International Business Machines Corporation

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 16, 2022

2021000996 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 16, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/962,470 12/08/2015 Michele M. Franceschini AUS920150284US1 5514 65362 7590 03/16/2022 TERRILE, CANNATTI & CHAMBERS, LLP IBM Austin P.O. BOX 203518 AUSTIN, TX 78720 EXAMINER GARNER, CASEY R ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2123 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/16/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): USPTO@dockettrak.com tmunoz@tcciplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte MICHELE M. FRANCESCHINI, TIN KAM HO, LUIS A. LASTRAS-MONTANO, ODED SHMUELI, and LIVIO SOARES ____________ Appeal 2021-000996 Application 14/962,470 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, JEREMY J. CURCURI, and JAMES B. ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judges. ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-3, 5-10, 12-17, and 19-21, all of the pending claims. Final Act. 2.2 Appellant cancels claims 4, 11, and 18. Id. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse. 1 Appellant refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2012). Appellant identifies the real party-in-interest as International Business Machines Corporation. Appeal Br. 1. 2 In this Decision, we refer to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed July 2, 2020) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed November 23, 2020); the Examiner’s Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed January 16, 2020) and Answer (“Ans.,” mailed September 23, 2020); and the Specification (“Spec.,” filed December 8, 2015). Rather than repeat the Examiner’s findings and Appellant’s contentions in their entirety, we refer to these documents. Appeal 2021-000996 Application 14/962,470 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s claimed methods, systems, and computer program products relate to processing of inquiries to an information handling system capable of answering questions by using the cognitive power of the information handling system to generate or extract a sequence of concepts, to extract or compute therefrom a distributed representation of the concept(s) (i.e., concept vectors), and to process the distributed representation (the concept vectors) to carry out useful tasks in the domain of concepts and user-concept interaction, including navigation applications for locating information in the corpus by identifying concepts of likely interest to the user. Spec. ¶ 3; see id. ¶ 25 (“Syntactically, a ‘concept’ is a single word or a word sequence (e.g., ‘gravity’, ‘supreme court’, ‘Newton's second law’, ‘Albert Einstein’) which becomes a semantic ‘concept’ once it has been designated by a community to have a special role, namely - as representing more than just a sequence of words. In addition, a concept has many attributes: field of endeavor, origin, history, an associated body of work and/or knowledge, cultural and/or historical connotation and more.”). As noted above, claims 1-3, 5-10, 12-17, and 19-21 are pending. Claims 1, 8, and 15 are independent. Appeal Br. 9 (claim 1), 10- 11 (claim 8), 12-13 (claim 15) (Claims App.). Claims 2, 3, and 5-7 depend directly from claim 1; claims 9, 10, and 12-14 depend directly from claim 8; and claims 16, 17, and 19-21 depend directly from claim 15. Id. at 9-14. Claim 1, reproduced below with certain disputed limitations emphasized, is representative. 1. A method, in an information handling system comprising a processor and a memory, for identifying concepts, the method comprising: Appeal 2021-000996 Application 14/962,470 3 generating, by the system, at least a first concept set comprising one or more candidate concepts extracted from one or more content sources; generating, by the system, at least a second concept set comprising one or more user-explored concepts extracted from a concept navigation history for the user; generating, by the system, a first vector representation of an aggregated view of the user’s interests or knowledge by tracking the user-explored concepts that the user has browsed before a current session and modeling the user with the first vector representation of the aggregated view of the user’s interests or knowledge; generating or retrieving, by the system, a second vector representation of each candidate concept in the first concept set; performing, by the system, a natural language processing (NLP) analysis comparison of the first and second vector representations to compute a measure of similarity between each candidate concept and the first vector representation of the aggregated view of the user’s interests or knowledge; and selecting, by the system, one or more of the candidate concepts for display as recommended concepts which are related to the first vector representation of the aggregated view of the user's interests or knowledge based on the computed measure of similarity. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). Each of claims 8 and 15 recites limitations corresponding to the disputed limitations of claim 1. Id. at 10-11, 12; see Appeal Br. 1, 3. REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS The Examiner relies upon the following references: Name3 Reference Issued/Published Filed Bergh US 6,112,186 Aug. 29, 2000 Mar. 31, 1997 3 All reference citations are to the first named inventor only. Appeal 2021-000996 Application 14/962,470 4 Roseman US 2009/0150388 A1 June 11, 2009 Oct. 16, 2008 Broman US 2011/0252342 A1 Oct. 13, 2011 Apr. 7, 2010 Szucs US 2013/0204876 A1 Aug. 8, 2013 Mar. 14, 2013 Gliozzo US 2014/0229163 A1 Aug. 14, 2014 Aug. 14, 2013 Buhrmann US 2016/0232160 A1 Aug. 11, 2016 Nov. 25, 2015 The Examiner rejects: 1. claims 1, 6, 8, 13, 15, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Broman, Buhrmann, and Gliozzo (Final Act. 4-15); 2. claims 2, 9, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Broman, Buhrmann, Gliozzo, and Szucs (id. at 16-17); 3. claims 3, 5, 10, 12, 17, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Broman, Buhrmann, Gliozzo, and Bergh (id. at 17-21); and 4. claims 7, 14, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Broman, Buhrmann, Gliozzo, and Roseman (id. at 21-23). We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant, and in light of the contentions and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). Appellant and the Examiner focus their contentions and findings, respectively, on claims 1, 8, and 15; so we do as well.4 See Appeal 4 Arguments not made are forfeited. See In re Google Tech. Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“Because Google failed to present these Appeal 2021-000996 Application 14/962,470 5 Br. 1, 3, 8; Ans. 23-25. Because we determine that reversal of the rejection of independent claim 1, as well as the rejection of the other independent claims, is dispositive, except for our ultimate decision, we do not discuss the merits of the rejection of claims 2, 3, 5-7, 9, 10, 12-14, 16, 17, and 19-21 further herein. We address the rejections below. ANALYSIS Obviousness Over Broman, Buhrmann, and Gliozzo As noted above, the Examiner rejects independent claim 1 as obvious over the combined teachings of Broman, Buhrmann, and Gliozzo. Final Act. 4-7. In particular, the Examiner finds that Broman teaches or suggests a majority of the limitations recited in claim 1. Id. at 4-5 (citing Broman, Abstr., ¶ 72, Figs. 8, 13, 30).5 The Examiner finds, however: Broman does not appear to expressly teach generating or retrieving, by the system, a second vector representation of each candidate concept in the first concept set; performing, by the system, a natural language processing (NLP) analysis comparison of the first and second vector representations to compute a measure of similarity between each candidate concept and the first vector representation of the aggregated view of the user's interests or knowledge; and selecting for display based on the computed measure of similarity. Id. at 5. Nevertheless, the Examiner finds that Buhrmann teaches or suggests claim construction arguments to the Board, Google forfeited both arguments.”). 5 The Examiner finds that some of the limitations that Broman teaches or suggests also are taught or suggested by Buhrmann. Final Act. 5 (citing Buhrmann, Fig. 1B). However, those limitations are not in dispute, and we do not discuss the Examiner’s parallel reliance on Buhrmann further herein. See supra note 4. Appeal 2021-000996 Application 14/962,470 6 these missing limitations. Final Act. 5-6 (citing Buhrmann ¶¶ 16, 17, 49, 50, Figs. 1B, 3). Further, the Examiner finds a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Broman and Buhrmann to achieve these missing limitations of claim 1. Id. at 6 (citing Buhrmann ¶ 13). Although the Examiner finds, “Broman as modified by Buhrmann does not appear to expressly teach generating, by the system, a first vector representation of an aggregated view of the user’s interests or knowledge by . . . modeling the user with the first vector representation of the aggregated view of the user’s interests or knowledge,” as recited in claim 1; the Examiner finds Gliozzo teaches or suggests these missing limitations. Final Act. 7 (citing Gliozzo ¶ 31, Fig. 2). Moreover, the Examiner finds a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Broman and Buhrmann with those of Gliozzo to achieve the methods of claim 1. Id. (citing Gliozzo ¶¶ 3, 4). Appellant contends the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 1 for three reasons. Appeal Br. 3-8; see Ans. 23. For the reasons given below, we find one of these persuasive of Examiner error. 1. First Reason First, claim 1 recites “tracking the user-explored concepts that the user has browsed before a current session.” Appeal Br. 9 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). Referring to Broman’s Figure 13, the Examiner finds Broman discloses the step of “[d]etermin[ing] web pages associated with the other topics that the browser has navigated to within a predetermined amount of time.” Final Act. 5 (quoting step 1320 of Broman, Fig. 13); see also Broman, Fig. 13 (preceding step 1310 discloses “[o]btain[ing] a set of Appeal 2021-000996 Application 14/962,470 7 topics associated with the web page”). The Examiner finds that Broman’s disclosure of determining web pages navigated “within a predetermined amount of time” teaches or suggests tracking user-explored concepts browsed “before a current session.” Id. at 5. Appellant contends the Examiner fails to show that Broman teaches or suggests, “tracking the user-explored concepts that the user has browsed before a current session.” Appeal Br. 4-5 (quoting claim 1). In particular, Appellant contends, instead of disclosing user concept tracking from a previous session, Broman is quite clear in explaining that the tracking of user webpages within “a predetermined amount of time” refers to a “set number of hours, within a set number of days,” but there is no mention or suggestion made of the claim requirement for tracking user-explored concepts that were browsed “before a current session.” See, Broman, paragraph 85 (“The client-side module 125 then determines web pages associated with the other topics that the browser 118 has navigated to within a predetermined amount of time (e.g., within a set number of hours, within a set number of days, etc.) (step 1320).”) (emphasis added). Id. at 4; see Reply Br. 1. Essentially, Appellant contends that Broman’s “predetermined amount of time” is the recited “current session,” not “before a current session.” See Ans. 23 (“Appellant asserts that Broman’s discussion of a ‘predetermined amount of time’ as being equivalent to a ‘[current] session.’”). We disagree with Appellant. [The Office] applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant’s specification. Appeal 2021-000996 Application 14/962,470 8 In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Relying on a dictionary definition, the Examiner finds that an ordinary usage of the word “session” means “a period devoted to a particular activity.” Ans. 23. Therefore, the Examiner interprets “‘session’ in the context of the claim is broad enough to encompass a single sequence of a hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) request-response transaction.” Id.; see, e.g., Broman ¶ 100 (“For example, FoxSports.com supports the action ‘show athlete player profile’ with the following URL: http://msn.foxsports.com//player?statsid=.”), Fig. 8 (identifying “http://reviews.cnet.com”). This interpretation is consistent with the Specification’s disclosure that, “[i]n selected embodiments, the user may be modelled with the user’s navigation history by tracking the concepts that the user has browsed earlier (either immediately before or through a longer session).” Spec. ¶ 56 (emphasis added); see id. ¶ 85. Appellant responds that the claim terms must be interpreted, not only according to their ordinary usage and consistent with the Specification, but “as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.” Reply Br. 2 (emphasis omitted; citing In re Am. Acad of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Appellant contends, [i]n determining the “ordinary and customary meaning[”] given to the term by those of ordinary skill in the art, the [Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP)] explicitly states that it is “appropriate to look to how the claim term is used in the prior art, which includes prior art patents, published applications, trade publications, and dictionaries.” Id. Appellant also questions the Examiner’s reliance on a non-technical dictionary and, instead, cites to Wikipedia and to an on-line computer dictionary. Appeal 2021-000996 Application 14/962,470 9 Initially, the Board views Wikipedia as an untrustworthy source. See Ex parte Coward, Appeal No. 2017-000644, 2018 WL 799021, at *4 (PTAB 2018) (“Due to the constantly changing nature of Wikipedia, a citation to Wikipedia is of limited value. Moreover, Wikipedia is not considered to be a reliable source.”); Ex parte Three-Dimensional Media Group, Ltd., Appeal No. 2009-004087, 2010 WL 3017280, at *17 (BPAI 2010) (non- precedential) (“Wikipedia is generally not to be considered as trustworthy as traditional sources for several reasons, for example, because (1) it is not peer reviewed; (2) the authors are unknown; and (3) apparently anyone can contribute to the source definition”); see also Techradium, Inc. v. Blackboard Connect Inc., 2009 WL 1152985 *4 n.5 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (“The Court agrees with Blackboard that Wikipedia disclaims any validity of the content listed on its website, and is therefore not a reliable source of technical information.”). Consequently, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s contentions based on Wikipedia. With respect to the second cited definition, Appellant contends “a ‘session’ begins when a user logs in to or accesses a particular computer, network, or software service, and ends when the user logs out of the service, or shuts down the compute[r].” Reply Br. 3 (emphases added). Thus, Appellant contends accessing a service and later logging out of that service is a “session.” Cf. Gliozzo ¶ 73 (“In FIG. 8, the secondary content is not associated with the current web page. . . . In one embodiment, a user accesses this user interface via a global button in the secondary content area (and possibly from the browser chrome) at any time during the browsing session.”). We understand that this definition of session would include Appeal 2021-000996 Application 14/962,470 10 browsing a concept. See Spec. ¶¶ 56, 85.6 We are not persuaded, however, that this definition is inconsistent with the Examiner’s interpretation of “session,” in which a “session” encompasses “a single sequence of a hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) request-response transaction.” Ans. 23 (emphasis added). Moreover, Appellant contends, Broman is quite explicit in teaching that “[t]he client-side module 125 then determines web pages associated with the other topics that the browser 118 has navigated to within a predetermined amount of time (e.g., within a set number of hours, within a set number of days, etc.) (step 1320).” Broman, paragraph 85. Reply Br. 4. Thus, Appellant contends that Broman teaches or suggests a “session” lasting for “a predetermined amount of time,” namely, hours or even days. Broman discloses, however, that “[t]he server computer determines that the web page is part of a domain that the user has navigated to more than a predetermined number of times within a given period of time.” Broman, Abstr. (emphasis added); see also id. ¶¶ 4, 6, 90, 92 (describing multiple visits to (e.g., accesses of) web pages over time). Consequently, Appellant’s contention is inconsistent with Broman’s disclosure. Here, the Examiner correctly interprets the recited “current session” of claim 1 and correctly finds Broman teaches or suggests this limitation. 6 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1322-23 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (‘‘[J]udges are free to consult dictionaries and technical treatises at any time in order to better understand the underlying technology and may also rely on dictionary definitions when construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.’’) Appeal 2021-000996 Application 14/962,470 11 Appellant does not persuade us of Examiner error for this first reason. 2. Second Reason Second, claim 1 recites, “generating . . . a first vector representation of an aggregated view of the user’s interests or knowledge by tracking the user-explored concepts that the user has browsed before a current session and modeling the user with the first vector representation of the aggregated view of the user’s interests or knowledge.” Appeal Br. 9 (Claims App.). Appellant and the Examiner agree that this step requires generating a vector representation by (1) tracking the user-explored concepts and (2) modeling the user. Reply Br. 4; Ans. 24; see Appeal Br. 5. As noted above, the Examiner finds Broman teaches or suggests, “tracking the user-explored concepts that the user has browsed before a current session” (Final Act. 5 (citing Broman, Fig. 13)), and Gliozzo teaches or suggests, “generating . . . a first vector representation of an aggregated view of the user’s interests or knowledge by . . . modeling the user with the first vector representation of the aggregated view of the user’s interests or knowledge” (id. at 7 (citing Gliozzo ¶ 31, Fig. 2)). Moreover, the Examiner finds a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Broman and Buhrmann with those of Gliozzo to achieve the methods of claim 1. Id. (citing Gliozzo ¶¶ 3, 4). Appellant contends that “[c]onspicuously missing from the rejection analysis is any assertion that Broman discloses ‘generating, by the system, a first vector representation of an aggregated view of the user’s interests or knowledge by tracking the user-explored concepts that the user has browsed before a current session.’” Reply Br. 5 (emphasis added). However, the Appeal 2021-000996 Application 14/962,470 12 Examiner does not rely on Broman to teach or suggest “generating . . . a first vector representation,” and Appellant misunderstands the rejection. The Examiner finds, a combination of Broman and Gliozzo render this claim limitation obvious. Vectorization of a set of data is a very common process in the art to abstract the underlying data to a more compact representation. This is demonstrated here by Gliozzo’s teachings of vectorization as concisely shown in figure 2. . . . . Broman tracks user-explored concepts that the user has browsed before a current session by determining web pages associated with the other topics that the browser has previously navigated. (Figure 13, 1310, 1320). Gliozzo’s vectorization of the underlying data in Broman, namely the tracked user- explored concepts, would be obvious to use to modeling the user with the first vector representation of the aggregated view of the user's interests or knowledge to generate the first vector representation of the aggregated view of the user's interest or knowledge. Ans. 24 (emphases added). Thus, the Examiner finds Gliozzo teaches or suggests, “generating . . . a first vector representation,” and the combined teachings of Broman and Gliozzo to teach or suggest this limitation. See Final Act. 7. As the Examiner notes, Appellant cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually when the rejection is based on combined teachings of the references. Final Act. 2; Ans. 24; see In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Appellant does not persuade us of Examiner error for this second reason. Appeal 2021-000996 Application 14/962,470 13 3. Third Reason Third, claim 1 recites, “generating . . . a first vector representation of an aggregated view of the user’s interests or knowledge.” Appeal Br. 9 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). The Examiner finds: Broman teaches determining web pages associated with the other topics that the browser has navigated to within a predetermined amount of time (figure 13, 1310, 1320).7 Second, the assertion that the vector built in Gliozzo is not a representation of aggregated view of interests or knowledge is incorrect. The algorithm is Gliozzo takes as input a concept and neighboring concepts (i.e., a concept set), averages those concepts as vectors and builds an average of the vectors of the neighboring concepts (i.e., an aggregated view). Final Act. 3 (emphasis added); see id. at 7. Thus, the Examiner finds Gliozzo’s average of the vectors of the neighboring concepts teaches or suggests the recited “first vector representation of an aggregated view of the user’s interests or knowledge.” Appellant contends, there are key differences between the meaning of “aggregate” and “average.” See, e.g., https://www.differencebetween.com/ difference-between-aggregate-and-vs-average/ (“Aggregate and average are two terms that are often used in calculations. However, these two terms mean two different things. Aggregate refers to the total sum of elements in a data set whereas average refers to the central value in a dataset. This is the key difference between aggregate and average.”). Thus, instead of meeting the claim requirement for aggregating (e.g., combining or adding) the user-explored concept vectors into a “first vector representation of an aggregated view of the user's interests or knowledge,” Gliozzo’s vector propagation algorithm adds an average of the vectors of the neighboring concepts. 7 Steps 1310 and 1320 of Broman’s Figure 13 are quoted above. Appeal 2021-000996 Application 14/962,470 14 Appeal Br. 6; see Reply Br. 6. The Examiner responds that Appellant’s contentions are misleading because the claim recites “aggregated view,” not “aggregate.” Ans. 25. Thus, the Examiner finds the differences between “aggregate” and “average” do not distinguish the recited “aggregated view” over Gliozzo’s teachings regarding an average of vectors. In particular, the Examiner finds: Taken in this context Gliozzo’s average of the vectors falls exactly [within] the claimed vector represented “aggregate view.” The claimed vector representation of the aggregate view does not envisage a cache of every page visited complete with images, layout, and other media. Rather the vector representation is a data structure that is a type of abstracted summary of the user’s interests. That is, the claimed vector represents an “aggregated view,” not merely an “aggregation,” of the user’s interests or knowledge. In the same way, Gliozzo’s average of vectors is abstracted summary, or in other words, an “aggregated view.” Ans. 25 (emphasis added). The Examiner, however, provides no support for this interpretation of “aggregated view,” for the distinction drawn between an “aggregated view” and an “aggregation,” and for this interpretation of Gliozzo’s average of vectors. Ans. 25; see Final Act. 2-3. As Appellant correctly asserts, “the Examiner’s proposed interpretation is unsupported by any intrinsic or extrinsic evidence. Conspicuously absent from the rejection analysis is any citation of supporting claim language, specification description, prior art patents, published applications, trade publications, and dictionaries.” Reply Br. 6 (emphasis added). Consequently, the Examiner fails to show that Gliozzo teaches or suggests the limitations of claim 1 that are missing from Broman and Buhrmann, and Appellant persuades us of Examiner error for this third reason. Appeal 2021-000996 Application 14/962,470 15 These deficiencies in the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 are dispositive. Consequently, we are persuaded that the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 1, as well as independent claims 8 and 15, which recite limitations corresponding to the disputed limitations of claim 1; and we do not sustain the obviousness rejection of claims 1, 8, and 15. We also do not sustain the obviousness rejection of dependent claims 6, 13, and 20, which are not challenged separately. See Appeal Br. 8. Obviousness Over Broman, Buhrmann, Gliozzo, and Szucs, Bergh, or Roseman As noted above, Appellant rejects claims 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Broman, Buhrmann, Gliozzo, and Szucs, Bergh, or Roseman. Final Act. 16-23. Each of these claims depends directly from independent claim 1, 8, or 15. Appeal Br. 9-14 (Claims App.). The Examiner does not find that Szucs, Bergh, or Roseman teaches or suggests the limitations of claims 1, 8, and 15 that are missing from the combined teachings of Broman, Buhrmann, and Gliozzo. Consequently, because we are persuaded the Examiner errs with respect to the obviousness rejection of claims 1, 8, and 15; we also are persuaded the Examiner errs with respect to the obviousness rejections of claims 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, and 21. For this reason, we do not sustain the rejections of claims 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, and 21. DECISION 1. The Examiner errs in rejecting: a. claims 1, 6, 8, 13, 15, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Broman, Buhrmann, and Appeal 2021-000996 Application 14/962,470 16 Gliozzo; b. claims 2, 9, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Broman, Buhrmann, Gliozzo, and Szucs; c. claims 3, 5, 10, 12, 17, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Broman, Buhrmann, Gliozzo, and Bergh; and d. claims 7, 14, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Broman, Buhrmann, Gliozzo, and Roseman. 2. Thus, on this record, claims 1-3, 5-10, 12-17, and 19-21 are not unpatentable. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, we reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-3, 5-10, 12-17, and 19-21. In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 6, 8, 13, 15, 20 103 Broman, Buhrmann, Gliozzo 1, 6, 8, 13, 15, 20 2, 9, 16 103 Broman, Buhrmann, Gliozzo, Szucs 2, 9, 16 3, 5, 10, 12, 17, 19 103 Broman, Buhrmann, Gliozzo, Bergh 3, 5, 10, 12, 17, 19 7, 14, 21 103 Broman, Buhrmann, Gliozzo, Roseman 7, 14, 21 Overall Outcome 1-3, 5-10, 12-17, 19- Appeal 2021-000996 Application 14/962,470 17 21 REVERSED