Integrated Device Technology, Inc.v.Manage-ment Science Associates, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 20, 2001

No. 91115082 (T.T.A.B. Jul. 20, 2001)

7/20/01

Paper No. 31
EJS

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
______

Integrated Device Technology, Inc.

v.

Management Science Associates, Inc.
_____

Opposition No. 115,082
to application Serial No. 75/510,183
filed on June 29, 1998
_____

Steven F. Lincoln of Skjerven, Morrill, MacPherson,
Franklin & Friel, LLP for Integrated Device Technology,
Inc.

Jon G. Hogue and George F. Pomper of Hogue & Lannis for
Management Science Associates, Inc.
______

Before Seeherman, Quinn and Bucher, Administrative
Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Seeherman, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Integrated Device Technology, Inc. has opposed the
application of Management Science Associates, Inc. to
register IDT as a trademark for “computer software for
use in the transfer of files via global computer
THIS DISPOSITION IS NOT
CITABLE AS PRECEDENT
OF THE TTAB
Opposition No. 115,082
2
information networks.”1 Opposer has brought this
opposition on the ground of likelihood of confusion,
alleging that opposer designs, manufactures, sells and
distributes integrated circuits, microprocessors, logic
devices, networking products and communication memories;
that it has used its IDT trade name and trademark to
identify its company and its products and services since
as early as June 1980; that it owns three trademark
registrations for IDT and design marks, and a trademark
application for IDT and design; that applicant’s mark is
identical to opposer’s trade name and trademark, that
opposer uses its IDT mark with software and other goods
that are closely related to applicant’s, and that the
parties’ goods are purchased by the same class of
purchasers through similar channels of trade; and, as a
result, applicant’s use of its mark is likely to cause
confusion or mistake or to deceive.
Applicant has denied the salient allegations of the
notice of opposition in its answer.
The case has been fully briefed;2 an oral hearing was
not requested.

1 Application Serial No. 75/510,183, filed June 29, 1998, and
asserting a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce.
2 With its appeal brief applicant has submitted a copy of a
Board decision marked “This opinion is not citable as precedent
of the TTAB.” In its reply brief opposer objected to the
Opposition No. 115,082
3
With certain exceptions, the parties are in
agreement as to what constitutes the record, which is set
out at pages 3 and 4 of opposer’s brief, and pages 2 and
3 of applicant’s brief. We now address the exceptions.
On January 8, 2001, after the filing of opposer’s main
brief on the case, applicant filed a “Second Notice of
Reliance under Rule Regarding Judicial Notice.”
Technically this is not a notice of reliance, which would
be manifestly untimely because applicant’s testimony
period had closed more than three months earlier. We
therefore view it as a request that we take judicial
notice of the materials submitted with the notice. The
materials consist of third-party registrations of
trademarks taken from the USPTO electronic files, and
excepts from forms filed with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). We decline to judicially
notice these materials. It is well established that the
Board does not take judicial notice of registrations that
reside in the Patent and Trademark Office. In re Duofold
Inc., 184 USPQ 638 (TTAB 1974). Nor are filings with the
SEC the kind of evidence of which the Board takes
judicial notice.

inclusion of this document. Opposer’s objection is well taken,
and the non-citable decision has not been considered.
Opposition No. 115,082
4
On January 19, 2001, on the same date opposer filed
its reply brief on the case, opposer, too, filed a
“Second Notice of Reliance re Rule Regarding Judicial
Notice.” Again, this is not technically a notice of
reliance, which would be manifestly untimely, but a
request that the Board take judicial notice of the
submitted materials, which consist of printouts of pages
from applicant’s Web site. The Board does not take
judicial notice of such material. Further, to consider
such material, after applicant’s brief on the case has
been filed, and applicant has no opportunity to respond,
would be prejudicial.
Accordingly, neither of the so-called second notices
of reliance have been considered.
Applicant has also objected to, and has moved to
strike, five exhibits and related testimony which were
introduced by opposer during the cross-examination of
applicant’s witness Paul Grubbs. These exhibits consist
of pages which opposer asserts were downloaded from
applicant’s Web site. Applicant contends that these
exhibits were not properly authenticated by the witness
as being from applicant’s Web site, nor is there evidence
to show that Mr. Grubbs had personal knowledge of the
matters contained in the exhibits. Opposer has opposed
Opposition No. 115,082
5
the motion, and applicant has filed a reply brief in
support of it.
We grant applicant’s motion to the extent that
Exhibits 5, 6, 7, 9 and 12, and testimony relating solely
to the contents of those exhibits, have not been
considered. These exhibits were never properly
authenticated by the witness. For example, with respect
to Exhibit 6, at the deposition it was opposer’s attorney
who stated that “what’s been marked as Exhibit 6 is again
another collection of pages from MSA’s Web site….”
Grubbs dep., p. 48. Mr. Grubbs was never asked if he
recognized the document as being from the Web site; he
was simply asked to look at the document to determine
whether the statements made in it were correct.3 With
respect to Exhibit 12, even opposer acknowledges that
“Mr. Grubbs did not expressly authenticate Exhibit 12,
nor did he seem to have much knowledge about the four
trade shows or events listed in that exhibit.” Opposer’s
brief in opposition to the motion to strike, p. 12.
There are similar problems with respect to authentication
of the remaining exhibits as well.

3 It should be noted that Mr. Grubbs’s testimony in this regard
was that he was not familiar with the services provided by the
division.
Opposition No. 115,082
6
Further, the Board is not persuaded by opposer’s
arguments to find these exhibits admissible under the
provisions of Rules 901(4) and 902(7) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. See Raccioppi v. Apogee Inc., 47
USPQ2d 1368 (TTAB 1998). 4
However, to the extent that Mr. Grubbs’ testified as
to his own knowledge regarding the contents of the
exhibits in question, that testimony is admissible. (It
would appear that applicant’s motion to strike does not
apply to such testimony in any case, in view of
applicant’s attorney’s agreement with the statement made
by opposer’s attorney at Mr. Grubbs’ deposition, that
“even if certain exhibits are struck, any testimony from
the witness that’s based on his own knowledge and not
necessarily on what’s contained in those exhibits is not
going to be struck.”
The record, then, consists of the pleadings; the
file of the opposed application; applicant’s responses to
certain of opposer’s interrogatories, and opposer’s
responses to certain of applicant’s interrogatories,
submitted by the respective parties under notices of
reliance; the affidavit testimony, with exhibits, of
opposer’s witnesses Phil Bourekas, Isabelle McAndrews and

4 Even if the exhibits and all appurtenant testimony were
Opposition No. 115,082
7
applicant’s witnesses Paul Grubbs and Joseph Delval, and
the rebuttal testimony affidavit of Alisa Johnson;5 and
the cross-examination depositions, with exhibits, of Phil
Bourekas, Isabelle McAndrews, Paul Grubbs6 and Joseph
Delval.
Isabelle McAndrews testified as to the current
status and title of opposer’s pleaded registrations, and
also made of record its registration which resulted from
the application asserted in the notice of opposition.
Accordingly, we deem the pleadings to be amended to
include the latter registration. The record shows that
opposer owns the following registrations:

Mark

Goods

Random access memory
apparatus7

considered, it would not change the result in this case.
5 The parties stipulated that affidavit testimony could be
submitted. In view of the parties’ agreement that Ms. Johnson’s
affidavit forms part of the record, we need not determine
whether her testimony would constitute proper rebuttal.
6 Consistent with our discussion above, the only exhibits of
record submitted with Mr. Grubbs’ testimony are Exhibits Nos. 1,
2 and 4.
7 Registration No. 1,244,288, issued July 5, 1983. Section 8
affidavit accepted; Section 15 affidavit received. The
registration bears the statement, “The mark comprises a circular
design within which is the semiconductor grid design and
mathematical integral sign and the letters ‘dt’.” Further, no
claim is made to the exclusive right to use the design of a
mathematical semiconductor grid or a mathematical integral sign,
apart from the mark as shown.
Opposition No. 115,082
8

Electronic semiconductor
components, namely random
access memories,
programmable read only
memories; bit-slice
apparatuses;
microprocessors; sequencers;
error detection and
correction apparatuses;
register files; support
chips; multipliers; analog-
to-digital converters; and
binary counters.8

Mark

Goods

Electronic semiconductor
components, namely random
access memories;
programmable read only
memories; bit-slice
apparatuses;
microprocessors; sequencers;
error detection and
correction apparatuses;
register files; support
chips; multipliers; analog-
to-digital converters; and

8 Registration No. 1,542,345, issued June 6, 1989. Section 8
affidavit accepted; Section 15 affidavit received. The
registration bears the statement “The mark comprises the
stylized letters ‘IDT’ and design.”
Opposition No. 115,082
9
to-digital converters; and
binary counters.9

Semiconductor devices,
semiconductor memory
modules, computer programs
for use in the design and
application of semiconductor
devices, microprocessors,
and microcontrollers.10

The evidence opposer has provided regarding its use
of its mark and trade name is relatively sketchy. For
example, opposer never provided specific testimony as to
the date on which it began using its trade name or any of
its four trademarks, relying only on the date of first
use indicated in each of the trademark registrations.
However, the date of use listed on a certificate of
registration, which merely reflects the date of first use
provided by the registrant in its application, is not
evidence that the mark was actually used on that date.
See Section 7(b) of the Trademark Act, for the
presumptions provided by a certificate of registration.
Opposer’s evidence is also vague with respect to the
specific marks used on any of its goods. Throughout Mr.

9 Registration No. 1,542,346, issued June 6, 1989; Section 8
affidavit accepted; Section 15 affidavit received. The
registration bears the statements, “The lining in the mark are
inherent elements of the mark and are not intended to indicate
color" and “the mark comprises the stylized letters 'DT' within
a circular design which contains two dots."
10 Registration No. 2,300,863, issued December 14, 1999.
Opposition No. 115,082
10
Bourekas’ testimony he refers to the IDT marks without
indicating the particular mark involved. Further, no
exhibits showing actual trademark have been submitted.
The only exhibit opposer has submitted, aside from its
registrations (and the exhibits as to applicant’s
activities) consists of several press releases. However,
the testimony pertaining to these releases merely states
that the releases describe certain of opposer’s recently
developed products; there is no information as to the
distribution of the releases.
Similarly, although opposer has submitted testimony
that it engages in print advertising, it has not provided
any information as to the publications in which it
advertises.
Priority is not in issue in view of opposer’s
registrations. See King Candy Company v. Eunice King’s
Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108 (CCPA 1974).
Accordingly, we turn our attention to the issue of
likelihood of confusion. In determining this question,
we have looked to the evidence submitted in connection
with the factors enunciated in In re E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973).
Considering first the factor of fame, we cannot
agree with opposer that the mark IDT is famous. The
Opposition No. 115,082
11
basis for its claim is that “by virtue of that
longstanding and continuous use—domestically and
internationally—Opposer has established the ‘IDT’ mark as
a prominent and recognizable trademark….” Brief, p. 19.
To establish this claim opposer relies on its three
registrations (Nos. 1,244,288; 1,542,345 and 1,542,346)
which claim first use dates of 1982. As noted above, the
dates of use recited in a trademark registration are not
evidence of use of the mark. In any event, even
testimony that a mark has been used for twenty years is
not, by itself, sufficient to demonstrate fame of a mark
since minimal sales over a twenty-year period would not,
in general, support a finding of fame. In this case,
opposer has not provided any information at all as to the
amount of sales of goods under any of the IDT marks from
which we could conclude that the consuming public regards
IDT as a famous mark. Similarly, opposer has not shown
that it has engaged in substantial advertising efforts
which would demonstrate the fame of its marks. The
affidavit of Alisa Johnson states that the company “ran a
RISC family of products advertisement twenty-four times
in Calendar Year (CY) 1993 and eight times in CY 1994”
and that it “also ran an Orion (evaluation board/kit)
advertisement fourteen times in CY 1994 (and likely in CY
Opposition No. 115,082
12
1995).” Paragraph 3. It is not clear from this
affidavit whether the products advertised even showed or
were sold under any of the IDT trademarks pleaded herein,
as opposer did not submit these advertisements as
exhibits. Nor did opposer provide information as to
which publications these print advertisements appeared
in, or indicate whether it produced any print
advertisements after 1995 (Ms. Johnson’s affidavit is
dated June 23, 2000). The other information regarding
opposer’s advertising efforts is that it “distributes
‘price books’ to its customers and potential customers
four times a year” (with no indication as to how many of
such books were distributed, or for how many years, or
even whether any or all of the pleaded IDT marks were
featured in the price books); that it has maintained a
web page “for several years” (again, there are no
specifics as to the years the web page has been in
existence, or the number of “hits” it has received); that
it has used point of purchase materials such as manuals
or documentation for some of its products (with no
indication as to how many pieces have been distributed);
and that it conducts displays at trade shows, roadshows,
and seminars, including, in 1994 and 1997 “datacom
seminars, featuring RISC products, in many cities” at a
Opposition No. 115,082
13
total cost of $732,000; and that it “also presented its
RISC products at roadshows in many cities, likely in 1992
and 1993.” This evidence falls far short of
demonstrating that any of opposer’s IDT marks is famous.11
Thus, in determining the issue of likelihood of
confusion, opposer’s marks are not entitled to the wide
latitude of legal protection that a famous mark would
have.
We turn next to a consideration of the parties’
goods. Mr. Bourekas, opposer’s vice president, described
its goods in his testimony affidavit in the following
paragraph:
IDT designs and manufactures and sells
microprocessors and other related
electronic products. IDT also designs
software that is embedded in the
systems utilizing the microprocessors
that it manufactures and sells,
including RISC microprocessors, and in
various networking products that it
manufactures and sells. IDT also
designs and sells software drivers
that function as part of an operating
system in controlling a particular
device. IDT also designs and licenses
such software products as its ‘IDT/c’
and ‘IDT/sim’ software, usually, but
not always, in connection with
diagnostic products such as evaluation
boards. IDT manufactures the
microprocessors and other products

11 We would point out that opposer’s statements that it has
placed advertisements in Asia and Japan, and maintains a
Japanese website, are not evidence of fame of its mark in the
United States.
Opposition No. 115,082
14
that contain and/or execute its
software. IDT sells its products both
directly to its customers and through
its distributors. Para. 212

Opposer’s goods are identified in its registrations as,
essentially, hardware devices (including semiconductor
components such as random access memories;
microprocessors; and support chips), while its most
recent registration also includes software in the nature
of “computer programs for use in the design and
application of semiconductor devices, microprocessors,
and microcontrollers.”
Applicant’s evidence shows that it provides data
processing services to companies whose businesses involve
the sales, distribution and marketing of “consumer
packaged goods” to distributors. Consumer packaged goods
are items that consumers ordinarily purchase at a
supermarket, such as canned ham, cookies and bottled
water. Data regarding such consumer packaged goods is
often supplied to applicant by consumer product
distributors, who supply the products to retail outlets
for sale to consumers. Applicant uses the mark IDT on
software which is designed to permit consumer product
distributors to send to applicant, in a secure fashion,

12 It should be noted that opposer provided no testimony as to
the dates on which it began using any of its IDT marks on its
Opposition No. 115,082
15
product data over the Internet. The software is
purchased only by consumer product distributors, and who
purchase it by downloading it from applicant’s Web site.
Although applicant has discussed in its brief the
specific goods on which applicant uses its mark, we must,
in determining the issue of likelihood of confusion, look
to the goods as they are identified in applicant’s
application, namely, “computer software for use in the
transfer of files via global computer information
networks.”13 Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1815
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (the question of likelihood of confusion
must be determined based on an analysis of the mark as
applied to the goods and/or services recited in
applicant’s application vis-à-vis the goods and/or
services recited in an opposer’s registration, rather
than what the evidence shows the goods and/or services to
be). Thus, the representation made by applicant’s
counsel in the trial brief that applicant will not expand

various goods.
13 The phrase “global computer information networks” is a
reference to the Internet. See In re Styleclick.com Inc., 57
USPQ2d 1445 (TTAB 2000). Opposer has acknowledged this meaning
at pages 13-14 of its brief. We confirm, however, that
opposer’s assertion, at page 17 of that same brief, that
applicant’s identification encompasses software to transfer
electronic files over cable systems and over radio, television,
satellite, and other broadcasting systems, is incorrect.
Opposition No. 115,082
16
its use of its mark beyond the aforesaid wholesale
distributors, has no effect on our decision herein.
Having said this, we find that there are significant
differences between opposer’s goods as identified in its
registrations and applicant’s goods as identified in its
application.14 While it is true that both parties’ goods
are or contain software, more must be shown than that one
term may generically describe the goods. General
Electric Company v. Graham Magnetics Incorporated, 197
USPQ 690 (TTAB 1977); Harvey Hubbell Incorporated v.
Tokyo Seimitsu Co., Ltd., 188 USPQ 517 (TTAB 1975).
The record shows that, in terms of opposer’s
hardware, the software it sells is embedded in the
hardware components, and essentially gives instructions
to the components. The software identified in its 1999
registration--computer programs for use in the design and
application of semiconductor devices, microprocessors,
and microcontrollers—are also closely related to this
hardware. Applicant’s software, on the other hand, has a

14 Opposer points out that even though applicant currently uses
its IDT mark with only one software product, applicant could
expand its goods to any software that fits within the
identification of goods in its application. We confirm that in
determining the issue of likelihood of confusion, we have
considered applicant’s goods to encompass all software within
the scope of its identification.

Opposition No. 115,082
17
very different purpose: it is used to transfer files via
the Internet.
Opposer has made the conclusory assertions in its
brief that the parties’ goods are virtually identical,
and that applicant’s use of its mark for its identified
goods “will directly overlap with the goods currently
being sold under Opposer’s registered ‘IDT’ trademark.”
Brief, p. 14. However, although opposer argues that its
goods include software used in transferring files over
the Internet, it appears that the evidence in support of
this statement is that certain of opposer’s products “are
sold to Internet companies such as Cisco Systems, for
incorporation as integral components in products like
routers” which are in turn used to transfer files via the
Internet. Brief, p. 13.
We find that there is a very real difference between
a part sold to an original equipment manufacturer which
can then be used by that manufacturer to make hardware
which can be used in connection with transferring files
over the Internet, and the software which is identified
in applicant’s application.
This Board and our primary reviewing court have
recognized the ubiquitous use of computers in all aspects
of business in the United States today, and as a result
Opposition No. 115,082
18
have rejected the view that a relationship exists between
goods (or services) simply because each involves the use
of computers. See Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. EDA
Micro Corp., 23 USPQ2d 1460, 1463 (TTAB 1992), and cases
cited therein. “It is important to note that, in order
to support a holding of likelihood of confusion, there
must be some similarity between the goods and services at
issue herein beyond the fact that each involves the use
of computers.” Reynolds & Reynolds Co. v. I.E. Systems,
Inc., 5 USPQ2d 1749, 1751 (TTAB 1987).
We thus must consider whether opposer has submitted
any other evidence to demonstrate a relationship between
its goods and those of applicant. The record shows that
applicant also sells hardware such as monitors and
computers, and that it sells other software products.
Opposer argues that there is “a potential to overlap even
more products for which Opposer is authorized to use its
mark” if applicant were to expand the use of its mark to
“any other software product that might be viewed as
within its natural area of expansion.” Brief, pp. 14,
15. However, opposer has not shown that hardware or
software similar to opposer’s is within the natural area
of expansion for a party making applicant’s identified
software.
Opposition No. 115,082
19
Opposer also argues that the parties’ goods must be
deemed to be sold through the same channels of trade.
However, opposer has not provided any information as to
its channels of trade, or shown how they are the same
channels as applicant’s. Certainly opposer’s hardware
cannot be downloaded over the Internet, as applicant’s
software can; nor has opposer shown that computer
programs for use in the design and application of
semiconductor devices, microprocessors, and
microcontrollers would be sold in such a manner.
Further, opposer has not shown that its hardware and
software are or would be offered in the same stores or
other distribution areas as software for use in the
transfer of files via the Internet.
Opposer also argues that it markets its goods15
through print advertisements, printed materials and trade
shows, and that these are the same channels of trade as
applicant. However, there is no evidence as to the
specific publications or trade shows in which opposer
promotes its goods, there is no evidence as to the
specific trade shows which applicant attends, or that
applicant promotes its ITD software in publications at

15 In its brief opposer asserts that it markets and sells its
goods through these channels of trade, but it is clear that
these are just advertising media.
Opposition No. 115,082
20
all. We certainly cannot conclude from the evidence of
record that the parties promote their respective ITD
trademarked goods at the same trade shows or
publications, or that they target the same class of
consumers.
Opposer also makes the point that both parties have
Web sites on the Internet. However, since businesses of
virtually every type are represented on the Internet, we
cannot conclude that the parties’ goods are related from
this fact alone.
Opposer does assert that it has a wide variety of
customers to whom it sells its products, including
Philips Electronics, Lucent Technologies and Cisco
Systems. Even if we assume that applicant’s software
could be purchased by these entities, it is not clear
that the same persons responsible for buying opposer’s
specialized hardware and related software would be
involved in a decision to purchase or use applicant’s
identified software. See Electronic Design & Sales Inc.
v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 21 USPQ2d
1388 (Fed. Cir. 1992). More importantly, because of the
very nature of opposer’s products, many if not most of
which are integrated into systems manufactured by the
purchasers, they will be purchased by sophisticated
Opposition No. 115,082
21
purchasers. See, for example, the descriptions of
opposer’s products as shown in the press releases
attached as exhibits to the Bourekas affidavit.16 Such
purchasers, even more than the public at large, are not
likely to assume that the goods identified in opposer’s
registrations and applicant’s application emanate from
the same source simply because all are computer products.
We should also point out that, with respect to the
earlier three of opposer’s registrations (Nos. 1,244,288;
1,542,345 and 1,542,346), we also find significant
differences in the parties’ marks. Although opposer
refers to its marks as IDT, in these three registrations
the “I” is actually the mathematical integral sign (?).17
Purchasers who are familiar with higher mathematics (and
we assume many of those who work in the computer industry
would be) will view the marks as the mathematical symbol
followed by the letters “dt.” And those who are not

16 Opposer asserts that no evidence was submitted on the factor
of careful, sophisticated purchasing versus impulse buying.
However, certain products, by their very nature, will be
purchased by sophisticated purchasers. Moreover, the press
releases showing the technical nature of opposer’s products and
the testimony about the customers for the products and the uses
to which the products are put all show that opposer’s goods are
not items purchased on impulse by the general public.
17 We note that in two of these registrations the description
of the mark refers to the letters IDT. However, it is not the
description offered by applicant or accepted by the Examining
Attorney that controls, but how the public is likely to perceive
the mark.
Opposition No. 115,082
22
familiar with the integral symbol are just as likely to
view the design, as used in the mark, as the stylized
letters “f” or “S” as they are to see the letter “I.”
Thus, because of these differences in the marks, coupled
with the differences in the goods, the likelihood of
confusion is remote.
Opposer’s fourth registration, No. 2,300,863, for
IDT with the integral symbol and computer chip design,
does clearly depict the letters IDT in block form, and
they will be perceived as these letters. Applicant’s
mark is also for the letters IDT. With respect to this
point, we note applicant’s discussion of the particular
manner in which its mark is currently used, “with a lower
case ‘i’, next to the capital letters ‘DT’” or “with a
globe as the dot on the ‘i’ in close proximity to the
name and Management Science Associates, Inc.” Brief, p.
13. However, this discussion is irrelevant in view of
the fact that the application is for a typed drawing
version of the mark. If a registration for this mark
were to issue to applicant, applicant’s protection would
not be limited to the manner in which the mark is
currently being used, and would certainly extend to the
depiction of the mark with a capital “I” or all capital
letters IDT, as in opposer’s registration No. 2,300,863.
Opposition No. 115,082
23
However, even though applicant’s mark is similar to
this mark of opposer’s, because of the differences in the
goods, and the sophistication of the purchasers of
opposer’s products, we find that confusion is unlikely.
Opposer has failed to meet its burden of establishing
that applicant’s goods are related to opposer’s such that
purchasers are likely to assume that they emanate from
the same source.
In reaching our determination, we have given no
weight to applicant’s evidence pertaining to no actual
confusion. Applicant submitted the testimony of Joseph
Delval, an employee of DEBS InfoNet, Inc., which acts as
a help desk for applicant’s customers, both calling these
customers about data problems and fielding calls from
them. The fact that Mr. Delval was aware of no instances
of confusion can easily be explained by the fact that the
calls were made only by existing customers of applicant,
and the telephone number they called was supplied by
applicant. Thus, there could be no opportunity for
misdirected calls, since calls were not being made to an
entity identified as IDT.
Decision: The opposition is dismissed.