INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 29, 2020

13659349 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 29, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/659,349 10/24/2012 DAVID H. GOTZ YOR920120550US2
(533CON)
3420
49267 7590 04/29/2020
Tutunjian & Bitetto, P.C.
401 Broadhollow Road
Suite 402
Melville, NY 11747
EXAMINER
PAULSON, SHEETAL R.
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3626
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/29/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@tb-iplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DAVID H. GOTZ, PEI-YUN S. HSUEH, JIANYING HU, and
JIMENG SUN
Appeal 2019-004932
Application 13/659,349
Technology Center 3600
Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and
BRADLEY B. BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judges.
CRAWFORD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as International
Business Machines Corporation. Appeal Br. 3.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to “identifying group and individual-level risk
factors via risk-driven patient stratification.” Spec. ¶ 2. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A system for individual risk factor identification, comprising:
a selection module configured to identify common risk
factors for one or more risk targets from population data;
a clustering module configured to stratify individuals into
clusters based upon the common risk factors, wherein a distance
between each cluster represents a similarity based upon the
common risk factors, and wherein a closest pair of clusters is
iteratively merged into a single cluster until a threshold is
reached;
a ranking module configured to determine, using a
processor, a discriminability of each of the common risk factors
for a target cluster using individual data of the target cluster to
provide re-ranked common risk factors as individual risk factors
for the target cluster, such that the discriminability is a measure
of how a risk factor discriminates its cluster from other clusters;
a memory device for non-transitorily storing computer
program instructions for the selection module, the clustering
module, and the ranking module; and
at least one hardware-based care management machine,
including a processor for executing the computer program
instructions, the processor being configured to perform clinical
decision support at a point-of-care by generating a customized
healthcare plan for an individual patient, and to customize and
perform, using a personalized user interface and dashboard
display operatively coupled to the at least one hardware based
care-management machine for personalized treatment of the
individual patient based on the customized healthcare plan, the
personalized user interface and dashboard display comprising a
customized graphical user interface (GUI) configured for
customizing healthcare plans, tailored to the individual patient
based on the individual risk factors, the stratifying individuals
into clusters, and the re-ranked common risk factors, and being
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configured to provide real-time clinical decision support at a
point-of-care for the individual patient.
REJECTION
The Examiner rejects claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to a judicial exception without something more.
Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis
1–20 101 Eligibility
OPINION
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
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economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
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concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to whether
the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate
that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether
the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance.
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The Appellant generally argues claims 1–20 as a group. Appeal Br.
23–24, 34. We select claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

Prong One
In the Answer, which was mailed after publication of the Guidance,
the Examiner finds that claim 1, which recites “identifying risk factors,
stratifying individuals based on risk factors and providing a treatment plan
based on the stratification,” is directed to “certain methods of organizing
human activity.” Answer 4. In the Final Office Action, which pre-dates the
Guidance, the Examiner finds the claims are directed to “organizing
information,” and “collecting information . . . analyzing it . . . and displaying
certain results of the analysis,” citing Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom,
S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Final Act. 4.
Following the Guidance, we determine that claim 1 recites three
“modules,” including a “selection module,” a “clustering module,” and a
“ranking module.” The Specification describes that a module is computer
logic. Spec. ¶ 19 (describing that the system may be hardware, software, or
“an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects that may all
generally be referred to herein as a ‘circuit,’ ‘module’ or ‘system.’”). Each
module is configured to perform a particular function.
The “selection module” receives risk targets and identifies “common
risk factors.” Id. ¶ 34. The Specification provides exemplary methods for
the selection, but does not limit how the selection is accomplished. Id.
(“Other selection methods and configurations are also contemplated.”). This
selection could be accomplished by a person mentally examining each
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received risk target, studying risk factors for each risk target, and selecting
some of them. Id. ¶ 35 (after “ranking identified common risk factors . . .
selection module 218 selects the top n risk factors, where n is any positive
integer.”).
The “clustering module” assigns individuals to clusters, though
“[e]ach individual may be assigned as its own cluster.” Id. ¶ 36. Then,
using unspecified metrics (“[o]ther metrics are also contemplated”), the
“closest pair of clusters” are merged. Id. This step could be performed
mentally by a person examining individuals and grouping individuals with
common risk factors together after mentally examining the data.
The “ranking module” is described as operating to:
re-rank the common risk factors (from selection module 218)
based upon how important each risk factor is to its particular risk
cluster. The importance can be quantified as how much a risk
factor discriminates its local cluster from other clusters. The
discriminability of each risk factor for its cluster may be
measured by comparing its cluster (i.e., the target cluster) with
other clusters or individuals based on a number of different
comparison configurations.
Id. ¶ 38. No particular method for ranking is limited by the
Specification, because “[o]ther comparison configurations are also
contemplated.” Id. This step could also be performed mentally by a
human sorting the risk factors based on how often they appear in the
clusters. As part of this, “risk factor discriminability” is measured and
taken into account. Id. ¶ 39. The Specification describes that
“discriminability is a measure of how a risk factor discriminates its
cluster from other clusters” (id. ¶ 5), but the Specification does not limit
the method of measurement used. Id. ¶ 40 (“Other methods are also
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contemplated.”). In ranking risk factors, a person could mentally take
“discriminability” into account and sort factors based on a numeric
measurement.
Aside from the generally computer-related nature of a “module,” the
three modules of claim 1 thus describe steps capable of being performed
through abstract mental thought concerning data. Guidance at 52; see also
MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III)(A)–(B). If a claim, under its broadest reasonable
interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of
generic computer components, then it is still in the mental processes
category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind. See
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).

Prong Two
Next, we determine if the claim integrates the abstract idea into a
“practical application,” by examining “additional elements,” beyond the
abstract idea. Guidance at 54–55.
In addition to the language of claim 1 corresponding to the abstract
mental steps, the claim recites that the “ranking” module is performed
“using a processor.” Claim 1 also recites “a memory device for non-
transitorily storing computer program instructions for the selection module,
the clustering module, and the ranking module.” Finally, claim 1 recites an
extensive “hardware-based care management machine” limitation.
The “hardware-based care management machine” is recited as
including a “processor,” being “configured to perform clinical decision
support at a point-of-care,” and configured “to customize and perform.” It is
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not clear, from our initial reading of the claim, what the processor is
customizing and performing. The claim recites that the customizing and
performing uses “a personalized user interface and dashboard display
operatively coupled to the at least one hardware based care-management
machine for personalized treatment of the individual patient.” This seems to
mean that the processor uses a display and user interface to display
information used in the personalized treatment of a patient, as we explain
next.
The Specification is completely silent on the nature and operation of
the “hardware-based care management machine.” The Appellant directs us
(Appeal Br. 5–6) to Figure 2, elements 202, 210, 212, and 214, which point
to the “processor 210,” “display 212,” and “user interface 214” of a “risk
factor identification system 202.” Spec., Fig. 2. The Specification describes
that the “system may include a workstation or console 202 from which
procedures (e.g., medical examination) may be performed.” Spec. ¶ 31
(cited at Appeal Br. 6). This description does not define the nature of the
“machine.”
The Specification does describe that “display 212 may also permit a
user (e.g., physician, care coordinator, care giver, etc.) to interact with the
system 202 and its components and functions,” and that “user interface 214,
. . . may include a keyboard, mouse, joystick, or any other peripheral or
control to permit user interaction with the system 202.” Id. ¶ 32 (cited at
Appeal Br. 6). The Specification further describes:
The risk factor identification system 202 may provide
output 228. Output 228 may include individual risk factors 230
for a cluster of individuals, which may represent a target
individual or patient. In one application, individual risk factors
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230 may be applied in a personal care management process for,
e.g., clinical decision support at the point-of-care. In another
application, individual risk factors 230 may be displayed using
display 212 and/or user interface 214 to, e.g., customize
healthcare plans or tailor patient education.
Id. ¶ 43 (cited at Appeal Br. 6). The last paragraph cited by the
Appellant in support of the “machine” explains that “individual risk
factors are outputted for the target cluster.” Id. ¶ 52 (cited at Appeal Br.
6).
The Specification also describes that “risk factors are outputted as
individual risk factors,” and “the individual risk factors may be utilized to,
e.g., customize a personalized care management process or may be displayed
for clinical decision support at the point-of-care or for patient education.”
Id. ¶ 18.
Based on these descriptions, especially the use of general-purpose
computer components such as a processor, display, and user interface, and
because the Specification generally describes the “output” of information,
which “may be utilized” to customize personal care, or “may be displayed
for clinical decision support,” we construe the entire “hardware-based care
management machine” limitation as a general-purpose computer that outputs
the results of the mental analysis steps recited in the three “modules,” and
permits a user to input and control other applications.
To the extent that the machine limitation essentially involves output,
this is not given weight in a § 101 analysis. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S.
593, 610–11 (2010) (“Flook stands for the proposition that the prohibition
against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to
limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or
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adding ‘insignificant postsolution activity.”’) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at
191-92); see also Guidance at 55, fn. 31.
This is true also for the use of the display and user interface to input
and edit data “for customizing healthcare plans.” Guidance at 55, n.31.
This is supported by the lack of description, or algorithm, in the
Specification for either “generating a customized healthcare plan for an
individual patient,” or “provid[ing] real-time clinical decision support at a
point-of-care for the individual patient.”
In examining these “additional elements” (Guidance at 54–55), we
determine that the claimed system does not improve the underlying
“memory” or “processor” recited as performing the limitations of claim 1,
because any computer can be used to execute the claimed method. See Spec.
¶ 23 (“instructions may be provided to a processor of a general purpose
computer . . . to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute
via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing
apparatus, create means for implementing the functions/acts”). In addition,
the system is for “identifying group-level and individual-level risk factors”
(Spec. ¶ 2), and, as such, the claimed method does not improve another
technology. Guidance at 55; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a). Because a
particular computer is not required, the claim also does not define or rely on
a “particular machine.” Id.; see also MPEP § 2106.05(b). Further, the
method does not transform matter. Id.; see also MPEP § § 2106.05(c).
Instead, the claim analyzes data and outputs results. As such, the method
has no other meaningful limitations (MPEP § 2106.05(e)), and thus merely
recites instructions to execute the abstract idea on a computer (MPEP
§ 2106.05(f)).
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Although the claim is drawn to a “system,” and involve components
such as a “processor,” “memory,” “display,” and “user interface,” these
components do not significantly alter our analysis. As the Federal Circuit
has made clear “the basic character of a process claim drawn to an abstract
idea is not changed by claiming only its performance by computers, or by
claiming the process embodied in program instructions on a computer
readable medium.” See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375–76 (citing In re
Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (CCPA 1982)).
As such, we determine that claim 1 does not integrate the judicial
exception into a “practical application.”

Step 2B
Next, we “evaluate the additional elements individually and in
combination under Step 2B to determine whether they provide an inventive
concept (i.e., whether the additional elements amount to significantly more
than the exception itself).” Guidance at 56. We consider whether an
additional element or combination of elements adds a specific limitation or
combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine,
conventional activity in the field, or simply appends well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry. Id.
As developed above, in addition to the language of claim 1
corresponding to the abstract mental steps, the claim recites that the
“ranking” module is performed “using a processor.” Claim 1 also recites “a
memory device for non-transitorily storing computer program instructions
for the selection module, the clustering module, and the ranking module,”
and a “hardware-based care management machine” limitation.
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The ranking using the processor, which could involve sorting based
on a number (see Spec. ¶¶ 38–40), involves basic computer tasks. The
operations of storing, analyzing, receiving, and writing data are primitive
computer operations found in any computer system. See In re Katz
Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’
‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ discussed below, those functions can be achieved
by any general purpose computer without special programming.”).
This also means the use of a memory to store computer program
instructions is a conventional use of computers.
Finally, we consider the “hardware-based care management machine.”
Above, we construed that this was a general-purpose computer that has a
display and user interface to output the results of the three claimed modules
data processing, and that data output and input was insignificant extra-
solution activity. Using a display and user interface to provide data input
and output is a conventional computer operation. See In re Katz, 639 F.3d at
1316.
We therefore conclude that the additional elements of claim 1 beyond
the abstract idea of steps able to be performed mentally, does not recite
“significantly more.”

Appellant’s Arguments
We are not persuaded by the Appellant’s argument that “the functions
recited in claims l, 12, and 20 perform[] functions which are not generic
computer functions, but instead include unconventional steps previously
unknown to the industry to which the inventions of these claims pertain
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(noting the lack of any obviousness-type rejections in the Office Action
dated August 27, 2018).” Appeal Br. 20. Even unconventional abstract
ideas are still unpatentable. See SAP America, Inc. v. Investpic, LLC, 890
F.3d 1016, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “What is needed is an inventive concept
in the non-abstract application realm.” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898
F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In addition, analyzing data, and
outputting results, are conventional computer operations. See In re Katz,
639 F.3d at 1316.
We are unpersuaded by the Appellant’s argument that the claims
“would ‘not preempt approaches that use rules of a different structure or
different techniques’.” Appeal Br. 20. While preemption may signal patent
ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not
demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.,
788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
The Appellant argues the independent claims are “directed to a
customized graphical user interface (GUI) configured for customizing
healthcare plans, . . . and for providing real-time clinical decision support,”
which “requires fast and accurate functionality,” and is thus “not simply a
generic display or interface.” Appeal Br. 20–23.
We disagree. Claim 1 recites that it includes a GUI, but neither the
claims nor the Specification provide any details about customizing the user
interface, how healthcare plans are customized, or how real-time clinical
decision support is implemented. The claim preamble itself, a “system for
individual risk factor identification,” gives no indication the GUI is critical
to the claim. We discern no mention in the originally-filed claims of any
user interface, customizing of healthcare plans, or decision support
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functions, which corresponds to a total lack of detail on these currently-
claimed functions or components.
The drawings only show “block/flow diagrams,” about the data
analysis, and do not show any features related to a GUI, healthcare plan, or
decision support, all ending with “output.” See Spec. ¶¶ 12–14, Figs. 1–3.
The Specification barely mentions a user interface, decision support,
or healthcare plan. See Spec. ¶ 18 (“the individual risk factors may be
utilized to, e.g., customize a personalized care management process or may
be displayed for clinical decision support at the point-of-care or for patient
education”), ¶ 30 (“risk factors may be used, e.g., in a personalized care
management process or may be displayed in a user interface or dashboard”),
¶ 32 (“user interface 214, which may include a keyboard, mouse, joystick, or
any other peripheral or control to permit user interaction with the system
202”), ¶ 43 (“individual risk factors 230 may be displayed using display 212
and/or user interface 214 to, e.g., customize healthcare plans or tailor patient
education”). The terms “healthcare plan” and “decision support” do not
seem to appear anywhere else in the Specification.
The Appellant argues “the user dashboards recited in the present
claims also function as user interfaces to interact with, and to control the
hardware care management machines to actually perform treatment on a
living patient based on the rules recited in the amended claims.” Appeal
Br. 21. Once again, we disagree. The “hardware-based care management
machine” of claim 1 uses “personalized user interface and dashboard display
operatively coupled to the at least one hardware based care-management
machine.” The machine is thus coupled to its user interface and display.
There is no language that the machine is coupled to any other device,
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including one that performs treatment. Further, we do not discern any
description in the Specification otherwise.
Citing Trading Technologies International, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., 675 F.
App’x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Appeal Br. 21), the Appellant argues the
claims are not abstract, because the claims “include a specifically structured
graphical user interface paired with functionality related to the structure of
the graphical user interface (e.g., control hardware care management
machines).” Id. at 23. We disagree with the Appellant, because the
distinguishing feature for the claims in Trading Technologies was an
advance in efficiency provided by an improved graphical user interface as
compared to other computer processes. Trading Technologies, 675 F. App’x
at 1004.
In contrast to Trading Technologies, no such distinguishing features
are recited in claim 1. In the claimed “personalized user interface and
dashboard display comprising a customized graphical user interface”
(emphasis added), the terms “personalized” and “customized” essentially
have no meaning, and, we believe, can be ignored. This is because the
Specification mentions a “personalized care management process” (Spec.
¶¶ 18, 30, 52), without describing it, but does not mention, or provide any
description of, what is involved in personalizing a user interface. Similarly,
the Specification mentions “risk factors may be utilized to, e.g., customize a
personalized care management process” (id. ¶ 18), and mentions that risk
factors may be displayed “to, e.g., customize healthcare plans” (id. ¶ 43), but
does not mention, or provide any description of, customizing a graphical
user interface. The Appellant’s argument is thus unconvincing, because
there is nothing revealed in the claims or Specification that suggests that the
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user interface of the claimed system is either personalized or customized in a
manner comparable to the user interface of Trading Technologies.
The Appellant again misstates the claim language, when arguing the
claims “amount to significantly more,” stating the “claims relate directly to
real-world physical items (e.g., hardware-based care management machine
performing treatments on patients and a personalized GUI for customizing
healthcare plans and to provide real-time clinical decision support at a point
of care).” Appeal Br. 25; see also id. at 26 (“the GUI of the present claims
is customized and improves timeliness, accuracy, and/or effectiveness of
real-time diagnosis and treatment”).
We do not construe the claims to perform any treatments on patients,
nor to recite anything more than convention user interfaces or data output
functions. The user interface is “coupled” to the “hardware-based care
management machine,” but that “machine” is merely a vehicle to provide
output about risk factors for display on the user interface. There is nothing
in the claim or Specification that supports that the claimed system performs
treatments on patients. As noted above, the scope of the original invention
ended at displaying the risk factors that resulted from the claimed analysis.
The remaining features being argued here have been contrived later.
Next, citing a 2018 USPTO memo, the Appellant asserts that the law
requires the Examiner “must prove that the present claims are not routine
and well understood in the art, and that claimed advantages of the present
invention are not in fact, advantages over the art,” and argues “the Examiner
has not provided the above support to conclude that any of the elements of
the present claims constitute functions that are well-understood, routine, and
conventional activities previously known to the pertinent industry.” Appeal
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Br. 27–28; see also id. at 29–30 (citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
This argument follows the Appellant’s quotations of rules that the
analysis in question relates to “additional” elements recited in the claims,
which are elements beyond the abstract idea. See Guidance at 56. We find
this argument unpersuasive, because the analysis, which we provided above,
shows there are no additional elements that are not well-understood, routine,
and conventional. That the abstract idea itself may not be proven to be well-
understood, routine, and conventional is beside the point. See Mayo, 566
U.S. at 90 (holding that a novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely
abstract idea is, nonetheless patent-ineligible). See also Synopsys Inc. v.
Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim
for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”) (emphasis omitted).
The Appellant next argues that, similar to the claims in Core Wireless
Licensing S.A.R.L., v. LG Electronics, Inc., LG Electronics Mobilecomm
U.S.A., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018), the “customized, interactive
interface” has several advantages in time spent by a user. Appeal Br. 31–32;
see also Reply Br. 4–5 (“customized, interactive interface also enables
users to make selections and interact with care management systems to plan
and/or execute customized health-care plans for individual patients, tailored
to their particular needs, which very clearly is advantageous over requiring a
user and/or caregiver to search through multiple databases, websites, patent
records”). We do not agree that the claims here are similar to those in Core
Wireless.
In Core Wireless, the court held that claims which recited an interface
were patent eligible as the claims recited specific limitations of the interface
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such as: an application summary that can be reached through a menu, the
data being in a list and being selectable to launch an application, and
additional limitations directed to the actual user interface displayed and how
it functions. Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1363. The court found that the
claims were directed to an improved user interface and not the abstract
concept of an index as the claim “limitations disclose a specific manner of
displaying a limited set of information to the user, rather than using
conventional user interface methods to display a generic index on a
computer.” Id.
There is no improvement to technology recited in claim 1. Further, an
improvement in speed alone does not render it patent eligible. While the
claimed system and method certainly purport to accelerate the process of
seeing analyzed risk factors data, the speed increase comes from the
capabilities of a general-purpose computer, rather than the patented system
itself. See Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.),
687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required
calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not
materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”). Of
interest, the Specification describes in background that the “ability to
identify risk factors related to an adverse health condition (e.g., congestive
heart failure) is very important for improving healthcare quality and
reducing cost,” and that “methods based on general population data will only
yield common risk factors and do not address individual differences of
patients.” Spec. ¶¶ 3–4. Missing, though, is any description of a problem
such as “requiring a user and/or caregiver to search through multiple
databases,” as argued.
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20
Finally, we are unpersuaded by the Appellant’s assertion, that under
the Guidance, the claims are “very clearly directed to a practical
application,” quoting only the last limitation of claim 1. Appeal Br. 32–33.
We have already addressed whether the claim integrates the abstract idea
into a practical application, above, in the Prong Two analysis.
For the preceding reasons, we do not find error in the Examiner’s
analysis. Therefore, we sustain the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of claims.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection is AFFIRMED.

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED