International Business Machines Corporation

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 11, 2022

2021003305 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 11, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/822,811 11/27/2017 Kelly A. Argyros SVL920170084US1_8150-0935 6570 112978 7590 03/11/2022 Cuenot, Forsythe & Kim, LLC 20283 State Road 7, Suite 300 Boca Raton, FL 33498 EXAMINER WAESCO, JOSEPH M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3683 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/11/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ibmptomail@iplawpro.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte KELLY A. ARGYROS, DANIEL J. FERRANTI, FLORIAN PINEL, ANDREW S. H. TING, and JOAN W. TOMLINSON ____________ Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before NINA L. MEDLOCK, BRUCE T. WIEDER, and BRADLEY B. BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judges. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 21-35. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed February 8, 2021) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” mailed April 26, 2021), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” February 26, 2021) and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed September 8, 2020). Appellant identifies IBM Corporation as the real party in interest (Appeal Br. 1). Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 2 CLAIMED INVENTION The Specification states, “[t]he present invention relates generally to a method, system, and computer program product for real-time data management of enterprise software” and, more particularly, to “a method, system, and computer program product for dynamically determining risk assessment based on assigned protocol values of the enterprise software based on historical data” (Spec. ¶ 1). Claims 21, 26, and 31 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 21, reproduced below with bracketed notations and some paragraphing added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 21. A computer implemented method of generating a graphical user interface using an application including a historical data parser, a protocol query generator, and a protocol analyzer, comprising: [(a)] performing, using the historical data parser, natural language processing on historical event data records received from an internal database to generate parsed content; [(b)] generating, by the protocol query generator, a plurality of protocol user interface (UI) elements to be displayed in the graphical user interface and each of the protocol UI elements is assigned: a description of a protocol associated with the respective protocol UI element, an input field configured to receive the input data, a set of rules for the protocol, and a weight value for the protocol, [(c)] detecting, by the application, updated third-party records stored external to the database; [(d)] displaying the graphical user interface including the plurality of protocol UI elements; [(e)] receiving input data provided by a user via one of the plurality of protocol UI elements for a particular protocol; and Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 3 [(f)] displaying, in the graphical user interface, a dynamically updated risk assessment score based upon the input data received for the particular protocol and the set of rules and the weight value for the particular protocol, wherein the weight value for each of the protocol UI elements is generated using a first coefficient value generated by the protocol query analyzer that uses a machine learning algorithm to compare the parsed content from the historical data parser with weight value attributes provided by the protocol query generator, the weight value for each of the protocol UI elements is adjusted using a second coefficient value assigned by the protocol query analysis based upon the detected updated content retrieved from third-party data records, and the risk assessment score indicates a likelihood that an adverse event will occur as a result of violating the particular protocol. REJECTION Claims 21-35 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. ANALYSIS Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101 to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 4 Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ - i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217-18 (alteration in original). The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) published revised guidance on January 7, 2019, for use by USPTO personnel in evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”).2 That guidance revised the USPTO’s examination procedure with respect to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework by (1) “[p]roviding groupings of subject matter that [are] considered an abstract idea”; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not “directed 2 The MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) incorporates the revised guidance and subsequent updates at Section 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020). Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 5 to” a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception. Id. at 50. The first step, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e., Step 2A), is, thus, a two-prong test. In Step 2A, Prong One, we look to whether the claim recites a judicial exception, e.g., one of the following three groupings of abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions; and (3) mental processes. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If so, we next determine, in Step 2A, Prong Two, whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application, i.e., whether the additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. Id. at 54-55. Only if the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application do we conclude that the claim is “directed to” the judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea. Id. If the claim is determined to be directed to a judicial exception under revised Step 2A, we next evaluate the additional elements, individually and in combination, in Step 2B, to determine whether they provide an inventive concept, i.e., whether the additional elements or combination of elements amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself; only then, is the claim patent eligible. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Here, in rejecting the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner determined that independent claim 31, which the Examiner treated Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 6 as representative, recites organizing and tracking information, i.e., a mental process, and, therefore an abstract idea (Final Act. 8-9). The Examiner also determined that the recited abstract idea is not integrated into a practical application; that independent claim 31 does not include additional elements sufficient to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself; and that the remaining claims, including independent claims 21 and 26, are patent ineligible for substantially the same reasons (id. at 9-12). Appellant argues the pending claims as a group (Appeal Br. 8-28). We select independent claim 21 as representative. The remaining claims stand or fall with claim 21. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A) We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in determining that claim 21 is directed to an abstract idea (Appeal Br. 28-32). The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335-36. Here, it is clear from the Specification (including the claim language) that claim 21 focuses on an abstract idea, and not on an improvement to technology and/or a technical field. The Specification is titled “DETERMINING RISK ASSESSMENT BASED ON ASSIGNED PROTOCOL VALUES,” and discloses that, in Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 7 prior risk assessment software and systems, “users manually select risk ratings in each protocol that an organization needs to be in compliance” (Spec. ¶ 13). The Specification describes that a problem with this arrangement is that manual selection of risk ratings for each protocol can be inaccurate and subjective and does not sufficiently address historical event data that may have an adverse impact on the organization (id. ¶ 14 (explaining that “[t]o examine each historical event data record manually to adjust ratings assigned to the protocols, the users may be forced to review massive amounts of data not only from internal databases but also third- party external databases”)). Risk assessment software and systems also require “the capability to provide real-time results of calculations in order to allow users to address possible issues that may be raised by entering certain data into the input fields associated with the protocols” (id. ¶ 15). Yet, according to the Specification, “the presently available tools or solutions” do not address the needs of prior risk assessment software and systems or provide adequate solutions for those needs (id. ¶ 16). The claimed invention is ostensibly intended to address these deficiencies by providing a method, system, and computer program product for “dynamically determining risk assessment based on assigned protocol values of the enterprise software based on historical data” (Spec. ¶ 1). The Specification, thus, discloses that an aspect of the present invention generates a protocol user interface (“UI”) element on a graphical user interface, wherein the protocol UI element includes an input field and is assigned a weight value; the weight value is determined based on data entered into the input field of the protocol UI element, and is adjusted based on historical event data associated with a protocol corresponding to the Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 8 protocol UI element (id. ¶ 4). A risk assessment score is calculated based on the adjusted weight value and historical data, and indicates the likelihood that an adverse event will occur if the protocol is violated (id.). Consistent with this disclosure, claim 21 recites a computer implemented method of generating a graphical user interface comprising: (1) “performing . . . natural language processing on historical event data records received from an internal database to generate parsed content” (step (a)); (2) generating a plurality of protocol UI elements to be displayed in the graphical user interface, and assigning a description, input field, a set of rules, and a weight value to each protocol UI element, i.e., generating, by the protocol query generator, a plurality of protocol user interface (UI) elements to be displayed in the graphical user interface and each of the protocol UI elements is assigned: a description of a protocol associated with the respective protocol UI element, an input field configured to receive the input data, a set of rules for the protocol, and a weight value for the protocol (step (b)); (3) “detecting, by the application, updated third-party records stored external to the database” (step (c)); (4) “displaying the graphical user interface including the plurality of protocol UI elements” (step (d)); (5) “receiving input data provided by a user via one of the plurality of protocol UI elements for a particular protocol” (step (e)); and (6) displaying a dynamically updated risk assessment score for the particular protocol in the graphical user interface, the score being indicative of the likelihood that an adverse event will occur if the protocol is violated, i.e., displaying, in the graphical user interface, a dynamically updated risk assessment score based upon the input data received Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 9 for the particular protocol and the set of rules and the weight value for the particular protocol, wherein the weight value for each of the protocol UI elements is generated using a first coefficient value generated by the protocol query analyzer that uses a machine learning algorithm to compare the parsed content from the historical data parser with weight value attributes provided by the protocol query generator, the weight value for each of the protocol UI elements is adjusted using a second coefficient value assigned by the protocol query analysis based upon the detected updated content retrieved from third-party data records, and the risk assessment score indicates a likelihood that an adverse event will occur as a result of violating the particular protocol (step (f)). These limitations, when given their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite: (1) collecting information (i.e., historical event data records; a plurality of protocol user UI elements, including a description, an input field, a set of rules, and a weight value; updated third party records; and user input data); (2) analyzing the information (i.e., calculating a risk assessment score for a particular protocol based on the input data, the set of rules, and the weight value) and (3) reporting the results of the collection and analysis (i.e., displaying the risk assessment score in the graphical user interface). Claim 21 recites that the claimed steps are performed using “an application including a historical data parser, a protocol query generator, and a protocol analyzer.” Yet, we agree with the Examiner that these are all acts that could be performed by a human either mentally or manually, e.g., using pen and paper, without the use of a computer or any other machine (Final Act. 2, 8-9). As such, we agree with the Examiner that claim 21 recites a Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 10 mental process, and, therefore, an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Addressing each of steps (a) through (f) of claim 21 in turn, Appellant argues that the Examiner’s analysis of these limitations is inconsistent with the 2019 Revised Guidance (Appeal Br. 14-20). Turning first to step (a) of claim 21, Appellant, thus, asserts that the Examiner erred in determining that “performing . . . natural language processing on historical event data records received from an internal database to generate parsed content” is a mental process because “a human cannot practically perform ‘natural language processing’ (i.e., a specific type of computer processing) or perform data on computer records received [from] an internal database” (Appeal Br. 15). Appellant’s argument is not persuasive at least because the Examiner’s determination is fully consistent with a common definition of natural language processing as “the branch of computer science - and more specifically, the branch of artificial intelligence or AI-concerned with giving computers the ability to understand text and spoken words in much the same way human beings can.” See https://www.ibm.com/cloud/learn/ natural-language-processing#:~:text=Natural%20language%20 processing%20(NLP)%20refers,same%20way%20human%20beings%20can (last accessed Feb. 14, 2022). Natural language processing, as commonly understood, thus, uses a computer to perform linguistic tasks otherwise performed in the human mind, including interpreting natural language content and extracting particular information. Appellant does not disclose any particular methodology here that is used in performing the “natural language processing on historical event data records”; instead, claim 21 merely recites the desired result, i.e., Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 11 “generat[ing] parsed content.” And although Appellant summarily asserts that “a historical data parser is not a generic computer component” (Appeal Br. 15), we find nothing in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to anything in the Specification, to support that assertion. We agree with the Examiner that “performing . . . natural language processing on historical event data records received from an internal database to generate parsed content” is reasonably interpreted as reciting a concept that can performed in the human mind, i.e., a mental process and, therefore, an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Turning next to step (b) of claim 21, Appellant notes that claim 21 recites “the generation of a user interface element that includes an input field configured to receive the input data” (Appeal Br. 15). And Appellant summarily asserts that this limitation “no more recite[s] an abstract idea than the ‘receiving, via the GUI, a user selection to organize each icon,’ which was determined to be an additional element (i.e., not an abstract idea) [in] Claim 1 of Example 37” of the USPTO’s “Subject Matter Eligibility Examples: Abstract Ideas” (id.).3 Appellant ostensibly would have us characterize the receipt of a plurality of protocol UI elements as an “additional element” rather than an abstract idea.” Yet, even were we to consider “generating . . . a plurality of protocol user interface (UI) elements to be displayed in the graphical user interface” as an additional element under Step 2A, Prong Two, rather than as part of the abstract idea under Prong One, this step of receiving data for subsequent use in the claimed method merely constitutes insignificant extra 3 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 101_examples_37to42_20190107.pdf (hereinafter “Examples”). Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 12 or pre-solution activity, which, as the 2019 Revised Guidance makes clear, is not enough for patent eligibility. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (identifying “an additional element adds insignificant extra- solution activity to the judicial exception” as an example in which a judicial exception has not been integrated into a practical application). See also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610-11 (2010) (“Flook [i.e., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)] stands for the proposition that the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or adding ‘insignificant post-solution activity.”’) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981)); MPEP 2106.05(g) (“An example of pre- solution activity is a step of gathering data for use in a claimed process, e.g., a step of obtaining information about credit card transactions, which is recited as part of a claimed process of analyzing and manipulating the gathered information by a series of steps in order to detect whether the transactions were fraudulent.”). Although Appellant contends otherwise (Appeal Br. 15), step (b) also is substantially different from “receiving, via the GUI, a user selection to organize each icon based on a specific criteria, wherein the specific criteria is an amount of use of each icon,” as recited in claim 1 of Example 37 - an “additional element” that, in combination with other additional elements, recited “a specific manner of automatically displaying icons to the user based on usage which provides a specific improvement over prior systems, resulting in an improved user interface for electronic devices” and, thus, integrated the recited abstract idea, i.e., a mental process, into a practical application. Examples 2-3. Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 13 Appellant next argues that “detecting. . . updated third-party records stored external to the database,” i.e., step (c) of claim 21, “not only cannot be practically be [sic] performed in the human mind, it . . . cannot be performed in the human mind at all” (Appeal Br. 16). Yet, this step involves nothing more than collecting information, i.e., stored third-party records - a process that a human clearly could perform by, for example, reading the third-party records from an existing database (cf. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that a limitation reciting obtaining information about transactions that have used an Internet address identified with a credit card transaction can be performed by a human who simply reads records of Internet credit card transactions from a pre-existing database)), and recording that information for subsequent use mentally or using pen and paper. We also are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in determining that “displaying the graphical user interface including the plurality of protocol UI elements” and “receiving input data provided by a user via one of the plurality of protocol UI elements for a particular protocol,” i.e., steps (d) and (e) of step 21, recite abstract ideas (Appeal Br. 17-18). The Federal Circuit has consistently held that collecting and analyzing information (e.g., here, protocol UI elements and user input data), without more, is an abstract idea, and that merely presenting the results of the abstract process of collecting and analyzing information is abstract as an ancillary part of the collection and analysis. See, e.g., Elec. Power Grp. LLC v. Alstom, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “As many cases make clear, even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 14 collection and analysis other than abstract.” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1355 (citing cases)). Moreover, “[a] claim does not cease to be abstract for section 101 purposes simply because the claim confines the abstract idea to a particular technological environment in order to effectuate a real-world benefit.” In re Mohapatra, 842 F. App’x 635, 638 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Turning finally to step (f) of claim 21, Appellant argues that, even assuming for the sake of argument, that “the graphical user interface is a ‘generic computer component’ and a human being can ‘display’ a risk assessment score using pen and paper,” step (f), i.e., “displaying, in the graphical user interface, a dynamically updated risk assessment score cannot be practically be performed by a human because claim 21 requires that “the risk assessment score being displayed is ‘dynamically updated’” (Appeal Br. 18). Appellant argues that dynamically updating the risk assessment score “cannot be practically performed without the use of computer since a human cannot update and display (using pen and paper) the risk assessment score without delay” (id.). Yet, the fact that claim 21 may require a computer is not a persuasive reason to argue that the claim is not directed to an abstract idea. Indeed, a substantially similar argument was expressly rejected by the Court in Alice. Thus, although the claimed invention in Alice involved a computer system acting as a third-party intermediary between two parties, the Court held that “the claims at issue amount to ‘nothing significantly more’ than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of intermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225-26. See also In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 15 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[N]ot every claim that recites concrete, tangible components escapes the reach of the abstract-idea inquiry.”). Although “a method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101,” CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1373, it does not automatically follow that methods that arguably cannot be performed entirely in the human mind or manually, using pen and paper, are, therefore, not directed to abstract ideas. Further urging that the Examiner’s analysis of the claim limitations is inconsistent with the 2019 Revised Guidance, Appellant asserts that “‘natural language processing,’ ‘an application including a historical data parser, protocol query generator, protocol analyzer,’ [and] ‘protocol UI elements[ ]’ are not generic computer elements” and that “the claimed ‘updated third-party records stored external to the database’ and ‘a machine learning algorithm’ are also non-generic computer elements” (Appeal Br. 20). Appellant concludes, “[c]onsequently, the limitations associated with these non-generic computer elements cannot practically be performed in the human mind so as to constitute ‘mental processes’ within the meaning of the 2019 PEG” (id.). Appellant’s argument is not persuasive at least because, as described above, Appellant does not disclose any particular methodology that is used in performing the “natural language processing on historical event data records”; claim 21 merely recites the desired result, i.e., “generat[ing] parsed content,” and we find no indication in the Specification that the natural language logic being used is other than generic (see Ans. 6 (“NOWHERE in the specification is there any detail of what this NLP [i.e., natural language processing] algorithm is other than what it is used to perform.”)). Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 16 Appellant also does not disclose any particular machine learning algorithms. As the Examiner observes, “the machine learning algorithms are just that, algorithms . . ., which have NO DETAILS in the specification, other than what they are used for,” i.e., to provide a more accurate assessment of how the weight values should be adjusted (Final Act. 6 (citing Spec. ¶ 20). “The absence of any type of description as to what these algorithms may be leads to the conclusion” that these are “generic algorithm[s] used to manipulate the risk score determination” (id.). Appellant argues, as described above, that the historical data parser, protocol query generator, protocol analyzer, and protocol UI elements are not generic computer components. Yet, these elements are recited at a high level of generality; and we find nothing in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to anything in the Specification, to indicate that these elements are anything other than generic computer components. The historical data parser, protocol query generator, and protocol analyzer, for example, are described solely in terms of the functions that they perform (see, e.g., Spec. ¶ 50 (“Historical data parser 304 may perform any number of analytics algorithms . . . using data records provided by database 314.”), ¶ 53 (“Protocol query generator 306 generates a set of protocol UI elements to be displayed on graphical user interface 310.”), ¶ 54 (describing that protocol query analyzer 308 retrieves protocol-weight value attributes from protocol query generator 306; receives parsed content processed by historical data parser 304 that corresponds to the protocols as provided by protocol query generator 306; and matches the protocols with the parsed content from historical data parser 304 so that the parsed content will only affect the applicable protocols)) with no structural details - a clear Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 17 indication that these are generic components (see Ans. 6 (remarking that paragraph 50 of the Specification “shows what the [historical data] parser does, but no structure of it, and NOWHERE is anything stating what it actually is, such as hardware, software, etc., and thus is generic as this is code/software to perform the abstract limitations of the claims”). It also clearly appears from the Specification that the UI protocol elements are no more than data input fields displayed on a graphical user interface, about which the Specification provides “no real details other than stating that they are text boxes, radio buttons, etc. which are generic means to collect information” (Ans. 5 (citing Spec. ¶ 53)). Turning to Step 2A, Prong Two of the 2019 Revised Guidance, Appellant further argues that even if claim 21 recites an abstract idea, claim 21 is nonetheless patent eligible because the claim is directed to an improvement to technology (Appeal Br. 24-27). That argument is not persuasive. The 2019 Revised Guidance references MPEP, Ninth Edition (rev. Jan 2018) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/ mpep/old/mpep_E9R08-2017.htm) § 2106.05(a)-(c) and (e) in non-exhaustively listing considerations indicative that an additional element or combination of elements may have integrated a recited judicial exception into a practical application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. In particular, the Guidance describes that an additional element may have integrated the judicial exception into a practical application if, inter alia, the additional element reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer or an improvement to other technology or technical field. Id. At the same time, the Guidance makes clear that merely including instructions to Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 18 implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea; adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception; or only generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field is not sufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Id. Appellant argues here that the “claimed invention represents an improvement to risk assessment software and systems” in that it “generally address[es] and solve[s] the above-described problems and other problems related to real-time and dynamic updates of enterprise operation data in large-scale information technology (IT) systems.” (Appeal Br. 26). Appellant asserts, “[t]he benefits are provided, for example, using limitations such as ‘performing, using the historical data parser, natural language processing on historical event data records received from an internal database to generate parsed content’ (i.e., addressing historical event data)” and “‘displaying, in the graphical user interface, a dynamically updated risk assessment score’ (i.e., real-time and dynamic updates enterprise operation data).” (id.). Yet, we are not persuaded that providing an organization with an accurate reflection of its operational risks is a technical problem, as opposed to a business problem, or that performing natural language processing on historical event data records or displaying a dynamically updated risk assessment score in a graphical user interface is a technological solution where, as here, we find no indication in the Specification that the operations recited in claim 21 require any specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components, invoke any allegedly inventive programming, or that the claimed invention is Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 19 implemented using other than generic computer components as tools operating in their ordinary capacity. The Specification discloses that prior risk assessment software and systems involve the manual selection of risk ratings, which can be inaccurate and subjective, and does not sufficiently address historical event data that may have an adverse impact on the organization (id. ¶ 14). These prior risk assessment software and systems, as described in the Specification, also lack the capability to provide the real-time risk assessment calculations required for timely addressing possible issues (id. ¶¶ 15, 16). The claimed invention is ostensibly intended to obviate these deficiencies by providing a method, system, and computer program product for dynamically determining risk assessment “based on assigned protocol values of the enterprise software based on historical data” (id. ¶ 1). It, thus, clearly appears from the Specification that the focus of the claimed invention is on achieving a business objective (i.e., providing an organization with an accurate, real-time assessment of the risk associated with a particular business process/protocol), and not on any claimed means for accomplishing that goal that improves technology. We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 21 recites a mental process, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the additional elements recited in the claim beyond the abstract idea are no more than generic computer components used as tools to perform the recited abstract idea. As such, they do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223-24 (“[W]holly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 20 monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)); 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54 (identifying “an additional element adds insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception” as an example in which a judicial exception has not been integrated into a practical application). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that claim 21 is directed to an abstract idea. Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2B) Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that claim 21 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework, whether claim 21 includes additional elements or a combination of elements that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether an additional element or combination of elements adds specific limitations beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” in the field (which is indicative that an inventive concept is present) or simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Citing BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), Appellant argues that “the alleged fact that the additional elements are ‘generic’ is not enough to meet the Examiner’s burden with regard to Step 2B” (Appeal Br. 27-28). We do not disagree. Yet, it is clear from a fair reading of BASCOM that the Federal Circuit held that the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework was satisfied because the claimed invention “represents a ‘software-based invention[ ] that improve[s] the performance of the computer system itself.”’ BASCOM, Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 21 827 F.3d at 1351 (stating that like DDR Holdings, where the patent “claimed a technical solution to a problem unique to the Internet,” the patent in BASCOM claimed a “technology-based solution . . . to filter content on the Internet that overcomes existing problems with other Internet filtering systems . . . making it more dynamic and efficient”) (citations omitted). In other words, as Appellant ostensibly acknowledges, the court determined that “the claims [in BASCOM] may be read to ‘improve[ ] an existing technological process.” Id. We are not persuaded, for the reasons set forth above, that a comparable technological improvement is presented here or that BASCOM otherwise impacts the patent eligibility of claim 21. Appellant additionally argues that “the Examiner’s analysis does not meet the requirements set forth in the Berkheimer Memo dated April 19, 2018” (Appeal Br. 28). Appellant, thus, asserts, [a]s admitted by the Examiner, the claimed invention is not disclosed by the applied prior art. Consequently, the additional elements identified above, alone or in combination, are not well- understood, routine, conventional activity. Therefore, the claimed invention includes additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the alleged judicial exception (id.). That argument is not persuasive at least because Appellant misapprehends the controlling precedent. Neither a finding of novelty nor a non-obviousness determination automatically leads to the conclusion that the claimed subject matter is patent eligible. Although the second step in the Mayo/Alice framework is termed a search for an “inventive concept,” the analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or non-obviousness, but rather, a Appeal 2021-003305 Application 15/822,811 22 search for “an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217-18 (citation omitted). “Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013). A novel and non- obvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-89 (1981) (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”). We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 21, and claims 22-35, which fall with claim 21. CONCLUSION In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 21-35 101 Eligibility 21-35 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED