IronTiger Logistics, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

May 6, 2011

16-CA-027543 (N.L.R.B. May. 6, 2011)

JD(ATL)–14–11
Kansas City, MO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
ATLANTA BRANCH OFFICE
IRONTIGER LOGISTICS, INC.
and
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS
AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, AFL-CIO
Case 16–CA–27543
Kelly Elifson, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Thomas P. Krukowski, Esq., for the Respondent.
Mr. Boysen Anderson, for the Charging Party Union.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
GEORGE CARSON II, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Fort Worth, Texas,
on March 28, 2011, pursuant to a consolidated complaint that issued on December 22, 2010.1
Prior to the hearing, Case 16–CB–8084, with which Case 16–CA–27543 had been
consolidated, was settled, and the allegations relating to Case 16–CB–8084 were withdrawn.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act (the Act) by delaying providing relevant information requested by the Union.
The answer of the Respondent denies any violation of the Act. Although I agree with the
Respondent that the information sought was not relevant, I find that the Respondent was
obligated to timely respond to the request made by the Union and that it failed to do so.
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the
following
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
The Respondent, IronTiger Logistics, Inc., IronTiger, a Missouri corporation
headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri, is engaged in the interstate transportation of freight
from various locations including Garland, Texas. IronTiger annually derives gross revenue in
excess of $50,000 for the transportation of freight from the State of Texas directly to points
located outside the State of Texas. IronTiger admits, and I find and conclude, that it is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.

1 All dates are in 2010 unless otherwise indicated. The charge in Case 16–CA–27543 was filed
on July 15 and was amended on December 1.
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IronTiger admits, and I find and conclude, that International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO, the Union or the IAM, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. Background
Thomas (Tom) Duvall is the owner and chief executive officer of IronTiger as well as
TruckMovers.com, Inc. TruckMovers has contracts for the transport of trucks from production
facilities of Volvo/Mack and Navistar to various locations. The delivery transport to the various
locations is carried out by drivers employed by TruckMovers, IronTiger, and some 15 other
companies. The contracts between TruckMovers and Volvo/Mack and TruckMovers and
Navistar provide that no more than 80 and 75 percent, respectively, of the transports can be
provided by any one carrier so that any disruption in service by any one provider would not
cause a cessation of all deliveries. The assignment of loads to a particular carrier is made by
TruckMovers. The vast majority of deliveries are made by TruckMovers and IronTiger.
IronTiger employs approximately 100 employees at four locations: Garland, Texas;
Springfield, Ohio; Macungie, Pennsylvania; and Dublin, Virginia. TruckMovers obtained the
transportation contracts with Volvo/Mack and Navistar from Auto Truck Transport. The first
contract obtained was at Dublin, Virginia. After TruckMovers obtained the contract,
management officials of IronTiger met with the employees of the predecessor. Upon conclusion
of their meeting, any employees interested were invited to remain for a presentation by the
Union. No management officials of IronTiger remained for the meeting with representatives of
the Union. A majority of employees signed cards authorizing the Union to represent them.
Pursuant to a card check, IronTiger agreed to recognize the Union. The initial collective
bargaining agreement related to only the location at Dublin, Virginia, and was negotiated
between CEO Duvall, Tom Jones, the attorney for IronTiger, and Boysen Anderson, automotive
coordinator for the Union. It was effective from September 29, 2008, until September 30, 2011.
Thereafter, when TruckMovers obtained additional contracts, the Union obtained
authorization cards from a majority of the predecessor’s employees at the other three IronTiger
locations, and the collective-bargaining agreement was extended to those locations by separate
letters of agreement. The record does not reflect the manner in which the TruckMovers drivers,
who are not represented by a union, were hired or whether they operate from the same
terminals as the IronTiger drivers.
The bargaining units at each location are identical and include all yard drivers, shop
workers, utility workers, and drivers domiciled and employed at each location.
Article 6 of the collective-bargaining agreement sets out the dispatch procedure for
IronTiger drivers. Subparagraph 3 provides that drivers will be “dispatched on a first in first out
basis” and that when “two or more IronTiger drivers arrive at the terminal at the same time”
priority will be given to the driver with the most company seniority. Subparagraph 5 provides:
All available loads will be placed on one board in the order of importance of delivery.
Available loads may include breakdowns or secondary moves as part of a trip or as a
separate dispatch. Old, Hot, or Expedited loads will have priority.
The “board” to which the foregoing provision refers is also referred to as a kiosk and is a
listing appearing on a computer screen. TruckMovers makes the assignments of loads, and the
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assignments are displayed on the computer screen of the carrier to which the load has been
assigned. TruckMovers, as already noted, is prohibited by its contracts with Volvo/Mack and
Navistar from assigning more that 80 and 75 percent of the loads to any one carrier. IronTiger is
not a party to those contracts. The foregoing contractual language relating to dispatch obviously
applies only to loads assigned by TruckMovers to IronTiger, and they are shown on the
IronTiger kiosk.
IronTiger informed the Union of the restriction upon the amount of work that
TruckMovers could assign to any one company, and Anderson does not deny that the Union
was informed of that restriction. IronTiger’s attorney, Tom Jones, sought to address that
restriction by proposing language to be included in article 19 of the collective-bargaining
agreement relating to subcontracting by IronTiger. Automotive coordinator Anderson requested
that the proposed language be placed in a letter of agreement because he did not want any
other employer to be aware of the agreement into which the Union had entered. Jones agreed.
The letter of agreement, executed on September 27, 2008, states:
The parties hereto agree that loads not appearing on the IronTiger Logistics drivers’
kiosk are not IronTiger loads and will be moved by carriers other than IronTiger Logistics
and the movement of such loads does not constitute Sub-Contracting and does not
violate Article 19 of the Agreement between IronTiger Logistics, Inc., and the
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers covering the period from
September 29th, 2008, through and including September 20, 2011.
B. Facts
On the morning of March 16, there was an exchange of emails between automotive
coordinator Anderson and Tom Duvall, the first of which was from Anderson.
Tom—once again the company is not complying with the dispatch language in the CBA.
Thus the final warning notice from the IAM. So that we are clear ALL AVAILABLE
LOADS ARE TO BE PLACED ON THE BOARD FOR DISPATCH. We have am [sic]
Agreement and the company will comply.
Duvall replied by email:
All available IronTiger loads ARE placed on the board for dispatch. If you believe that
they are not, please give me some specifics so that I can investigate. [Emphasis added.]
Anderson answered:
Tom—don’t question me on what I believe; here are the facts, one driver 1 load—two
drivers 2 loads—six drivers 6 loads. Enough of the bullshit.
Three short emails followed. Duvall stated, “We don’t set the priorities. Our customer
does.” Anderson answered, “Bullshit, you will abide by the contract.” Duvall replied, “I am.”
On March 29, the Union, in an email from Anderson to Duvall, informed IronTiger that
the Union was filing a class action grievance.
Tom—attached you will find a class grievance on the continuing contract violations. Also
this shall serve as the notice to cure the contract provision breach outlined in the
attached grievance. If the Company ignores this notice the Union will proceed on this
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grievance under Article 20, Section 1.
Article 20, section 1 of the contract provides that “all grievances and questions of
interpretation arising from or in any way pertaining to the provisions of this Agreement shall be
submitted to the grievance procedure for determination.” It further provides that there shall be
no strike except “in the event the Company intentionally ignores the provisions of this
agreement.”
The grievance, dated March 29, alleges violation of articles 6 and 7 of the contract.
Article 7 relates to return travel and is not an issue herein. Relative to article 6, the grievance
states: “The Employer is not placing all available loads on the dispatch board.” The settlement
desired is stated as “all loads to be placed on the board asap . . . all drivers shall be [made]
whole for all losses when not allow[ed] to pick from all available loads.”
Duvall replied to Anderson by email on April 5:
Boysen,
The Company is in receipt of your class action grievance alleging violation of Article 6-
Master Dispatch Procedure and Article 7-Return Travel.
The Company respectfully disagrees with your allegations and states that the Company
is in compliance with the provisions of Article 6-Master Dispatch Procedure as well as
the provision of Article 7-Return Travel.
Further, concerning your allegations regarding Article 20, Section 1, the Company
denies that it has intentionally ignored any of the provisions of the National Master
Agreement.
It is respectfully suggested that we set up a meeting to see if we can resolve what is an
obvious difference of opinion as to the meaning and/or interpretation of the
aforementioned Articles. If we are not able to agree then the matter should be submitted
to the grievance procedure for determination as set forth and required by Article 20,
Section 1.
Anderson replied by email on April 5 stating, in pertinent part:
Your e-mail misstates several facts . . . . This is to advise you that the Union rejects your
contention and claim. . . . [T]he Union met with you several times on these issues. You
choose to intentionally ignore the Agreement. In short, the Union believes another
meeting on these issues will be none [sic] productive and will proceed with it’s course of
actions to correct the contract breach.
On April 12, the Union made an information request of the Company requesting
identification of all units dispatched to TruckMovers and IronTiger drivers, respectively, for the
last 6 months, the persons responsible for dispatching TruckMovers drivers and the persons
responsible for dispatching IronTiger drivers, and documentation “to support why these units
were dispatched to TruckMovers drivers” and documentation “to support why these units were
dispatched to IronTiger drivers.”
On May 7, the Company responded in a 29 page document that gave the units
dispatched to TruckMovers and IronTiger drivers, respectively, and the names of the individuals
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responsible for dispatching. Don Houk of TruckMovers was identified as the individual
responsible for dispatching TruckMovers drivers. Dispatchers at the respective IronTiger
terminals were identified as the individuals responsible for dispatching IronTiger drivers. In
response to the request for documentation, the response explained that the assignments are
“[d]one by system assignment not though email or other written communication.”
I note that the information request sought the identification of the persons responsible for
dispatching. It did not seek identification of the persons responsible for assignment of the loads
to specific carriers. As already noted, TruckMovers made those assignments. Dispatching
drivers occurred after the assignments were made.
The Union, on May 11, sent another information request as follows:
After reviewing the information you provided, the Union is requesting additional
information. Please provide the following information:
a) Please provide the name for each TruckMovers driver dispatched on the referenced
unit(s) outlined in your paragraph No. 1.
b) Please provide the destination and mileage for each unit(s) dispatched to
TruckMovers drivers in you paragraph No. 1.
c) Please identify Don Houk primary employer.
d) Please provide Don Houk job title.
e) Please provide the name(s) of the person who authorize[d] Don Houk to dispatch the
referenced unit(s) outlined in your paragraph No. 1 to TruckMovers drivers.
f) Please provide in details the “System Assignment” you referenced in your
paragraphs 4 and 8.
g) Provide all e-mails, transcripts, faxes, telecommunications and other documentation
from your customers(s) to support the units in your paragraph No. 1 be dispatched to
Truckmovers drivers.
h) Please provide the name for each IronTiger driver dispatched on the referenced
unit(s) outlined in your paragraph No. 5.
i) Please provide the destination and mileage for each unit(s) dispatched to IronTiger
drivers in you paragraph No. 5.
j) Provide all e-mails, transcripts, faxes, telecommunications and other documentation
from your customers(s) to support the units in your paragraph No. 5 be dispatched to
IronTiger drivers.
IronTiger did not respond to the foregoing request. On July 15, the Union filed the
charge herein alleging that IronTiger had failed and refused to provide information since April
12. On July 30, the Union repeated its request of May 11. On September 27, the Union
withdrew its charge insofar as it related to the April 12 information request to which IronTiger
had responded. Also, on September 27, IronTiger, by attorney Tom Jones, responded by email
to the May 11 request.
The response by Jones initially notes that the letter of agreement provides that “loads
not appearing on the IronTiger Logistics drivers’ kiosk are not IronTiger loads.” It then
addresses the individual requests and points out that the information relating to TruckMovers
drivers relates to nonunit employees and is irrelevant. It confirms, as stated in the May 7
response, that Don Houk is employed by TruckMovers. The response, as did the May 7
response to the April 12 request, explains that there is no paperwork, that assignments are
made through a computerized system. Relative to the request for information relating to unit
employees, i.e., the name of each IronTiger driver dispatched to deliver the units listed in the
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May 7 response and the destination and mileage related to those units, Jones requested that
the Union explain the relevance insofar as the work had been performed by IronTiger drivers.
He points out that there were over 10,500 units involved and that the request was “harassment,
burdensome, and irrelevant.” Jones closes by pointing out that IronTiger had requested that the
parties meet in its April 5 response to the grievance and that the request had been refused. He
again offered to meet.
On October 12, Anderson responded by email. His response states that the letter of
agreement “has nothing to do with the Union’s request for information.” It raises a claim that
loads had been removed from the IronTiger kiosk and asserts that the information sought
relating to TruckMovers drivers is relevant because “in the past the Company removed loads
from the IronTiger board and dispatch[ed] such loads to non-union drivers.” Although Anderson
asserted that the information relating to IronTiger drivers assigned the units and the destination
and mileage related to those units was relevant “in order to investigate the appropriate
grievances,” no grievance relating to removal of loads had been filed and the Union had made
no complaint or filed any grievance relating to improper payment to IronTiger drivers for loads
that they had delivered. Anderson’s October 12 response does not address the claim of
harassment or burdensomeness, nor does it respond to the offer to meet.
IronTiger had, on March 30, 2009, settled a grievance relating to the removal of loads
from the IronTiger dispatch kiosk. The brief of the General Counsel refers to testimony by
Anderson that he received reports that loads had been removed from the IronTiger kiosk.
Insofar as any driver was aware that a load had been removed, the driver would be able to
identify the load that was removed, and, as in 2009, an appropriate grievance could be filed.
Whether the reports Anderson received were accurate is immaterial insofar as neither the
March 29, 2010, grievance nor the information request relates to removal of loads.
In subsequent communications, the Union continued to assert that the contract had been
violated, and IronTiger continued to deny any violation of the contract. IronTiger continued to
seek a meeting, but the Union did not agree to meet.
Notwithstanding its contention that IronTiger was violating the collective-bargaining
agreement, the Union, as of May 13, contended that there was no contract at Springfield, Ohio,
or Garland, Texas. On May 13, in a telephone conversation, Anderson informed IronTigers’s
attorney, Tom Jones, that IronTiger did not have a collective-bargaining agreement with the
Union at Springfield or Garland. On May 18, Jones sent an email to Anderson confirming the
May 13 conversation and seeking further information relating to the position of the Union.
Anderson responded by email on May 21 stating that “we have not [sic] agreements at the
Garland, Texas, and Springfield, Ohio, locations.”
IronTiger filed a charge, Case 16–CB–8084, against the Union. That charge resulted in a
complaint being issued against the Union. As already noted, that case was consolidated with
the case herein. Thereafter, Case 16–CB–8084 settled, and those allegations were withdrawn.
C. Analysis and Concluding Findings
The complaint herein issued on December 22, after the Respondent’s September 27
response. It alleges that the failure to timely furnish information “necessary for, and relevant to,
the Union’s performance of its duties” as the representative of the unit employees violated
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. As established by emails on March 15 and 16, 2011, following
conference calls in this proceeding, the Union confirmed that the Respondent had sufficiently
responded to its information request. At the hearing, counsel for the General Counsel confirmed
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that the only issue before me is “unlawful delay in furnishing requested information.”
The General Counsel argues that the information sought was relevant and that, even if it
was not, the Respondent was obligated to respond to the request of the Union.
The Respondent contends that the information sought was not relevant. Both the April
12 and the May 11 requests related to the March 29 grievance that IronTiger had not placed “all
available loads on the dispatch board.” No other grievance was pending. The grievance does
not assert that any loads had been removed from the IronTiger kiosk. The Union did not
mention removal of loads until its letter of October 12. The letter of agreement states that “loads
not appearing on the IronTiger Logistics drivers’ kiosk are not IronTiger loads.”
At the hearing herein, counsel for IronTiger questioned Anderson regarding the May 13
contention of the Union that the parties had no contract. Notwithstanding the Union’s contention
that there was no contract, Anderson claimed that the March 29 grievance had not been
forfeited by the failure of the Union to seek further processing of the grievance after IronTiger’s
April 5 response. It is unnecessary to address the foregoing conflicting contentions insofar as
there is no allegation relating to the grievance, only the information request.
I agree with the Respondent that the information sought in the May 11 request was not
relevant. The information relating to the identification of the TruckMovers driver assigned to
each load as well as the destination and distance of each load related to nonunit employees and
was not presumptively relevant. The request regarding the individual IronTiger drivers assigned
to each IronTiger load was presumptively relevant insofar as the request related to unit
employees. Although presumptively relevant, the information concerning the assignment,
destination, and miles driven by the drivers assigned to the IronTiger loads was unrelated to the
grievance relating to failure to place all loads on the IronTiger kiosk. Duvall explained that a
driver assigned a shorter trip would not necessarily earn less because that driver would be able
to return sooner and be available for another dispatch. The Union had made no complaint, filed
no grievance, or made any claim that any IronTiger drivers were improperly paid. The
information relating to assigned driver, destination, and distance was not relevant.
Duvall testified that the Respondent did not respond to the May 11 information request
because it was “nothing more than harassment.” He explained that, on March 24, IronTiger had
refused to reinstate an employee. Anderson informed him that, if IronTiger wanted “labor
peace,” the employee needed to be reinstated and that, if he was not reinstated, Anderson
would “make your [Duvall’s] life hell.” The brief of the Respondent makes several references to
the foregoing comment which Anderson did not deny making. Although Duvall considered the
May 11 information request to be harassment, as the brief of counsel for the General Counsel
points out, the exchange of emails on March 16 relative to placing all loads on the board was
before the March 24 meeting. The position of the Union had been stated prior to Anderson’s
March 24 comments. The Respondent fulfilled the Union’s April 12 information request and
made no claim of harassment with regard to that request.
Anderson recalled meeting with attorney Jones regarding an unrelated matter on May
12, the day after the May 11 information request and the day before he asserted that there was
no contract at Garland or Springfield. In casual conversation, Anderson recalled that Jones
referred to the information request, stating that Anderson was “asking for a lot of bullshit.”
Anderson recalls answering, “Yes I am, but I need it.” He claims that Jones stated that he would
be responding, but no response was received until September 27. Anderson’s agreement that
the information sought was “bullshit,” absent an explanation regarding why the information was
needed, confirms my finding that the information requested was irrelevant.
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Notwithstanding my finding that the information sought in the May 11 request was not
relevant, I agree with the General Counsel that an employer may not ignore a union’s request
for information. Information relating to unit employees is presumptively relevant. “It is well
established that when a union makes a request for relevant information, the employer has a
duty to supply the information in a timely fashion or to adequately explain why the information
was not furnished.” Beverly California Corp., 326 NLRB 153, 157 (1998). The Union requested
information relating to unit employees. The Respondent was obligated to inform the Union in a
timely manner that it would not provide the information and the reasons for its refusal.
An employer cannot simply ignore a union’s information request. See Daimler Chrysler
Corp., 331 NLRB 1324, 1329 (2000); Interstate Food Processing, 283 NLRB 303, 304 at fn. 9
(1987). The Respondent herein was obligated to inform the Union in a timely manner of the
reasons that it did not believe that the information sought was relevant. “[A]n employer must
respond to a union's requests for relevant information within a reasonable time, either by
complying with it or by stating its reason for noncompliance within a reasonable period of time.
Failure to make either response in a reasonable time is, by itself, a violation of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act. Some kind of response or reaction is mandatory.” Columbia University, 298
NLRB 941, 945 (1990), citing Ellsworth Sheet Metal, 232 NLRB 109 (1977). [Emphasis added.]
The September 27 response, more than 4 months after the May 11 request, was not made in a
timely manner. The Respondent’s brief does not address the foregoing precedent.
Although the Respondent did not violate the Act by failing to provide the irrelevant
information requested by the Union on May 11, I find that, by not providing a timely response to
the Union's May 11 information request, the Respondent failed and refused to bargain in good
faith with the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
Conclusions of Law
By failing to respond to the May 11, 2011, information request of the Union in a timely
manner, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent will be ordered to post and email an appropriate notice.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended2
ORDER
The Respondent, IronTiger Logistics, Inc., Kansas City, Missouri, its officers, agents,

2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations,
the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the
Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all
purposes.
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successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to respond to information requests made by International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO, in a timely manner.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facilities in Garland, Texas;
Springfield, Ohio; Macungie, Pennsylvania; and Dublin, Virginia, copies of the attached notice
marked Appendix.3 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
16 after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet
or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by
the Respondent at any time since May 11, 2010.
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges
violations of the Act not specifically found.
Dated, Washington, D.C., May 6, 2011.
_____________________
George Carson II
Administrative Law Judge

3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the
notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
JD(ATL)–14–11
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board had found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to respond to information requests made by International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO, in a timely manner.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
IRONTIGER LOGISTICS, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
819 Taylor Street, Room 8A24, Fort Worth, TX 76102-6178
(817) 978-2921, Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (817) 978-2925.