HRB Innovations, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 29, 2020

14548589 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 29, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/548,589 11/20/2014 James L. Buttonow 2513-38.01 2666
118925 7590 07/29/2020
Erise IP, P.A.
7015 College Blvd., Ste 700
Overland Park, KS 66211
EXAMINER
BARTLEY, KENNETH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3693
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/29/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patents@eriseip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JAMES L. BUTTONOW, RALPH BRYAN HOWELL, BRIAN
ALLEN HOWELL, and CLAY ANDRE REIMER
Appeal 2019-006420
Application 14/548,589
Technology Center 3600
BEFORE CAROLYN D. THOMAS, CARL W. WHITEHEAD, JR., and
GREGG I. ANDERSON, Administrative Patent Judges.
ANDERSON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–7, 9–13, 15, 16, and 18–20. Final

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as HRB
Innovations, Inc., a Delaware corporation and a subsidiary of H&R Block,
Inc., a Missouri corporation. Appeal Br. 3.
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Act. 1.2 Claims 8, 14, and 17 were previously cancelled. Id. at 2. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Independent claims 1, 15, and 20 are directed to a system, “advanced
notice engine,” and method relating to “Advance Notice and Analysis of
Notice Documents from a Taxing Authority.” Spec., Title. Notice
documents are sent by a taxing authority, which may be the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”), to a taxpayer and its authorized tax services
provider regarding “deficiencies, analyses, and warnings on tax related
topics.” Id. ¶¶ 3–4. An “advance notice engine” associated with the tax
services provider receives and analyzes the notice document. Id. ¶¶ 2, 6, see
also id. ¶¶ 18–19 (equating “tax professional” to claimed “tax services
provider”). Upon receipt of a notice document, the advance notice engine
identifies the taxpayer, categorizes the notice and its severity, generates an
action plan, and generates a notice information set, which is sent to the
taxpayer. Id. ¶¶ 44, 52–53, 56, 58, 63, Figs. 2 (Step 218 “Send to
Taxpayer”), 4 (Flowchart ending in “Notice Information Set”).
Claims 1 and 20, reproduced below, are illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:

2 We use “Final Act.” to refer to the Final Office Action dated May 16,
2018, “Spec.” to refer to the Specification filed November 20, 2014,
“Appeal Br.” to refer to Appellant’s Brief filed March 15, 2019, and “Ans.”
to refer to the Examiner’s Answer filed June 13, 2019.
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1. A system for providing a notice information set
concurrently with a notice document to a user, the system
comprising:
a notice form data store having a plurality of notice forms
associated therewith wherein each said notice form is associated
with at least one category,
wherein each notice form in the plurality of notice forms
is a document prepared by a taxing authority;
a taxpayer file data store having a plurality of taxpayer
files associated therewith; and
an advance notice engine having an associated non-
transitory computer readable storage medium with a computer
program stored thereon, wherein execution of the computer
program by at least one processing element performs the
following steps:
receiving an authorization document indicative of a
taxpayer authorizing a tax services provider to have access
to the notice document;
analyzing the authorization document to determine if the
authorization document is free of errors,
wherein the analyzing the authorization document is
performed, at least in part, by comparing the authorization
document to a set of taxpayer data for the taxpayer;
acquiring the notice document from the taxing authority
associated with the taxpayer,
wherein the notice document is distinct from the plurality
of notice forms;
analyzing the notice document by identifying a keyword
on the notice document and comparing the keyword on the
notice document to at least a portion of the plurality of
notice forms associated with the notice form data store that
is a component of the system;
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analyzing the notice document by comparing the notice
document to at least a portion of the plurality of taxpayer
files associated with the taxpayer file data store that is a
component of the system;
calculating a severity level of the notice document based
at least in part on the category of the notice form from the
notice form data store that was compared to the keyword;
generating said notice information set based upon the
severity level, the category, and the notice document; and
presenting, to the user on a graphical user interface, the
notice document along with the notice information set,
such that the user has immediate access to the notice
information set before or during reading of the notice
document.
20. A computerized method for providing a notice
information set concurrently with a notice document to a user,
the steps of the method comprising:
receiving an authorization document indicative of a
taxpayer authorizing a tax services provider to have access to the
notice document;
analyzing the authorization document to determine if the
authorization document is free of errors,
wherein the analyzing the authorization document is
performed, at least in part, by comparing the authorization
document to a set of taxpayer data for the taxpayer;
acquiring the notice document associated with the
taxpayer;
analyzing the notice document by identifying a keyword
on the notice document and comparing the keyword on the notice
document to at least a portion of the plurality of notice forms
associated with a notice form data store;
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wherein each notice form in the plurality of notice forms
is a document prepared by the taxing authority,
wherein the notice document is distinct from the plurality
of notice forms;
analyzing the notice document by comparing the notice
document to at least a portion of the plurality of taxpayer files
associated with a taxpayer file data store;
calculating a severity level of the notice document based
at least in part on the notice form from the notice form data store
that was compared to the keyword;
generating a notice information set based upon the severity
level and the notice document; and
presenting, to the user on a graphical user interface, the
notice document along with the notice information set, such that
the user has immediate access to the notice information set before
or during reading of the notice document.
REJECTION3
Claims 1–7, 9–13, 15, 16, and 18–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 7–15.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Board conducts a limited de novo review of the appealed
rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant and in light
of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94
USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). Arguments not made are
waived. See id.; 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

