Hotline Sales Corp.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

May 10, 2001

No. 75525736 (T.T.A.B. May. 10, 2001)

5/10/01 Paper No. 8
TR
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________
In re Hotline Sales Corp.
________
Serial No. 75/525,736
_______
Howard Joseph of Law Office of Howard Joseph for Hotline
Sales Corp.
Elliott S.A. Robinson III, Trademark Examining Attorney,
Law Office 108 (David Shallant, Managing Attorney).
_______
Before Simms, Cissel and Seeherman, Administrative
Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Simms, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Hotline Sales Corp. (applicant), an Illinois
corporation, has appealed from the final refusal of the
Trademark Examining Attorney to register the mark DEVON for
clothing, namely, men’s, women’s and children’s socks and
hosiery.1 The Examining Attorney has refused registration
1 Application 75/525,736, filed July 27, 1998, claiming use and
use in commerce since 1992. The Examining Attorney also refused
registration on the basis that applicant’s mark is primarily
merely a surname, pursuant to Section 2(e)(4) of the Act.
Applicant overcame that refusal by submitting a declaration under
Section 2(f) of the Act.
THIS DISPOSITION IS NOT
CITABLE AS PRECEDENT OF
THE TTAB
Ser. No. 75/525,736
2
under Section 2(d) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), on the
basis of Registration No. 765,959, issued March 3, 1964
(renewed), for the mark shown below for skirts, suits and
sweaters for women.
Applicant and the Examining Attorney have submitted briefs,
but no oral hearing was requested.
At the outset, we should point out that the registered
mark was amended in 1985 to show the mark DEVON in the
following form:
See attachment to this decision. Accordingly, as far as
the marks are concerned, we must consider the amended mark
to be the mark on the basis of which the refusal has been
made.
Upon careful consideration of the arguments of
applicant’s attorney and the Examining Attorney, we
conclude that confusion is likely when the respective marks
are used in connection with socks and hosiery (for men,
Ser. No. 75/525,736
3
women and children) on the one hand and for skirts, suits
and sweaters for women on the other.
In its brief, applicant has compared the registered
mark to the slightly stylized display of its mark on the
specimens of record. In particular, applicant points to
the exaggerated “V” in its mark as actually used and
contrasts that to the registered mark. However, it is the
mark displayed on the drawing sheet – DEVON in typed form -
that is to be compared with registrant’s mark because that
is the mark sought to be registered. Because the actual
registered mark is slightly different from the form of the
registered mark argued by the attorneys, much of the
argument concerning the similarities and differences of
registrant’s and applicant’s marks is not relevant.
Suffice it to say that because of the similarities in
sound, appearance and commercial impression of the two
marks, they are likely to cause confusion when the
respective marks are used in connection with closely
related goods.
With respect to the goods, neither the registration
nor the application contains any limitation concerning
channels of trade or classes of purchasers. Accordingly,
we must assume that registrant’s clothing items and
applicant’s socks and hosiery travel in all normal channels
Ser. No. 75/525,736
4
of trade for these goods to all potential classes of
purchasers. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells
Fargo Bank, 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Such goods would, of course, be sold in clothing and
department stores, as the Examining Attorney argues. These
goods may also be sold in discount stores, as applicant has
contended. Further, although registrant’s goods are
specifically for women, we note that applicant’s goods also
include socks and hosiery for women.
We conclude that purchasers, aware of registrant’s
DEVON skirts, suits and sweaters for women, who then
encounter applicant’s DEVON socks and hosiery (also
including socks and hosiery for women) are likely to
believe that these goods all come from the same source.
See, for example, In re Mercedes Slacks, Ltd., 213 USPQ 397
(TTAB 1982)(OMEGA for hosiery vs. OMEGA and design for
trousers); In re Cook United, Inc., 185 USPQ 444 (TTAB
1975)(GRANADA for men’s suits, coats and trousers vs.
GRANADA for ladies’ pantyhose and hosiery); and In re
Kosugi Sangyo Kabushiki Kaisha, 128 USPQ 16 (TTAB
1960)(GRACE for sweaters, gloves and headwear vs. LADY
GRACE for hosiery and knitted underwear).
Decision: The refusal of registration is affirmed.