iControl Networks, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 2, 2021

2020005480 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
16/034,132 07/12/2018 Reza Raji 102005.024285 4818
71581 7590 11/02/2021
BakerHostetler / Comcast
Cira Centre, 12th Floor
2929 Arch Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-2891
EXAMINER
TERRELL, EMILY C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2689
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/02/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
eofficemonitor@bakerlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte REZA RAJI, AARON WOOD, and ROBERT HAZBUN
Appeal 2020-005480
Application 16/034,132
Technology Center 2600

Before JAMES R. HUGHES, JOHN A. EVANS, and
CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claims 1–25 are pending, stand rejected, are appealed by Appellant,
and are the subject of our decision under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a).1 See Final Act.
1–2; Appeal Br. 1.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42 (2019). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as iControl
Networks, Inc. Appeal Br. 1.
2 We refer to Appellant’s Specification (“Spec.”), filed July 12, 2018
(claiming benefit of multiple applications, including provisional application
US 60/553,932, filed Mar. 16, 2004); Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”), filed
May 4, 2020; and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”), filed July 20, 2020. We also
refer to the Examiner’s Final Office Action (“Final Act.”), mailed Aug. 5,
2019; and Answer (“Ans.”), mailed May 19, 2020.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claimed subject matter, according to Appellant, generally
“relate[s] to security systems and, more particularly, premise intrusion alarm
systems that effectuate a successful alarm report in the face of damage or
equipment failure associated with the alarm reporting device.” Spec. 3:15–
17. Specifically, Appellant describes an integrated security system including
monitoring, video, and automation features. See Spec. 3:20–5:11, 8:12–24.
More specifically, Appellant’s claims recite integrated security system
(premises management) devices and methods. On the occurrence of a power
failure, an exemplary premises management method maintains power to
high priority components of the premises management device, while
disabling power to lower priority components. See Spec. 23:1–24:6; Abstr.
Claim 1 (directed to a method), claim 8 (directed to a method), claim 15
(directed to device), and claim 20 (directed to a device) are independent.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method comprising:
determining, by a premises management device located at
a premises, an indication of a failure of a power supply located
at the premises, wherein the premises management device
comprises a plurality of components;
maintaining, based at least in part on the indication of the
failure of the power supply, operations associated with a first
component of the plurality of components; and
disabling, based at least in part on the indication of the
failure of the power supply, operations associated with a second
component, of the plurality of components, associated with a
lower priority than the first component.
Appeal Br. 10 (Claims App.) (emphasis added).
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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Farrington US 4,996,646 Feb. 26, 1991
Raji et al. (“Raji ’273”) US 10,062,273 B2 Aug. 28, 20183
Addy US 2005/0229016 A1 Oct. 13, 20054

REJECTIONS5
1. The Examiner rejects claims 1, 8, 15, and 20 under the non-
statutory ground of obviousness-type double patenting over Raji ’273. See
Final Act. 9–12.6
2. The Examiner rejects claims 1–14 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
being anticipated by Addy. See Final Act. 2–5.
3. The Examiner rejects claims 15–25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Addy and Farrington. See Final Act. 6–9.

3 Raji ’273 (US 10,062,273 B2) (issued Aug. 28, 2018) was filed Mar. 24,
2015. The instant application claims benefit of Raji ’273’s filing date.
4 Addy (US 2005/0229016 A1) (published on Oct. 13, 2005) was filed Apr.
5, 2004. Appellant does not contest Addy’s priority date or that Addy is a
proper prior art reference.
5 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103. Because the present
application has an effective filing date prior to the AIA’s effective date
(March 16, 2013), this decision refers to 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b) and 103(a).
6 Appellant does not mention, much less address, the Examiner’s double
patenting rejection in their Appeal Brief or their Reply Brief. Accordingly,
the Examiner’s double patenting rejection is uncontested, and we summarily
affirm the rejection.
Appeal 2020-005480
Application 16/034,132

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ANALYSIS
Appellant argues claims 1–25 as a group based on claim 1. Although
Appellant provides nominal separate arguments for independent claim 8 (see
Appeal Br. 7–8), as well as independent claims 15 and 20 (see Appeal Br.
8), the arguments are substantially the same as those made with respect to
claim 1 or rely on the arguments made with respect to claim 1. See Appeal
Br. 7–8. Appellant does not separately argue dependent claims 2–7, 9–14,
16–19, and 21–25. See Appeal Br. 3–8. We select independent claim 1 as
representative of Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 1–14, as well
as claims 15–25. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Anticipation Rejection of Claims 1–14
The Examiner rejects independent claim 1 as anticipated by Addy.
See Final Act. 2–3; Ans. 3–8. Specifically, the Examiner finds that Addy
teaches each feature of claim 1, including a premises management system
(security system) including a power over Ethernet (“POE”) prioritized active
splitter, POE power supply (uninterruptible power supply (“UPS”)) with a
prioritized back-up response, the security system including high priority and
low priority components (devices), and maintaining power to high priority
devices while disabling low priority devices during a power failure. See
Final Act. 2–3 (citing Addy ¶¶ 15, 16, 18, 23, 24). The Examiner further
explains, in the Examiner’s Answer, that Addy’s system functions
identically to Appellant’s premises management system as recited in
Appellant’s claim 1, includes multiple components with different priorities,
and makes a determination of an indication of a failure of a power supply
located at the premises. See Ans. 3–8 (citing Addy ¶¶ 15, 16, 18, 19, 23–
27).
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Appellant contends that Addy does not disclose certain disputed
features of claim 1. See Appeal Br. 4–7; Reply Br. 1–8. Specifically,
Appellant contends, inter alia, that Addy does not disclose the components
of the premises management system because (1) the Examiner maps the
recited premises management device to Addy’s POE active splitter, which is
separate from Addy’s high and low priority devices (see Appeal Br. 4–5);
and (2) does not explicitly disclose determining an indication of a power
failure (see Appeal Br. 7). Appellant contends:
In rejecting claim 1, the Office Action erroneously equates a
“POE active splitter” described in paragraph 15 of Addy with the
claimed “premises management device,” and erroneously
equates various “high and low priority network devices”
described in paragraphs 16 and 23-24 of Addy with the claimed
“plurality of components [of the premises management device]”
. . . . But the cited high and low priority network devices of Addy
are not components of Addy’s POE active splitter (which the
Examiner attempts to equate with the claimed “premises
management device”). Thus, the cited portions of Addy do not
teach a “premises management device comprising a plurality of
components” as claimed.
Appeal Br. 4–5. Appellant also contends:
the Office Action fails to show that Addy teaches “determining,
by a premises management device located at a premises, an
indication of a failure of a power supply located at the
premises” as claimed. For example, paragraph 23 of Addy
discloses a “POE power supply with different levels of priority”
but does not disclose that the POE power supply actually makes
any determination of an indication of failure of power.
Paragraph 26 of Addy, for example, describes a process in which
“in the event of a power outage or disconnection of the Ethernet
network, the switch(es) 28 disconnect the low priority devices 16
from the UPS system,” but Addy does not disclose that the switch
disconnecting the low priority devices is based on “determining
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. . . an indication of a failure of a power supply located at the
premises” as claimed.
Appeal Br. 7. See Appeal Br. 4–7; Reply Br. 1–8.
We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the
Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 2–3) and
(2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 3–
8) in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. We concur with the findings and
conclusions reached by the Examiner, and we provide the following analysis
for emphasis.
With respect to Appellant’s first contention (supra), Appellant
apparently misconstrued the Examiner’s rejection. See Appeal Br. 4–5.
Although the Examiner points to Addy’s POE active splitter as a device that
performs the power failure determination and power management
functionality, the Examiner references Addy’s entire security system (see
Addy Fig. 1, element 10) including the POE active splitter (element 22),
UPS (element 20), and the high and low priority devices (elements 12 and
16) in the rejection. See Final Act. 2 (citing Addy ¶¶ 15, 16, 23, 24); Addy
Fig. 1; see also Ans. 3–5 (citing Addy ¶¶ 18, 19, 25–27).
Even if we were to accept Appellant’s argument—that the Examiner
mapped the premises management device strictly to Addy’s POE active
splitter—Addy discloses the disputed features of Appellant’s claim 1. We
broadly but reasonably construe Appellant’s “premises management
device,” which is not mentioned or explicitly defined in the Specification, to
be a security system. See Spec. 8:12–24, 9:9–21, 23:1–24:6. Addy discloses
such a security system. Compare Addy Fig. 1 with Appellant’s Fig. 2A.
Appellant’s contention discounts the conspicuous disclosures in Addy of a
security system managing power during a power failure to devices of
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different priorities. Addy ¶¶ 15, 16, 18, 23–27; Fig. 1. Further, Appellant
concedes that Addy’s high and low priority devices are components of
Addy’s security system (“Addy describes these devices as
components/devices 12 of the security system” (Appeal Br. 5 (quoting Addy
¶ 23) (internal quotations and emphasis omitted)). Accordingly, we agree
with the Examiner and also find that Addy discloses a premises management
device (Addy’s security system (element 10)) including Addy’s POE active
splitter (element 22) maintaining power to high priority devices (element 12)
from UPS (element 20) and disabling power to low priority devices (element
16) during a power failure. See Addy ¶¶ 15, 16, 18, 23–27; Fig. 1.
With respect to Appellant’s second contention (supra), we agree with
Appellant that Addy does not explicitly disclose the determination (by the
POE active splitter of the security system) of a power failure—“Addy does
not disclose that [power management] is based on ‘determining . . . an
indication of a failure of a power supply located at the premises’ as
claimed.” Appeal Br. 7. See Appeal Br. 4–7; Reply Br. 1–8. Addy,
however does implicitly or inherently disclose this functionality.
Our analysis begins with a construction of Appellant’s disputed
limitation. We give claims their “broadest reasonable interpretation” in light
of the Specification, In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(citations omitted), without importing limitations into the claims from the
Specification. See SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870,
875 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We broadly but reasonably construe “determining, by
a premises management device located at a premises, an indication of a
failure of a power supply located at the premises” (claim 1) (Appeal Br. 10
(Claims App.)) to mean a security system device (see our construction,
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Application 16/034,132

8
supra) ascertaining some information that an interruption (failure) of
electrical power supplied to a location (premises) has occurred. This
interpretation is consistent with Appellant’s Specification, which does not
explicitly describe an “indication of a failure of a power supply located at
the premises” (claim 1). See Spec. 4:3–11; 23:20–24:6.
Having construed the disputed limitation, we next determine if Addy
discloses the disputed limitation. Anticipation requires that the prior art
reference “discloses within the four corners of the document . . . all of the
limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.”
Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
But, even if the prior art “d[oes] not expressly spell out” all the limitations
arranged or combined as in the claim, a reference may still anticipate if a
person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would “at once envisage” the
claimed arrangement or combination, Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting
Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Petering, 301
F.2d 676, 681 (CCPA 1962)), or if the “missing descriptive matter is
necessarily present,” or inherent, in the reference, Continental Can Co. USA
v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991). “It is well settled
that a prior art reference may anticipate when the claim limitations not
expressly found in that reference are nonetheless inherent in it. Under the
principles of inherency, if the prior art necessarily functions in accordance
with, or includes, the claimed limitations, it anticipates.” In re Cruciferous
Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). “Under the principles of inherency, if the prior art
necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the claims limitations,
it anticipates.” Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1376
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(Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d
1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). “A reference may anticipate inherently if a
claim limitation that is not expressly disclosed is necessarily present, or
inherent, in the single anticipating reference.” In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d
1375, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Although Addy does not explicitly describe ascertaining information
concerning a power failure, Addy necessarily ascertains such information.
That is, Addy necessarily functions in accordance with or includes the
determination of an indication that a power failure has occurred. Addy
describes numerous instances where the security system supplies power
from the UPS to high priority devices when a power failure occurs. See
Addy ¶¶ 15, 16, 18, 23–27. In particular Addy describes that the “security
system would be backed-up by an uninterruptible power supply (UPS)” “to
cover emergency power outages” and that “when power fails, the UPS
system . . . provides . . . a brief back-up.” Addy ¶ 16. Further, Addy
explains “in a residential security system, the more critical components of
the security system network” “are supplied with electrical power at the high
priority level, while less critical components are supplied with electrical
power at the low priority level.” “In the event of a power outage or
disconnection, the critical high priority components remain connected to the
Ethernet network to be supplied with electrical power over the Ethernet
network from the UPS system.” Addy ¶ 18. In view of Addy’s disclosures,
we find Addy necessarily determines an indication of a power failure. Thus,
Appellant does not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s finding that Addy
discloses this disputed feature.
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Therefore, for all the reasons discussed above, Appellant’s
contentions do not persuade us that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1
as being anticipated by Addy. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s
anticipation rejection of independent claim 1, as well as independent claim 8
and dependent claims 2–7 and 9–14, not separately argued with particularity
(supra). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Obviousness Rejection of Claims 15–25
The Examiner rejects claims 15–25 as being obvious in view of Addy
and Farrington. See Final Act. 6–9. Independent claims 15 and 20 include
limitations commensurate in scope to independent claim 1. Appellant does
not separately argue the rejection of independent claims 15 and 20 or
dependent claims 16–19 and 21–25 with particularity. See Appeal Br. 8;
supra.
For the same reasons as claim 1, Appellant does not persuade us of
error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 15–25, not
separately argued with particularity. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Therefore, we affirm the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 15–25.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1,
8, 15, and 20 under the ground of non-statutory obviousness-type double
patenting. Appellant has also not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 1–14 as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Additionally,
Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 15–25
as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s
rejections of claims 1–25.
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Application 16/034,132

11
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 8, 15,
20
Nonstatutory Double
Patenting Raji ’273
1, 8, 15,
20

1–14 102(b) Addy 1–14
15–25 103(a) Addy, Farrington 15–25
Overall
Outcome
1–25
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED