Idaax Technologies Private Limited

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 30, 2020

2019003097 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 30, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/458,761 03/14/2017 Vishnu Sharma IDAX-0003.IN.US1.D1 2379
107693 7590 07/30/2020
Idaax Technologies c/o Cortex Law Group, P.C.
PO Box 1210
Morgan Hill, CA 95038
EXAMINER
BLACK-CHILDRESS, RAJSHEED O
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2684
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/30/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
_________________

Ex parte VISHNU SHARMA and MADHAV SIVADAS
_________________

Appeal 2019-003097
Application 15/458,761
Technology Center 2600
_________________

Before JASON V. MORGAN, DEBORAH KATZ, and
JOHN A. EVANS, Administrative Patent Judges.

KATZ, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks our review2, under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), of the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–22. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant
identifies the real party-in-interest as ldaax Technologies Private Limited.
(Appeal Br. 1.)
2 We consider the Final Office Action issued May 24, 2018 (“Final Act.”),
the Appeal Brief filed September 28, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”), the Examiner’s
Answer issued on January 18, 2019 (“Ans.”), the Reply Brief filed March 8,
2019 (“Reply Br.”).
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Application 15/458,761

2
The Examiner rejected claims 1–15, 17–20, and 22 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) over Nitu3, Ingle4, and Yang.5 (See Final Act. 2–11). The
Examiner also rejected claim 16 over Nitu, Ingle, Yang, and Garrsion6 (see
id. at 10–11) and claim 21 over Nitu, Ingle, Yang, and Campbell7, both
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (see id. at 11–12).
Appellant claims an electronic locker. Specifically, Appellants’ claim
1 recites:
An apparatus comprising:
a housing defining a compartment, wherein said housing is
configured to accept at least one item within said compartment;
a member coupled with said housing, wherein said member
defines a container, wherein said member is configured to provide
access to said compartment in a first state, and wherein said member
is further configured to restrict access to said compartment in a second
state;
an electronic lock disposed at least partially within said
container, wherein said electronic lock is configured to limit relative
movement between said member and said housing in said second
state; and
an interface routed between said compartment and said
container, wherein said interface is configured to allow control of said
electronic lock.

3 Nitu et al., U.S. Patent Application Publication 2015/0356801 A1,
published December 10, 2015.
4 Ingle and Derkitt, U.S. Patent 9,418,497 B2, issued August 16, 2016.
5 Yang, U.S. Patent 6,987,452 B2, issued January 17, 2006.
6 Garrison, U.S. Patent Application Publication 2013/0307382 A1, published
November 21, 2013.
7 Campbell et al., U.S. Patent Application Publication 2010/0106291 A1,
published April 29, 2010.
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(Appeal Br. 23.) The apparatus of claim 1 has a lock that controls the
movement of a “member” to control access through an “interface routed
between said compartment and said container.”
Figure 2 of Appellant’s Specification is reproduced below.

Figure 2 depicts an electronic locker (100), with a housing (110) containing
a compartment (130) and a member (120). (See Spec. 7:4–5.) Figure 2
further depicts a container (140) within the member (120) and having
circuitry (150), which in Figure 1 is depicted in more detail to include an
interface as elements 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 174, etc., represented as
lines connecting various components. (See Spec. 7:16–23 and Fig. 1.)
Appellant does not dispute that the Examiner’s finding that Nitu
teaches lockers with electronic locks controlled by a computer, which
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communicates with the electronic lock. (See Final Act. 2–3.) Appellant also
does not dispute the Examiner’s finding that Ingle teaches locked storage
devices with mechanical and electronic components on the inside panel and
that it would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art to have
combined the teachings of Nitu and Ingle. (See Final Act. 3–4.)
The Examiner cites Yang for its teaching of locked storage devices
(mailboxes) that have wiring connections routed between the rear and front
panels and a control panel located on the front panel. (See Final Act. 4,
citing Yang, 3:39–43, 5:8–50, Figs. 1 and 3.)
Appellant argues that the Examiner fails to provide any citations to a
specific portion of Nitu or Ingle that teaches the claim element of “routed
between said compartment and said container” recited in claim 1. (See
Appeal Br. 9–11.)
The Examiner cites Yang at Figure 1, columns 3, lines 39–43, and
column 5, lines 8–50 as teaching an interface routed between a compartment
and a container allowing control of an electronic lock. (See Ans. 4.) We
agree that Yang teaches wiring connections made through a multiple
position connector, which is built in the rear side of the compartment and
connects to the other compartments and the control panel when they are
stacked together. (Yang 3:39–43.) Yang teaches further that a keypad
“controls and interfaces” with several other parts of this iBOX, including
cameras, ROM/RAM modules, as well as interfaces with signals from
Ethernet, power lines, or wireless phone. (See Yang 5:8–50.) Thus,
Appellant’s argument that the Examiner does not cite to Nitu or Ingle for
this element of claim 1 is negated by the Examiner’s citation to Yang.
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Appellant argues further that the combination of Nitu, Ingle, and Yang
fails to teach or suggest “an interface routed between said compartment and
said container,” as required in claim 1. (See Appeal Br. 11–13.) Appellant
acknowledges that Yang teaches wiring connections made through a position
connector and connecting the control panel and compartments of a locked
box, but argues that Yang fails to teach or suggest a container defined by a
member as claimed. (See Appeal Br. 12.) Specifically, Appellant argues
that Yang also fails to teach or suggest a control panel that is movable and
that also has an electronic lock at least partially disposed, teaching a fixed
control panel instead. (See Appeal Br. 12, citing Yang, Fig. 1; 8:38–41;
10:51–54.)
We are not persuaded by these arguments that the Examiner erred
because Ingle teaches a locked box with mechanical and electrical elements
located on the inside panel of the door, corresponding to the “container” of
claim 1. (See Ingle Fig. 2, 2:63–65; Ans. 5.) Thus, even if Yang does not
teach this specific configuration, we agree with the Examiner that a locked
box with this configuration would have been obvious to those in the art.
“Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually
where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of
references.” In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Appellant argues further that the Examiner’s rationale for combining
the cited prior art references, remote control of access to a lockable
container, is in adequate because Nitu teaches allowing a user to remotely
set a password or code that can be used locally to unlock a locker door. (See
Appeal Br. 13–15.)
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Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive because even if Nitu teaches
remote access in one way, those of ordinary skill would appreciate from
Yang that remote access to a locked box can be achieved in different ways,
including through an interface routed between a compartment and a
container.
Appellant argues that the combination of Nitu and Ingle teaches away
from the Examiner’s proposed modification according to the teachings of
Yang. (See Appeal Br. 16–17.) According to Appellant, Nitu teaches that
smart locks may be configured to use little power by using a local or short-
range communications protocol such as Bluetooth, WiFi, RFID, or NFC,
without having to use a long-range communications network, such as the
internet or WAN. (See Appeal Br. 16, citing Nitu ¶ 60.) Appellant
characterizes this as a teaching away of the interface of Yang because it
teaches that smart locks should not communicate over a power line or the
internet. (See Appeal Br. 16.)
Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive because it mischaracterizes
Nitu. Rather than discouraging the use of long-range communications
networks, Nitu teaches using them. For example, Nitu teaches “[t]he mobile
kiosk may use inherent technologies of mobile devices that provide for
short-range and long-range communications paths and protocols.” (Nitu
¶ 5.) In Figure 2B, Nitu depicts a mobile device configured as mobile kiosk
that communicates with a smart locker either in a non-networked
configuration or over a cloud-based management server. (See Nitu ¶ 33.)
Appellant does not direct us to a teaching in Nitu that criticizes, discredits,
or otherwise discourages the use of long-range communications networks.
Thus, we are not persuaded that it teaches away from modification with the
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elements of Yang, as Appellant argues. “The prior art’s mere disclosure of
more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any of
these alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or
otherwise discourage the solution claimed in the ’198 application.” In re
Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Appellant argues further that combination with Yang would
fundamentally alter the principle of operation of a smart locker system
taught in the combination of Nitu and Ingle. (See Appeal Br. 17–18.)
Appellant argues that modifying the smart lock of Nitu with an interface as
taught in Yang would amount to hardwiring the smart locks by connecting
them to a power line or Ethernet and thus increase power consumption while
reducing the number and type of applications available. (See id. at 18.) For
example, Appellant argues that hardwiring could be difficult or impossible
in a mailbox or car where power lines or Ethernet connections are not
available. (See id.) Appellant also argues that Nitu teaches that mobile
kiosks are essential features of the smart locker system taught, but that
power line or Ethernet connections would bypass or obviate such structures.
(See id.)
Again, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument because it fails
to cite a teaching of Nitu or Ingle that an interface with a power line or
Ethernet would render the locked box taught by either unworkable. We have
not been directed to a teaching in Nitu that the smart locker system must be
used in a mailbox or a car. Although Nitu may teach a kiosk configuration,
“[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary
reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary
reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in
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any one or all of the references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA
1981). We look, instead, to “what the combined teachings of the references
would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. Appellant has
not persuaded that modification of the systems of Nitu or Ingle by the
teachings of Yang would fundamentally alter the principle of operation to
render Appellant’s claimed apparatus non-obvious.
For these reasons, Appellant fails to persuade us that the Examiner
erred in rejecting claim 1. Appellant does not provide any separate
arguments against the rejection of claims 2–15, 17–20, or 22. Accordingly,
we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting these claims. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018).
Appellant argues separately against the rejections of claims 16 and 21,
but only to contend that neither Garrsion nor Campbell cures the deficiencies
of Nitu, Ingle, and Yang. (See Appeal Br. 19–20.) For the reasons
discussed above, we are not persuaded that the combination of Nitu, Ingle,
and Yang presents any deficiencies. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that
the Examiner erred in rejecting these claims either.

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Application 15/458,761

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Conclusion
Upon consideration of the record and for the reasons given, we affirm
the Examiner’s rejection.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References Affirmed Reversed
1–15,
17–20, 22
103 Nitu, Ingle, Yang 1–15,
17–20, 22
16 103 Nitu, Ingle,
Yang, Garrsion
16
21 103 Nitu, Ingle,
Yang, Campbell
21
Overall
Outcome
1–22

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136.
AFFIRMED