3 The Examiner withdrew the rejection of claims 1–7, 9–13, 15, 16, and
18–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). Ans. 3.
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ANALYSIS
I. Principles of Law
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described
in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed
to.” See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the
concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67–68 (1972)).
Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical
processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing
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India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56
U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. “A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely
requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
After the docketing of this Appeal, the USPTO published revised
guidance on the application of § 101 (“2019 Guidance”). See, e.g., USPTO,
2019 Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7,
2019); USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (Oct. 17,
2019) (“Update”), 84 Fed. Reg. 55942 (Oct. 18, 2019) (notice).
Under the 2019 Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
of organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see MPEP
§§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)).
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional
activity” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Guidance, 56.
In the Answer, the Examiner identifies claims 20 and 1 as exemplary
of the claimed abstract idea. Ans. 4–6 (claim 20), 13–15 (claim 1). Except
as specifically noted, Appellant does not separately argue any of the rejected
claims, treating the claims as a group. Appeal Br. 12–30; see 37 C.F.R. §
41.37(c)(1)(iv). We address the claims generally where possible with
specific reference to claims 20 and 1. When it is helpful to refer to explicit
claim language, we refer to the claim containing the language.
II. Step 2A, Prong One (Judicial Exception)
The Final Action was mailed prior to the effective date of the 2019
Guidance. See Applicant-Initiated Interview Summary (February 13, 2019)
(“Applicant pointed out 3 areas of change with the 2019 (Jan, 2019)
guidelines.”). This fact is acknowledged in subsequent papers filed by
Appellant and the Examiner. See Appeal Br. 12; Ans. 4. Appellant argues
that the rejection should be reversed for failure to follow the 2019 Guidance.
Appeal Br. 15–16. The Answer responds to Appellant’s argument and
applies the 2019 Guidance to the claims. See, e.g., Ans. 4–5. On appeal,
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both the Appellant and the Examiner rely on the 2019 Guidance. Appeal Br.
12; Ans. 4. We consider the Answer in our analysis.
In the Final Action, the Examiner found that the claims were directed
to the abstract idea of “analyzing notice document from a taxing authority.”
Final Act. 7.4 The Final Action follows the Alice two-pronged analysis. See
id. at 7 (stating the abstract idea), (claims do not add significantly more, are
not rooted in computer technology, but instead are directed to the abstract
idea), 7–11 (“receiving and analyzing tax notice documents, in the area of
the economy and commerce”), 12–15 (“well-understood, routine, and
conventional functions that can be implemented on a general-purpose
computer or done by a human analog”).
In the Answer, the Examiner applied the 2019 Guidance and further
clarified the abstract idea recited in method claim 20 as falling under
“certain methods of organizing human activity as a fundamental economic
practice (e.g. ‘acquiring the notice document associated with the taxpayer’)
and legal interactions including legal obligations (e.g. [‘]analyzing the notice
document by comparing the notice document to at least a portion of the
plurality of taxpayer files . . .’).” Ans. 6 (quoting from claim 20). System
claim 1 includes similar limitations, reciting “acquiring the notice
document” and “analyzing the notice document” and the Examiner finds
claim 1 also recites an abstract idea. Id. The Examiner further found that
claims 20 and 1 also include claim elements that can be performed in the
mind of a person, therefore abstract under mental processes.” Id. at 6 (claim

4 The Examiner questions whether the claims are “the equivalent of a tax
expert (e.g. tax attorney or CPA) reading an IRS submitted notice document
and interpreting it for a client?” Final Act. 3.
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20), 14 (claim 1). The remaining dependent claims 2–7, 9–13, 16, 18, and
19 and independent claim 15 were also found to recite an abstract idea for
the same reasons. Id. at 6–7.
We agree with the Examiner and find that the claims recite the
abstract idea related to one of certain methods of organizing human activity,
i.e., receiving a notice document from a taxing authority and organizing,
analyzing, and responding to the notice document, i.e., legal obligations.
For reasons discussed below, we also find that the abstract idea falls in the
category of a mental process.
Under the 2019 Guidance, Appellant argues that the abstract idea
identified by the Examiner is not recited in the claims. Appeal Br. 12, 15–
18. Appellant also contends the abstract idea “is not recited verbatim in the
claims.” Id. at 17. For the following reasons, we disagree.
First, the abstract idea need not be recited verbatim in the claims.
Appellant does not cite authority to the contrary. Accordingly, this
argument is not persuasive.
Turning to what the claims do recite, the Examiner applies the 2019
Guidance to the limitations of claim 20, determining many to be “abstract
elements.” Ans. 4–6. As discussed above, the Examiner specifically
references two limitations of claim 20 as directly related to the abstract idea,
“acquiring the notice document” and then “analyzing the notice document.”
See id. at 6. Both of these cited limitations, for example, recite the abstract
idea of receiving a notice document from a taxing authority and organizing,
analyzing, and responding to the notice document, i.e., “legal interactions
including legal obligations.” Id. We also agree with the Examiner and find
that substantially all of the remaining limitations of claim 20 recite abstract
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elements, most of which do not require a computer for implementation. Id.
Appellant did not file a reply and does not respond to the Examiner’s
showing.
Appellant next argues that analysis of the claims cannot be at “too
high a level of generality” and cautions that the analysis must be connected
to the claim language. Appeal Br. 17–18 (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Appellant then argues the
Final Action’s statement of the abstract idea, “analyzing notice document
from a taxing authority,” is a “high level of abstraction” and violates the
caution set forth in Enfish. Id. at 18. Appellant’s argument is not
persuasive.
The Examiner responds under the 2019 Guidance and cites specific
limitations of claim 1 as reciting the abstract idea, i.e., “connected to the
claim language.” Ans. 13–15; see also id. at 4–6 (claim 20 as analyzed
above). All limitations of claim 1 save the “advance notice engine” and
presenting the results on a “graphical user interface” limitations (see claim
15 above) are asserted by the Examiner as “abstract elements” pertaining to
“certain methods of organizing human activity and mental processes and
similar to claims 15 and 20.” Id. at 14.
The Examiner has shown that the claims are categorized under the
2019 Guidance “methods of organizing human activity” as including
“commercial or legal interactions” and “interactions between people
(including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions).”
Ans. 6; see also 2019 Guidance, 52 (emphasis added). The Specification

5 Claim 20 does not recite an “advance notice engine” but does recite a
“graphical user interface.”
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also describes the invention as an “interaction via the advance notice
engine” between the tax services professional, the taxpayer, and the taxing
authority. Spec. ¶ 19 (emphasis added). We find preparing a response to a
notice document is such an interaction, where instructions for responding are
provided by the IRS. See, e.g.,
https://www.irs.gov/individuals/understanding-your-irs-notice-or-letter
(“IRS Notice Website”) (“Your notice or letter will explain the reason for
the contact and give you instructions on how to handle the issue.”)
(emphasis added).
The Examiner also determines, and we agree, that claim 20 also falls
into the category of a mental process because some of “the claim elements
can be performed in the mind of a person.” Ans. 6. Method claim 20 lists
the mental steps a tax professional would take in responding to a notice
document. For example, the IRS Notice Website lists reasons why a
taxpayer would receive a notice including: a balance is due; a larger or
smaller refund is due; there is a question about the tax return; verification of
taxpayer identity; additional information is required; the IRS changed the
return; and there is a delay in processing your return. The listed reasons are
steps a tax professional typically takes to organize and analyze a response to
an IRS notice document. The actions that are taken by a tax professional
track many of the limitations of claim 20 including, without limitation,
receiving the notice, associating the notice with the correct taxpayer,
obtaining the appropriate form, and preparing a response to the notice. See
claim 20.
Appellant disputes that the abstract idea is “within one of the three
Section I categories” of the 2019 Guidance listed above. Appeal Br. 18–22.
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Appellant argues the claims do not recite any “economic function” or
“economic practice.” Id. at 18; see also Final Act. 8 (claims “relate to
economic and commerce concepts of analyzing taxpayer tax notice
information for ensuing compliance with taxing authorities which is a
fundamental economic practice”). As already discussed, the Final Action
was mailed prior to the 2019 Guidance and Appellant’s argument that the
Final Office Action does not analyze any of the Section I categories is
unpersuasive in view of our determination that the claims recite a method of
organizing human activity and a mental process. See Ans. 6.
Because Appellant’s argument responds only to the Final Action, it
focuses on the “fundamental economic practice” determination made by the
Examiner in the Final Action. See Final Act. 8. Here, we have applied the
2019 Guidance, as did the Examiner in the Answer, and analyzed
“interactions between people,” as part of the general category methods of
organizing human activity. See 2019 Guidance, 53. Appellant does not
respond to this determination nor that the abstract idea in the category of a
mental process.
Thus, under Prong 1 of Step 2A in accordance with the 2019
Guidance, we agree with the Examiner’s determination that the claims recite
a judicial exception to patentability, namely, “a method of organizing human
activity and a mental process,” because “receiving a notice document,” etc.
is not itself one of the abstract ideas recognized in the Guidance/case law.
We agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that the claims recite an abstract
idea. Accordingly, in Prong 1 of the first step of the Alice/Mayo analysis,
we conclude the claims recite an abstract idea.
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III. Step 2A, Prong 2 (Integration into a Practical Application)
Under the Guidance, we now must determine if additional elements in
the claims integrate the judicial exception into a practical application
(see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).6 We evaluate the claims to
determine whether they recite additional elements beyond the abstract idea,
and, if so, we evaluate the additional elements to determine whether they
integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. 2019 Guidance, 54.
The Examiner finds the claims “do not include any additional elements that
integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.” Ans. 6. Appellant
argues the claims here, even if “related to economics,” are like the claims
found eligible in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245
(Fed. Cir. 2014). Appeal Br. 21–22. Appellant argues the DDR Holdings
claims have a certain “look and feel” presented to the user, which is
analogous to the claims here in which “the user is presented with two
different items of information (the notice document and the notice
information set) concurrently.” Id. at 22.
This argument is unpersuasive because simply presenting two items of
information “concurrently,” is not shown to have any similarity to the DDR
Holdings claims. Appellant contends the DDR Holdings claims are directed
to a “system useful in an outsource provider serving web pages offering
commercial opportunities.” Id. at 21 (citing DDR Holdings). The claims
here involve an interaction between a tax authority, a tax professional, and a

6 We acknowledge that some of the considerations at Step 2A, Prong 2 may
be evaluated under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of the Guidance). For purposes
of maintaining consistent treatment within the Office, we evaluate them
under Step 1 of Alice (Step 2A of the Guidance). See 2019 Guidance, 55
n.25, 27–32.
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taxpayer concerning the legal obligation to pay taxes. See Spec. ¶ 19 (“Fig.
1 is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary interaction”). The claims here
are more similar to ineligible claims “directed to organizing business or
legal relationships in the structuring of a sales force (or marketing
company).” See In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(emphasis added).
Appellant argues that claim 20’s recitation of “presenting, to the user
on a graphical user interface, the notice document along with the notice
information set, such that the user has immediate access to the notice
information set before or during reading of the notice document” is “a
practical application of analyzing the notice document.” Appeal Br. 26.
Appellant adds that “the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort to
monopolize the exception because “additional elements also apply or use
‘the judicial exception to affect a particular treatment.’” Id. (citing 2019
Guidance, 55). The Examiner determines the “processing element and
engine are neither a practical application nor enough.” Ans. 14–15. As
discussed above, Appellant did not file a reply and does not respond.
Acknowledging the alleged “treatment” is not medical, as used in the
example provided in the 2019 Guidance, Appellant contends the claims still
apply or use a particular treatment. Appeal Br. 26. Presenting the “notice
document” and “notice information set” to a user concurrently, is alleged by
Appellant to address the problem of “taxpayers becoming concerned and
upset.” Id. (citing Spec. ¶ 3). Appellant’s argument is not persuasive.
The claims have not been shown to be tied into any computer
technology, which is one of the ways integration may be shown under the
2019 Guidance. Appellant does not identify any problem particular to
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computer technology that claim 1’s graphical user interface allegedly
overcomes or improves. See, e.g., DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258.
Indeed, the problem of “taxpayers becoming concerned and upset” is not a
computer or technology problem. In other words, the plain focus of the
claims is not an improvement to computer functionality, but rather the
alleged improvement is in line with improving customer satisfaction, an
interaction between the tax professional and the taxpayer.
We discern no additional element (or combination of elements)
recited in Appellant’s representative claims 1 and 20 that integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application. See 2019 Guidance, 54–55.
Appellant’s claimed additional elements (e.g., a notice form data store, a
taxing authority, a taxpayer file data store, as advance notice engine, one
processing element, a tax services provider, and a graphical user interface)
(1) do not improve the functioning of a computer or other technology; (2)
are not applied with any particular machine (except for a generic
“computerized method”); (3) do not effect a transformation of a particular
article to a different state; and (4) are not applied in any meaningful way
beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See MPEP
§§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Instead, these limitations merely serve to narrow
the recited abstract idea using generic computer components, e.g., a
graphical user interface, which cannot impart patent-eligibility. See Bancorp
Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (A computer “employed only for its most basic function . . .
does not impose meaningful limits on the scope of those claims.”).
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We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that the claimed notice
form data store, a taxing authority, a taxpayer file data store, an advance
notice engine, one processing element, a tax services provider, and a
graphical user interface are no more than generic computer components used
as tools to perform the recited abstract idea. As such, they do not integrate
the abstract idea into a practical application. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24
(“[W]holly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of
‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical assurance that the process
is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea]
itself.’”) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at
77).
Further, the recitation is “presenting, to the user on a graphical user
interface, the notice document.” The presenting step of claim 20 occurs only
after the notice document has been acquired and analyzed. The recitation of
a “graphical user interface” is merely a tool to perform the abstract idea.
2019 Guidance, 55. As such, this “additional element adds insignificant
extra-solution activity to the judicial exception.” Id.
For at least the reasons noted supra, we determine that claims 1 and
20 (1) recite a judicial exception and (2) do not integrate that exception into
a practical application. Thus, representative claims 1 and 20 are directed to
the aforementioned abstract ideas.

IV. Step 2B (Inventive Concept)
Because we determine that the claims are directed to an abstract idea,
we next consider whether the claims contain any “inventive concept” or adds
anything “significantly more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-
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eligible application. Alice, 573 U.S. at 216. As recognized by the Revised
Guidance, an “inventive concept” under Alice step 2 can be evaluated based
on whether an additional element or combination of elements:
(1) adds a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are
not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field,
which is indicative that an inventive concept may be present; or
(2) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is indicative
that an inventive concept may not be present.

See 2019 Guidance, 56; see MPEP § 2106.05(d).
The Final Action determined that
The claims recite the additional limitations of: a form data store;
a file data store; an advance engine with a computer readable
medium and computer program and processing element. The
stores and processing elements, and engine are recited at a high
level of generality and are recited as performing generic
computer functions routinely used in computer applications.
Generic computer components recited as performing generic
computer functions that are well-understood, routine and
conventional activities amount to no more than implementing the
abstract idea with a computerized system. The use of generic
computer components to perform the functions of acquiring,
analyzing, calculating and generating does not impose any
meaningful limit on the computer implementation of the abstract
idea. Thus, taken alone, the additional elements do not amount
to significantly more than the above-identified judicial exception
(the abstract idea). Looking at the limitations as an ordered
combination adds nothing that is not already present when
looking at the elements taken individually. There is no indication
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that the combination of elements improves the functioning of a
computer or improves any other technology.

Final Act. 9 (emphasis added).
The Specification supports the determination that the additional
limitations are directed to generic computing devices. For example, an
“exemplary hardware platform” for certain embodiments can include “a
desktop computer, a laptop computer, a server computer, a mobile device
such as a smartphone or tablet, or any other form factor of general- or
special-purpose computing device.” Spec. ¶ 68. Further, the computer may
include a “system bus 504, whereby other components of computer 502 can
communicate with each other,” a central processing unit, and one or more
random-access memory (RAM) modules. Id. ¶¶ 68–69. Specific to the
claimed “graphical user interface” of claim 1, a graphics card includes a
“display for user interaction.” Id. ¶ 69. Further, “[i]n some embodiments no
display is present” but other embodiments include peripherals such as
keyboard and mouse and like the display “these peripherals may be
integrated into computer” or to the system bus along with local storage. Id.
The Examiner determined that “existing computer technology [is
used] to perform the functions of the claim.” Final Act. 12 (citing
MPEP § 2106.05(d)).
Appellant contends that the Examiner fails to show that the additional
elements were well-understood, routine, and conventional because the Final
Action cites functions that are not claimed. Appeal Br. 29 (citing Final Act.
13–14). Appellant contends “[s]ince the claims do not recite the identified
computer functions, Appellant submits that the claims include non-
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conventional computer functions.” Id. Appellant’s argument is not
persuasive.
First, we understand that Appellant’s reference to pages 13 and 14
was intended to reference page 12, which cites the Specification as
describing various functions performed by the claimed “advance notice
engine.” We disagree that the functions listed are not claimed. For
example, the function of “automatically analyzing the notice document 10
and providing information to a user” is recited in claims 1 and 20. See claim
1 (“analyzing the notice document” and “presenting the notice document”),
claim 20 (reciting all but identical limitations). The claimed functions are
performed by the advance notice engine which, among other computer
functions, stores taxpayer information “in the taxpayer file data store 28.”
Spec. ¶ 29; see also id. ¶ 22 (“the advance notice engine . . . perform[s] the
described functions for the tax services provider”). Therefore, we agree with
the Examiner that the recited claim limitations are computer functions which
are well-understood, routine, and conventional.
Appellant then argues “these steps transform the identified
purportedly abstract idea into a claim actually [because it] provides
immediate access to the notice information set before or during reading of
the notice document,” which is not a routine computer functionality. Appeal
Br. 29–30. This argument is not persuasive because Appellant does not
identify “an additional element [that] effects a transformation or reduction of
a particular article to a different state or thing.” 2019 Guidance, 55 (citing
MPEP § 2106.05(c); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184 (a transformation of uncured
synthetic rubber into precision-molded synthetic rubber)). Furthermore,
“relying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more
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accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.” See OIP Techs.,
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
For the reasons discussed above, we determine that the elements of
the claims, when considered individually or as an ordered combination, do
not recite significantly more than the abstract idea beyond generally linking
the abstract idea to a generic technological environment.
Because Appellant’s independent claims 1 and 20 are directed to a
patent-ineligible abstract concept, do not include additional elements that
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, and do not add a
specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-
understood, routine, and conventional,” we sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of the claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory
subject matter.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–7, 9–13, 15,16, and 18–
20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter is affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–7, 9–13,
15,16, 18–20
101 Eligibility 1–7, 9–13,
15,16, 18–20

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED