INTERTAPE POLYMER GROUP

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Feb 20, 2013

11-CA-077869 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 20, 2013)

JD(ATL)–04–13
Columbia, SC
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
ATLANTA BRANCH OFFICE
INTERTAPE POLYMER CORP.
and CASES 11-CA-77869
11-CA-78827
UNITED STEEL, PAPER & FORESTRY, 10-CA-80133
RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, 11-RC-76776
ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE
WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION,
AFL-CIO-CLC
Jasper Brown, Esq.,
for the Acting General Counsel.
Michael D. Carrouth and Reyburn W. Lominack, III, Esqs.
(Fisher & Phillips, LLP), for the Respondent.
Benjamin Brandon, Organizer
(United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing,
Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International
Union, AFL-CIO-CLC), for the Charging Party.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
ROBERT A. RINGLER, Administrative Law Judge. These cases were heard in Columbia,
South Carolina, from October 9 to 12, 2012.1 The underlying charges were filed by the United
Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers
International Union, AFL–CIO–CLC (the Union). The resulting complaint alleged that Intertape
Polymer Corp. (IPG or the Respondent) violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor
Relations Act (the Act) by, inter alia: interrogating employees; making threats; engaging in
surveillance; confiscating Union literature; withholding overtime from Wilton Dantzler; and firing
Johnnie Thames. The Union also filed objections to an April representation election, which were
based upon the same record and, thus, heard simultaneously.
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after

1 All dates herein are in 2012, unless otherwise stated.
JD(ATL)–04–13
2
thoroughly considering the parties’ briefs,2 I make the following:
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction5
At all material times, IPG, a corporation, with a Columbia, South Carolina plant (the
plant), has manufactured tape. Annually, it purchases and receives goods valued in excess of
$50,000 at the plant directly from points outside of South Carolina. Thus, it admits, and I find,
that it is an employer engaged in commerce, within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the 10
Act. It also admits, and I find, that the Union is a labor organization, within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
15
A. Introduction
IPG has owned the plant since 1998, where it employs roughly 320 workers. The plant is
led by Operations Manager Don Hoffman, who is aided by Human Resources Manager Sandra
Rivers. Hoffman reports to Senior Vice-President of Administration Burge Hilldreth, who works 20
at IPG’s Bradenton, Florida headquarters.
B. Petition and Election
On March 16, the Union filed a petition seeking to represent the plant’s production and 25
maintenance employees. (GC Exh. 2). On April 26 and 27, Region 11 of the National Labor
Relations Board (the Board) conducted a secret-ballot election in this bargaining unit (the unit):
All full-time and regular part-time production and maintenance employees,
including converting operators, converting technicians, coating operators, 30
environmental operators, maintenance technicians, stockroom coordinator, mixing
operators, quality assurance technicians, shipping/receiving/warehouse operators
and lead operators employed by [Intertape at the plant] . . . ; but excluding all office
clericals, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.3
35
(GC Exhs. 3, 5). The Union lost this election,4 and filed several objections. (GC Exhs. 4–6).
C. Pre-Election Activities
1. Captive Audience Meetings40
Prior to the election, IPG held several captive audience meetings, where Hoffman and
Hilldreth spoke. Counsel for the Acting General Counsel (the GC) averred that many of their

2 The Union did not file a post-hearing brief.
3 There were roughly 250 employees in the unit.
4 The Tally of Ballots revealed 97 employees voting for, and 142 against, unionization. (GC Exh. 5).
JD(ATL)–04–13
3
strike-related comments were unlawful. (GC Exh. 1).
a. February 13
The testimony covering this meeting is mostly undisputed. Donnie Mack recalled Hoffman 5
stating that IPG did not need a third party and was disappointed. Rivers testified that Hoffman
read a prepared speech to employees. (R. Exh. 6). Regarding strikes, his speech provided that, “in
a union operation, you can have problems with . . . work stoppages . . . . [y]ou need to understand
how a strike could affect . . . your job, and . . . family . . . .” (Id.).
10
b. February 21 and 22
Rebecca Dunlop testified that Hoffman and Rivers spoke at this meeting. She recounted
Hoffman stating that, “the Union could cause us to go on strike and that if we go on strike, that we
would not get paid . . . [and were not] guaranteed to have our jobs.” (Tr. 184). 15
Rivers testified that she and Hoffman made power point presentations to employees, which
were read verbatim. (R. Exh. 7). Concerning strikes, their presentation provided:
Since January 2000, the Steelworkers have called 254 strikes . . . .20
We hope that we never have a strike at IPG . . . .
Because most contracts last about 3 years, employees could face another strike
before even recovering what was lost [by going on a 49 day strike] . . . .25
A strike could affect our ability to maintain business relationships . . . .
Steelworkers Strike in Brantford, Ontario
ï‚· In August 2008, the Steelworkers called its members out on strike.30
ï‚· In March 2011, IPG was forced to close the Brantford plant for business
reasons.
o The plant was not closed to punish employees because of the strike.
o The plant was not closed because it was union.
ï‚· Having the Steelworkers did not guarantee higher pay and benefits and did 35
not guarantee job security. . . .
(Id.) (emphasis as in original). Hoffman reiterated that he read his prepared speech verbatim.
Given that Dunlop testified that Hoffman stated that the Union would prompt a strike and 40
cause job losses, and Rivers testified otherwise, I must resolve this factual dispute. For several
reasons, I credit Rivers, who was honest, cooperative, and consistent, with a strong recall. Her
testimony was supported by documentary evidence and Hoffman. Dunlop, on the other hand, had
a poor recall, and retreated from portions of her testimony during cross-examination.
45
JD(ATL)–04–13
4
c. March 25 and 26
Dantzler testified that, on March 26, he attended a meeting, where Hilldreth stated:
[H]e . . . will be conducting the negotiation with the Union . . . . [and] didn’t have 5
to negotiate . . . [and] could cause a lockout. And that if we thought we were going
to make $5 more an hour . . . , we could all get on the bus and go to California.
(Tr. 66). Mack testified that Hilldreth said that, “if [we] … wanted . . . [to] be paid a higher cost
of living . . . get on the bus to California.” (Tr. 141). Shirley Gladden recalled Hilldreth saying 10
that, if employees want to make more money, they should “catch a bus and go to California.”
Faith Epps recounted Hilldreth announcing that employees could not expect to the make the same
wages as California workers. Richard Dupree related that Hilldreth said that, “if the employees
were to go on strike, that we would get replaced by temporary workers . . . . [and] we can be
permanently replaced.” (Tr. 173–174). Joseph Pearson reported that Hilldreth stated that, if 15
employees struck, they would be replaced.
Rivers testified that Hilldreth and Hoffman spoke. She recalled Hilldreth commenting that
California’s labor market mandated higher wages and, if employees wanted higher wages, they
could work there. She denied that he said that employees would be permanently replaced, if they 20
struck. She added that the presentations flowed from power point slides, which did not discuss
strikes or threaten discharge. (R. Exh. 8).
Hilldreth testified that the Union deceptively contrasted IPG’s South Carolina wages to
costlier labor markets, which prompted him to discuss California. He denied stating that, if 25
employees struck, they would be replaced, or mentioning a lockout. He admitted that he mainly
followed the power point slides, but, did not read this material “word for word.” Regarding
California, he recalled stating:
[W]hen we negotiate . . . with the Union . . . we're looking at . . . the competitive 30
landscape for labor in that market, because you have to attract and retain qualified
employees, so you've got to pay a decent wage . . . . And I said, if you're being told
that the Union has contracts elsewhere that are paying much higher rates . . . , you
need to ask them where they are, and I said I'll give you an example. If you're in
California, . . . the hourly rates are . . . higher . . . , but so is the cost of your home 35
and . . . other things . . . . So if you want that, you have to get on a bus and go to
California and work, because that's where that rate is . . . .
(Tr. 650–651).
40
Hoffman testified that he read his portion of the power point slides verbatim. He denied
stating that workers would be replaced during a strike. Daryl Hinton, a machine operator, stated
that neither Hoffman nor Hilldreth stated that employees would be replaced, if the Union struck.
Although it is essentially undisputed that Hilldreth told employees that, if they wanted a 45
raise, they could get on a bus and go to California, there is a significant factual dispute concerning
JD(ATL)–04–13
5
his other comments, which must be resolved. Specifically, the GC’s witnesses collectively stated
that Hilldreth said that he didn’t have to negotiate with the Union, could cause a lockout and IPG
would replace employees, while Hilldreth broadly denied such comments. For several reasons, I
credit the GC’s witnesses. I found Hilldreth to be less than credible; his demeanor suggested a
disdain for the Board’s processes. He appeared cagey, self-serving, and argumentative on cross. 5
He also acknowledged that he did not read the slides in verbatim manner, which makes it plausible
that his ad-libs yielded the contested commentary. Although I found Rivers to be mostly credible,
even she admitted that Hilldreth ran astray of the slides. On the contrary, many of the GC’s
witnesses were credible. Epps was clear, consistent, and honest, while Dupree was believable and
even-keeled. Although it’s a closer call, Dantzler was also more credible than Hilldreth. 10
d. April 9 and 11
Joseph Pearson testified that, on April 9, he attended a meeting, where Production Manager
Harry Plexico and Hoffman spoke. He recalled them stating that, if employees struck, they would 15
be replaced.
Rivers said that Hoffman and Plexico made power point presentations on April 9 and 11.
(R. Exh. 10). She denied hearing them tell workers that, if they struck, they would be replaced.
The slides discussed unfair labor practice charges filed against the Union and strike fund 20
procedures. (Id.). Hoffman and Plexico testified that they made a verbatim reading of the slides.
Given that Pearson stated that employees were told that, if they struck, they would be
replaced, and Plexico, Rivers, and Hoffman stated otherwise, I must make a credibility resolution.
For several reasons, I credit Rivers over Pearson. As noted, she was a highly credible witness, 25
whose testimony was consistent with Plexico, Hoffman, and documentary evidence. (R. Exh. 10).
e. Other April Meetings5
The testimony covering these meetings was essentially undisputed.6 Rivers testified that, 30
in April, over 2 consecutive days, Hoffman made another scripted power point presentation.
(R. Exh. 9). Concerning strikes, this presentation provided:
USW Strikes
ï‚· I am not predicting that we would ever have a strike at IPG . . . . 35
ï‚· However, strikes are a real part of the collective bargaining process . . . .
IPS’s Recent Experiences with Steelworkers Strike in Brantford, Ontario
ï‚· In August 2008, the Steelworkers called its members out on strike.
ï‚· IPG continued to operate the plant with replacements workers.40
ï‚· In March 2011, IPG . . . close[d] the Branford plant for business reasons.
o The plant was not closed to punish [striking] employees . . . .

5 The parties did not specify the dates of these meetings, beyond agreeing that such meetings occurred in April.
6 The GC did not proffer any witnesses, who discussed this meeting.
JD(ATL)–04–13
6
Questions/Answers on Strikes
ï‚· Q: How often do the Steelworkers go on strike?
ï‚· A: Since January 2000, the Steelworkers have called 254 strikes . . . .
(R. Exh. 9). She stated that Hoffman did not threaten permanent replacement or discharge. 5
Hoffman reiterated that his comments were limited to a verbatim reading of the power point slides.
2. February Conversation Involving Williams and Thames7
Thames stated that, in February, he and Supervisor Bill Williams had this exchange:10
[H]e was asking me what I think about the Union, and said that . . . it can hurt you,
and so I didn’t respond to him. I just walked away.
(Tr. 251) (grammar as in original). Williams denied this discussion. (Tr. 690). 15
I credit Thames over Williams. Thames offered a detailed account and had a strong recall
of this discussion. It is probable that Williams, a lower level supervisor, was curious about
Thames’ Union sentiments at this nascent campaign stage and unaware that such queries might be
unlawful. Williams’ testimony on this issue was not persuasive; he solely offered a general denial.20
3. February 16—Robinson’s Overtime Comments
Dantzler stated that, on February 16, he attended a meeting, which was interrupted by
Supervisor Leon Robinson, who summoned him to his office. He recounted this exchange:25
[H]e said that he thought I was taking a break. And I told him, no . . . I wasn’t . . . .
[H]e just told me that due to my . . . activities8 that my overtime was cut. . . .
(Tr. 58). Robinson denied this statement.30
In this credibility dispute, I credit Robinson, who was open, cooperative, consistent, and
helpful. Dantzler was not credible; he was less than candid, and seemed mainly motivated to
advocate his overtime case, rather than aiding the proceeding. For example, although he rattled
off the dates that he allegedly missed overtime and who was absent on such dates, he was unable 35
to produce notes supporting his assertions, even though he claimed that he initially prepared notes.
He, instead, explained that he discarded his notes, once he committed these matters to memory.
His inexplicable decision to destroy probative evidence deeply devalued his testimony.
4. Mid-March—Plexico’s Comments to Dantzler40
Dantzler testified that, in mid-March, Plexico said, “this Union activity is going to get you
all in trouble.” (Tr. 62). On cross-examination, he admitted, however, that Plexico added that: he

7 The parties did not specify the exact date of this discussion.
8 Dantzler initially testified that Robinson said “Union activities,” but then changed his testimony to “activities”
only, although he averred that he was implying “Union activities.” (Tr. 58).
JD(ATL)–04–13
7
could talk to employees outside of work areas; he needed to stay in his assigned area during work
time; and he was warning him because he did not want him to get into trouble. (Tr. 109).
Plexico testified that in March, Ira Radin, Manager, told him that Dantzler was seen talking
to rubber department employees, without a work-related reason to be in the area. Plexico stated 5
that he later told Dantzler that he should not visit departments, which were not required by his job.
He denied raising his Union activity and stated that he previously advised him that he could solicit
outside of work hours, or in non-work areas. Dennis Webber testified that Dantzler approached
him in the rubber department during working hours and encouraged him to support the Union,
without a business-related reason to visit his work station.10
I credit Plexico over Dantzler, who, as explained, was less than credible. Plexico was
candid and straightforward; his testimony was plausible and corroborated by Webber.
5. March and April—Disposal of Union Flyers in the Break Area15
a. IPG’s Solicitation and Distribution Rule
At all material times, IPG has maintained the following rule:
20
Solicitation by employees is prohibited when the person soliciting or the person
being solicited is on working time. Working time is the time employees are
expected to be working and does not include breaks, meals, before the shift starts,
and after the shift ends.
25
Distribution by employees during working time, as defined above, is prohibited.
Distribution by employees in working areas is prohibited at all times.
(GC Exh. 1). 30
b. GC’s Position
i. March 22
35
Epps testified that, on March 22, she left Union flyers in the break room, which is 35 feet
from her work station. She stated that, upon returning to her work station, she observed Williams
enter the break room and linger for 5 minutes. She said that, immediately after he departed, she
re-entered the break room and noted that her flyers were missing. She stated that, before the
campaign began, literature (e.g. newspapers, magazines, etc.) left in the break room remained 40
untouched until, minimally, the end of the workday.
ii. March 23
Epps stated that, on March 23, she left Union flyers on the break room counter. She stated 45
that, while returning to work, she saw Williams enter the break room and discard her flyers.
JD(ATL)–04–13
8
iii. March 29
Epps testified that, on March 29, she observed another coworker leave Union flyers in the
break room. She stated that, when she later observed that these flyers had been thrown away, she
retrieved the flyers and replaced them on the counter. She stated that, upon returning to work, she 5
saw Williams collect the flyers, and that, thereafter, they remained missing.
iv. April 23
John Jordan said that, on April 23, after distributing Union literature in the break room, 10
Supervisor Chuck Becknell advised him that he could no longer pass out such materials. He stated
that he retrieved his literature and told Becknell that this directive was unlawful.
c. IPG’s Response
15
Williams testified that he regularly cleans the break area and, consequently, removes
Union literature in the process. He added that he also discards newspapers, soda cans, and other
refuse. He stated that he normally cleans the break room, after break periods. Moran testified that
supervisors normally assist the cleaning crew by cleaning up break rooms.
20
Becknell testified that, on April 24, Jordan told him to ask Hoffman why IPG was
discarding Union materials. He stated that Jordan never accused him of removing Union flyers.
He denied banning,9 or confiscating, such materials. On cross-examination, however, he admitted
to periodically removing Union flyers from the break area. (Tr. 476).
25
d. Credibility Resolution
For several reasons, I credit Epps’ testimony that: (1) Williams entered the break room
after she left on March 22, 23 and 29, and discarded Union flyers; and (2) prior to the Union’s
organizing drive, reading material was left in the break area, until, at least, the end of the workday. 30
First, concerning demeanor, Epps was open, candid, and keenly committed to relaying truthful
testimony. She was consistent, with a strong recall. Second, her testimony was corroborated by
Jordan’s credible testimony that Becknell banned him from leaving out Union literature.10 Third,
Williams, who did not deny inadvertently disposing of Union materials, implausibly stated that his
actions were an accidental byproduct of his commitment to break room tidiness. I find it 35
unbelievable that his actions were unintentional and that it was mere coincidence that his clean
sweeps of the break area aligned with Epps leaving out Union materials. Lastly, I found Becknell
to be a less than credible witness.11
6. April 24 and 25—Leafleting at the Plant Gate40
These facts are mostly undisputed. Dantzler and others distributed Union literature to

9 Michelle Diamond, who reportedly observed this conversation, said that Becknell never told Jordan that he could
not leave out Union literature.
10 Jordan had a believable demeanor, strong recall and was consistent.
11 I note that he indicated on direct that he did not discard Union literature and then admitted to doing so on cross.
JD(ATL)–04–13
9
workers at the plant gate on April 24 and 25, while supervisors John Thompson, Jason Beck,
Moran, Plexico, and Michael Johnson simultaneously distributed IPG’s campaign literature in
close proximity. (R. Exhs. 11–12). On some occasions, IPG’s team arrived to leaflet first, while
on others, the Union group first appeared. Moran stated that, generally, management does not
leaflet workers at the plant gate and personnel matters are addressed at meetings. 5
D. Thames’ Discharge
1. Work Rules and Progressive Disciplinary System
10
IPG maintains a progressive disciplinary policy, which provides:
Work rules are grouped into three levels (LEVEL I, LEVEL II, and LEVEL III).
Violation[s] . . . will result in a . . . a written counseling, final written counseling, or
discharge. The level of discipline . . . depends on the seriousness of the violation, 15
whether there were single or multiple violations, the time period over which the
violations occurred, and other relevant factors. Typically, a LEVEL I work rule
violation moves 1 step within the discipline system; LEVEL II work rule violation
moves 2 steps within the system; and LEVEL III work rule violation results in a
Final Written counseling or discharge. 20
A violation of . . . LEVEL II and III work rules are . . . more serious . . . and
violations may result in immediate discharge . . . .
(GC Exh. 7). This progressive disciplinary system describes these successive steps: written 25
counseling; second written counseling; final written counseling; and discharge. (Id.).
2. Prior Discipline Issued to Thames
On December 21, 2011, Thames received a second written counseling for:30
Creating a disturbance . . . [by] arguing with supervisor . . . . [and] lack of
application on the job . . . .
(R. Exh. 1). 35

3. Termination
On March 6 (i.e. less than 3 months from the second written counseling), Thames was
fired for “sleeping while on duty,” which is a LEVEL II offense that moved him 2 steps up the 40
disciplinary ladder to the termination rung. (GC Exhs. 7, 9). His discharge form stated:
Johnny was seen sleeping in a chair upstairs by his Supervisor Bill Williams.
There was work that could have been done, boxes on lift, helping . . . etc.
45
(GC Exh. 9).
JD(ATL)–04–13
10
a. GC’s Position
Thames testified that, during his March 6 shift, he began feeling shaky due to diabetes, and
retreated to the upstairs warehouse to rest and inject insulin. (GC Exh. 16). He indicated that
Williams appeared and accused him of sleeping, which he adamantly denied.12 He averred that, at 5
this time, he was talking with Javier Suarez, a colleague, who left after Williams arrived.13 He
said that Williams returned 5 minutes later with Moran, who again asked why he was asleep.
The GC argued that Thames was fired due to his relationship with Epps, a known Union
adherent. Thames testified that he and Epps were solely workplace friends and agreed that many 10
workers socialized with her. He stated that Williams chided him about their friendship. He stated
that, although he signed a Union authorization card, IPG management did not observe this action.
He said that, beyond signing a card, he performed no Union activities. He stated that he spent
equal social time with Epps both before, and during, the campaign. (Tr. 278).
15
Epps testified that she began supporting the Union in February. She stated that she
distributed flyers, encouraged coworkers, secured 7 authorization cards, wore Union paraphernalia
and leafleted.14 She claimed that Williams knew about these activities. She noted that she
periodically socialized with Thames during work, although she conceded that she gets many daily
visitors. She added that, besides Thames, none of her other visitors were disciplined. She stated 20
Williams commented that Thames visited her before the Union campaign began. (Tr. 300).
b. IPG’s position
Rivers indicated that, although Thames denied sleeping, she ultimately credited Williams, 25
who is a trusted employee that lacked an obvious motivation to lie.15 (GC Exh. 10; R. Exh. 5).
She explained that, because Thames had a preexisting second written counseling, his current
discipline, a LEVEL II offense, resulted in him moving up two steps on the disciplinary ladder and
being fired. She added that employees are consistently issued LEVEL II violations for sleeping on
the job. She stated that, although it would have been preferable to have multiple witnesses to 30
Thames’ misconduct, a single witness did not preclude the issuance of discipline.16
Williams testified that, on March 6, after discovering Thames asleep, he summoned Moran
to act as a witness. He averred that he chose not to immediately awaken Thames because he was
concerned about a potentially aggressive reaction. He noted that, when he returned with Moran, 35
Thames was already awake. He denied Thames raising his diabetes, knowing that Thames or
Epps supported the Union, or ever thinking that they were more than workplace acquaintances.

12 He admitted that Williams observed him seated with his hands clasped behind his head.
13 On cross-examination, however, he agreed that he contrarily stated in his sworn affidavit that Suarez remained,
after Williams arrived. (Tr. 272).
14 She admitted that several employees secured more authorization cards than she did.
15 She averred that, although Suarez did not observe Thames asleep, he was not present at all relevant times.
16 Jennifer Lucas, Converting Supervisor, testified that she disciplined Marvin Johnson for sleeping on the job,
without a second witness. Dantzler opined that employees cannot be disciplined for sleeping on the job, without
second witnesses; this less than credible opinion, however, was based upon conjecture and inconsistent with
IPG’s personnel rules, which do not expressly require corroborating witnesses. (GC Exh. 7).
JD(ATL)–04–13
11
Moran testified that Williams approached her and reported that Thames was asleep. She
said that she saw him seated with his hands clasped behind his head, but, not asleep.
c. Past Discipline Issued For Sleeping on the Job
5
This chart summarizes past discipline issued at the plant for sleep-related offenses:
Name Date Incident LEVEL
II
Discipline in Last Yr. Discipline Issued
M. Johnson Sep. 8, 2006 Sleeping on duty Yes n/a 2nd Written
F. Mason Jan. 15, 2008 Sleeping on duty Yes Level 1 – failure to call in Final Written
D. Wilson Apr. 1, 2008 Sleeping on duty Yes Level 1 – wasting materials Final Written
D. White May 13, 2008 Sleeping on duty, and
other violations
Yes n/a Discharge (all
violations)
E. Gadson Nov. 13, 2008 Sleeping on duty Yes n/a 2nd Written
R. Vinson Mar. 2, 2009 Sleeping on duty Yes n/a 2nd Written
E. Bradley Sep. 1, 2010 Sleeping on duty Yes Level 1 – wasting materials Final Written
S. Wingard Jan. 31, 2011 Sleeping in duty Yes Level 1 – not wearing
safety glasses17
Final Written
M. Johnson Nov. 29, 2011 Sleeping on duty Yes n/a 2nd Written
D. Wilson May 18, 2012 Sleeping on duty Yes n/a 2nd Written
(R. Exh. 2; GC Exhs. 11, 12, 18).
10
d. Credibility Resolution
Given that Thames denied sleeping and Williams testified otherwise, this key factual
dispute must be resolved. For several reasons, I credit Williams. Regarding demeanor, Thames
appeared to be a strong advocate on direct, but, less than helpful on cross. His testimony was 15
inconsistent with his sworn affidavit, where he claimed that Suarez was present, when Moran
arrived. Moreover, the GC’s conspicuous and unexplained failure to call Suarez greatly decreases
Thames’ credibility.18 It is also implausible that, if Williams concocted Thames being asleep, he
would have summoned Moran to witness a fictitious event.
20
E. Dantzler’s Overtime Issues
1. GC’s Position
Dantzler, a hazardous waste handler, who services the coating, mixing, solvent recovery, 25
and latex departments, testified that he previously worked 3 to 4 hours of daily overtime. He
noted that this overtime covered absences and workload increases. He said that, in January, he
initiated the Union’s campaign; he reported that he collected 50 Union authorization cards,
leafleted, campaigned in the break area, and wore Union insignia.
30
Dantzler testified that, on February 17, he and Odell Harris, mixing department lead,

17 He received the level 1 safety violation at the same time that he received the level 2 sleeping on duty violation.
18 Suarez, a key witness, could have independently and persuasively confirmed Thames’ denial.
JD(ATL)–04–13
12
discussed overtime. He related that Harris told him that Supervisor Cam Dornauer said that he
was to be assigned “absolutely no overtime unless there were two men out.”19 (Tr. 59–60). He
stated that he promptly followed-up on this matter with Dornauer and recounted this exchange:
I just asked him why I couldn’t get more overtime in the mixing department. And 5
he said that two people had to be out in order for me to get overtime . . . . He
responded that that was for nobody else, just for me.
(Tr. 60). He related that he was formerly offered overtime on a “man-for-man” basis, which meant
that, if a single worker was absent, overtime was offered. He stated that he was, consequently, not 10
assigned overtime until early September. He stated that, although he asked why he was being
singled out, Dornauer refused to explain.
Dantzler contended that he should have been assigned overtime on March 11 and 18,
April 18 to 20, and May 12 and 20. He testified that two employees were absent on each of these 15
dates, and identified several absent workers, whose absences were posted.20 (Tr. 74). He
conceded, on cross examination, that, in September 2011, IPG went from 12-hour shifts to 8-hour
shifts, which reduced overtime. (Tr. 98).
2. IPG’s Position20
Dornauer testified that he and Robinson supervised Dantzler. He noted that, in February,
IPG sought to control overtime due to decreased business. See (R. Exhs. 18–19). He stated that
there is no policy, which bans overtime unless 2 employees are absent, and denied announcing this
rule to Dantzler. He explained that overtime is only a function of workload demands. 25
Leon Robinson, a former supervisor in coating, latex, and mixing, testified that he
supervised Dantzler until his April 29 retirement. He confirmed that, in early 2012, IPG
prioritized controlling overtime costs, which decreased everyone’s overtime. He denied retaliating
against Dantzler because of his Union activities.30
Plexico,21 Dantzler’s second-level supervisor, testified that Dantzler historically worked
overtime in coating and mixing. He stated that, in September 2011, business declined sharply and
overtime was cut.22 See (R. Exh. 14). On September 22, 2011, he, accordingly, sent this email to
his first-level supervisors:35
Everyone is aware that we are working schedules of reduced hours in Saturation,
Coating and Mixing . . . . I do not understand how we can have overtime when we
are working four or five day work weeks. If we need overtime please let me know
as timely as possible. . . . We have to get something accomplished if I allow them 40
to work when we do not have a schedule to make anything . . . .

19 Harris was not alleged to be a supervisor; this testimony was, accordingly, not received for its truth.
20 He stated that he created a list of the absent employees, which was never produced. (Tr. 78). He inexplicably
stated that he discarded this list, after committing it to memory. (Tr. 92, 107).
21 He oversees the mixing, latex, adhesive coating, and paper adhesive coating departments.
22 He stated that, at this time, production employees consequently went from a 7-day to a 5-day schedule.
JD(ATL)–04–13
13
(R. Exh. 15). He stated that Dantzler, who previously worked significant overtime, was greatly
impacted by these changes. In February,23 he then sent out this ongoing overtime missive:
We should only have scheduled OT. If we have a need for more than that, you 5
(SUPERVISORS) need to be the one to solicit for it and I need to know about it.
(R. Exh. 16).
Robert Powell, Master Scheduler, agreed that product demand sunk in February, and that 10
he struggled to avoid having idle staff. He estimated that this dilemma began in December 2011.
Harris, a lead, testified that, in early 2012, overtime shrunk. William Roach, a forklift driver,
testified that he had typically worked overtime in mixing, before overtime ended in February.
IPG’s records demonstrated that, between December 3 and 18, 2011, Dantzler worked 15
51.79 hours of overtime. (R. Exh. 21). Between January 14 and February 12, he worked 56.11
hours of overtime. (Id.). No subsequent records of his overtime were submitted by IPG or the
GC.24
3. Credibility Resolutions20
As a threshold matter, it appears to be undisputed that: overtime opportunities decreased in
late 2011; overtime continued to decrease into early 2012; and this decrease was prompted by a
drop in business. Several IPG witnesses provided unrebutted testimony about these matters, and
IPG provided corroborative documentary evidence. 25
I do not credit Dantzler’s testimony that he should have been assigned overtime on
March 11 and 18, April 18 to 20, and May 12 and 20 due to absences. As noted, regarding
demeanor, he was less than candid; it is also suspect that he destroyed the very same notes that
would have corroborated this testimony. It is noteworthy that the GC neglected to produce any 30
personnel records, which corroborated his claim that 2 employees were absent on each of these
dates.25 Finally, the GC failed to show that someone else actually worked overtime on these dates,
or that they were inappropriately assigned overtime over Dantzler (i.e. it was not their turn).26
Lastly, I do not credit Dantzler’s claim that Dornauer told him that he was solely subject to 35
a specialized overtime rule requiring 2 employees to be absent in order for him to get overtime. I
credit Dornauer’s denial; he was a straightforward, consistent and possessed a solid recall.

23 He indicated that, at this time, he was unaware of any Union activity at the plant.
24 Cf. ((R. Exh. 17) (showing that planned overtime was subsequently offered in various departments, but,
neglecting to identify the affected employees).
25 The GC’s unexplained failure to produce these records suggests that the records would not have been supportive.
26 The GC similarly neglected to produce pay records (i.e. Dantzler’s pay checks), which would have corroborated
that his claim that he received no overtime through September. The GC also failed to produce records showing
that his coworkers worked greater overtime, or did so when it was not their fair turn. Dantzler’s overtime
allegations, as a result, rested almost entirely upon his uncorroborated statements, which should have been
supplemented by documentary evidence. These conspicuous omissions undercut his testimony about these issues.
JD(ATL)–04–13
14
III. Analysis
A. Section 8(a)(1)
1. Interrogation275
IPG, by Williams, unlawfully interrogated Thames about his Union activities.
In Westwood Healthcare Center, 330 NLRB 935 (2000), the Board held that these factors
determine whether an interrogation is unlawful:
10
(1) The background, i.e. is there a history of employer hostility and
discrimination?
(2) The nature of the information sought, e.g., did the interrogator appear to be
seeking information on which to base taking action against individual
employees?15
(3) The identity of the questioner, i.e. how high was he in the company
hierarchy?
(4) Place and method of interrogation, e.g. was employee called from work to
the boss’s office? Was there an atmosphere of unnatural formality?
(5) Truthfulness of the reply.20
Id. at 939. In applying these factors, however, the Board concluded that:
In the final analysis, our task is to determine whether under all the circumstances
the questioning at issue would reasonably tend to coerce the employee at whom it 25
is directed so that he or she would feel restrained from exercising rights protected
by Section 7 of the Act.
Id. at 940.
30
In February, Williams approached Thames, his direct subordinate, in the plant; he asked
him what he thought about the Union and told him that it could hurt him. This query was
unlawful; it was coercive, and reasonably designed to restrain Section 7 activity.
2. Captive Audience Meeting Threats2835
a. Strike-related Comments
IPG’s strike-related comments were lawful. The GC asserted that IPG unlawfully
threatened employees with replacement during a strike, if they unionized. The contested 40
comments were made by Hoffman and Hilldreth at captive audience meetings.
An employer can lawfully inform employees that they are subject to permanent
replacement, in the event of a strike. Eagle Comtronics, 263 NLRB 515, 516 ( 1982). It need not

27 These allegations are listed under pars. 7 and 16 of the complaint.
28 These allegations are listed under pars. 8 and 16 of the complaint.
JD(ATL)–04–13
15
fully explain the Act's protections for replaced strikers. Superior Emerald Park Landfill, LLC, 340
NLRB 449, 462 (2003). Where its statements about permanent replacements, however, make
specific references to job loss, such statements are generally unlawful since they convey that
employees will be terminated.29 Wild Oats Market, 344 NLRB 717, 740 (2005).
5
In the instant case, IPG lawfully told employees about: strikes being a part of collective-
bargaining; the Union’s strike record and strike fund procedures; and a recent strike involving IPG
and the Union. See Novi American, Inc., 309 NLRB 544 (1992) (finding statement about possible
strike lawful). Similarly, IPG lawfully told employees that they were subject to permanent
replacement, if they struck, and did not suggest that their Laidlaw rights would terminate. See 10
Eagle Comtronics, Inc., 263 NLRB 515, 516 (1981).
b. Lockouts and Futility of Bargaining
IPG unlawfully told employees that unionizing was futile and would trigger a lockout. The 15
Board has held that, barring outright threats to refuse to bargain in good faith with a union, the
legality of any particular statement depends upon its context. Somerset Welding & Steel, Inc., 314
NLRB 829, 832 (1994). Statements made in a coercive context are unlawful because they, "leave
employees with the impression that what they may ultimately receive depends upon what the
union can induce the employer to restore." Earthgrains Co., 336 NLRB 1119, 1119–1120 (2001); 20
see, e.g., Smithfield Foods, 347 NLRB 1225, 1230 (2006) (statement from highest official that
company was in complete control of future negotiations was unlawful); Aqua Cool, 332 NLRB
95, 95 (2000) (statement that employees were unlikely to win anything more at the bargaining
table than other employees unlawfully implied that unionizing would be futile).
25
Hilldreth commented that unionizing and collective bargaining would be futile. He added
that he did not have to negotiate with the Union and would prompt a lockout. He announced that,
if employees wanted a raise that IPG unilaterally deemed to exceed local labor market conditions,
they should move to California and seek it there. These statements, in totality, conveyed that
Hilldreth, who identified himself as a key player at the bargaining table, would irrespective of the 30
Union’s proposals and contrary positions: not bargain over wages that he independently deemed
unreasonable; force the Union’s hand via a lockout; and unilaterally set wages in accordance with
IPG’s assessment of the local labor market. He drove this point home by drawing an analogy to
California, and effectively said, if you don’t like it, board a Greyhound to California. These
statements, when taken as a whole, conveyed that unionizing would be futile. 35
3. Threats to Reduce Overtime30
IPG, by Robinson, did not threaten employees with lost overtime. I did not credit
Dantzler’s testimony that Robinson threatened to cut his overtime because of his Union activities. 40

29 Such comments contradict employees’ Laidlaw rights. Laidlaw, 171 NLRB 1366 (1968) (permanently replaced
strikers, who have made unconditional return to work offers, receive full reinstatement once replacements depart).
30 These allegations are listed under pars. 9 and 16 of the complaint.
JD(ATL)–04–13
16
4. Unspecified Reprisals31
IPG, by Plexico, did not threaten employees with unspecified reprisals. I did not credit
Dantzler’s testimony that Plexico told him that “this Union activity is going to get you all in
trouble.” Plexico solely told him to cease soliciting in departments outside of the scope of his 5
assignment during working hours.
5. Confiscation of Union Materials32
IPG unlawfully confiscated Union literature from the break areas. Employees generally 10
have the right to possess union materials at work, absent evidence that their employer restricts
possession of other personal items, or that possession of union materials interferes with production
or discipline. Brooklyn Hospital-Caledonian Hospital, 302 NLRB 785, 785 fn. 3 (1991). An
employer, accordingly, violates the Act by confiscating union materials from its employees.
Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC, 357 NLRB No. 136 (2011). Given that IPG’s rules expressly 15
permit solicitation and distribution during “breaks, before the shift starts, and after the shift ends,”
Williams’ repeated confiscation of Epps’ Union materials from the break area was unlawful.33
6. Surveillance34
20
IPG engaged in unlawful surveillance. An employer unlawfully “surveils employees
engaged in Section 7 activity by observing them in a way that is ‘out of the ordinary’ and thereby
coercive.” Aladdin Gaming LLC, 345 NLRB 585, 586 (2005). Indicia of coerciveness, include
the “duration of the observation, the employer’s distance from employees while observing them,
and whether the employer engaged in other coercive behavior during its observation.” Id. On 25
April 24 and 25, management simultaneously leafleted at the plant gate in close proximity to the
Union’s supporters, only days before the election. From its post, management was free to observe
who accepted a Union leaflet or interacted with its supporters. This scenario was unusual,
inasmuch as management typically communicated in meetings and there was no evidence of any
pre-campaign leafleting. This arrangement, as a result, constituted unlawful surveillance. 30
B. Section 8(a)(3)35
IPG did not violate Section 8(a)(3). The GC alleged that IPG violated Section 8(a)(3) by
terminating Thames and reducing Dantzler’s overtime opportunities. 35
1. Legal Framework
The framework described in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), sets forth the appropriate standard:40

31 These allegations are listed under pars. 10 and 16 of the complaint.
32 These allegations are listed under pars. 12 and 16 of the complaint.
33 See Seton Co., 332 NLRB 979, 992 (2000) (an employer who disparately enforces or applies rules against
employees based on the employees' support or opposition towards a union violates the Act).
34 These allegations are listed under pars. 13 and 16 of the complaint.
35 These allegations are listed under pars. 14, 15, and 17 of the complaint.
JD(ATL)–04–13
17
Under that test, the General Counsel must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that union animus was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse
employment action. The elements commonly required to support such a showing
are union or protected concerted activity by the employee, employer knowledge of 5
that activity, and union animus on the part of the employer.
If the General Counsel makes the required initial showing, the burden then shifts to
the employer to prove, as an affirmative defense, that it would have taken the same
action even in the absence of the employee's union activity. To establish this 10
affirmative defense, “[a]n employer cannot simply present a legitimate reason for
its action but must persuade by a preponderance of the evidence that the same
action would have taken place even in the absence of the protected activity.”
Consolidated Bus Transit, 350 NLRB 1064, 1065–1066 (2007) (citations omitted).15
If the employer’s proffered defenses are found to be a pretextual (i.e., the reasons given for
its actions are either false or not relied upon), it fails by definition to show that it would have taken
the same action for those reasons, and there is no need to perform the second part of the Wright
Line analysis. Further analysis, however, is required if the defense is one of “dual motivation,”20
that is, the employer defends that, even if an invalid reason might have played some part in its
motivation, it would have taken the same action against the employee for permissible reasons.
Palace Sports & Entertainment, Inc. v. NLRB, 411 F.3d 212, 223 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
2. Thames’ Discharge25
a. Prima Facie Case
The GC made a prima facie Wright Line showing that Thames’ discharge violated Section
8(a)(3). He had limited Union activity; he signed a card and associated with Epps, a Union 30
adherent. Concerning knowledge, Williams observed and commented upon his relationship with
Epps.36 Lastly, there is evidence of Union animus, which can be gleaned from the unlawful
threats, surveillance, and interrogation violations found herein.
b. Affirmative Defense35
IPG demonstrated that it would have taken the same action against Thames for permissible
reasons. First, he was guilty of the underlying offense. He was caught sleeping on the job, a
LEVEL II offense. Second, IPG’s rules expressly provided for his discharge; his LEVEL II
offense moved him 2 steps up the disciplinary ladder and placed him at the termination level. 40
Third, other employees, who were caught sleeping, were consistently issued LEVEL II offenses,
and comparably moved 2 steps up the disciplinary ladder. Fourth, the GC’s attempt to link
Thames’ discharge to his relationship with Epps is tenuous, at best, inasmuch as it is undisputed

36 Knowledge is based upon the assumption that Williams knew about Epps’ Union activities, which, at the time of
Thames’ discharge, was debatable. I will, however, give the GC the benefit of the doubt on this issue, and move
forward with the Wright Line analysis.
JD(ATL)–04–13
18
that: Epps is a popular worker, who is visited by many others throughout the workday; none of her
other visitors were disciplined; Thames visited Epps in a consistent manner before, and during, the
campaign; and Epps, who only obtained 7 Union authorization cards in a 250-person unit, was
admittedly a lesser player in the Union’s organizing drive than many others.37 Under these
circumstances, IPG demonstrated that it consistently disciplined an employee, who violated its 5
rules, irrespective of his limited Union activities and tenuous connection to a Union adherent.
3. Dantzler’s Overtime
a. Prima Facie Case10
The GC made a prima facie Wright Line showing that Dantzler’s discharge violated
Section 8(a)(3). Dantzler had substantial Union activity; he initiated the campaign; collected 50
Union authorization cards; leafleted; and wore Union insignia. Concerning knowledge, IPG
minimally observed him leafleting at the plant gate. Finally, as noted, there is evidence of Union 15
animus, which can be gleaned from the Section 8(a)(1) violations found herein.
b. Affirmative Defense
IPG demonstrated that Dantzler’s overtime would have been reduced, irrespective of his 20
Union activity. First, in early 2012, business demand dropped, which decreased everyone’s
overtime. Second, the GC conspicuously failed to produce documentary evidence, which
demonstrated that Dantzler received a less than proportional share of existing overtime
opportunities.38 The GC, instead, solely relied upon Dantzler’s uncorroborated and self-serving
testimony that he lost overtime on certain dates,39 and was subject to a more rigorous overtime 25
rules than his coworkers.40 This unsupported testimony, as discussed, was simply not credible.
IV. Representation Case
The Union filed 17 objections41 to IPG’s conduct during the critical period preceding the 30
election (i.e., March 16 to April 27).42 (GC Exh. 4). Some objections mirrored the complaint’s
allegations. IPG presented argument concerning these objections in its post-hearing brief.

37 The GC’s discharge theory would have been more persuasive, if centered upon someone with substantially more
Union activity than Epps, who held a more exceptional relationship with Thames.
38 Specifically, the GC failed to explain why these overtime records, which IPG clearly maintained in the normal
course of its business, were never presented. These records would have been the best evidence of Dantzler’s
overtime losses and alleged discrimination, and might have conclusively shown that his colleagues, who were not
Union activists, were receiving a disproportionately greater share of overtime opportunities. Ironically, the only
overtime records that were produced for Dantzler covered December 2011 through February 13 (see (R. Exhs.
21–22)), which preceded the February 17 onset date of his alleged overtime discrimination. In sum, the failure to
produce this critical documentary evidence deeply undercut this allegation.
39 Although Dantzler identified specific dates that he lost overtime, the GC neglected to produce any records
regarding these dates, which would have corroborated his testimony on this point (i.e. records demonstrating that
overtime was offered to someone else, or that 2 employees, as Dantzler suggested, were absent on these dates).
40 The GC similarly neglected to produce records, which supported Dantzler’s contention that his coworkers were
granted overtime, when only one person was absent.
41 At the hearing, it withdrew objections 5, 7, 11, 15, and 17. See (Tr. 322, 592, 772).
42 Ideal Electric Mfg. Co., 134 NLRB 1275 (1961) (critical period is span between petition and election dates).
JD(ATL)–04–13
19
A. Objections
1. Objections 1 and 4
Objections 1 and 4 alleged that, during the critical period, IPG engaged in surveillance. 5
Given that I have found that IPG engaged in unlawful surveillance on April 24 and 25, these
objections are valid.
2. Objection 2
10
Objection 2 alleged that, during the critical period, IPG unlawfully interrogated employees.
Although I found that Williams unlawfully interrogated Thames in February, this activity
preceded the critical period that began on March 16. Given that the Union adduced no evidence of
interrogations occurring during the critical period, this objection is invalid.
15
3. Objection 3
Objection 3 alleged that, during the critical period, IPG unlawfully issued warnings to
employees due to their Union activities. This objection focused on Thames’ discharge. It is, thus,
invalid for 2 reasons: his discharge was lawful; and his firing occurred before the critical period. 20
4. Objection 6
Objection 6 alleged that, during the critical period, IPG confiscated Union literature from
plant break areas. Given that I have found this conduct to be unlawful, this objection is valid.25
5. Objections 8–10, and 12–1443
Objections 8–10 and 12–14 alleged that, during the critical period, IPG, inter alia,
threatened “dire consequences,” and “created the impression of futility,” if employees unionized. 30
These objections focused on the captive audience meetings, which have already been considered.
Given that I that found Hilldreth’s comments to be unlawful, these objections are sustained.
6. Objection 16
35
Objection 16 alleged that, during the critical period, IPG “engaged in isolation of the
employees.” This objection focused on Plexico’s mid-March comment to Dantzler about
performing Union activities outside of his assigned area, when he was supposed to be working.
Given that Plexico’s statement was lawful, this objection is denied.
40
B. Conclusion
I find that objections 1, 4, 6, 8–10, and 12–14 are valid, and that the conduct underlying
these objections, which also violated Section 8(a)(1), prevented employees from exercising free

43 At the hearing the Union amended objection 13 to allege that, “[IPG] [a]dvised employees that they would be
permanently and forever replaced.” (Tr. 322).
JD(ATL)–04–13
20
choice during the election. I recommend, accordingly, that the election be invalidated, and that
employees be permitted to vote in a second untainted election. See General Shoe Corp.,
77 NLRB 124 (1948); IRIS U.S.A., Inc., 336 NLRB 1013 (2001); Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc.,
326 NLRB 28 (1988).
5
Conclusions of Law
1. IPG is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
10
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. IPG violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by:
a. Interrogating employees about their Union or other protected concerted 15
activities.
b. Threatening employees that, if they selected the Union as their collective-
bargaining representative, it would not negotiate, cause a lockout, and bargaining would be futile.
20
c. Confiscating Union materials and related documents from break areas.
d. Engaging in surveillance of employees’ Union or other protected concerted
activities.
25
4. The unfair labor practices set forth above affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. IPG has not otherwise violated the Act.
30
6. By the conduct cited by the Union in objections 1, 4, 6, 8–10, and 12–14, IPG has
prevented the holding of a fair election, and such conduct warrants setting aside the election held
in Case 11–RC–76776.
Remedy35
Having found that IPG committed unfair labor practices, it is ordered to cease and desist
and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
IPG must have a responsible official read the Notice to Employees to the unit during 40
working hours at a meeting or meetings, in the presence of a Board agent. A notice reading will
likely counteract the coercive impact of the instant unfair labor practices, which were, in the case
of Hilldreth’s unlawful commentary, committed by a high-ranking official. See Consec Security,
325 NLRB 453, 454–455 (1998), enfd. 185 F.3d 862 (3d Cir. 1999) (participation of high-ranking
management in ULPs magnifies the coercive effect); Mcallister Towing & Transportation Co., 45
341 NLRB 394, 400 (2004) (“[T]he public reading of the notice is an ‘effective but moderate way
to let in a warming wind of information and . . . reassurance. [citations omitted].”’). A notice
JD(ATL)–04–13
21
reading will also foster the environment required for a final election result.
IPG will distribute remedial notices electronically via email, intranet, internet, or other
appropriate electronic means to its employees, in addition to the traditional physical posting of
paper notices, if it customarily communicates with workers in this manner. See J Picini Flooring, 5
356 NLRB No. 9 (2010).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended44
10
ORDER
Intertape Polymer Corp., Columbia, South Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall
15
1. Cease and desist from
a. Interrogating employees about their Union or other protected concerted
activities.
20
b. Threatening employees that, if they selected the Union as their collective-
bargaining representative, it would not negotiate, cause a lockout, and bargaining would be futile.
c. Confiscating Union materials and related documents from break areas.
25
d. Engaging in surveillance of employees’ Union or other protected concerted
activities.
e. In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.4530
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
a. Within 14 days after service by the Region, physically post at its Columbia, 35
South Carolina facility, and electronically distribute via email, intranet, internet, or other
electronic means to its unit employees, if it customarily communicates with these workers in this
manner, who were employed by the Respondent at its Columbia, South Carolina facilities at any

44 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and
all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
45 A broad cease and desist order is merited. See Regency Grande Nursing & Rehabilitation Center,
354 NLRN 530, 531, fn. 10 (2009).
JD(ATL)–04–13
22
time since February 1, 2012, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”46 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be physically posted by the Respondent and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure 5
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during
the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy
of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any
time since February 1, 2012.10
b. Within 14 days after service by the Region, hold a meeting or meetings
during working hours, which will be scheduled to ensure the widest possible attendance of unit
employees, at which time the attached notice marked “Appendix” is to be read to employees by a
responsible official of Respondent, in the presence of a Board agent.15
c. Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director
a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
20
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Regional Director for Region 10 shall, in
Case 11–RC–076776, set aside that election result, and hold a new election at a date and time to
be determined by the Regional Director.
Dated Washington, D.C. February 20, 201325
30
_________________________________
Robert A. Ringler
Administrative Law Judge

46 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading
“Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.”
JD(ATL)–04–13
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered
us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights. Specifically:
WE WILL NOT interrogate you about your activities on behalf of the United Steel, Paper &
Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International
Union, AFL–CIO–CLC (the Union).
WE WILL NOT threaten that, if you select the Union as your collective-bargaining
representative, we will not negotiate, cause a lockout, and make bargaining futile.
WE WILL NOT confiscate Union materials and related documents from break areas.
WE WILL NOT watch your Union activities.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights set forth above.
WE WILL hold a meeting or meetings during working hours and have this notice read to you and
your fellow workers by a responsible official of our company in the presence of an agent of the
National Labor Relations Board.
INTERTAPE POLYMER CORP.
(Employer)
Dated: ________________ By: ________________________________________________
(Representative) (Title)
JD(ATL)–04–13
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor Relations
Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it investigates and
remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge
or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also
obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
233 Peachtree Street N.E., Harris Tower, Suite 1000, Atlanta, GA 30303-1531
(404) 331-2896, Hours: 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE. THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60
CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY
OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE
DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (205) 933-3013.