INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 21, 2020

2019001283 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 21, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/294,908 06/03/2014 LI-JU CHEN CN920130040US1 9072
37945 7590 08/21/2020
DUKE W. YEE
YEE AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.
P.O. BOX 6669
MCKINNEY, TX 75071
EXAMINER
SOMERS, MARC S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2159
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/21/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ptonotifs@yeeiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte LI-JU CHEN, YING C. GUO, XIN S. MAO,
BO YANG, and HUA ZHANG
________________

Appeal 2019-001283
Application 14/294,908
Technology Center 2100
________________

Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, JASON V. MORGAN, and
JOHN F. HORVATH, Administrative Patent Judges.

Opinion for the Board filed by Administrative Patent Judge MORGAN.

Opinion Concurring-in-part, Dissenting-in-part filed by Administrative
Patent Judge THOMAS.

MORGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Summary Of The Disclosure
Appellant’s claimed subject matter relates to “managing a complex
object in a cloud environment.” Abstract.
The Specification discloses example complex objects as objects that
include attributes (e.g., Name, Birth, Image, Price, ROI), methods (e.g.,
UploadImage, AddFollow, ROIChange), and constraints (e.g., Searchable
[Name], Followable). Spec. ¶ 69, Fig. 5. These complex objects are part of a
System of Engagement, such as a MicroBlogger system, in which objects are
declared, managed, and consumed. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. In admitted “prior art, [such]
objects are usually defined by programmers.” Id. ¶ 5. The Specification
discloses that an “object model of [a] complex object may be established
using [a] declarative language,” such as “an object oriented language with
annotations.” Id. ¶¶ 58, 70.
The Specification discloses one way to analyze an object model is to
extract from the object model metadata describing its structure. Id. ¶ 73.
This enables mapping of an attribute of the object model to corresponding
data storage. Id. ¶ 74. For example, an attribute that is structural data can be

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as International
Business Machines Corporation of Armonk, New York. Appeal Br. 2.
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mapped to a relational database. Id. ¶ 76. Semi-structural data can be
mapped to a non-relational database. Id. ¶ 77. Non-structural data can be
mapped to an object storage system. Spatial data can be mapped to a spatial
database. Id. ¶ 78. And text data can be mapped to an index database. Id.
¶ 79. Such mappings (i.e., desired data storage) can be used to select
available data storage in a cloud environment (i.e., the data storage can be
generated). Id. ¶ 83.
The Specification also discloses determining an object service
interface as a data service of the complex object. Id. ¶ 81. For example, “in
response to the information which describes [an] attribute of the complex
object . . . interface[s] for adding, deleting, modifying and querying the
attribute [are] determined.” Id. Similarly, “in response to the information
which describes [a] constraint of the complex object . . . interface[s] for
adding, obtaining and deleting the constraint” are determined. Id. For
example, “for the constraint of ‘comment-able’, . . . interface function[s]
such as addComment(), getComments(), [and] deleteComment() may be
determined.” Id. Thus, “[t]he generated data storage may be accessed via the
created object service interfaces to perform operations on the stored data.”
Id. ¶ 86.
Representative Claims (Key Limitations Emphasized)
1. A method for managing a complex object in a cloud
environment, the method comprising:
obtaining, by one or more processors, an object model of the
complex object, the object model comprising information
describing a constraint, attributes, and a method of the complex
object, wherein the complex object describes an entity in a
System of Engagement, wherein the complex object is
continuously evolving with growing data and a varying
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structure, and wherein the System of Engagement uses a System
of Engagement application to retrieve and provide data to a
particular user according to the constraint, the attributes, and
the method of the complex object;
analyzing, by one or more processors, the object model to
determine at least one desired data storage mapped with the
object model and at least one desired data service representing
an object service interface for accessing the complex object;
and
generating, by one or more processors, at least one data storage
and at least one data service for the complex object in the cloud
environment, based on the desired at least one data storage and
at least one data service.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the constraint
comprises:
being search-able of the attribute, wherein a search-able
constraint indicates that the complex object may be searched,
being follow-able of the complex object, wherein a follow-able
constraint indicates that the complex object has a relationship
with other objects that follow the complex object,
being tag-able of the complex object, wherein a tag-able
constraint indicates that the complex object has a tag by which
the complex object may be searched,
being comment-able of the complex object, wherein a
comment-able constraint indicates that the complex object
includes a comment about traits of the complex object, and
being locatable of the complex object, wherein a locatable
constraint indicates that the complex object may be located.
3. The method according to claim 1, wherein the object model
further comprises information describing at least one of a
relationship and a conditions-action of the complex object.
4. The method according to claim 1, wherein the analyzing of
the object model to determine at least one desired data storage
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mapped with the object model and at least one desired data
service representing an object service interface for accessing the
complex object comprises:
extracting, by one or more processors, metadata from the object
model;
establishing, by one or more processors, a mapping from the
attributes to the corresponding data storage based on the
extracted metadata; and
determining, by one or more processors, at least one object
service interface for accessing the complex object based on the
information.
5. The method according to claim 4, wherein the establishing of
a mapping from the attribute attributes to the corresponding
data storage based on the extracted metadata comprises:
determining, by one or more processors, that the attributes are
structural data, semi-structural data, non-structural data, spatial
data and text data to be retrieved based on the extracted
metadata;
mapping, by one or more processors, the structural data to a
relational database in response to determining that the attributes
are the structural data, wherein the relational database becomes
one of data storages for the complex object;
mapping, by one or more processors, the semi-structural data to
a non-relational database in response to determining that the
attributes are the semi-structural data, wherein the non-
relational database becomes one of the data storages for the
complex object;
mapping, by one or more processors, the non-structural data to
an object storage system in response to determining that the
attributes are the non-structural data, wherein the object storage
system becomes one of the data storages for the complex
object;
mapping, by one or more processors, the spatial data to a spatial
database in response to determining that the attributes are the
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spatial data, wherein the spatial database becomes one of the
data storages for the complex object; and
mapping, by one or more processors, the text data to be
retrieved to an index database system in response to
determining that the attributes are the text data to be retrieved,
wherein the index database system becomes one of the data
storages for the complex object.
6. The method according to claim 4, wherein the determining of
at least one object service interface based on the information
comprises:
determining, by one or more processors and in response to the
information describing the attributes of the complex object, a
first interface for adding, deleting, modifying and querying the
attributes;
determining, by one or more processors and in response to the
information describing the method of the complex object, a
second interface for exposing a public method; and
determining, by one or more processors and in response to the
information describing the constraint of the complex object, a
third interface for adding, obtaining and deleting the constraint.
16. The system according to claim 15, further comprising:
program instructions to determine that the attribute is any one
of structural data, semi-structural data, non-structural data,
spatial data and text data to be retrieved based on the extracted
metadata;
program instructions to map the attribute to a relational
database in response to determining that the attribute is the
structural data, to map the attribute to a non-relational database
in response to determining that the attribute is the semi-
structural data, to map the attribute to an object storage system
in response to determining that the attribute is the nonstructural
data, to map the attribute to a spatial database in response to
determining that the attribute is the spatial data, and to map the
attribute to an index database system in response to determining
that the attribute is the text data to be retrieved.
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The Examiner’s Rejections And Cited References
The Examiner rejects claims 1–10 and 12–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–9.
The Examiner rejects claims 1–4, 7–15, 18, and 20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Ng et al. (US 6,374,256 B1; issued Apr.
16, 2002) (“Ng”), Mazhar et al. (US 2010/0088150 A1; published Apr. 8,
2010) (“Mazhar”), Kawai (US 5,717,924; issued Feb. 10, 1998), and Wong
et al. (US 6,708,172 B1; issued Mar. 16, 2004) (“Wong”). Final Act. 9–17.
The Examiner rejects claims 5 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Ng, Mazhar, Kawai, Wong, Crockett et al. (US 2013/
0205028 A1; published Apr. 8, 2013) (“Crockett”), and Vlahos et al. (US
2002/0133504 A1; published Sept. 19, 2002) (“Vlahos”). Final Act. 20–25.
The Examiner rejects claims 6 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Ng, Mazhar, Kawai, Wong, and Gorelik (US 2012/
0215766 A1; published Aug. 23, 2012). Final Act. 19–20.
The Examiner rejects claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Ng, Mazhar, Kawai, Wong, and Shiffer et al. (US 2009/
01986702 A1; published Aug. 6, 2009) (“Shiffer”). Final Act. 17–19.

2 The Examiner erroneously cites to Wei et al. (US 2012/0110024 A1;
published May 3, 2012) instead of Shiffer in rejecting claim 16. Final Act.
17. This is a typographical error and Appellant had the correct information
for Shiffer. See Appeal Br. 56; Notice of Refs. Cited by Examiner 1 (Dec.
27, 2016). Therefore, we hold this error harmless.
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ANALYSIS (35 U.S.C. § 101)
Principles Of Law
To constitute patent-eligible subject matter, an invention must be a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or [a] new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. There are
implicit exceptions to the categories of patentable subject matter identified
in 35 U.S.C. § 101, including: (1) laws of nature; (2) natural phenomena;
and (3) abstract ideas. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216
(2014). The U.S. Supreme Court has set forth a framework for
distinguishing patents with claims directed to these implicit exceptions
“from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Id. at
217 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S.
66 (2012)). The evaluation follows a two-part framework: (1) determine
whether the claim is directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract
idea; and (2) if so, then determine whether any element, or combination of
elements, in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to
significantly more than the patent-ineligible concept itself. See id. at 217–18.
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) published
guidance on the application of the two-part analysis in 2019. USPTO, 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(January 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”); see also USPTO, October
2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, available at https://www.uspto.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf (Oct. 17, 2019)
(“Oct. 2019 Update”). Under that guidance, we first look to whether the
claim recites:
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(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (see 2019 Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 54 (step 2A, prong one)); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see id. at 54–55 (step 2A,
prong two); MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional”
in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Step 2A, Prong One
The Examiner determines that the steps of claim 1 “describe the
concept of collecting, displaying, and manipulating data, which
corresponds to concepts identified as abstract ideas by the courts.”
Final Act. 3 (citing Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin.
Corp., 850 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017)); see also Ans. 3–4.
Specifically, claim 1 recites “obtaining . . . an object model of
[a] complex object,” “analyzing . . . the object model to determine at
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least one desired data storage mapped with the object model and at
least one desired data service representing an object service interface
for accessing the complex object,” and “generating . . . at least one
data storage and at least one data service for the complex object . . .
based on the desired at least one data storage and at least one data
service.”
In light of the Specification, discussed above, these steps
encompass obtaining an object model established using a declarative
language, mapping an attribute of the object model to corresponding
data storage and selecting available data storage, and determining an
interface for adding, deleting, modifying, or querying an attribute of
the object. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 70, 73, 74, 76–78, 81, 83. Thus, the
steps encompass further defining a complex object—which has been
partially defined using an object model—by determining where data
for the complex object is stored and how to access data of the
complex object.
Defining complex objects has usually been a programmer task.
See id. ¶ 5. As the Specification demonstrates, determining where to
store the data is a rote definition task driven by the type of data (e.g.,
structural, semi-structural, non-structural, spatial, text) and the
availability of storage. See id. ¶¶ 76–79, 83. Determining how to
access the data is similarly a rote definition task driven by what data a
complex object contains. See id. ¶ 81.
These determinations show that the claimed steps are similar to
patent-ineligible mental processes for “translating a functional
description of a logical circuit into a hardware component description
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of the logic circuit.” See Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
839 F.3d 1138, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The claimed steps are also
similar to patent-ineligible XML document manipulation claims that,
even with data structure limitations that “add a degree of
particularity,” nonetheless encompass mental processes (i.e., an
“abstract idea of itself”) of “organizing, displaying, and manipulating
data of particular documents.” Intellectual Ventures I, 850 F.3d at
1341. Both types of patent-ineligible claims relate to the translation of
information (e.g., a functional description of a logical circuit or web
site navigation data or modifications of data detected via a user
interface) to another form (e.g., a hardware component description of
a logical circuit or a data component of an XML document) using
processes a human could perform. See Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1150
(the claimed “translation is a mental process”); Intellectual Ventures I,
850 F.3d at 1339 (noting that resolving conflicts between
incompatible XML documents “was a difficult task that required
specialized programming skills to manipulate and transfer XML
documents into the desired format”).
Accordingly, we determine that claim 1 recites concepts
performed in the human mind—including observation, evaluation,
judgement, opinion—and, therefore, claim 1 recites an abstract idea in
the form of mental processes. See 2019 Revised Guide, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52.
Step 2A, Prong Two
Appellant contends the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1
because it does “not recite any ‘collecting’ of data or ‘displaying’ of
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data,” but instead recites a technique “to facilitate generation of both a
‘data storage’ as well as a ‘data service’ for a complex object in a
cloud environment by use of an object model of the complex object
that describes a constraint, attributes and a method of the complex
object.” Appeal Br. 9. Appellant argues this technique provides a
technological improvement to cloud based computing “by
automatically generat[ing] both a (1) data storage and (2) a data
service based on a desired data storage that is mapped with the object
model and a desired data service that represents an object service
interface for accessing the complex object.” Id. at 10. Appellant
submits this streamlines “the provisioning of various complex objects
and avoid[s] complex programming techniques that would otherwise
be required to provide different customized environments.” Id. (citing
Spec. ¶ 5)
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive because the claimed
generation of a data storage and a data service does not improve the
functioning of a computer or other technology or technical field. See
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Rather, the claimed
generation of a data storage and a data service automates prior art
programming tasks such as data storage provisioning and providing
simple interfaces. See Spec. ¶¶ 5–6. Merely automating manual
processes is not enough to integrate an abstract idea into a patent-
eligible practical application. See, e.g., Credit Acceptance Corp. v.
Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“mere
automation of manual processes using generic computers does not
constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology”).
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Moreover, the claimed invention does not improve computer
capabilities. Compare with Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d
1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims “directed to a specific
improvement to the way computers operate, embodied in the self-
referential table” were not abstract).
Appellant argues that the claim 1 step of “‘generating’ is very
different from ‘manipulating’ since generating provides tangible new
things (data storage and data service), whereas manipulating
something merely processes pre-existing information.” Reply Br. 3.
But Appellant does not show what “tangible new things” are
generated by selecting available data storage or determining an
interface for adding, deleting, modifying, or querying an attribute of
the object. The claimed invention is unlike, for example, a method
that automatically opens a press at a proper time to cure rubber, thus
leading to something tangible (i.e., the cured rubber). See Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). Rather, the claimed invention is
more like the use of an algorithm to update an alarm value. See Parker
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978). Even if the new information
generated may be useful if further applied (id. at 586), merely
generating such information does not create “tangible new things”
such that the claimed process does not recite an abstract idea (id. at
594–95).
Appellant also argues the claimed technique “allows for
automatically updating a data storage and a data service when the
object model of the complex object changes – without having to
modify the program of the System of Engagement application.” Reply
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Br. 4 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 5, 94). Appellant unpersuasively relies on
limitations not found in claim 1 (i.e., the claim fails to limit the steps
to be performed when the object model changes or to preclude
modification of the program of System of Engagement application).
Moreover, and more importantly, the analyzing and generating
recitations are highly general and fail to include limited rules
structured to reflect a specific technique different from that which
would likely be used by a programmer performing the steps manually.
See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299,
1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
For these reasons, we determine claim 1 does not have
additional recitations that integrate the underlying mental processes—
concepts performed in the human mind including observation,
evaluation, judgement, opinion)—into a patent-eligible practical
application. Therefore, claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
Step 2B
Appellant argues that even if claim 1 is directed to an abstract
idea, the method, viewed as an ordered combination, contains
additional recitations that contain an inventive concept that makes
claim 1 significantly more than the underlying abstract idea. Appeal
Br. 15. Specifically, Appellant argues that
when viewing Claim 1 as an ordered combination, the
following inventive features are provided, including a
synergistic interplay between: (1) obtaining an object model of
a complex object, (2) analyzing the object model to determine a
desired data storage mapped with the object model and a
desired data service representing an object service interface for
accessing the complex object, and (3) automatically generating
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a data storage and a data service for the complex object based
on the desired data storage and data service. This automatic
generation of both (1) a data storage and (2) a data service
based on an object model of a complex object advantageously
allows an application to retrieve and provide data to a particular
user according to the constraint, attributes and the method of
the complex object – thereby advantageously streamlining the
provisioning of various complex objects and avoiding complex
programming techniques that would otherwise be required to
provide different customized environments (i.e. a providing a
specific technological improvement, and not a mere generic
computer process that manipulates and displays data).
Id.; see also Reply Br. 6–8.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because they are
directed to the underlying abstract idea, discussed above in Steps 2A,
Prongs One and Two. Thus, Appellant’s arguments fail to show that
there are additional recitations that provide the requisite inventive
concept by adding a specific limitation or combination of limitations
that was not well-understood, routine, or conventional in the art. 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Furthermore, claim 1 recites, for example, a System of
Engagement, processors, data storage, and a cloud environment. But
the Specification’s descriptions of these elements shows that they
were well-understood, routine, and conventional at the time of the
invention. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 2 (describing Systems of Engagement
“such as a MicroBlogger system”), ¶ 41 (noting “[e]xamples of well-
known computing systems, environments, [and] configurations . . .
suitable for use”), ¶¶ 76–80 (describing data storage technologies such
as a relational database, a non-relational database, an object storage
system, a spatial database, and an index database system), ¶ 85 (noting
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that “generation of storage structures of various types of data storages
in [a] cloud environment is well known”). Even when considered in
combination, we are unable to discern anything in the additional
recitations of claim 1 (i.e., in the recitations that are not part of the
underlying abstract idea) that were not well-understood, routine, and
conventional.
Preemption
Appellant further argues that claim 1 does not recite “language
that would ‘tie up the use of basic tools of scientific and technological
work and thereby inhibit future innovation premised upon them.’”
Appeal Br. 18 (quoting Westlaw Headnote No. 2 (Key No. 291k451)
to Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S.
576, 589 (2013)). In particular, Appellant argues “it is immediately
clear that the claim does not seek to tie-up all ways of ‘obtaining an
object model, analyz[ing] the object model to determine [a] data
storage and service, and generat[ing] the data storage and service.’”
Id. at 19; see also Reply Br. 9–10.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because “[w]hile
preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility,” as
“questions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101
analysis.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
No additional determination regarding preemption is necessary here
because the two-part analysis (i.e., steps 2A (prongs one and two) and
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2B, discussed above) shows that claim 1 is directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 101
rejection of claim 1, and claims 2, 3, 12–14, 18, and 20, which
Appellant does not argue separately with respect to this rejection.
Dependent Claims 4–10, 15–17, And 19
Appellant contends dependent claims 4–10, 15–17, and 19 are
not directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.3 Appeal Br. 22–28,
30–31; see also Reply Br. 11–17. We have reviewed Appellant’s
contentions and determined that they do not persuasively distinguish
the subject matter of these claims from the patent-ineligible subject
matter of claim 1.
For example, Appellant contends the features of claim 1
do not come anywhere close tying up the science or technology
of “obtaining an object model, analyze the object model to
determine data storage and service, and generate the data
storage and service” (the alleged abstract idea) due to the
recitation of a specific implementation of how the object model
analyzing step is actually performed.
Appeal Br. 21. In particular, Appellant contends that
[t]he features recited in Claim 4 advantageously facilitate
an improved process for determining an ‘object service
interface’ that is used for accessing the ‘complex object’ by the
use of a mapping technique that establishes mappings from the
complex object’s attributes to the corresponding data storage –
thus providing an efficient technique for determining an

3 Appellant also contends dependent claim 11 is not-directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter. Appeal Br. 29–30. The Examiner has not rejected
claim 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Ans. 21; Final Act. 5), however, as
Appellant acknowledges (Reply Br. 17).
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interface to be used for adding, deleting, modifying and
querying an attribute of the ‘complex object.’
Id. at 22. Appellant also argues
[t]he features . . . in Claim 4 advantageously facilitate an
improved process for determining an ‘object service interface’
that is used for accessing the ‘complex object’ by the use of a
mapping technique that establishes mappings from the complex
object’s attributes to the corresponding data storage – and thus
provide significantly more than “obtaining an object model,
analyze the object model to determine data storage and service,
and generate the data storage and service” (the alleged abstract
idea) using a generic computer process.
Id. Appellant raises similar contentions with respect to claims 5–10,
15–17, and 19. See id. at 23–28, 30–31.
Appellant’s contentions draw our attention to limitations in the
dependent claims (e.g., to the claim recitation of “determining, by one
or more processors, at least one object service interface for accessing
the complex object based on the information” (emphases added)). But
merely pointing out what a claim recites is not considered an
argument for separate patentability of the claim. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018).
Furthermore, Appellant’s contentions in the Reply Brief
regarding the other dependent claims do not add any timely persuasive
arguments. See Reply Br. 11–17. “Any argument raised in the reply
brief which was not raised in the appeal brief, or is not responsive to
an argument raised in the examiner’s answer . . . will not be
considered by the Board . . . unless good cause is shown.” 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.41(b)(2).
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19

The arguments Appellant makes in the Reply Brief that do
address new findings and analysis in the Answer are not persuasive of
error. For example, Appellant argues the Examiner “erroneously
asserts that the features of Claim 4 are described in Appellant[’]s
paragraph [0005] of the Published Application.” Reply Br. 12; see
also Ans. 16. But Appellant does not show, and we are unable to
ascertain, how this alleged deficiency in the Answer demonstrates
error in the Examiner’s determination that the recitations of claim 4
add “no meaningful limitation beyond that of the abstract idea” of
claim 1, from which claim 4 depends. Final Act. 6.
Appellant’s Reply Brief arguments with respect to the
Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of claims 5–10, 15–17, and 19
are similarly untimely or unpersuasive. See Reply Br. 13–17.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of
claims 4–10, 15–17, and 19.
ANALYSIS (35 U.S.C. § 103)
Claims 1, 4, 7–12, 15, 18, and 20
The Examiner finds that Ng’s method of mapping object classes
in an object-oriented application to database table entries, where the
object classes have “fields, methods, and other operators associated
with an object-oriented language” (Ng 7:51–53) teaches or suggests
“obtaining . . . an object model of [a] complex object,” as recited in
claim 1. See Final Act. 9 (citing Ng 7:49–63, 8:65–9:67).
Appellant argues that “Ng’s ‘class’ is not equivalent to the
claimed ‘object model’ because such ‘class’ is not described as being
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a ‘model’ of a ‘complex object.’” Appeal Br. 37. Appellant argues
Ng’s class “is described as being in an ‘object-oriented application’”
and that “‘objects’ are created from the ‘classes.’” Id. at 37, 43 (citing
Evidence Appendix4); Reply Br. 19 (“the Examiner is interchanging
. . . the Ng ‘class’ and the Ng ‘object’”), 22–26.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because the
Specification explicitly discloses that a “complex object may be
described using a declarative programming language.” Spec. ¶ 58
(cited in Ans. 30); see also id. ¶ 70. That is, such descriptions form
models of complex objects, and the models are not themselves
complex objects. Appellant’s arguments fail to distinguish the claimed
object model of a complex object from Ng’s classes. In particular, in
Ng “classes have fields, methods, and other operators associated,”
where “[f]ields . . . are used to store different types of data or
variables and methods are used to manipulate the objects derived from
the corresponding classes.” Ng 7:51–56 (emphasis added) (cited in
Ans. 31). That is, objects in Ng are created from Ng’s classes; thus
Ng’s classes are object models that describe the complex objects
created therefrom. Therefore, use of classes in Ng teaches or suggests

4 The cited Evidence Appendix (Appeal Br. 77–78) is an excerpt from
Michelle Yaiser, Object-oriented programming concepts: Objects and
classes, Adobe, archive available at https://web.archive.org/web/
20111116022157/https://www.adobe.com/devnet/actionscript/learning/oop-
concepts/objects-and-classes.html (Oct. 31, 2011). This evidence was
presented to (Resp. to Final Office Act. (filed June 18, 2018)) and
considered by the Examiner (initialed Resp. to Final Office Action (July 2,
2018) (“OK TO ENTER: /M.S.S/”)). Thus, this evidence is properly before
us and has been considered.
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“obtaining . . . an object model of [a] complex object,” as recited in
claim 1. See Final Act. 9.
The Examiner finds that Ng’s “object model or class . . .
includes information about a constraint, method, and attributes.” Final
Act. 9 (citing Ng 7:49–63, 8:65–9:67). Specifically, the Examiner
relies on Ng’s teaching that classes have fields (i.e., attributes),
methods, and other operators. See Ng 7:51–53 (cited in Final Act. 9);
Ans. 27–28. The Examiner finds that Wong’s ability to “make certain
information for private view only” (Wong 25:46–47) teaches or
suggests constraints as a type of other operator (see Ans. 29).
Appellant argues Wong does not mention “a ‘complex object’,
and therefore . . . does not describe retrieving data ‘according to the
constraint, the attribute, and the method of the complex object.’”
Appeal Br. 36. Appellant also argues that Ng’s objects are not
complex objects because in Ng “‘fields’ are used to store data, and
‘methods’ are used to manipulate class-derived objects – without
regards to any ‘constraint’ of a ‘complex object.’” Id. at 36, 41–42
(citing, e.g., dictionary.com (a constraint can be a “limitation or
restriction”); Spec. ¶ 56); Reply Br. 3, 25–27.
Appellant unpersuasively attacks Ng and Wong individually
even though the Examiner’s rejection is based on their combined
teachings and suggestions. See Final Act. 9; Ans. 29; In re Keller, 642
F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). In particular, Appellant does not dispute
that Wong teaches or suggests a constraint, but instead argues Wong
merely teaches that “a ‘user profile’ has a constraint, and the ‘user
profile’ is not equivalent to the claimed ‘complex object’ since the
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‘user profile’ does not comprise ‘information describing a constraint,
an attribute, and a method.’” Reply Br. 20–21. But the Examiner
relies on Ng, not Wong, to teach or suggest a complex object. See
Final Act. 9. Even if the class fields, methods, and other operators of
Ng fall short of teaching or suggesting an object model comprising
information describing constraints of a complex object, as Appellant
argues (Appeal Br. 36), we agree with the Examiner that Wong’s
teaching of limiting access to information (i.e., making the
information private) teaches or suggests adding constraints to Ng’s
classes, thereby adding constraints to the objects that are defined by
those classes (see Ans. 29). Therefore, we agree with the Examiner
that the combination of Ng and Wong teaches or suggests “the object
model comprising information describing a constraint, attributes, and
a method of the complex object,” as recited in claim 1. See Final Act.
9; Ans. 29.
The minority disagrees that the Appellant is attacking the
references individually, finding the Specification and claim 1 define a
complex object as an entity in a System of Engagement, and neither
Ng or Wong teach such an object. Respectfully, we disagree. The
Specification identifies MicroBlogger and Mobile Banking as types of
Systems of Engagement applications, without ever defining a “System
of Engagement application.” Spec. ¶ 2. We understand a “System of
Engagement application” to be an application that allows users to
interact with one another. The Specification indicates that in such
applications, the users and comments they make can be represented by
objects, i.e., that the applications are object-oriented. Id. Moreover,
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these objects can be “complex objects” because they can contain data
having different formats (e.g., structured, unstructured, plain text)
whose size “is exploding.” Id. Respectfully, none of these disclosures
“define” a complex object in a System of Engagement application.
They simply describe an ordinary object in an object-oriented
application that, due to the social nature of the application, can
contain an ever expanding amount of different types of data (e.g., a
growing list of comments containing text, embedded graphics, links to
videos, documents, webpages, or other user profiles).
Ng describes object classes (object models) in an object
oriented application and “objects derived from the corresponding
classes.” Ng 7:47–56 (cited in Final Act. 9). Wong teaches a “System
of Engagement application,” namely, a “Spatial Chat Engine” that
allows users to move around a two-dimensional space and “chat with
only whomever is in the vicinity of the user.” Wong 21:10–13 (cited
in Final Act 12). We agree with the Examiner that it would have been
obvious to modify Ng’s object classes defining Ng’s objects based on
the teachings of Wong “to allow the system to be able to make a
particular class to represent an object/entity in a system of
engagement application,” e.g., to use Ng’s object classes to define the
user objects in Wong’s Spatial Chat application. See Final Act. 12.
Indeed, although the Examiner does not rely on Wong for teaching an
object oriented application containing objects, it does. See Wong
28:51–54 (teaching the “users” in the application can be represented
by “graphical objects”). Similarly, although the Examiner doesn’t rely
on Ng for teaching a “System of Engagement application,” it arguably
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does. See Ng 9:30–35. Fig. 8 (teaching a purchasing application
associating customer objects with order objects, and vice-versa).
The Examiner further relies on Wong’s system for enabling
users to send and receive messages (Wong 21:12–55), and to edit their
profiles and view the profiles of others (id. at 25:42–60), to teach or
suggest “wherein the complex object describes an entity in a System
of Engagement,” and further “wherein the System of Engagement
uses a System of Engagement application to retrieve and provide data
to a particular user according to the constraint, the attributes, and the
method of the complex object.” See Final Act. 12 (citing Wong
21:12–55, 25:42–60; Ng 7:51–56); Ans. 29–30.
Appellant argues that Wong fails to “describe any form of a
‘System of Engagement’, or a ‘System of Engagement’ that uses a
‘System of Engagement’ application.” Appeal Br. 37; see also Reply
Br. 21–22.5
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because, as the
Examiner correctly notes, the Specification fails to explicitly define a
“System of Engagement.” Ans. 29. The Specification instead

5 Appellant’s arguments in the Reply Brief are based in part on “Appendix
A” to the Reply Brief. See Reply Br. 21. This appendix (actually titled
“Appendix I”) reproduces an article, no longer available at the URL
provided in the appendix, by Erica Toelle: Systems of Record versus Systems
of Engagement, purportedly previously available at https://www.recordpoint.
com/system-record-system-engagement/ (Dec. 18, 2017). See Reply Br. 37–
38. This article constitutes evidence not previously before the Examiner.
Therefore, this article is not properly before us and we have not considered
it. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.33(d) (2018) (limiting admissibility of evidence after
an appeal has been filed).
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identifies “a MicroBlogger system” as an example of a System of
Engagement. See Spec. ¶ 2. Appellant fails to identify any
distinguishing features that define a System of Engagement in either
the Specification or in the claim recitations. Moreover, Wong’s
system provides for engagement by enabling users to send and receive
messages (Wong 21:12–55) and to edit their profiles and view the
profiles of others (id. at 25:42–60). That is, Wong’s system enables
users to communicate (i.e., engage) with each other. Therefore, we
agree with the Examiner that Wong teaches or suggests “wherein the
complex object describes an entity in a System of Engagement,” and
further “wherein the System of Engagement uses a System of
Engagement application to retrieve and provide data to a particular
user according to the constraint, the attributes, and the method of the
complex object,” as recited in claim 1. See Final Act. 12; Ans. 29–30.
The Examiner finds Ng’s class-to-table mapping, which
includes generating stored procedures “to perform routine operations
on objects such as Add, Delete, Modify and Retrieve data entries in
the database” (Ng 8:52–54) teaches or suggests “analyzing . . . the
object model to determine . . . at least one desired data service
representing an object service interface for accessing the complex
object” and “generating . . . at least one data service for the complex
object in the cloud environment, based on the desired . . . at least one
data service” (Final Act. 10 (citing Ng 7:43–45, 7:57–63, 8:47–54,
11:20–29)).
Appellant argues the Examiner erred because “[t]here is no
mention [in Ng] of any type of ‘interface’ for accessing a complex
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object” and that “tables are created from classes – without regards to
any ‘complex object’ or interface-access thereto.” Appeal Br. 33; see
also Reply Br. 18. Appellant argues, in particular, that “data stored in
a ‘database’ is retrieved – and the Ng ‘database’ is not equivalent to
the claimed ‘complex object’ since Ng does not describe obtaining a
‘class’ (which is alleged as being equivalent to the claimed ‘object
model’) of the ‘database.’” Appeal Br. 34; see also Reply Br. 18.
Appellant further argues “Ng does not describe generating such data
service with such ‘based on’ characteristics since it does not describe
a ‘desired data service’ representing an object service interface for
accessing the complex object.” Appeal Br. 35; see also Reply Br. 19.
Appellant’s arguments unpersuasively fail to distinguish the
claimed determining and generating at least one desired data service
representing an object service interface from Ng’s stored procedures,
“generated to perform routine operations on objects such as Add,
Delete, Modify and Retrieve data entries in the database.” Ng 8:52–54
(emphasis added). As Ng teaches, “tables in the database hav[e] rows
and columns corresponding to . . . one or more classes.” Id. at 7:64–
65. A “class having multiple field entries is mapped to a single table
wherein each column corresponds to each of the multiple fields” and
where a “row is added to the table for each object instance of the class
stored in the database.” Id. at 8:4–8. Moreover, Ng explicitly discloses
the generated stored procedures correspond “to operations typically
performed on objects in the object-oriented application.” Id. at 8:47–
48; see also id. at Fig. 6. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that
the generated stored procedures of Ng, which provide routines for
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adding, deleting, modifying, and retrieving data entries representing
object data, provide interfaces to the objects themselves. See Final
Act. 10; Ans. 25.
For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103
rejection of claim 1, and claims 12 and 20, which Appellant does not
argue separately. See Appeal Br. 32.
Appellant purports that claims 4, 7–11, 15, and 18 are part of
four separately patentable groups of claims. Id. at 50–56; Reply Br. at
29–32. Appellant’s arguments, however, are premised on alleged
deficiencies in Ng that Appellant argues with respect to claim 1. See,
e.g., Appeal Br. 53 (in Ng “a ‘class’ is translated to table entries in a
database – without regards to a ‘data service’ of a ‘complex object’”);
compare with, e.g., id. at 32–35. Appellant merely adds that Mazhar
and Kawaii—considered separately and not in combination with Ng—
fail to cure the alleged deficiency of Ng. See id. at 53–56. But as we
do not agree that Ng is deficient, and as non-obviousness cannot be
shown by attacking references individually (Keller, 642 F.2d at 426),
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive of error. Accordingly, we
also sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of claims 4, 7–
11, 15, and 18.
Claims 2 and 13
Claim 2 recites search-able, follow-able, tag-able, and
comment-able constraints on the complex object. The Examiner finds
that Wong teaches or suggests each of the recited constraints. See
Final Act. 13 (citing Wong 24:57–59, 25:42–60, 25:58–60, 26:5–12,
26:53–61); Ans. 43–51.
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Appellant contends the Examiner erred because Wong does not
have a “specific ‘constraint’ that indicates that a ‘complex object’ may
be ‘searched.’” Appeal Br. 45–46; see also Reply Br. 27 (“Wong –
whose teachings are devoid of any object model or complex object
characteristics – teaches an ability to search for actual ‘attributes’
themselves”).
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive because Wong
teaches that users can make certain information private and see the
public profile information of others. See Wong 25:45–52 (cited in
Ans. 44). Moreover, the Examiner properly relies on Ng to teach or
suggest the claimed complex object. See, e.g., Final Act. 9. We agree
with the Examiner that being able to make such information private
teaches or suggests making a complex object searchable (i.e., by
making data of the complex object public) or not searchable (i.e., by
making all of the complex object’s data private). See Ans. 44.
Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that Wong teaches or suggests
the claimed search-able constraint. Id.
Appellant argues the Examiner erred because Wong does not
mention “a specific constraint that indicates that a ‘complex object’
has a relationship with ‘other objects’ that follow the ‘complex
object.’” Appeal Br. 46; see also Reply Br. 28. Appellant further
argues Wong’s “follow me feature” is “a ‘people-based’ parameter.”
Appeal Br. 46.
Appellant’s argument are unpersuasive because Wong enables a
user to “invite other users to follow him/her.” Wong 26:53–54 (cited
in Final Act. 13). Moreover, the Examiner properly relies on Ng to
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teach or suggest the claimed complex object. See, e.g., Final Act. 9.
Ng’s complex objects can represent information about people. See Ng
9:33 (noting use of a customer object). We agree with the Examiner
that Wong’s invitation to follow—which, when combined with Ng,
would indicate that an object representing the user can be followed—
teaches or suggests the claimed follow-able constraint. Final Act. 9;
Ans. 45.
Appellant further argues the Examiner erred in finding Wong
teaches or suggests a tag-able constraint because “the tag-able
constraint (1) is object-based, and (2) pertains to specific ‘searching’
with respect to a ‘complex object.’” Appeal Br. 46; see also Reply Br.
28. Appellant similarly argues the Examiner erred in finding Wong
teaches or suggests a comment-able constraint because “Wong
describes currency, proxy, plans, messages – and that a user can edit
their profile – without regards to characteristics/features pertaining to
a ‘complex object’ or traits thereof.” Appeal Br. 46.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive because the Examiner
properly relies on Ng to teach or suggest the claimed complex object
(see, e.g., Final Act. 9) and because Ng’s complex objects can
represent information about people (see Ng 9:33). The Examiner also
properly relies on Wong’s list of friends and profile information
features to teach or suggest making information tag-able and
comment-able. See Final Act. 9 (citing Wong 25:45, 25:58–60, 6:5–
12). Thus, the combination of Ng and Wong teaches or suggests that
enacting edits to information about a user (e.g., to the user’s list of
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friends or profile) by enabling editing a complex object representing
information about the person.
For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103
rejection of claim 2, and claim 13, which Appellant does not argue
separately. See Appeal Br. 44.
Claims 3 and 14
In rejecting claim 3 as obvious, the Examiner finds that Ng’s
class hierarchy teaches or suggests “wherein the object model further
comprises information describing . . . a relationship . . . of the
complex object.” Final Act. 14 (citing Ng 7:57–63); see also Ans. 54.
Appellant argues the Examiner erred because in Ng “[t]here is
no mention of a ‘complex object’, and therefore [Ng] cannot describe
that an ‘object model’/‘class’ includes information describing a
relationship or conditions-action ‘of the complex object.’” Appeal Br.
49. This argument is similar to unpersuasive arguments Appellant
makes with respect to claim 1. See id. at 37–38. It is, therefore,
unpersuasive for similar reasons.
Appellant also argues that it is not enough “that an object
model/class can have relationships with other classes, including
relationships with other classes,” to demonstrate “obviousness with
respect to the claimed ‘object model’ and ‘complex object’ synergistic
interplay, where one (the ‘object mode[l]’ itself) describes
characteristics/features (relationship/conditions-actions) of the other
(the ‘complex object’).” Appeal Br. 50; see also Reply Br. 28–29.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because they are not
commensurate with the scope of claim 3. See Ans. 54 (Appellant’s
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arguments fail to “specifically point[] out how the language of the
claims patentably distinguishes them from the references”). Claim 3
does not have any “synergistic interplay” recitations or recitations
requiring that one object describes “characteristics/features” of
another object. Rather, claim 3 recites that the object model comprises
information describing a relationship of the complex object. Appellant
fails to distinguish this recitation from Ng’s class hierarchy
teachings—which describe the relationship between subclasses and
superclasses, such that objects instantiated by the subclass inherit
methods, fields, and other object-oriented characteristics of the
superclass. See Ng 7:60–62 (cited in Final Act. 14).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103
rejection of claim 3, and claim 14, which Appellant does not argue
separately. See Appeal Br. 48.
Claims 5 and 19
In rejecting claim 5 as obvious, the Examiner finds that
Crockett’s use of multiple forms of data storage, including text files,
combined with Vlahos’s querying from wrapped data sources teaches
or suggests the claim 5 limitation that “establishing of a mapping from
the . . . attributes to the corresponding data storage based on the
extracted metadata” comprises “determining . . . that the attributes are
. . . text data to be retrieved” and “mapping . . . the text data to be
retrieved to an index database system in response to determining that
the attributes are the text data to be retrieved.” Final Act. 22–23
(citing, e.g., Crockett ¶¶ 204–05; Vlahos ¶¶ 68, 82, 84); see also Ans.
70–75.
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Appellant argues the Examiner erred by failing
to establish a teaching of the specific claimed features of: (i) an
index database system, (ii) text data to be retrieved, or (iii)
mapping text data (to be retrieved) to an index database system,
where such mapping is specifically invoked/triggered by a
determination that the ‘attributes’ of a complex object are the
text data to be retrieved.
Appeal Br. 63; see also Reply Br. 34–35.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because Vlahos wraps
data sources such that records can be retrieved from a cache instead of
directly from the data sources, when the records exist in the
corresponding cache. Vlahos ¶ 82 (cited in Final Act. 23). Wrapper
caches can be implemented in relational databases (id. ¶ 69) and
different data sources are wrapped by different wrappers (id. ¶ 62, Fig.
3). Thus, in Vlahos, queries to a particular data source, such as text
data (see id. ¶ 68 (flat text files); see also Crockett 204–05), are
mapped to the wrapper for the particular data source (Vlahos ¶ 82,
Fig. 3). Moreover, the particular wrapper, having a relational database
to cache records for retrieval (i.e., that are indexed so that queries can
be used to obtain results without directly searching the cached data
source) teaches or suggests an index database system. Therefore, we
agree with the Examiner that the combination of Crockett and Vlahos
teaches or suggests “mapping . . . the text data to be retrieved to an
index database system in response to determining that the attributes
are the text data to be retrieved,” as recited in claim 5. See Final Act.
22–23.
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Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103
rejection of claim 5, and claims 19, which Appellant does not argue
separately. See Appeal Br. 62.
Claims 6 and 17
In rejecting claim 6 as obvious, the Examiner finds that Ng’s
generated stored procedures “to perform routine operations on objects
such as Add, Delete, Modify and Retrieve data entries in the
database” (Ng 8:52–54) and generated “object-oriented methods
corresponding to other stored procedures” (Ng 10:63–64) teaches or
suggests “determining . . . in response to the information describing
the attributes of the complex object, a first interface for adding,
deleting, modifying and querying the attributes” and “determining . . .
in response to the information describing the method of the complex
object, a second interface for exposing a public method” (Final Act.
19 (citing Ng 8:52–54, 10:63–67)). See also Ans. 67–70 (citing Ng
7:49–52, 8:47–64, Fig. 6).
Appellant argues the Examiner erred because in Ng “‘stored
procedures’ are generated – without any type of invocation/triggering
mechanism that is based on characteristics of a ‘complex object.’”
Appeal Br. 60; see also Reply Br. 33–34. Similarly, Appellant argues
the Examiner erred because in Ng “‘methods’ are generated – without
any type of invocation/triggering mechanism that is based on
characteristics of a ‘complex object.’” Appeal Br. 61.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because, as discussed
above with respect to the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim
1, Ng generates stored procedures (i.e., interfaces) “to perform routine
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operations on objects such as Add, Delete, Modify and Retrieve data
entries in the database.” Ng 8:52–54 (cited in Final Act. 19) (emphasis
added). Moreover, Ng’s classes have methods that “are used to
manipulate the objects derived from the corresponding classes.” Id. at
7:54–56. The Examiner’s findings show that Ng’s teaching of
generating methods to provide access to stored procedures (Ng 10:63–
64) suggests generating a stored procedure (i.e., an interface) to access
a method. See Final Act. 19. We agree with the Examiner that
generating an additional interface would have been obvious as a way
of providing the ability to manipulate objects using their methods
rather than only enabling routine operations to be performed on the
objects. See Ans. 68.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103
rejection of claim 6, and claim 17, which Appellant does not argue
separately. See Appeal Br. 59.
Claim 16
In rejecting claim 16 as obvious, the Examiner finds that
Shiffer’s determination as to whether input data is structured, and
extracting individual records for indexing, teaches or suggests
“program instructions to determine that the attribute is any one of
structural data, semi-structural data, non-structural data, spatial data
and text data to be retrieved based on the extracted metadata” and
“program instructions to map the attribute to a relational database in
response to determining that the attribute is the structural data.” Final
Act. 18 (citing Shiffer ¶ 159); see also Ans. 63–66.
Appellant contends the Examiner erred because in Shiffer
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‘search results’ are placed within an index that is associated
with a metadata store or content store if the search query input
data is non-structured; and ‘individual records’ of a structured
XML search query are extracted for indexing if the search
query input data is structured – without regards to any database/
system-based mapping that is specially invoked/triggered based
on the type of the attribute defined by an object model of a
complex object.
Appeal Br. 58; see also Reply Br. 33. Appellant further argues
Shiffer’s “system can determine if the input data is unstructured or
structured – without regards to any use of (‘based on’) ‘extracted
metadata.’” Appeal Br. 58; see also Reply Br. 32–33.
Appellant’s argument are unpersuasive because the Examiner,
in rejecting claim 15 (from which claim 16 depends), finds that the
combination of Ng and Mazhar teaches or suggests mapping an
attribute to a corresponding data storage based on metadata extracted
from an object model. See Ans. 64; Final Act. 14 (citing Ng 8:1–7,
8:47–54; Mazhar ¶¶ 35–36), 17. The Examiner properly relies on
Shiffer’s structured data categorization to teach or suggest use of the
extracted metadata to determine if the attribute is “any one of
structural data.” See Final Act. 18. Moreover, Shiffer teaches that
structured data can be handled by (i.e., be mapped to) a relational
database. Shiffer ¶ 159. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that
the combination of Ng, Mazhar, and Shiffer teaches or suggests
“program instructions to determine that the attribute is any one of
structural data, semi-structural data, non-structural data, spatial data
and text data to be retrieved based on the extracted metadata” and
“program instructions to map the attribute to a relational database in
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response to determining that the attribute is the structural data,” as
recited in claim 16. See Final Act. 14, 17–18.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103
rejection of claim 16.
CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. §
References/
Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–10, 12–20 101 Eligibility 1–10, 12–20
1–4, 7–15,
18, 20
103 Ng, Mazhar,
Kawai, Wong
1–4, 7–15,
18, 20

5, 19 103 Ng, Mazhar,
Kawai, Wong,
Crockett, Vlahos
5, 19
6, 17 103 Ng, Mazhar,
Kawai, Wong,
Gorelik
6, 17
16 103 Ng, Mazhar,
Kawai, Wong,
Shiffer,
16
Overall
Outcome
1–20
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED

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THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
On slightly different determinations, I might join the analysis of my
colleagues with respect to the §101 rejection of claims 1–10 and 12–20.
Although the majority has properly summarized the law and general two-
part test for determining whether the claimed subject matter is patent eligible
under the Alice/Mayo framework, which I do not repeat here, I write
separately because I find the majority’s application of the test to the facts
partly conflates “abstract concepts” with “additional elements.”
Specifically, the majority point out that claim 1 recites “obtaining . . .
analyzing . . . and generating.” Decision 10. The majority thereafter
determines, that “the claimed steps are similar to patent-ineligible mental
processes.” See id. at 11.
However, beyond the abstract ideas noted above in the Prong-1
analysis, claim 1 also recites several additional elements: “a cloud
environment,” “one or more processors,” “a System of Engagement,”
“a System of Engagement application,” “data storage,” “data service,” and
“an object service interface.” Although such additional elements are
discussed in the majority’s step 2B analysis (see Decision 16), the majority
fails to distinguish the additional elements under the Prong 2 analysis.6 In

6 I acknowledge that some of the considerations at Step 2A, Prong 2,
properly may be evaluated under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of the Office
revised guidance). For purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within
the Office, we evaluate them under Step 1 of Alice (Step 2A of the Office
revised guidance). See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.25, 27–32.

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any case, it appears that the majority is noting the “generating” step as both
an “abstract idea,” i.e., a mental process and as an “additional element.”
Under the Revised Guidance, we must determine if additional
elements in the claims integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). It is my opinion that the
majority Decision should clearly treat the “generating . . . at least one data
storage and at least one data service” as an additional element, as opposed to
suggesting it is also an abstract idea, for the purpose of determining whether
this step integrates the judicial exception into a practical application. I thus
concur in the affirmance of the § 101 rejection but clarify that the
“generating step” should be one or the other, abstract idea or additional
element, but not both.
Regarding the § 103 rejection, I disagree with the majority in
affirming this rejection. In particular, I disagree with the majority’s
adoption of the Examiner’s interpretation regarding the claimed “complex
object” feature.
For example, Claim 1 recites “obtaining . . . an object model of the
complex object . . . wherein the complex object describes an entity in a
System of Engagement.” See claim 1. Similarly, Appellant’s Specification
states that “‘a complex object’ is used to represent an object describing an
entity in the System of Engagement application.” See Spec. ¶ 56. As such, I
believe both claim 1 and Appellant’s Specification requires “a complex
object” to describe an entity in a System of Engagement. Additionally,
claim 1 requires the complex object to be continuously evolving with
growing data and a varying structure.
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The Examiner admits that Ng “does not appear to explicitly teach . . .
the complex object describes an entity in a System of Engagement.” See
Final Act. 10. Instead, the Examiner clearly relies upon Wong to teach the
System Engagement feature. Id. at 12. However, the majority is dismissing
the Examiner’s findings and asserts that Ng also arguably teaches a System
of Engagement, without properly noting this as a new ground. See Decision
24. The majority further dismisses the Examiner’s finding that Wong does
not teach a complex object, again without noting this as a new ground. Id. at
24–25.
My remarks are based on the Examiner’s explicit findings, which
Appellant is responding thereto. In other words, in the Final Action, because
the Examiner is relying on Wong (not Ng) to teach a System Engagement, it
appears to me that the Examiner should also be relying on Wong, not Ng, to
teach or suggest the claimed “complex object.” As noted by Appellant, and
I agree,
the Examiner has failed to identify [in the Final Action] what
aspect of Ng is alleged to be equivalent to the claimed ‘complex
object’ – instead asserting that Ng’s ‘class’ is equivalent to the
claimed ‘object model,’ but providing no guidance as to what
element of Ng is equivalent to the claimed ‘complex object.’
Appeal Br. 34.
In any case, Appellant argues that neither Ng nor Wong teaches or
suggests the “complex object.” See Appeal Br. 36. The majority also
acknowledges that Appellant contends that neither Ng nor Wong teach a
“complex object.” See Decision 22. Yet, the majority accuse Appellant of
attacking the references individually. Id. at 23. I disagree with the majority
that Appellant are arguing the references individually with regard to the
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“complex object” limitation, given that Appellant argues the neither Ng nor
Wong teach this limitation. Arguing the references individually implies that
Appellant only argues a single reference, the references that is not being
specifically relied upon. That is not the case here. Unfortunately, because
the majority believes Appellant is arguing the reference individually, some
arguments made by Appellant are ignored.
The majority also states that they “agree with the Examiner that Wong
teaches or suggests ‘wherein the complex object describes an entity in a
System of Engagement.” Decision 26. It is not clear to me how the majority
in one instance can say that the Examiner does not rely on Wong to teach the
“complex object” (see Decision 23) and then on the other hand state that
they agree with the Examiner that Wong teaches the complex object
describes an entity in a System of Engagement. Stated differently, if the
majority agrees with the Examiner that Wong does not teach the “complex
object” then how can Wong teach that the complex object describes an entity
in a System of Engagement?
Finally, in the Answer, the Examiner appears to clarify that “the
objects of Ng are representative of the complex object . . . the complex
object was equivalent to the object.” Ans. 25–26. However, claim 1
requires that that complex object (1) describes an entity in a System of
Engagement; and (2) is continuously evolving with growing data and a
varying structure. See claim 1. The Examiner clearly admits that Ng does
not teach limitations (1) and (2), but instead relies upon Wong and Kawai,
respectively. See Final Act. 11–12. However, the majority’s Decision is a
bit fuzzy regarding which findings the majority are relying on, the
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Examiner’s or the new findings noted supra in the Decision, which clearly
contradict the Examiner’s findings.
In any case, I am particularly troubled by the chain of causation that is
split between the multiple references in the Examiner’s proffered
combination of Ng, Wong, and Kawai. Here, the Examiner has merely
shown that Ng teaches objects, but has not shown in Ng the descriptive
limitations that signify a “complex object.” Also, the Examiner’s proffered
evidence does not show a linkage between Ng’s objects and Wong’s alleged
System of Engagement and/or Kawai’s continuously evolving object.
As such, I believe the Examiner has resorted to speculation,
unfounded assumptions, or hindsight reconstruction to supply deficiencies in
the factual basis. In re Warner, 379, F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967).
Therefore, I find persuasive Appellant’s arguments that neither Ng nor
Wong teach a complex object because without illustrating a nexus between
Ng, Wong, and Kawai objects, the Examiner’s reasons to combine are
merely conjecture.
Respectfully, I would reverse the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
the claims.