International Business Machines Corporation

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 28, 2020

2020003000 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 28, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/499,280 04/27/2017 Justin D. Eyster AUS920170028US1 3694
45992 7590 12/28/2020
IBM CORPORATION (JVM-AUS)
C/O LAW OFFICE OF JACK V. MUSGROVE
2911 BRIONA WOOD LANE
CEDAR PARK, TX 78613
EXAMINER
MARTINEZ BORRERO, LUIS A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3665
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/28/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JUSTIN D. EYSTER, AVERY K. ROWE,
PRIYANKA SARKAR, and CHRISTOPHER E. WHITRIDGE

____________

Appeal 2020-003000
Application 15/499,2801
Technology Center 3600

____________

Before BIBHU R. MOHANTY, BRUCE T. WIEDER, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.

WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 8–20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
International Business Machines Corporation. (Appeal Br. 2.)
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s “invention generally relates to transit, and more
particularly to a method of finding a parking space for a motor vehicle.”
(Spec. 1, ll. 6–7.)
Claims 8 and 15 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 8 is
illustrative. It recites (some paragraphing added):
8. A computing device comprising:
one or more processors which process program
instructions;
a wireless communications transceiver controlled by said
one or more processors;
a memory device connected to said one or more
processors; and
program instructions residing in said memory device for
finding a parking space for a motor vehicle by
receiving a destination,
determining a current location of the computing device,
receiving an estimated arrival time for travel from the
current location to the destination,
receiving a plurality of parking locations proximate the
destination wherein each parking location has multiple parking
spaces and an associated parking service system,
transmitting a request for parking availability with the
estimated arrival time from the wireless communications
transceiver to a plurality of the parking service systems,
receiving one or more responses from the plurality of
parking service systems wherein each response includes
predicted parking availability for the estimated arrival time at
one of the associated parking locations, and
receiving a selection of one of the parking locations whose
corresponding response indicates an available parking space
from the predicted parking availability.

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REJECTION2
Claims 8–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable in
view of Quinn (US 2008/0048885 A1, pub. Feb. 28, 2008) and Kotecha
(US 2015/0066545 A1, pub. Mar. 5, 2015).

ANALYSIS
Claims 8, 9, 15, and 16
Obviousness is a legal conclusion involving a determination of
underlying facts.
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at
issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness
or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such
secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but
unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give
light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject
matter sought to be patented.

KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (quoting Graham v.
John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)).
With regard to the scope and content of the prior art, the Examiner
finds that Kotecha “teaches transmitting a request for parking availability

2 The rejection of claims 8–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 was withdrawn.
(Answer 3.) Claims 8–20 were provisionally rejected on the ground of
nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1–7 of
copending application 15/794,422. (Final Action 8–9.) This rejection was
not appealed, and was not listed in the Answer. (See Answer 3.) It is
unclear if it is still pending. Regardless, even if the rejection is maintained,
we do not reach the issue as the claims in the 15/794,422 application are still
pending. See Ex parte Moncla, 2009-006448 (BPAI June 22, 2010).
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with the estimated arrival time from the wireless communications
transceiver to a plurality of the parking service systems represented in fig 1
where a mobile communication device transmit[s] a request for parking
availability to both parking manager A and B.” (Answer 5 (citing Kotecha
¶ 16).)
Appellant argues that Kotecha fails to teach transmitting a request
from a wireless communications transceiver to a plurality of parking service
systems and, specifically, that “Kotecha unequivocally states that the request
is sent to the parking management server 25/31; see the last sentence of
paragraph 19 of Kotecha (‘the parking management server (25, 31) receiving
a reservation request for a parking spot from a user device 13’).” (Reply
Br. 4.)
As an initial matter, we construe the claim term “transmitting a
request for parking availability with the estimated arrival time from the
wireless communications transceiver to a plurality of the parking service
systems.” Applying a broadest reasonable interpretation, we determine that
the term is not limited to direct communication to the plurality of parking
service systems. Additionally, Appellant does not direct us to, and we did
not find, a definition in the Specification for the claim term “parking service
system.” The Specification does, however, disclose that a parking location
has an associated parking service system (Spec. 4, ll. 7–8) and that parking
service systems may respond to requests for parking availability (id. at 4,
ll. 10–12). Applying a broadest reasonable interpretation, we determine that
the term includes systems for managing a parking location, such as systems
that store information on parking spots at the parking location.
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Kotecha discloses a method for providing “[p]arking guidance . . . to a
user of a mobile device requesting information on parking spots at a
requested location for a requested time.” (Kotecha Abstract.) Kotecha
discloses that a parking manager may “store information on parking spots
located in the parking garage or parking lot.” (Id. ¶ 18.) Kotecha further
discloses
mobile communication services, including data communication
services for communication between mobile user devices 13 and
servers connected to one or more packet data networks (PDNs)
23, 29. The system 10 additionally includes a plurality of
parking managers 19 each responsible for managing one or more
parking spots. The parking managers 19 communicate through
the mobile communication network 15 and the PDNs 23, 29 with
the mobile user devices 13 and a parking management server
(e.g., server 25 or 31).

(Kotecha ¶ 16; see also id. at Figs. 1, 2.) In short, Kotecha teaches
communication between a mobile user device and a plurality of parking
managers via the mobile communications network and PDNs.
In view of the above, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
finding that Kotecha “teaches transmitting a request for parking availability
. . . from the wireless communications transceiver to a plurality of the
parking service systems,” as recited in claim 8. (See Answer 5.)
Appellant argues that neither Quinn nor Kotecha “teach responses
being received from the parking service systems at the cell phone.” (Appeal
Br. 14; see also id. at 15.) Specifically with regard to Kotecha, Appellant
argues that “[t]he Parking Manager communicates with the Management
Server to provide parking space availability (step 201); the Parking Manager
never transmits any response to the User Device. It is the Management
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Server which sends the notification of matching parking spots to the User
Device (step 211).” (Id. at 15 (citing Kotecha Fig. 2).)
The Examiner finds that the parking managers of Kotecha
“communicate through the mobile communication network 15 and the
PDNs 23, 29 with the mobile user devices 13 and a parking management
server.” (Answer 5 (quoting Kotecha ¶ 16); see also Kotecha Fig. 1.)
As an initial matter, we construe the claim term “receiving one or
more responses from the plurality of parking service systems.” Applying a
broadest reasonable interpretation, we determine that the term is not limited
to receiving a response directly from the plurality of parking service
systems.
Kotecha discloses that the parking managers communicate with the
mobile user devices via the mobile communication network and the PDNs.
(Kotecha ¶ 16.) Kotecha also discloses that “[t]he user devices 13, parking
managers 19, and parking management server (e.g., server 25 or 31) are in
communication with each other through mobile communication
network 15.” (Id. ¶ 20.)
In view of the above, we are not persuaded that Kotecha fails to teach
“receiving one or more responses from the plurality of parking service
systems,” as recited in claim 8. Claim 15 is argued with claim 8 and falls
with claim 8. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Dependent claims 9 and 16
are not separately argued and fall with their respective independent claims.
See id.

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Claims 10 and 17
Claim 10 recites:
10. The computing device of claim 8 wherein said program
instructions further provide first travel directions from the
current location to the destination using the mobile computing
device, dynamically determine that the mobile computing device
is within a predefined proximity of the destination, and
responsively provide second travel directions from the current
location to the selected parking location.

Appellant argues that “destination” and “parking location” are
different and that “paragraph 41 of Kotecha is talking about ‘the location of
the selected parking spot’, not the destination.” (Reply Br. 7.) Moreover,
Appellant argues, “Kotecha never gives any example of a predefined
proximity. The only trigger in Kotecha is when the user arrives at the
parking lot.” (Id.) We do not find this argument persuasive.
Kotecha teaches that “[i]n general, the location of the selected parking
spot differs from the requested location, and the vehicle guidance device or
application may thus override a previous request for directions to the
requested location with a new request for directions to the selected or
reserved parking spot.” (Kotecha ¶ 41.) Kotecha also teaches that the user
device “provide[s] directions to guide the user to the parking lot and, upon
entering the parking lot, to the particular spot within the parking lot.” (Id.
¶ 42.) And Kotecha teaches that “[i]n response to receiving a parking
information request, parking spots having locations proximate to the
requested location and having availability at the requested time are
identified,” i.e., the parking spots are predefined as proximate the requested
location. (Id., Abstract.) In view of the above, we do not find persuasive
Appellant’s argument that entering the parking area cannot be the recited
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predefined proximity. Moreover, Kotecha teaches that a real time parking
guidance system can “be integrated with a vehicle guidance device or
application of the user.” (Id. ¶ 41.)
Additionally, dynamically providing updated travel information was
considered conventional in the field of navigation systems and would have
been obvious in view of the cited references to provide more accurate
navigation. (See Answer 8; see also Final Action 15–16.) In view of the
above, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 10.
Claim 17 is not separately argued and falls with claim 10. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

Claims 11–13 and 18–20
Claim 11 recites:
11. The computing device of claim 8 wherein the request for
parking availability includes one or more user preferences, and
said program instructions further analyze the responses from the
plurality of parking service systems using a cognitive system
based on the one or more user preferences to derive a
recommendation score for each of the responses.

Appellant argues that Quinn does not teach “using a cognitive system
based on the one or more user preferences to derive a recommendation score
for each of the responses” as recited in claim 11. (Appeal Br. 17.)
The Examiner, however, finds that “[p]aragraph 20 of Quinn shows
how user preferences are used to solve the problem of selection of parking
space.” (Answer 9.)
Quinn discloses
a system and method for maintaining a record of parking space
usage data for a plurality of parking spaces, using the usage data
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to compute probability of availability for a given space . . . and
communicating the resultant probability data . . . to an end user
who is looking for a parking space.

(Quinn, Abstract.) Quinn further discloses
provid[ing] a ranking to the user of in order to assist the user to
select an order of spaces in which to seek a vacancy. In various
embodiments the ranking can be based solely on likelihood of
availability at an [estimated time of arrival], or may include or
weigh distance/travel time information into the ranking such that
nearer spaces receive higher ranking for a given probability of
availability, for example.

(Id. ¶ 20.)
Nonetheless, we agree with Appellant that the cited portions of Quinn
fail to disclose “a cognitive system based on the one or more user
preferences to derive a recommendation score for each of the responses,” as
recited in claim 11. Quinn does recite ranking the spaces, but the ranking is
not specified as based on “user preferences.”
Therefore, we will reverse the rejection of claim 11. We will also
reverse the rejection of dependent claim 18 which contains similar language,
and the rejection of claims 12 and 13 which depend from claim 11, and
claims 19 and 20 which depend from claim 18.

Claim 14
Claim 14 recites:
14. The computing device of claim 8 wherein said program
instructions further transmit a reservation from the computing
device to the parking service system associated with the
selected parking location.

Appellant argues that “the Office Action refers to paragraph 37 of
Kotecha, but that text does not say that the reservation is transmitted from
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the cell phone to the parking system. Rather, it is transmitted to the
Management Server (not the Parking Manager).” (Appeal Br. 18.)
As an initial matter, we construe the claim term “transmit a
reservation from the computing device to the parking service system
associated with the selected parking location.” Applying a broadest
reasonable interpretation, we determine that the term is not limited to direct
communication from the computing device to the parking service system.
Kotecha discloses transmitting a parking reservation request from the
user device to the parking manager via the management server. (See
Kotecha Fig. 2.)
In view of the above, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 14.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 8–10 and 14–17 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 11–13 and 18–20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 is reversed.
Specifically:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
8–20 103 Quinn, Kotecha 8–10, 14–17 11–13,
18–20

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART