Ira Wein, Complainant,v.Christopher Cox, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 15, 2005
01A45371 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 15, 2005)

01A45371

12-15-2005

Ira Wein, Complainant, v. Christopher Cox, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, Agency.


Ira Wein,

Complainant,

v.

Christopher Cox,

Chairman,

Securities and Exchange Commission,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A45371

Agency No. 040404

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final

decision (FAD) dated July 29, 2004, finding that it was in compliance

with the terms of the April 20, 2004 settlement agreement into which

the parties entered. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402; 29 C.F.R. �1614.504(b);

and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:

1a The SEC agrees that complainant will receive full and fair

consideration for any SEC vacancy for which he applies, including

managerial positions in connection with the reorganization of the Office

of Economic Analysis (OEA).

1j The SEC agrees that office reassignments will be fair and

transparent, and will be based on the reorganization of the OEA [Office

of Economic Analysis]. Office reassignments will be made concurrent

with the selection of managerial economics.

By letter to the agency dated June 22, 2004, complainant alleged that

the agency was in breach of the settlement agreement. Specifically,

complainant alleged that his supervisor breached provision 1j by

"tampering with the process used for the distribution of offices."

Complainant alleged that his supervisor came to him and asked him if

he would switch to the office next to the one he had chosen to move

so that a co-worker could keep her office, although the co-worker was

ranked lower than complainant on an office assignment list. Complainant

further alleged that his supervisor pressured another employee to take

an office he did not want so that his friend could have the office

the co-worker wanted to occupy and attempted to influence the office

selection process so that another friend could keep his window office.

During the investigation of complainant's breach claim on July 6, 2004,

complainant further raised his concern that he had not been selected for

the position of Supervisory Financial Analyst. Complainant stated that

his supervisor informed him that he was certified for the position and

the vacancy had been cancelled. Complainant alleged that a friend of

his supervisor's has been pre-selected for the position, in violation

of provision 1a.

In its July 29, 2004 FAD, the agency concluded that it did not breach

the agreement. The FAD concluded that a certification was never given

for the Supervisory Financial Analyst position, and complainant was

given full and fair consideration for the position. The FAD further

concluded that while complainant's supervisor requested that he change

his office selection, he assigned complainant to his office choice

after complainant indicated he did not want to change his selection.

The FAD also concluded that complainant's co-worker was also given the

option to keep his original office space selection when the supervisor

discussed office assignments with him. The FAD found that the office

selection process was fair and transparent.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at

any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.

The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a

contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules

of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,

EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further

held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,

not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.

Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795

(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard

to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally

relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states

that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,

its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument

without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery

Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

Generally, the adequacy or fairness of the consideration in a settlement

agreement is not at issue, as long as some legal detriment is incurred

as part of the bargain. However, when one of the contracting parties

incurs no legal detriment, the settlement agreement will be set aside

for lack of consideration. See MacNair v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC

Appeal No. 01964653 (July 1, 1997); Juhola v. Department of the Army,

EEOC Appeal No. 01934032 (June 30, 1994) (citing Terracina v. Department

of Health and Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05910888 (March 11, 1992).

In provision 1a, the agency agreed that complainant would receive full

and fair consideration for any SEC vacancy for which he applies. We find

that the term "fair" is too vague to be enforced. See Johnson v. United

States Postal Service, Appeal No. 01A21576 (June 17, 2003)(ethereal

provisions regarding fair treatment of employees are too vague to allow

a determination as to whether the agency has complied with such an

agreement). We also find that by agreeing to give complainant full and

fair consideration for a job vacancy, the agency was merely agreeing to

provide complainant nothing more than that which he was already entitled

to receive as an employee. We note that this provision is not the same

as a provision that promises complainant a particular position or even

priority consideration, which would contain sufficient consideration

to bind the agency to a particular course of action that it would not

otherwise be obligated to undertake. Similarly, in provision 1j, the

agency promised that office assignments would be fair and transparent and

based on the reorganization of the OEA. Again, the term "fair" is too

vague to enforce, as is the term "transparent" which is not defined by the

agreement's terms. Moreover, there is no indication in the record that

basing official assignments on the reorganization of the OEA obligated

the agency to do something that it was not already obligated to do apart

from the settlement agreement. Accordingly, we find that provisions 1a

and 1j are void and unenforceable. Because portions of the remainder of

the settlement agreement contain adequate consideration,1 we find that the

settlement agreement is hereby reformed without provisions 1a and 1j.

We further note that matters contained in complainant's breach

claim arguably also allege that he was subjected to further acts

of discrimination. EEO Regulations provide that allegations that

subsequent acts of discrimination violate a settlement agreement shall

be processed as separate complaints, not as breach claims. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.504(c). Therefore, we find that if complainant has not already done

so, he should contact an EEO counselor to pursue these matters within

45 days after the date this decision becomes final.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final decision for the

reasons set forth in this decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous

interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact

on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your

time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil

action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph

above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_December 15, 2005_____________

Date

1 We note that the agency agreed to pay complainant a lump sum

of $10,000.00 in provision 1h and $3,600.00 in attorney's fees in

provision 1i. However, provision 1d's guarantee that complainant will

not be subjected to retaliation only obligated the agency to do what

it is already obligated to do by law, and therefore does not contain

adequate consideration.

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01A45371

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 0036

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01A45371