JENKINS, dissenting:
On the morning of July 20, 1978, two of Re-
spondent's bakery pan setters complained to their
foreman that the pans that had been brought to
them to use were "too hot to handle."
1174
ITT CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY
After checking the pans, the foreman concluded
that the pans were not too hot and he orderd the
two employees to run them or face the loss of their
jobs. Faced with this alternative, the two employ-
ees decided to walk off the job and, soon thereaf-
ter, they were joined by a third employee who also
complained about running hot pans. True to its
word, Respondent discharged all three employees
for walking out.
As both the Administrative Law Judge and the
Board majority recognize, the evidence in this case
clearly indicates that the walkout engaged in by
the three discharged employees was occasioned by
their sincere belief that the baking pans were "too
hot" and thus unsafe to handle. Under the rule of
Washington Aluminum, 2 therefore, the walkout in
the instant case would be protected concerted ac-
tivity and an employer would be prohibited from
taking retaliatory actions, such as discharge, in re-
sponse to the employees' exercise of their Section 7
rights.
The Administrative Law Judge and the Board
majority would find the walkout unprotected in
this case, however, because of a clause in the col-
lective-bargaining agreement between the Employ-
er and the Union which they read as prohibiting
employee strikes or work stoppages to protest
unsafe or unhealthful working conditions. I must
dissent from such a conclusion because I find that
the language of the no-strike clause at issue in this
case is not sufficiently free of ambiguity to consti-
tute the "clear and unmistakeable waiver" which
we have consistently required before we have held
that a party has relinquished rights granted by the
Act. Daniel Construction Company, Inc., 239 NLRB
1335 (1979); International Union of Operating Engi-
neers, Local Union 18, AFL-CIO (Davis-McKee,
Inc.), 238 NLRB 652 (1978); Mastro Plastics Corp.
v. N.L.R.B., 250 U.S. 270 (1956); Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 325 F.2d 746, 751 (6th
Cir. 1963).
The grievance and arbitration procedures of the
parties' collective-bargaining agreement are set
forth in articles 21 (grievance procedure) and 22
(arbitration). Article 21, which establishes a four-
step grievance-arbitration procedure, contains no
mention of any restrictions on the employees' right
to strike. Article 22, which concerns only the arbi-
tration procedures of step 4, contains the following
clause:
(5) It is agreed that during such proceedings
there shall be no lock-out, strike, stoppage of
work, picketing, boycott or the equivalent
thereof. [Emphasis supplied.]
2 N.L.R.BR v Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962)
The Administrative Law Judge and my col-
leagues have held that the language of section 5 be
read to encompass the procedures of both articles
21 and 22. While this reading is perhaps permissi-
ble, I must conclude that it is certainly not the only
or even the most reasonable interpretation of sec-
tion 5, and that therefore section 5 is ambiguous
and does not meet the "clear and unmistakable
waiver" standard. 3
The Board and the courts have traditionally de-
clined to find a relinquishment of Section 7 rights
absent a "clear and unmistakble waiver." Daniel
Construction Co., Inc., supra; Local 18, Operating
Engineers, supra: Mastro Plastics, supra; Timken
Roller Bearing Co., supra. Under our decisions,
waiver may be found either in the express langauge
of the collective-bargaining agreement or in un-
equivocal extrinsic evidence concerning the mean-
ing of ambiguous contract language, such as clear
evidence of the parties' bargaining history. Daniel
Construction, supra: Local 18, Operating Engineers,
supra.
Our first inquiry, therefore, is whether the con-
tract language is ambiguous. The Administrative
Law Judge and the majority conclude that section
5 of article 22 must be read to apply to the griev-
ance proceedings set forth in article 21 as well as
the arbitration proceedings of article 22. It appears
entirely reasonable to me, however, to read section
5 of article 21 as applying solely to the arbitration
procedures with which article 22 is exclusively
concerned. Under this reading of the contract, em-
ployee walkouts, such as occurred in this case,
would be prohibited only during the arbitration
process. Prior to that time, either party would be
free to exercise the self-help remedies secured by
Section 7 of the Act. Because this seems to be the
I My colleagues nsist that the no-strike clause set forth In art 22 of
the parties' collective-hargaining agreement "obviously" applies to both
the arbitration procedures established in art. 22 and the grievance prote-
dures established in art 21, and that their nonliteral reading is the "only
logical interpretation," of the contract. What is so obvious to them, how-
ever, is not at all obvious to me.
The "labor relations realities of industrial life" teach us that unions are
traditionally reluctant to relinquish their right to strike. It is by no means
illogical or absurd, therefore, that a union would concede the right to
strike only at the point in the dispute resolution process where the deci-
sion of the merit of an employee grievance was securely in the hands of a
neutral arbitrator In our instant case, neutral decisionmaking does not
occur until the arbitration phase established by art. 22. It is thus not sur-
prising, given "the realities of industrial life," that art. 22 contains the
first and only language restricting the Union's right to strike
My colleagues are led to their conclusion in this case by the force of
two errors First, they impose upon the parties a narrow and, to my
mind. unrealistic sles of "industrial life." Second. they rely upon this
narrow and unrealistic 'iew as the basic premise for interpreting the rele-
s.anit contract language and permit this premise to steer them away from
what the contract, by both structure and language, actually says At the
least, the language of the no-strike clause in art. 22 is neither "clear" nor
"unmistlkable" Uinder our consistently applied standard, therefore, we
should dejlin. absent a clear and unmistakable ai er, It find a relin-
quishmniet of the employees' right to strike under the facts of this case
1175
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
most plausible interpretation, I cannot agree with
my colleagues that the relevant contract language
is sufficiently free of ambiguity to constitute a clear
and unmistakable waiver of Section 7 rights.
Our second inquiry is whether there is any un-
equivocal extrinsic evidence in the record concern-
ing the meaning of the ambiguous contract lan-
guage which would support a waiver of Section 7
rights. In the present case, there is no testimony
whatsoever concerning the parties' own under-
standing of the meaning of section 5 of article 22.
The ambiguous language of section 5 remains am-
biguous.
As the Board has stated, our standard for finding
a waiver of rights guaranteed by the Act is a strict
standard. Local 18, Operating Engineers, supra. Be-
cause I believe that the Board has departed in this
case from our sound and traditional policy of refus-
ing to infer a relinquishment of rights secured by
the Act without a clear and unmistakable waiver, I
respectfully dissent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN C. MILLER, Administrative Law Judge: This
case was heard in Columbus, Ohio, on June 7-8, 1979.
The complaint alleged that Respondent discharged em-
ployees Willie Walker, Norman Bradley, and George
Thomas because they engaged in a concerted work stop-
page to protest their working conditions, and that such
conduct is protected concerted activity and their dis-
charge as a result thereof is violative of Section 8(a)(l)
of the Act.
On the entire record in this case including my observa-
tions of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the fol-
lowing:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a Delaware corporation, is engaged in the
production and sale of bread, buns, and related food
items at various facilities throughout the United States.
Its Columbus, Ohio, facility is the only one involved in
this proceeding. The complaint alleges that during the
preceding 12 months Respondent purchased goods and
materials in excess of $50,000 which were shipped to its
Columbus, Ohio, plant, directly from outside the State of
Ohio. The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I
find on the basis of the above admitted facts, that Re-
spondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find
that Bakery and Confectionary Workers International
Union of America, Local 57, AFL-CIO-CLC, is a labor
organization as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act.
It. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background Facts
Most of the basic facts in this case are not in dispute.
The labor dispute herein occurred at Respondent's
bakery in Columbus, Ohio, and involved three employees
working in the so-called Model K area. In the Model K
area are two model K machines, which are utilized in
making buns. Each machine requires three employees,
namely, a pan setter, a machine operator, and a pan-
racker. The pan setters and pan rackers are provided
safety gloves. In addition to these employees, there is a
floorman whose principal job is clean up and providing
pans to the pan setters on small trucks or dollies.
The production process for this portion of the bakery
involves the mixing of dough on the second floor, which
is in turn dropped or fed into the two model K machines
on the first floor. The pan setters, who have racks of
empty bun pans placed behind them, place the pans on a
conveyor and thereafter the machine operator fills it
with dough and further down the line, the pan rackers
take the pans and place them on a hand truck. Thereaf-
ter, the bun filled pans are taken to a proof box where
the dough rises and the pans are then taken to the ovens
where the dough is baked. The baked buns are separated
from the pans and the pans continue on a conveyor belt
and are ultimately put on small hand trucks and placed
in a cooling area. There are fans in the cooling area; the
pans are cooled for approximately 2 hours before being
reused. As the pans come out of the bakery area, they
are piled on small hand trucks and kept in chronological
order. In effect, the hand truck with the pans out of the
ovens the longest is used first unless there is a switch to
another product requiring a different size pan.
The dispute arose about 11 a.m. on July 20, 1978,
when the two pan setters, Willie Walker and Norman
Bradley complained that the bun pans (called hamburger
8's) brought and placed behind them for their use were
too hot to handle. Bradley voiced this complaint to Bob
Ross, the foreman, who touched the pans and said they
were only warm and told him to continue to run them.
Bradley called for a union steward and Don Stanford
came to the area. After feeling the pans, Stanford asked
whether Ross could not run some other product which
would use other pans. Ross declined, stating he did not
have enough other work and that the pans were not too
hot. Stanford left to call John Browning, the union busi-
ness agent. Walker and Bradley ceased work when they
ran out of cool pans, whereupon Ross ordered them to
continue working or lose their jobs. Both men left the
job, discussed the matter briefly with Stanford, the union
steward,' and departed the plant for the union office, lo-
cated some 15 minutes from the bakery.
Shortly after Walker and Bradley ceased work,
Thomas, the machine operator for one of the model K
I Stanford conceded on cross-examination that he called and advised
Browning that the pans were not real hot. He further testified that
Browning advised him to tell the employees to use gloves and continue
working until he got there. While the record does not disclose whether
or not Stanford advised the employees to stay on the job, he presumably
did so, at least prior to their leaving the plant.
1176
ITT CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY
machines, stopped his machine. Ross advised him to con-
tinue to run the pans or punch out. While there is some
inconsistency in the testimony over why Thomas quit
work, I credit Ross that Thomas refused to run the al-
leged hot pans. In any event, it is undisputed that
Thomas also stopped work despite instructions to the
contrary and under threat of losing his job.
After Walker, Bradley, and Thomas walked off the
job, Ross called Townes, the assistant superintendent,
and asked for some help. 2 Ross then placed the floor-
man, Acevedo, as pan setter on the one model K ma-
chine, and he worked as both pan setter and machine op-
erator for a short while, until Townes arrived. Thereaf-
ter Townes filled in as machine operator and employees
Eastman and Blattner were transferred in to fill the pan
setter spots. Neither Acevedo nor the two employees
that filled in as pan setters used gloves in handling the
pans nor did they complain that the pans were too hot.
Acevedo, whose testimony I credit, stated that while the
pans were warm, he handled them without gloves or any
ill effects. Both Walker and Bradley wore gloves and
Bradley conceded that he could have handled the pans
with gloves but contended they too would become hot
in a short while.
After reaching the union office, Walker and Bradley
discussed the matter with John Browning, the union
business representative. After several unsuccessful at-
tempts by Browning to telephone Townes, he, Walker,
and Bradley returned to the bakery.
A meeting was held in the plant office to discuss the
dispute and was attended, inter alia, by Townes, Ross,
Browning, Stanford, and the three discriminatees. After a
heated discussion involving the use of allegedly hot pans
and whether the employees would be reinstated, it was
agreed to meet the following morning to discuss the
matter further.
At the meeting the following morning, Townes stated
that the decision had been made to terminate the em-
ployees; they were given their termination slips. While
the decision to terminate was left largely to Ross, the
foreman in charge, Townes, the assistant superintendent,
and Lindsey, the personnel manager, concurred in the
decision. Browning stated a grievance would be filed on
behalf of the men, and the meeting broke up. Later, the
grievances were denied and the Union decided not to
take the matter to arbitration (step 4 in the contract) be-
cause Browning did not believe they would win the arbi-
tration. 3
It is undisputed that on the day of the discharges, the
outside temperature was in the 90's, that the alleged dis-
criminatees were working overtime, and that the tem-
perature inside the bakery was hotter than the outside
temperature.
2 The record establishes that once a dough is dropped to the model K
machines, it must continue to be processed to completion.
I Browning stated that the reason they did not go to arbitration was
because he felt that the grievance lacked merit and that the men were
wrong in walking off the job.
A charge that the Union failed to represent them was dismissed by the
Regional Director for Region 9.
The contract between the Union and Respondent, ef-
fective from June 5, 1977 to June 2, 1979, provided in
pertinent part as follows: 4
Article I sets forth the purpose of the contract and
section 2 thereof states in part:
We recognize that it is mutually advantageous to
work together to maintain high standards of living,
safe healthful working conditions, high quality of
products . .
Section 3 states:
We further agreed to cooperate to the fullest extent
in obtaining the abovementioned results.
Article 4 of the contract set forth the wage rates and
classifications and the wage rates for machine operators,
pan setters and pan rackers are set forth therein.
Article 21-Grievance Procedure states in pertinent
part:
Any complaint or dispute arising out of the inter-
pretation or application of the terms of the Agree-
ment shall be handled in the following matter.
The grievance procedure sets out a four step proce-
dure, with the third step being a written grievance, and
the fourth step is arbitration.
Article 22 is entitled "Arbitration" and states in part:
1. Upon failure to adjust any dispute or grievance
through the procedures above outlined [referring to
the grievance procedure] either of the parties may
demand arbitration ....
The no-strike provision is set forth in section 5 of this
article and states:
5. It is agreed that during such proceedings there
shall be no lock-out, strike, stoppage of work, pick-
eting, boycott or the equivalent thereof.
B. Issues
1. Was the work stoppage by employees Walker, Brad-
ley, and Thomas in protest over the use of hot pans, nor-
mally deemed protected concerted activity?
2. If protected concerted activty, is the no-strike
clause contract applicable? If so, what effect does it have
on the walkout?
C. Contentions
The General Counsel contends that the walkout must
be considered in context. He points out the fact that
Walker, Bradley, and Thomas were working overtime,
that the temperature in the bakery was high and the cir-
culation of air in the Model K was poor and was com-
pounded by outside temperatures of 90 degrees. He also
states that the placing of hot bun pans for use by the pan
setters prompted the employees to stop work because
See Resp Exh. 10
1177
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
they considered such working conditions to be oppres-
sive.
He further contends, in any event, that the merit of
the employees' position is not the controlling factor in
determining whether the conduct engaged in, is protect-
ed concerted activity. Lastly, as to the "no-strike" clause
in the contract, he contends that the reference to "such
proceedings" limits the application of the no-strike clause
to arbitration proceedings, and does not refer to article
21 governing grievances. Lastly, the General Counsel
contends that the grievance-arbitration provisions were
not an exclusive means of resolving disputes, citing
Rockford Newspapers, Inc., 229 NLRB 429 (1977), and
that matter in dispute was not within the contract and
therefore, not subject to the no-strike clause.
Respondent's counsel contends that the walkout was
not protected concerted activity because it was prompt-
ed by a desire for a break from work, and not caused by
the use of allegedly hot pans. Assuming, arguendo, that
the walkout was prompted by the use of hot pans, Re-
spondent urges that the no-strike clause is applicable, and
therefore their discharges are valid.
D. Discussion
1. Was the walkout protected concerted activity?
The lead case for protected concerted activities is, of
course, Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). In
that and subsequent cases it has been clearly established
that irrespective of the reasonableness of employees' ac-
tions, a walkout or work stoppage concerning working
conditions is still protected concerted activity.
I conclude that the walkout of Walker, Bradley, and
Thomas was in fact prompted by their concern over han-
dling "hot" bun pans. However, I further conclude that
their claims that the pans were too hot to handle were
exaggerated. I note and credit the testimony of Acevedo,
and Ross, that while the pans were warm, they could
and were handled without gloves by Acevedo, Ross, and
by two employee replacements, Eastman and Blattner.
Moreover, I note that Walker and Bradley were wearing
gloves at the time the incident arose, although Bradley
claimed that even the gloves would ultimately get hot
from the pans and blister their hands. There seems little
doubt that the hamburger 8 pans were warm, and that in
an already heated environment like the Model K area of
the bakery, it contributed to and made working condi-
tions unpleasant. However, working on that particular
job in a bakery, high temperatures would appear to be
more the norm than the exception.
Despite the exaggerated claims by Walker, Bradley,
and Thomas.5 I find they did walk off the job because
they felt the use and presence of the "hot" pans made
their working conditions more onerous, and that such
conduct is normally deemed protected concerted activi-
ty.
To the extent Thomas testified at one point that his walkout was
prompted by problems concerning the dough and the operation of his
machine, I do not credit him. The union representatives and the Compa-
ny treated Thomas as part of the walkout involving the use of "hot" bun
pans, and I find his walkout was prompted by sympathy with the claims
of Walker and Bradley about the use of hot pans.
2. Is the no-strike clause in the contract applicable
here, and if so, does it render the walkout
unprotected?
Regarding the no-strike clause, the General Counsel
has relied on two principal contentions. The first, that
the no-strike clause herein should be narrowly construed
to apply only to arbitration proceedings. However, the
grievance and arbitration provisions and the no-strike
clause refer to each other and must be considered as a
whole, not separately. Accordingly, I reject this conten-
tion and find that the no-strike clause applies to both
grievance and arbitration proceedings.
A second and somewhat related contention by the
General Counsel is that the dispute concerned matters
outside the contract and, therefore, the no-strike clause is
inapplicable. The General Counsel argues that the prob-
lem of hot bun pans was not cognizable under the agree-
ment and points to an oral side agreement, whereby the
Union claimed that Respondent had agreed to switch
products whenever the pans being run became too hot.
However, Respondent's witnesses stated that any oral
agreement in 1977 regarding the use of pans was ren-
dered moot by the fact that additional pans had been se-
cured after a closing of another bakery. In any event
there was testimony that there had never been a shortage
of hamburger 8 pans nor any agreement involving the
pans in issue here.
It is true that the contract did not deal specifically
with the manner and use of pans or hot pans, but, as
noted previously, the contract (in art. I, secs. 2 and 3)
did touch generally on the subject of "safe and healthful
working conditions," and cooperating on such matters.
Secondly, the parties to the contract treated the dispute
as falling within the contract, and the grievance proce-
dures were used through Step 3. Thirdly, Respondent
used a procedure and a form called an Error Cause Re-
moval (ECR), which permitted employees to point out
hazardous, unhealthy, or unpleasant working conditions
in writing, which had to be answered in writing by the
appropriate foreman. If the matter complained of was
not taken care of, it often led to the filing of a formal
grievance.6 It appears that the filing of these ECR forms
often dealt with working conditions, and that matters
were often resolved at that level. However, it was
merely a preliminary step which offered employees an
opportunity to put suggestions or complaints in written
form and was a part and parcel of the grievance and ar-
bitration procedure. ' In practice therefore, practically all
working conditions whether or not specifically delineat-
ed in the contract, were deemed by the parties to fall
within the grievance and arbitration provisions of the
contract.
As recognized by the Supreme Court in Washington
Aluminum Co., supra, not all concerted activities are pro-
tected if they are unlawful, violent, or in breach of con-
tract. In this instance, Walker, Bradley, and Thomas
walked off the job in disregard of a no-strike clause in
their contract, and despite on-going efforts by a union
6 See Resp. Exhs 13A and B.
? Rockford Newvpapers, Inc., 229 NLRB 429 (1977)
1178
ITT CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY
steward to resolve the problems. The precipitous action
of the employees in walking out in effect undercut the
efforts of their union to resolve their grievance, and nul-
lified their very purpose in being represented.
There is no contention here that the walkout was
prompted by abnormally dangerous working conditions
under section 502 which might justify disregarding the
no-strike clause nor is there any evidence in this record
to support such contention in any event.
I find that the labor dispute arose over working condi-
tions that concern matters of interpretation or application
of the contract and that the no-strike clause of the con-
tract is applicable and renders the walkout unprotected.8
Accordingly, I shall recommend that the complaint be
dismissed in its entirety.
8 Washington Aluminum Co., supra: Curris , arhes Manufacturing Com-
pany, 145 NLRB 473. 475 (1963)
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Bakery and Confectionary Workers Interna-
tional Union of America, Local 57, AFL-CIO-CLC, is a
labor organization as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent, by terminating the employment of
Willie Walker, Norman Bradley, and George Thomas,
did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
ORDER 9
It is hereby ordered that the complaint herein be dis-
missed in its entirety.
9 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the find-
ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Sec 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes
1179