Igal Raichelgauz et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 24, 2020

14321231 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 24, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/321,231 07/01/2014 Igal Raichelgauz COR-095ME-C 4913
158341 7590 01/24/2020
Cortica Ltd.
103 Allenby Street
Tel Aviv, 6513443
ISRAEL
EXAMINER
WONG, LUT
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2121
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/24/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
karen.moses@cortica.com
patents@cortica.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte IGAL RAICHELGAUZ, KARINA ODINAEV, and
YEHOSHUA Y. ZEEVI
____________________

Appeal 2018-003093
Application 14/321,231
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before LARRY J. HUME, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.

DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1–6, 8–13, and 15–21. Appellant has canceled claims 7 and 14. See
Appeal Br. 15, 17. We have jurisdiction over the remaining pending claims
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Throughout this Decision, we use the word “Appellant” to refer to
“applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2016). Appellant identifies
Cortica, Ltd. as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention generally relates to
“linking a multimedia data element (MMDE) and a webpage.” Abstract. In
a disclosed embodiment, a MMDE is received by the system and a signature
of the data element is generated and compared against a plurality of
signatures stored in a database. Spec. ¶ 10. When a matching signature is
detected, a universal resource locator (URL) of a corresponding web page,
stored as metadata to the matching signature, may be provided in response to
the received MMDE. Spec. ¶ 10.
Claim 1 is exemplary of the subject matter on appeal and is
reproduced below with the disputed limitation emphasized in italics:
1. A method for linking between a multimedia data element
(MMDE) and a web page, comprising:
receiving a MMDE from a source;
generating a signature representative of the MMDE using
a plurality of computational cores, each computational core
having properties statistically independent of each other
computational core, each computational core generates,
responsive to the received MMDE, at least a signature
comprising a first signature element and a second signature
element, the first signature element being robust at least to noise,
wherein the first signature element is based on a robust signature
threshold;
matching the generated signature with a plurality of
signatures stored in a database to find at least one matching
signature, wherein each signature of the stored plurality of
signatures is generated by the plurality of computational cores,
and wherein at least one of the stored signatures has at least one
corresponding universal resource locator (URL) of a web page
stored therein as metadata of the at least one of the stored
signatures; and
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providing to the source at least a URL that is a metadata
of a matched signature upon determination of a match between
the generated signature and at least one of the plurality of
signatures stored in the database.

The Examiner’s Rejections
1. Claims 1–6, 8–13, and 15–21 stand rejected under the doctrine
of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting over claims 1–19 of U.S.
Patent No. 8,818,916 B2. Final Act. 3.
2. Claims 1–6, 8–13, and 15–21 stand rejected under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Jonathan T. Foote, Content-
Based Retrieval of Music and Audio, Institute of Systems Science, National
University of Singapore (1997) (“Foote”); Leandro de C.T. Gomes, et al.,
Audio Watermarking and Fingerprinting: For Which Applications?,
Université René Descartes, Paris, France (2002) (“Gomes”); and Hans-
Joachim Stolberg, et al., HiBRID-SoC: A Multi-Core SoC Architecture for
Multimedia Signal Processing, Journal of VLSI Signal Processing 41, 9–20
(2005) (“Stolberg”). Final Act. 7–16.
3. Claims 1–6, 8–13, and 15–21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Ans. 3–6.

ANALYSIS2
Obviousness-type Double Patenting Rejection
Appellant disputes the Examiner’s conclusion that the instant claims
are not patentably distinct from the claims of U.S. Patent No. 8,818,916

2 Throughout this Decision, we have considered the Appeal Brief, filed
October 4, 2017 (“Appeal Br.”); the Reply Brief, filed January 29, 2018
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(“the ’916 patent). Appeal Br. 7–8; Reply Br. 7. In particular, Appellant
argues that claims 1 and 7 of the ’916 patent, as relied on by the Examiner,
fail to recite a robust signature threshold. Appeal Br. 7–8; Reply Br. 7.
Appellant alleges the Examiner is improperly relying on the disclosure of the
’916 patent instead of only the claims to support the rejection. Reply Br. 7.
Additionally, Appellant argues the claims of the ’916 patent fail to recite that
“the stored signatures are generated by the computational cores or that any
of the stored signatures have corresponding URLs stored therein as
metadata.” Appeal Br. 8.
In response, the Examiner provides a comprehensive table identifying
the claim language of the instant claims and the claim language of claims 1
and 7 from the ’916 patent. See Ans. 7–10. Regarding the robust signature
threshold, the Examiner finds claim 7 of the ’916 patent recites “the first
signature element being a robust signature” and “wherein the robust
signature is being robust to at least additive noise.” Ans. 9 (emphases
omitted). The Examiner explains that although the term threshold is not
recited, by reciting that the signature is robust, it is implied that the
robustness of the signature is relative to a robust signature threshold. Ans. 9.
Also, the Examiner finds claim 1 of the ’916 patent recites that a “URL is
part of a metadata of the matching concept structure” and that the extracted
URL is associated “with the signature as a metadata of the signature.”
Ans. 10 (emphasis omitted). In addition, the Examiner finds claim 7 of the

(“Reply Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer, mailed November 29, 2017 (“Ans.”);
and the Final Office Action, mailed January 6, 2017 (“Final Act.”), from
which this Appeal is taken.
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’916 patent recites each computational core generates at least a signature.
Ans. 9.
Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, we agree with the Examiner’s
reasoning that by characterizing the signature as being robust—particularly
“wherein the robust signature is being robust to at least additive noise,” as
recited in claim 7 of the ’916 patent—the robustness of the signature is
relative to a threshold (i.e., the robust signature threshold). Moreover, we
agree with the Examiner that by reciting each computational core generates
at least a signature, and that a URL of a web page is associated with the
signature “as a metadata,” the claims of the ’916 patent teach the stored
signatures are generated by the computational cores, and that any of the
stored signatures have corresponding URLs stored therein as metadata. See,
e.g., ’916 patent (claims 1 and 7).
For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner
error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under the doctrine
of obviousness-type double patenting of independent claim 1 over the cited
claims of the ’916 patent. For similar reasons, we also sustain the
obviousness-type double patenting rejection of claims 2–6, 8–13, and 15–21.
See Final Act. 3–6; Ans. 7–11; see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

Rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
In rejecting independent claim 1, the Examiner finds Foote teaches
most of the limitations, but relies on Gomes to teach the first signature
element being robust to at least noise, and Stolberg to teach a plurality of
statistically independent computational cores for generating the signatures.
See Final Act. 7–11. In particular, and at issue, the Examiner finds Foote
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teaches “at least one of the stored signatures has at least one corresponding
universal resource locator (URL) of a web page stored therein as metadata of
the at least one of the stored signatures.” Final Act. 8 (citing Foote § 5); see
also Ans. 13.
To the extent that the Examiner finds Foote’s generated template
corresponds to the claimed generated signature, Appellant argues Foote’s
template does not comprise the source URL, but rather Foote teaches the
template is saved with the source URL. Appeal Br. 8–9; Reply Br. 8–10.
More specifically, Appellant asserts the claim language explicitly recites the
URL is “stored therein as metadata of the at least one of the stored
signatures” and Foote teaches the URL is saved with the source URL—that
is, Foote’s template (the signature) does not comprise or include the URL.
Reply Br. 9 (emphasis omitted).
Foote generally relates to “an audio search engine that can retrieve
sound files from a large corpus based on similarity to a query sound.” Foote
§ 1. Foote teaches the query sound is received and a template of the sound is
generated. Foote §§ 1–2. As relied on by the Examiner (see Final Act. 8),
Foote further teaches “[a] large collection of templates can then be amassed
in reasonable storage space, because the actual audio can be discarded
provided the source URL is saved with the template.” Foote § 5 (emphasis
added).
We agree with Appellant that the claims require more than the URL is
saved with the signature, as taught by Foote. Instead the claims require the
URL of a corresponding web page to be stored as metadata of the at least
one stored signatures. The Examiner has not provided sufficient evidence or
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persuasive technical reasoning that Foote (or the other cited references)
teaches or reasonably suggests storing the URL as metadata.
For the reasons discussed supra, we are persuaded of Examiner error.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of independent claim 1. For similar reasons we do not
sustain the Examiner’s rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of
independent claims 11 and 12, which recite similar limitations. In addition,
we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) of claims 2–6, 8–10, 13, and 15–21, which depend directly or
indirectly therefrom.

Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101
In the Answer, the Examiner sets forth a new ground of rejection,
rejecting the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. Ans. 3–6. In particular, the Examiner
determines the claims are directed to “linking data with [a] webpage,” which
the Examiner analogizes to the mental processes of collecting information,
analyzing the collecting information, and displaying the results of the
analysis. Ans. 3 (citing Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Further, the Examiner determines the claims do not
recite significantly more than the abstract idea to confer patent eligibility.
Ans. 3–4. Instead, the Examiner finds the claims recite generic computer
components performing generic computer functions that are well-
understood, routine, and conventional activities. Ans. 4.
Appellant disputes the Examiner’s conclusion of patent ineligibility
and asserts the Examiner oversimplifies the claims. Reply Br. 4–5.
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Moreover, Appellant argues the claims are significantly more than the
alleged abstract idea by improving computer functionality. Reply Br. 5–6.
The Supreme Court’s two-step framework guides our analysis of
patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 217 (2014). In addition, the Office has published revised guidance
for evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, specifically
with respect to applying the Alice framework. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Office
Guidance”). If a claim falls within one of the statutory categories of patent
eligibility (i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter)
then the first inquiry is whether the claim is directed to one of the judicially
recognized exceptions (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an
abstract idea). Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. As part of this inquiry, we must “look
at the ‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the
claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.”
Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
Per Office Guidance, this first inquiry has two prongs of analysis: (i)
does the claim recite a judicial exception (e.g., an abstract idea), and (ii) if
so, is the judicial exception integrated into a practical application. 84 Fed.
Reg. at 54. Under the Office Guidance, if the judicial exception is integrated
into a practical application, see infra, the claim is patent eligible under
§ 101. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. If the claims are not directed to an abstract
idea, the inquiry ends. See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., 837
F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2016). However, if the claim is directed to a
judicial exception (i.e., recites a judicial exception and does not integrate the
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exception into a practical application), the next step is to determine whether
any element, or combination of elements, amounts to significantly more than
the judicial exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217; 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Here, we conclude the claims are directed to determining, for a
received multimedia data element (MMDE), a universal resource locator
(URL) for a web page corresponding to the received MMDE. This is
consistent with how Appellant describes the claimed invention. See Spec.
¶¶ 2 (describing that the invention “relates to the automatic association of
content to a web page using signatures”), 10 (“linking between a multimedia
data element (MMDE) and a web page”), 22 (describing the system is “used
to provide universal resource locators (URLs) associated with signatures to
enable access of web pages responsive of input MMDEs”). As set forth in
the Specification—and as recited in the claims—after a MMDE has been
received, a signature representative of the MMDE is generated and
compared to a plurality of signatures stored in a database to determine a
matching signature. See Spec. ¶¶ 10–11, 22; claim 1. Stored within the
metadata of the matching signature is a URL to a web page associated with
the matching signature, and is, therefore, determined to be relevant to the
received MMDE. See Spec. ¶ 22.
We disagree with the Examiner that the instant claims recite a
scenario analogous to that in Electric Power. See Ans. 3. Rather, in Electric
Power, the court determined the focus of the pending claims was “on
collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the
collection and analysis.” Elec. Pwr., 830 F.3d at 1353. Further, the court
explained that “[i]nformation as such is an intangible” and that the collection
of information falls within the realm of abstract ideas. Elec. Pwr., 830 F.3d
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at 1353. In addition, “analyzing information by steps people go through in
their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more [are treated] as
essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.” Elec. Pwr.,
830 F.3d at 1354.
Here, we agree with Appellant that the generation of a robust
signature representative of the received MMDE is more than merely a
mental process within the guidelines provided by the court in Electric
Power, i.e., as a practical matter generation of a robust signature of a
received MMDE could not be performed entirely in a human’s mind. See
Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (a method for rendering a halftone image of a digital image by
comparing, pixel by pixel, the digital image against a blue noise mask was
found to recite patent-eligible subject matter because the method could not,
as a practical matter, be performed entirely in a human’s mind); SiRF Tech.,
Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n., 601 F.3d 1319, 1331–33 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (a
method for calculating an absolute position of a GPS receiver and an
absolute time of reception of satellite signals was found to recite patent-
eligible subject matter because there was “no evidence . . . that the
calculations here [could] be performed entirely in the human mind”).
Accordingly, the instant claims are not directed to a mental process (a
category of abstract ideas).
Further, as the court discussed in Enfish, claims that improve an
existing technology might not succumb to the abstract idea exception of
patent eligibility. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2016). In Enfish, the court framed the first step of the Alice
inquiry as whether the focus of the claims is on a specific asserted
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improvement in computer capabilities or, instead on an abstract idea that
merely uses a computer as a tool for carrying out the abstract idea. Enfish,
822 F.3d at 1335–36.
Here, we agree with Appellant that the claims recite an improvement
to the technical field of multimedia-driven searching. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(a) (9th ed., rev. 07.2015, Nov. 2015). As set forth in the
Specification, prior art techniques for searching based on multimedia data
element inputs is limited by currently inadequate descriptions of the
multimedia data element, either as a search term or contained within
metadata. See Spec. ¶¶ 3–9. By generating a robust signature of the
multimedia data element, the claimed invention need not rely on a
description of the element, but instead, a search may be conducted based on
the actual content of the multimedia data element.
For the reasons discussed supra, we are persuaded of Examiner error.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 of claims 1–6, 8–13, and 15–21.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–6, 8–13, and
15–21 under the doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting.
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–6, 8–13, and
15–21 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–6, 8–13, and
15–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–6, 8–13,
15–21
Nonstatutory
Obviousness-type
Double Patenting
1–6, 8–13,
15–21

1–6, 8–13,
15–21
103(a) Foote, Gomes,
Stolberg
1–6, 8–13,
15–21
1–6, 8–13,
15–21
101 Eligibility 1–6, 8–13,
15–21
Overall
Outcome
1–6, 8–13,
15–21

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED