Ira Wein, Complainant,v.Christopher Cox, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 15, 2005
01a45371r (E.E.O.C. Dec. 15, 2005)

01a45371r

12-15-2005

Ira Wein, Complainant, v. Christopher Cox, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, Agency.


Ira Wein,

Complainant,

v.

Christopher Cox,

Chairman,

Securities and Exchange Commission,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A45371

Agency No. 040404

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final

decision (FAD) dated July 29, 2004, finding that it was in compliance with

the terms of the April 20, 2004 settlement agreement into which the parties

entered. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402; 29 C.F.R. �1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R.

� 1614.405.

The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:

1a The SEC agrees that complainant will receive full and fair

consideration for any SEC vacancy for which he applies,

including managerial positions in connection with the

reorganization of the Office of Economic Analysis (OEA).

1j The SEC agrees that office reassignments will be fair and

transparent, and will be based on the reorganization of the OEA

[Office of Economic Analysis]. Office reassignments will be

made concurrent with the selection of managerial economics.

By letter to the agency dated June 22, 2004, complainant alleged that the

agency was in breach of the settlement agreement. Specifically,

complainant alleged that his supervisor breached provision 1j by "tampering

with the process used for the distribution of offices." Complainant

alleged that his supervisor came to him and asked him if he would switch to

the office next to the one he had chosen to move so that a co-worker could

keep her office, although the co-worker was ranked lower than complainant

on an office assignment list. Complainant further alleged that his

supervisor pressured another employee to take an office he did not want so

that his friend could have the office the co-worker wanted to occupy and

attempted to influence the office selection process so that another friend

could keep his window office. During the investigation of complainant's

breach claim on July 6, 2004, complainant further raised his concern that

he had not been selected for the position of Supervisory Financial Analyst.

Complainant stated that his supervisor informed him that he was certified

for the position and the vacancy had been cancelled. Complainant alleged

that a friend of his supervisor's has been pre-selected for the position,

in violation of provision 1a.

In its July 29, 2004 FAD, the agency concluded that it did not breach the

agreement. The FAD concluded that a certification was never given for the

Supervisory Financial Analyst position, and complainant was given full and

fair consideration for the position. The FAD further concluded that while

complainant's supervisor requested that he change his office selection, he

assigned complainant to his office choice after complainant indicated he

did not want to change his selection. The FAD also concluded that

complainant's co-worker was also given the option to keep his original

office space selection when the supervisor discussed office assignments

with him. The FAD found that the office selection process was fair and

transparent.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at

any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties. The

Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a contract

between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules of contract

construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense, EEOC Request

No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further held that it

is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, not some

unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.

Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795

(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard

to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally relied

on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states that if the

writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must

be determined from the four corners of the instrument without resort to

extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Building

Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

Generally, the adequacy or fairness of the consideration in a settlement

agreement is not at issue, as long as some legal detriment is incurred as

part of the bargain. However, when one of the contracting parties incurs

no legal detriment, the settlement agreement will be set aside for lack of

consideration. See MacNair v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No.

01964653 (July 1, 1997); Juhola v. Department of the Army, EEOC Appeal No.

01934032 (June 30, 1994) (citing Terracina v. Department of Health and

Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05910888 (March 11, 1992).

In provision 1a, the agency agreed that complainant would receive full and

fair consideration for any SEC vacancy for which he applies. We find that

the term "fair" is too vague to be enforced. See Johnson v. United States

Postal Service, Appeal No. 01A21576 (June 17, 2003)(ethereal provisions

regarding fair treatment of employees are too vague to allow a

determination as to whether the agency has complied with such an

agreement). We also find that by agreeing to give complainant full and

fair consideration for a job vacancy, the agency was merely agreeing to

provide complainant nothing more than that which he was already entitled to

receive as an employee. We note that this provision is not the same as a

provision that promises complainant a particular position or even priority

consideration, which would contain sufficient consideration to bind the

agency to a particular course of action that it would not otherwise be

obligated to undertake. Similarly, in provision 1j, the agency promised

that office assignments would be fair and transparent and based on the

reorganization of the OEA. Again, the term "fair" is too vague to enforce,

as is the term "transparent" which is not defined by the agreement's terms.

Moreover, there is no indication in the record that basing official

assignments on the reorganization of the OEA obligated the agency to do

something that it was not already obligated to do apart from the settlement

agreement. Accordingly, we find that provisions 1a and 1j are void and

unenforceable. Because portions of the remainder of the settlement

agreement contain adequate consideration,[1] we find that the settlement

agreement is hereby reformed without provisions 1a and 1j.

We further note that matters contained in complainant's breach claim

arguably also allege that he was subjected to further acts of

discrimination. EEO Regulations provide that allegations that subsequent

acts of discrimination violate a settlement agreement shall be processed as

separate complaints, not as breach claims. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(c).

Therefore, we find that if complainant has not already done so, he should

contact an EEO counselor to pursue these matters within 45 days after the

date this decision becomes final.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final decision for the

reasons set forth in this decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case

if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous

interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29

C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and

arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C.

20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider

shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of

the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604.

The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other

party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in

very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head or

department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case

in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and

not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file

a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action

will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The

grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court.

Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your

time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil

action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph

above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_December 15, 2005_____________

Date

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[1] We note that the agency agreed to pay complainant a lump sum of

$10,000.00 in provision 1h and $3,600.00 in attorney's fees in provision

1i. However, provision 1d's guarantee that complainant will not be

subjected to retaliation only obligated the agency to do what it is already

obligated to do by law, and therefore does not contain adequate

consideration.