A-7134756
Decided by Board December 1, 1949
Illiteracy — Ground of exclusion — Section 3, act of 1917 — Exemption — Evidence as to religious persecution.
A native of Poland, (area now under control of U.S.S.R.), a member of the Roman Catholic Church, in Germany since 1943 under the Nazi forced-labor program, who is illiterate and not otherwise exempt from the literacy requirement may be found exempt from such requirement under the provisions of section 3 of the act of 1917, as one seeking to enter the United States to avoid religious persecution in the country of her last permanent residence (Poland), where the evidence establishes that religious persecution exists there, even though such alien did not personally experience such persecution.
BEFORE THE BOARD
Discussion: This case is before us on appeal from an order of the Assistant Commissioner dated July 14, 1949, directing that the excluding decision of the Board of Special Inquiry be affirmed. Appellant, a 42-year-old native and citizen of Poland, who is presently in Germany, seeks admission to the United States for permanent residence under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (Public Law 774 of the 80th Cong.). Appellant was born in Nowogrodek, Poland, which is in the so-called eastern zone of Poland now under the control of the Soviet Union, and lived in that country until 1943, when she was sent to Germany under the Nazi forced-labor program. Appellant is unwilling to return to Poland and seeks to pursue her occupation as a domestic in this country; her admission is sponsored by the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and she has an offer of employment as a domestic in Clintonville, Wis. Appellant is single and a member of the Roman Catholic Church. Appellant admits that she is unable to read and, upon being tested in the Polish language, she was found deficient in this regard, although she is physically capable of reading.
Section 2 (c) of the above-mentioned act defines an eligible displaced person as one who is qualified under the immigration laws of the United States for admission into the United States for permanent residence.
Section 10 of the act states that all immigration laws, including deportation laws, shall be applicable to eligible displaced orphans and eligible displaced persons who apply to be or who are admitted to the United States pursuant to the act. Section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917 provides as follows:
The following persons shall also be excluded from admission thereto, to wit:
All aliens over 16 years of age, physically capable of reading, who cannot read the English language, or some other language or dialect, including Hebrew or Yiddish: Provided, * * * That the following classes of persons shall be exempt from the operation of the illiteracy test, to wit: All aliens who shall prove to the satisfaction of the proper immigration officer or to the Attorney General that they are seeking admission to the United States to avoid religious persecution in the country of their last permanent residence, whether such persecution be evidenced by overt acts or by laws or governmental regulations that discriminate against the alien or the race to which he belongs because of his religious faith.
The Assistant Commissioner, in his order mentioned above, discusses at length the question of whether appellant is in fact seeking "to avoid religious persecution in the country of their last permanent residence," Poland; the conclusion of the Assistant Commissioner is that even if appellant would be subject to persecution upon her return to Poland (and the Assistant Commissioner seems doubtful of the truth of the latter statement), her primary motive in seeking entry into the United States is to earn a living rather than to be safe from oppression. We do not agree with the Assistant Commissioner's view. Appellant's predominant consideration is to settle in a country where she can freely and securely live out her days in comparative peace. Naturally, she must work to earn her way, just as any other United States resident does; such a practical consideration enters into every person's design for living. However, economic considerations are secondary to the necessity of staying alive and living an untroubled existence, untouched by fear of mental duress or physical violence.
Appellant may indeed have a variety of reasons motivating her in her desire to come to this country, but these are not our chief concern at this time. The question in the instant case is: Does appellant come within the terms of the above-mentioned statutes? In an attempt to picture the true situation in Poland today, the recent report dated August 16, 1949, which was submitted by a National Catholic Welfare Conference representative in Europe and incorporated into the record, proves very helpful, for it is specific in its statements and conclusions. In addition, the assertions in this report coincide in spirit with the meager facts which have found their way into the newspapers of this country. We feel that this report of record gives at least a minimum picture of the hardships, problems, fear, and unrest which presently exist in Poland, and shows that there is a genuine Polish refugee problem since those persons who escape through the Iron Curtain do fear to return home.
The Assistant Commissioner stated in his order that appellant had failed to prove that she would be subject to persecution upon her return; however, we note that in 1943, when appellant was taken from Poland to Germany by the German occupation forces, the Communists did not control the Polish economy and she naturally had no opportunity to experience any personal persecution at their hands. However, this does not affect her position under section 3 of the act of 1917, for the test set out in that statute is the attitude of the Polish Government toward the religious group to which she belongs. Both the report of record and the newspapers of this country make it clear that the attitude of the present Polish Government toward Roman Catholics in that country is extremely destructive and hostile and that no opportunity is overlooked in an effort to destroy the influence of that religion or any other within the confines of Poland.
Therefore, in view of the foregoing facts, it is concluded that appellant is exempt from the literacy test by virtue of the exception found in section 3, act of 1917, as one who seeks admission to this country to avoid religious persecution in the country of her last permanent residence — Poland.
Order: It is hereby ordered that the appeal be sustained.