Imagination Technologies Limited

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 18, 2022

2020003252 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 18, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 16/041,066 07/20/2018 Luke Tilman PETERSON 2645-0153US02 2022 125968 7590 01/18/2022 Potomac Law Group PLLC (IMGTEC) 8229 Boone Boulevard Suite 430 Vienna, VA 22182 EXAMINER AQUINO, WYNUEL S ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2199 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/18/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): Eofficeaction@appcoll.com Patents@potomaclaw.com vdeluca@potomaclaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte LUKE TILMAN PETERSON and JAMES ALEXANDER McCOMBE ____________________ Appeal 2020-003252 Application 16/041,066 Technology Center 2100 ____________________ Before JEREMY J. CURCURI, NATHAN A. ENGELS, and JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING Appellant1 requests rehearing under 37 C.F.R. § 41.52 of our Decision, mailed August 18, 2021 (“Decision”), in which we affirmed the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-14 and 16-21 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appellant timely filed a Request for Rehearing (“Req. Reh’g”) on October 16, 2021. Appellant’s Request for Rehearing is DENIED. 1 Throughout this Decision, we use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2019). Appellant identifies Imagination Technologies Limited as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2020-003252 Application 16/041,066 2 DISCUSSION Appellant asserts the Board “misapprehended the distinction between scheduling instances of graphics computation for execution by computation units whose concurrent execution could cause a memory access conflict, and the prior art’s [(i.e., Reid’s)] handling of a subsequent instance of graphics computation received while a first instance of graphics computation is already executing.” Req. Reh’g 1 (emphasis omitted). Specifically, Appellant argues that if two instances of graphics computations were identified because their concurrent execution would cause a memory conflict, the claim language makes clear that the scheduler would schedule the execution of both of the identified instances of graphics computation in accordance with an adjusted execution priority.2 Req. Reh’g 2. Appellant argues that Reid only adjusts the execution of a second graphics-related operation (i.e., not the execution of both the first and second graphics-related operations). Req. Reh’g 2-3. More particularly, Appellant asserts Reid is distinguishable from claim 1 because Reid only adjusts the execution of one (i.e., the second) graphics computation rather than scheduling the execution of all of the identified instances of graphics computation. Req. Reh’g 5. In addition, Appellant asserts the Board overlooked Appellant’s argument that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to modify Reid with Resnick because there exists no problem with Reid that would need to be addressed. Req. Reh’g 5-6. Moreover, Appellant argues that the Board overlooked the argument that the combination of Reid and 2 Appellant acknowledges that the claim language recites “adjust[ing] an execution priority of at least one of the identified instances of graphics computation,” but asserts the scheduler schedules the execution of both the identified instances of graphics computations. See Req. Reh’g 2. Appeal 2020-003252 Application 16/041,066 3 Resnick would not result in the claimed invention. Req. Reh’g 6. More particularly, Appellant argues “any combination of Reid with Resnick or modification of Reid in view of Resnick would affect Resnick’s memory access operations, not the adjusting of graphics computation execution.” Req. Reh’g 6 (emphases omitted). We disagree that we misapprehended or overlooked Appellant’s arguments. As an initial matter, we do not read Appellant’s claim 1 to preclude only adjusting the execution of a second (potentially memory conflicting) graphics-related operation, as taught by Reid. As recited in claim 1, the scheduler identifies instances of graphics computation whose concurrent execution could cause a memory conflict and “adjust[s] an execution priority of at least one of the identified instances of graphics computation.” See claim 1 (emphasis added). Further, claim 1 recites that “in accordance with the adjusted execution priority,” execution of the identified instances of graphics computation are scheduled to serialize the execution of the identified instances of graphics computation. See claim 1. As we explained in our Decision, “Reid describes using potential- memory-utilization-information to determine whether there would be a memory conflict between a first and second graphics-related operation.” Decision 8 (citing Reid ¶ 5, Fig. 2 (206)). If there is not a memory conflict, the two operations are executed simultaneously. Decision 8 (citing Reid ¶ 5, Fig. 2 (210)). However, if there would be a memory conflict, Reid teaches that a second graphics-related operation is not executed until after a first graphics-related operation is completed. Decision 8-9 (citing Reid ¶ 30, Fig. 2 (212)). Thus, we found that Reid “at least suggests a priority of Appeal 2020-003252 Application 16/041,066 4 at least one of the graphics-related operations (i.e., the second graphics- related operation) is adjusted from parallel execution to serial execution.” Decision 9. In other words, Reid reasonably suggests (i) identifying instances of graphics computation whose concurrent execution could cause a memory conflict (i.e., Reid’s second graphics-related operation is an identified instance of graphics computation that would cause a memory conflict); (ii) adjusting the execution priority of at least one of the identified instances (i.e., the execution priority of Reid’s second graphics-related operation is adjusted to execute after execution of the first graphics-related operation); and (iii) scheduling the execution of the identified instances in accordance with the adjusted execution priority to serialize the identified instances of graphics computation (i.e., Reid’s scheduling the second graphics-related operation to execute after the first graphics-related operation). Regarding the proposed combination of Reid and Resnick (and the motivation for the proposed combination), we explained that the Examiner relied on Resnick “only for the limited teaching of adjusting the priority of operations to alter their order of execution.” Decision 9 (citing Ans. 19; Final Act. 3-4). That is, because Reid does not expressly state the priority of the second graphics-related operation is lower with respect to the first graphics-related operation (only that it is scheduled to execute after the first graphics-related operation has completed), it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to apply Resnick’s express teaching of adjusting the priority of operations (i.e., the priority of the second graphics- related operation) for improved memory performance and efficiency. See Resnick ¶¶ 2, 10. Further, because the proposed combination modifies Appeal 2020-003252 Application 16/041,066 5 Reid’s system with Resnick’s teaching of adjusting the priority of operations whose concurrent execution would cause a memory conflict, we disagree with Appellant (see Req. Reh’g 6) that the modification would affect Resnick’s memory access operations rather than Reid’s execution of graphics-related operations. For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked Appellant’s arguments. Accordingly, we decline to change the final disposition of the Decision. CONCLUSION We have considered Appellant’s Request, but we maintain our Decision to affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-14 and 16-21 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). DECISION SUMMARY Outcome of Decision on Rehearing: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Denied Granted 1, 3-5, 7-9, 11, 13, 14, 16-18, 20, 21 103(a) Reid, Resnick, Bourd 1, 3-5, 7- 9, 11, 13, 14, 16-18, 20, 21 2, 12 103(a) Reid, Resnick, Bourd, Du 2, 12 6 103(a) Reid, Resnick, Bourd, Maddhirala 6 10, 19 103(a) Reid, Resnick, Bourd, Wexler 10, 19 Overall Outcome 1-14, 16- 21 Appeal 2020-003252 Application 16/041,066 6 Final Outcome of Appeal after Rehearing: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3-5, 7-9, 11, 13, 14, 16-18, 20, 21 103(a) Reid, Resnick, Bourd 1, 3-5, 7- 9, 11, 13, 14, 16-18, 20, 21 2, 12 103(a) Reid, Resnick, Bourd, Du 2, 12 6 103(a) Reid, Resnick, Bourd, Maddhirala 6 10, 19 103(a) Reid, Resnick, Bourd, Wexler 10, 19 Overall Outcome 1-14, 16- 21 DENIED