A-6151548
Decided by Central Office September 26, 1949 Decided by Board December 20, 1949
Suspension of deportation — Section 19 (c) (2) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended — Eligibility — Effect where child becomes a major after application for such relief — Serious economic detriment — Evidence.
1. Where an applicant for suspension of deportation is a minor at the time she makes application for such relief under section 19 (c) (2) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended, and she seeks such relief on the basis of serious economic detriment to her parent, who is legally obligated to support such minor child, the fact that such applicant reaches her majority before her case is adjudicated by the Central Office will not, of itself, constitute a bar to the grant of such relief.
2. Although such child be working while attending school, where the parent is to continue to support such child until the child completes her education, and where, if this child were deported and deprived of her present earnings she would be dependent upon her parent, such liability to which her parent would be subjected is deemed to constitute sufficient economic detriment to warrant granting suspension of deportation as authorized in section 19 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended.
CHARGE:
Warrant: Act of 1924 — Remained longer, transit.
BEFORE THE CENTRAL OFFICE
Discussion: By order dated May 10, 1949, the Central Office denied the application for suspension of deportation submitted by the respondent and her sister, M---- M---- L----, (A-6151558), and granted both voluntary departure.
The aliens' applications for suspension of deportation were denied on the ground that they were over the age where the citizen parent (mother) was legally liable for their support.
This is a motion for reconsideration by L---- E---- L---- only.
She is a 22-year-old single female, a native and citizen of the Philippine Islands, whose only entry occurred on August 13, 1945, when she was admitted for 60 days in transit in the company of her parents. Her mother is a native-born citizen of the United States.
The motion for reconsideration states that when the respondent's application for suspension of deportation was submitted in 1946, she was under the age of 21, and that at the time of the hearing upon her application "in January of 1947" she still was under 21 years of age. The respondent's application for suspension was executed on August 6, 1946. The warrant of arrest was issued September 4, 1946, and was served on January 2, 1948. The hearing was held on January 15, 1948. (There was no hearing held in January 1947 as alleged.)
This Service has held that suspension of deportation must be denied where there is not a legal obligation to support an alien applicant who alleges that his deportation will cause his legally resident or citizen parent a serious economic detriment. This holding is on the theory that any economic detriment in such a case would be voluntarily assumed.
The alien's motion for reconsideration raises the question as to whether the fact that an application for suspension was made at a time when the deportable alien being under 21 had a legal claim for support, would not entitle such alien to suspension of deportation even though at the time the Central Office considered the case on behalf of the Attorney General, the legal obligation to support no longer applied as the alien applicant had reached her majority.
The Service has held that where suspension of deportation is predicated upon a serious economic detriment to a minor child, the fact that the minor child reached 21 at the time the Central Office considered the application was immaterial so long as such application was submitted during the minority of the child. (See Matter of V---- A----, A-4860140 (1945 Atty. Gen.).) In other words, although section 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended, requires the serious economic detriment be to a minor child, this Service has felt that the equities require that consideration be given to a request for suspension as of the date the application was submitted since normal delay required by Government procedure should not act as a penalty where the application has been filed in good faith prior to the majority of the child.
The equities of the situation, require that a similar common sense view be taken of the situation where the alien applicant is a minor at the time request for suspension is made on the basis of a serious economic detriment to a citizen or legally resident alien parent who is legally obligated to support such minor, and that the normal delay required by Government procedure should not act as a penalty in such cases. It would, therefore, appear proper to grant suspension of deportation to an alien who submitted an application prior to reaching majority but whose case was not adjudicated by the Central Office until after he had reached majority.
The respondent's case will, therefore, be considered to determine whether she qualifies for suspension of deportation. Her application for suspension of deportation reveals that from 1945 to 1946 she was employed as a railway express file clerk at a monthly salary of $163. The respondent's mother claimed that she supports the alien. In view of her earnings, any sums provided by the respondent's mother appear to be merely gratuitous. The motion for reconsideration alleges that if the alien were deported, she would find it impossible to find employment in view of the fact that her education had been retarded by the Japanese occupation of the Philippine Islands. It is noted that the alien, who came to the United States for the first time in August 1945, succeeded in finding part time employment in the same year and which paid her $163 a month. There appears to be no reason why she could not support herself in a country where she was familiar with the language and custom.
Reconsideration of the entire record fails to reveal that the alien has qualified for suspension of deportation and that relief will be denied to her. She has established her good moral character for the past 5 years and her financial ability to depart voluntarily. In view of her close family ties in the United States she will be granted the privilege of voluntary departure. Preexamination will be denied as it does not appear that a quota visa is readily available to the alien.
Recommendation: It is recommended that an order of deportation not be entered at this time but that the alien be required to depart from the United States, without expense to the Government, to any country of her choice within 90 days after notification of decision, conditioned upon arrangements being made with the local immigration office for verification of departure.
So ordered.
Discussion as to Deportability: This case is before us on appeal from a decision of the Assistant Commissioner dated September 26, 1949, directing that, upon motion for reconsideration by respondent, voluntary departure within 90 days be permitted and affirming the denial of the application for suspension of deportation.
Respondent, 22 years of age, a native and citizen of the Philippine Islands, last entered the United States at San Francisco on August 13, 1945, with her older sister. She was admitted for 60 days under section 3 (3) of the Immigration Act of 1924 as an alien in continuous transit through the United States; since she has remained longer than the permitted time, respondent is subject to deportation under sections 14 and 15 of the Immigration Act of 1924. Discussion as to Eligibility for Suspension of Deportation: When respondent made application for suspension on August 6, 1946, and also when a hearing on this application was held in January 1948, respondent was a minor child under the age of 21 years. However, when respondent's application was acted upon, she had become 21; the Assistant Commissioner, in an order dated May 10, 1949, denied suspension on the ground that respondent's citizen parents are no longer legally liable for her support. The Assistant Commissioner concedes in his order of September 26, 1949, that the status of respondent in respect to whether or not she is a "minor" child should be determined as of the date of the filing of application in question. We concur in this respect.
But, even though the Assistant Commissioner stated that respondent had established her good moral character during the past 5 years and her financial ability to depart voluntarily, the application for suspension was denied because she is currently earning $163 per month as a file clerk for the Railway Express Agency claim department. Respondent's mother had claimed that she supported her and very possibly she does in some measure, for the record reveals that since February 1946 respondent has only been working part time for the employer while going to Berkeley High School. Respondent's mother stated that even though respondent has attained her majority, they will continue to contribute to her support in order that she may finish her education and, respondent's mother asserts, that if it were necessary to support respondent outside this country, the family would be subjected to a burdensome hardship.
Therefore, even though there is currently no economic detriment to respondent's family, as she is regularly employed, yet, upon leaving this country under the warrant and order of deportation, respondent would be deprived of her salary and would then be dependent upon her parents. This liability to which her parents would be subjected constitutes sufficient economic detriment to warrant the granting of discretionary relief by suspension of deportation, as authorized in section 19 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended.
Suspension of Deportation — Findings of Fact: Upon the basis of all the evidence presented, it is found:
(1) That the alien is not ineligible for naturalization in the United States;
(2) That the alien has been of good moral character for the preceding 5 years;
(3) That deportation of the alien would result in serious economic detriment to her parents, naturalized citizens of the United States;
(4) That after full inquiry, no facts have been developed which would indicate that the alien is deportable under any of the provisions of law specified in section 19 (d) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended.Suspension of Deportation — Conclusions of Law: Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, it is concluded:
(1) That the alien is eligible for suspension of deportation under the provisions of section 19 (c) (2) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended.Order: It is ordered that deportation of the alien be suspended under the provisions of section 19 (c) (2) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended.
It is further ordered, That the order entered by the Assistant Commissioner on September 26, 1949, be and the same is hereby withdrawn.
It is further ordered, That if during the session of the Congress at which this case is reported, or prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which this case is reported, the Congress passes a concurrent resolution, stating in substance that it favors the suspension of such deportation, the proceedings be canceled upon the payment of the required fee and that the alien be charged to the quota for the Philippine Islands.