Idaax Technologies Private LimitedDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 30, 202015458761 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 30, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/458,761 03/14/2017 Vishnu Sharma IDAX-0003.IN.US1.D1 2379 107693 7590 07/30/2020 Idaax Technologies c/o Cortex Law Group, P.C. PO Box 1210 Morgan Hill, CA 95038 EXAMINER BLACK-CHILDRESS, RAJSHEED O ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2684 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/30/2020 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE _________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD _________________ Ex parte VISHNU SHARMA and MADHAV SIVADAS _________________ Appeal 2019-003097 Application 15/458,761 Technology Center 2600 _________________ Before JASON V. MORGAN, DEBORAH KATZ, and JOHN A. EVANS, Administrative Patent Judges. KATZ, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 seeks our review2, under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), of the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–22. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party-in-interest as ldaax Technologies Private Limited. (Appeal Br. 1.) 2 We consider the Final Office Action issued May 24, 2018 (“Final Act.”), the Appeal Brief filed September 28, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer issued on January 18, 2019 (“Ans.”), the Reply Brief filed March 8, 2019 (“Reply Br.”). Appeal 2019-003097 Application 15/458,761 2 The Examiner rejected claims 1–15, 17–20, and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Nitu3, Ingle4, and Yang.5 (See Final Act. 2–11). The Examiner also rejected claim 16 over Nitu, Ingle, Yang, and Garrsion6 (see id. at 10–11) and claim 21 over Nitu, Ingle, Yang, and Campbell7, both under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (see id. at 11–12). Appellant claims an electronic locker. Specifically, Appellants’ claim 1 recites: An apparatus comprising: a housing defining a compartment, wherein said housing is configured to accept at least one item within said compartment; a member coupled with said housing, wherein said member defines a container, wherein said member is configured to provide access to said compartment in a first state, and wherein said member is further configured to restrict access to said compartment in a second state; an electronic lock disposed at least partially within said container, wherein said electronic lock is configured to limit relative movement between said member and said housing in said second state; and an interface routed between said compartment and said container, wherein said interface is configured to allow control of said electronic lock. 3 Nitu et al., U.S. Patent Application Publication 2015/0356801 A1, published December 10, 2015. 4 Ingle and Derkitt, U.S. Patent 9,418,497 B2, issued August 16, 2016. 5 Yang, U.S. Patent 6,987,452 B2, issued January 17, 2006. 6 Garrison, U.S. Patent Application Publication 2013/0307382 A1, published November 21, 2013. 7 Campbell et al., U.S. Patent Application Publication 2010/0106291 A1, published April 29, 2010. Appeal 2019-003097 Application 15/458,761 3 (Appeal Br. 23.) The apparatus of claim 1 has a lock that controls the movement of a “member” to control access through an “interface routed between said compartment and said container.” Figure 2 of Appellant’s Specification is reproduced below. Figure 2 depicts an electronic locker (100), with a housing (110) containing a compartment (130) and a member (120). (See Spec. 7:4–5.) Figure 2 further depicts a container (140) within the member (120) and having circuitry (150), which in Figure 1 is depicted in more detail to include an interface as elements 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 174, etc., represented as lines connecting various components. (See Spec. 7:16–23 and Fig. 1.) Appellant does not dispute that the Examiner’s finding that Nitu teaches lockers with electronic locks controlled by a computer, which Appeal 2019-003097 Application 15/458,761 4 communicates with the electronic lock. (See Final Act. 2–3.) Appellant also does not dispute the Examiner’s finding that Ingle teaches locked storage devices with mechanical and electronic components on the inside panel and that it would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art to have combined the teachings of Nitu and Ingle. (See Final Act. 3–4.) The Examiner cites Yang for its teaching of locked storage devices (mailboxes) that have wiring connections routed between the rear and front panels and a control panel located on the front panel. (See Final Act. 4, citing Yang, 3:39–43, 5:8–50, Figs. 1 and 3.) Appellant argues that the Examiner fails to provide any citations to a specific portion of Nitu or Ingle that teaches the claim element of “routed between said compartment and said container” recited in claim 1. (See Appeal Br. 9–11.) The Examiner cites Yang at Figure 1, columns 3, lines 39–43, and column 5, lines 8–50 as teaching an interface routed between a compartment and a container allowing control of an electronic lock. (See Ans. 4.) We agree that Yang teaches wiring connections made through a multiple position connector, which is built in the rear side of the compartment and connects to the other compartments and the control panel when they are stacked together. (Yang 3:39–43.) Yang teaches further that a keypad “controls and interfaces” with several other parts of this iBOX, including cameras, ROM/RAM modules, as well as interfaces with signals from Ethernet, power lines, or wireless phone. (See Yang 5:8–50.) Thus, Appellant’s argument that the Examiner does not cite to Nitu or Ingle for this element of claim 1 is negated by the Examiner’s citation to Yang. Appeal 2019-003097 Application 15/458,761 5 Appellant argues further that the combination of Nitu, Ingle, and Yang fails to teach or suggest “an interface routed between said compartment and said container,” as required in claim 1. (See Appeal Br. 11–13.) Appellant acknowledges that Yang teaches wiring connections made through a position connector and connecting the control panel and compartments of a locked box, but argues that Yang fails to teach or suggest a container defined by a member as claimed. (See Appeal Br. 12.) Specifically, Appellant argues that Yang also fails to teach or suggest a control panel that is movable and that also has an electronic lock at least partially disposed, teaching a fixed control panel instead. (See Appeal Br. 12, citing Yang, Fig. 1; 8:38–41; 10:51–54.) We are not persuaded by these arguments that the Examiner erred because Ingle teaches a locked box with mechanical and electrical elements located on the inside panel of the door, corresponding to the “container” of claim 1. (See Ingle Fig. 2, 2:63–65; Ans. 5.) Thus, even if Yang does not teach this specific configuration, we agree with the Examiner that a locked box with this configuration would have been obvious to those in the art. “Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references.” In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Appellant argues further that the Examiner’s rationale for combining the cited prior art references, remote control of access to a lockable container, is in adequate because Nitu teaches allowing a user to remotely set a password or code that can be used locally to unlock a locker door. (See Appeal Br. 13–15.) Appeal 2019-003097 Application 15/458,761 6 Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive because even if Nitu teaches remote access in one way, those of ordinary skill would appreciate from Yang that remote access to a locked box can be achieved in different ways, including through an interface routed between a compartment and a container. Appellant argues that the combination of Nitu and Ingle teaches away from the Examiner’s proposed modification according to the teachings of Yang. (See Appeal Br. 16–17.) According to Appellant, Nitu teaches that smart locks may be configured to use little power by using a local or short- range communications protocol such as Bluetooth, WiFi, RFID, or NFC, without having to use a long-range communications network, such as the internet or WAN. (See Appeal Br. 16, citing Nitu ¶ 60.) Appellant characterizes this as a teaching away of the interface of Yang because it teaches that smart locks should not communicate over a power line or the internet. (See Appeal Br. 16.) Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive because it mischaracterizes Nitu. Rather than discouraging the use of long-range communications networks, Nitu teaches using them. For example, Nitu teaches “[t]he mobile kiosk may use inherent technologies of mobile devices that provide for short-range and long-range communications paths and protocols.” (Nitu ¶ 5.) In Figure 2B, Nitu depicts a mobile device configured as mobile kiosk that communicates with a smart locker either in a non-networked configuration or over a cloud-based management server. (See Nitu ¶ 33.) Appellant does not direct us to a teaching in Nitu that criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages the use of long-range communications networks. Thus, we are not persuaded that it teaches away from modification with the Appeal 2019-003097 Application 15/458,761 7 elements of Yang, as Appellant argues. “The prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any of these alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed in the ’198 application.” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Appellant argues further that combination with Yang would fundamentally alter the principle of operation of a smart locker system taught in the combination of Nitu and Ingle. (See Appeal Br. 17–18.) Appellant argues that modifying the smart lock of Nitu with an interface as taught in Yang would amount to hardwiring the smart locks by connecting them to a power line or Ethernet and thus increase power consumption while reducing the number and type of applications available. (See id. at 18.) For example, Appellant argues that hardwiring could be difficult or impossible in a mailbox or car where power lines or Ethernet connections are not available. (See id.) Appellant also argues that Nitu teaches that mobile kiosks are essential features of the smart locker system taught, but that power line or Ethernet connections would bypass or obviate such structures. (See id.) Again, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument because it fails to cite a teaching of Nitu or Ingle that an interface with a power line or Ethernet would render the locked box taught by either unworkable. We have not been directed to a teaching in Nitu that the smart locker system must be used in a mailbox or a car. Although Nitu may teach a kiosk configuration, “[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in Appeal 2019-003097 Application 15/458,761 8 any one or all of the references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). We look, instead, to “what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. Appellant has not persuaded that modification of the systems of Nitu or Ingle by the teachings of Yang would fundamentally alter the principle of operation to render Appellant’s claimed apparatus non-obvious. For these reasons, Appellant fails to persuade us that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1. Appellant does not provide any separate arguments against the rejection of claims 2–15, 17–20, or 22. Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting these claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018). Appellant argues separately against the rejections of claims 16 and 21, but only to contend that neither Garrsion nor Campbell cures the deficiencies of Nitu, Ingle, and Yang. (See Appeal Br. 19–20.) For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded that the combination of Nitu, Ingle, and Yang presents any deficiencies. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting these claims either. Appeal 2019-003097 Application 15/458,761 9 Conclusion Upon consideration of the record and for the reasons given, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection. In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References Affirmed Reversed 1–15, 17–20, 22 103 Nitu, Ingle, Yang 1–15, 17–20, 22 16 103 Nitu, Ingle, Yang, Garrsion 16 21 103 Nitu, Ingle, Yang, Campbell 21 Overall Outcome 1–22 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136. AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation