International Business Machines Corporation

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 1, 2020

2020002166 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 1, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/951,916 11/25/2015 Gregory J. Boss YOR920151060US1 8870
35526 7590 07/01/2020
DUKE W. YEE
YEE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
P.O. BOX 190809
DALLAS, TX 75219
EXAMINER
EL-BATHY, IBRAHIM N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/01/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ptonotifs@yeeiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte GREGORY J. BOSS, RICK A. HAMILTON II, JAMES R.
KOZLOSKI, BRIAN M. O’CONNELL, and CLIFFORD A. PICKOVER
____________

Appeal 2020-002166
Application 14/951,9161
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, CYNTHIA L. MURPHY, and
AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges.

FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1, 5–12, 14 and 17-20. Claims 2–4, 13, 15 and 16
have been cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.

1 Appellant identifies International Business Machines Corporation as the
real party in interest. (Appeal Br. 2.)
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THE INVENTION
Appellant states “[t]he disclosure relates generally to electric vehicles
and more specifically to managing an exchange of an electric vehicle having
an insufficient battery charge to reach a user-desired destination with
another electric vehicle that has sufficient battery charge to reach the user-
desired destination.” (Spec. ¶ 1.)
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal.
1. A computer-implemented method for managing an
electric vehicle exchange, the computer-implemented method
comprising:
selecting, by a computer, an available electric vehicle
having a highest exchange score to perform an exchange at a
selected charging station with another electric vehicle that has an
insufficient battery charge level to reach a travel destination of
the another electric vehicle;
responsive to the computer determining that a current
battery charge level of the available electric vehicle is sufficient
to reach the travel destination of the another electric vehicle,
determining, by the computer, whether the exchange will allow
the available electric vehicle to reach a travel destination of the
available electric vehicle;
responsive to the computer determining that the exchange
will allow the available electric vehicle to reach the travel
destination of the available electric vehicle, sending, by the
computer, routing information via a network to a navigation
system of the available electric vehicle to the selected charging
station;
determining, by the computer, whether a user of the
available electric vehicle agrees to the exchange at the selected
charging station;
receiving, by the computer, the travel destination from a
navigation system of the another electric vehicle via the network;
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determining, by the computer, a current battery charge
level of the another electric vehicle based on data received from
a sensor system of the another electric vehicle; and
predicting, by the computer, a travel distance of the
another electric vehicle at the current battery charge level of the
another electric vehicle.

THE REJECTION
The following rejection is before us for review.2
Claims 1, 5–12, 14 and 17203 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101
because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without
significantly more.

FINDINGS OF FACT
We adopt the Examiner’s findings as set forth on pages 3–5 and
11–13 in the Final Office Action4 and on pages 3–11 in the Examiner’s
Answer, concerning only the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection.

ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We affirm the rejection of claims 1, 5–12, 14, and 17–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.

2 The Examiner withdrew the rejection of claims 1, 5–12, 14, and 17–20
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). (Answer 3).
3 The status of claims on appeal are based on those submitted in the After
Final Response dated June 18, 2019 which were entered for purposes of
appeal in the Advisory Action dated July 18, 2019.
4 All references to the Final Office Action refer to the Final Office Action
mailed on May 3, 2019.
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The Appellant argues claims 1, 6–12, 14, and 17, 19, 20 as a group.
(Appeal Br. 8.) We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this group,
and so the remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2019).
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept
of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
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such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
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monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“Guidance”).5 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency
management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October
2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th
ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).6
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.

5 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
6 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg.
at 54–55.
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter
to claims, considered in light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their
character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet
Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement
in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract
idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See Enfish,
822 F.3d at 1335–36.
In so doing, as indicated above, we apply a “directed to” two prong
test: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the
claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether the claim “appl[ies],
rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 53; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).

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Accordingly, we find that the Specification states:
Typically, a single individual usually rents a rental vehicle
from a rental company and that same individual must return that
particular rental vehicle to the rental company. This may present
a problem for renters when renting electronic vehicles that have
limited travel range due to battery charge. Range, as is
commonly referred to in electric vehicle literature, refers to the
remaining distance an electric vehicle can travel with the amount
of battery charge the electric vehicle currently has on board.
(Spec. ¶ 3.)
The Examiner finds that claim 1 recites a method of “managing
electric vehicle exchange (emphasis omiotted)” and hence, “organizing
human activity.” (Final Act. 3.) The Examiner finds in support of this
finding that:
Appellant’s Specification ¶76-¶78 and ¶81 shows managing
relationship between a rental car user and rental services as for
example “ensure a useful exchange of electric vehicles, which is
beneficial for both rental parties involved in the exchange and
the electric vehicle rental service . . . initiating an exchange of
batteries between the electric vehicles by the users based on the
determining steps” which shows there’s an exchange an
interaction between people for vehicle rental service.
(Ans. 4.)
The preamble states claim 1 is “for managing an electric vehicle
exchange.”
Claim 1 recites in pertinent part:
selecting, . . . an available electric vehicle having a highest
exchange score to perform an exchange at a selected charging
station with another electric vehicle that has an insufficient
battery charge level to reach a travel destination of the another
electric vehicle;
responsive to . . . determining that a current battery charge
level of the available electric vehicle is sufficient to reach the
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travel destination of the another electric vehicle, determining, . . .
whether the exchange will allow the available electric vehicle to
reach a travel destination of the available electric vehicle;
responsive to . . . determining that the exchange will allow
the available electric vehicle to reach the travel destination of the
available electric vehicle, sending, . . . routing information via a
network to a navigation system of the available electric vehicle
to the selected charging station; determining . . . whether a
user of the available electric vehicle agrees to the exchange at the
selected charging station; receiving . . . the travel
destination from a navigation system of the another electric
vehicle via the network; determining . . . a current battery
charge level of the another electric vehicle based on data received
from a sensor system of the another electric vehicle; and
predicting . . . a travel distance of the another electric
vehicle at the current battery charge level of the another electric
vehicle.
Thus, all this intrinsic evidence shows that claim 1 recites managing an
exchange of an electric vehicle having an insufficient battery charge to reach
a user-desired destination with another electric vehicle that has sufficient
battery charge to reach the user-desired destination. This is consistent with
the Examiner’s determination. Personal behavior or interactions are
apparent in claim limitations such as, “determining, . . . whether the
exchange will allow the available electric vehicle to reach a travel
destination of the available electric vehicle”; and “determining . . . whether a
user of the available electric vehicle agrees to the exchange at the selected
charging station.” The user-desired destination is also governed by human
behavior. Managing personal behavior or interactions between people is one
of certain methods of organizing human activity– a judicial exception.
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Turning to the second prong of the “directed to” test, claim 1 only
generically requires “a computer,” “electric vehicle,” “a charging station”
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and “a sensor system.” These components are described in the Specification
at a high level of generality. (See Spec. ¶¶ 15–24, Fig. 1.) We fail to see
how the generic recitations of these most basic computer components and/or
of a system so integrate the judicial exception as to “impose[] a meaningful
limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 53. We find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant
direct us to any indication, that the operations recited in independent claim 1
invoke any assertedly inventive programming, require any specialized
computer hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a
particular machine, or that the claimed invention is implemented using other
than generic computer components to perform generic computer functions.
See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic
computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-
eligible.”).
Thus, we find that claim 1 recites the judicial exception of a certain
method of organizing human activity that is not integrated into a practical
application.
That the claims do not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be
limited to driver behavior using an electric vehicle, does not make them any
less abstract. See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359,
1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“And that the claims do not preempt all price
optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce
setting do not make them any less abstract.”).
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Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that
the claims are directed to abstract ideas/judicial exceptions, the claims must
include an “inventive concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must
be an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim
in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
Concerning this step the Examiner finds the following:

The claim[s] do not include additional elements that are
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception because, as discussed above, the additional elements
amount to mere instructions to apply the exception using a
generic computer. Furthermore, the sending of routing
information through a network to a navigation system is extra-
solution activity that the courts have found to be well understood
routine and conventional activity.
Final Act. 12–13.
We agree with the Examiner. “[T]he relevant question is whether the
claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the
abstract idea . . . on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. They do
not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer to select, determine, send, receive, and apply decision criteria to
data as a result amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of the
most basic functions of a computer. All of these computer functions are
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354
(Fed. Cir. 2016); see also In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent
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Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower
construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those
functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special
programming”). In short, each step does no more than require a generic
computer to perform generic computer functions. The claims do not, for
example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. In
addition, as we stated above, the claims do not affect an improvement in any
other technology or technical field. The Specification spells out different
generic equipment and parameters that might be applied using this concept
and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on
the concept of information access under different scenarios (see, e.g., Spec.
¶¶ 15–24, Fig. 1). Thus, the claims at issue amount to nothing significantly
more than instructions to apply the abstract idea using some unspecified,
generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 225–226.
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellant’s claims add nothing that is not already present when the steps are
considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis (selecting,
determining (successively), receiving, and predicting) and storing is equally
generic and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract. See Ultramercial,
Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of
receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and
receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed
Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that
sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and
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transmission was abstract), Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable
Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding sequence of
processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was abstract). The ordering
of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional.
We have reviewed all the arguments Appellant has submitted
concerning the patent eligibility of the claims before us that stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (Appeal Br. 7–28, Reply Br. 2–8.) We find that our
analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments
(including those made in support of claims 5 and 18), which have been
made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address various
arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same.
Appellant argues:
a series of computer-performed steps are recited that do not
involve any ‘human activities’ or ‘people activities’ at all, and
therefore there is no organizing[] of ‘human activities’ recited in
Claim 1 since human activities are not structured or formed into
a coherent unity by any claimed feature.
(Appeal Br. 8.)
We disagree with Appellant because as the Examiner finds, the
Specification and claim steps “show[] there’s an exchange [or] an interaction
between people for vehicle rental service.” (Ans. 4.) That is, the claimed
predicting, “a travel distance of the another electric vehicle at the current
battery charge level of the another electric vehicle,” is the result of the
driving behavior taken relative to electric vehicle range. Using Appellant’s
words, “coherent unity” (Appeal Br. 8), occurs by virtue of coordinating the
exchange between the available vehicle and the another vehicle for the
purpose of meeting the user’s requirements that derive from the user’s
driving behavior.
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Appellant next asserts that the claimed features are integrated into a
practical application because:
[1)] specific ‘routing information’ is sent to a navigation system
of an available electric vehicle that has been determined to have
a current battery charge level that is sufficient to reach the travel
destination of another electric vehicle that has an insufficient
battery charge level to reach a travel destination of such another
electric vehicle[,]
…
2) “‘routing information’ is sent to a navigation system of the available
electric vehicle when it is determined that a vehicle exchange will allow the
available electric vehicle to reach the travel destination of the available
electric vehicle,”… and 3) “‘travel distance’ of the another electric vehicle at
the current battery charge level of the another electric vehicle is predicted.”
(Appeal Br. 9.)
We disagree with Appellant. As we found above, the device
components of claim 1 are generic recitations of the most basic computer
components and/or of a power system which do not integrate the judicial
exception as to “impose[] a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such
that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53. Thus, there can be no
practical application.
Also, in each of Appellant’s points 1–3 above, items such as, “routing
information,” “a user agreement,” “exchange score” and “travel distance”
are data being operated on by the computer system. (Appeal Br. 9.) As to
such data operated upon, “even if a process of collecting and analyzing
information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that
limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract.”
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SAP Am. Inc. v. InvestPic LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
As to Appellant’s assertion that “[a] technology-based solution of
extending battery life is also provided by taking into account battery
depletion issues” (Appeal Br. 9), we note that an improvement in efficiency
alone does not render a claim patent eligible:
[w]hile the claimed system and method certainly purport to
accelerate the process of analyzing audit log data, the speed
increase comes from the capabilities of a general-purpose
computer, rather than the patented method itself. See Bancorp
Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d
1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required
calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer
does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed
subject matter.”).
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Appellant next argues:
The resulting synergistic interplay is thus seen as being two
special invocation/triggering mechanisms that are used to
specially invoke specific processing steps pertaining to providing
special routing information to a vehicle that has both (1) an
adequate battery charge and (2) the desired travel by such vehicle
is allowed by the exchange.
(Appeal Br. 10.)
First, Appellant’s arguments are not commensurate with the broader
scope of claim 1 which does not recite invocation/triggering mechanisms.
Second, as found above, claim 1 recites no inventive concept under a
35 U.S.C. § 101 analysis. Appellant’s points 1 and 2 above are directed to
abstract ideas which “merely present[] the results of abstract processes of
collecting and analyzing information [in human comprehensible form],
without more (such as identifying a particular tool for presentation), is
abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis.” SAP Am.,
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898 F.3d at 1167.
To the extent that Appellant is arguing that claim synergism operates
to effect a nonobvious result, we note that synergism in and of itself, is not
conclusive of unobviousness in that synergism might be expected. In re
Huellmantel, 324 F.2d 998, 1003 (CCPA 1963). Even so, a novel and non-
obvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-
ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90; see also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89
(“The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process
itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim
falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”).
Claims 5 and 18
Appellant’s argument to claims 5 and 8 are similar to those made for
claim 1 concerning the practical application argument (see Appeal Br. 10),
particularly to the triggering aspect of the claims. For the same reasons
given above for why this argument was not persuasive for claim 1, it
likewise is not persuasive for claims 5 and 18 either.
Appellant’s other arguments, including those directed to now-
superseded USPTO guidance, have been considered but are not persuasive
of error. (See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-
related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R–08.2017, of the MPEP
(published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”)).

CONCLUSION
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1, 5–12, 14
and 17–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

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In summary:

DECISION
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 5–12, 14,
17–20
§ 101 Eligibility 1, 5–12, 14,
17–20