Horel, Brian Christopher. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 27, 2020

13816757 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 27, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/816,757 05/06/2013 Brian Christopher Horel 20717-USA (38201-0094) 9866
109963 7590 02/27/2020
GP-Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP
999 Peachtree Street, NE
Suite 2300
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
RANDALL, JR., KELVIN L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3651
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/27/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
gplawpatents@gapac.com
koch_PAIR@firsttofile.com
patentdocket@eversheds-sutherland.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte BRIAN CHRISTOPHER HOREL, HAROLD JOHN GOEKING,
and ABBY CASE
____________

Appeal 2019-004684
Application 13/816,757
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, WILLIAM A. CAPP and LISA M. GUIJT,
Administrative Patent Judges.

GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the rejection
of claims 1–6, 8–12, 14–16, 18–22, and 24–31. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP,
as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
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THE INVENTION
Appellant’s invention relates to “a sheet product dispenser, and more
particularly to a combination sheet product dispensing unit and a cartridge
therefore, where the cartridge holds the sheet product to be dispensed via the
dispensing unit.” Spec. ¶ 2. Claims 1, 9, and 16 are the independent claims
on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter
on appeal.
1. A dispensing apparatus combination for dispensing sheet
product, the dispensing apparatus combination comprising:
a cartridge comprising:
an enclosure comprising a cartridge opening; and
sheet product disposed within the enclosure and
configured to be dispensed through the cartridge opening; and
a sheet product dispensing unit comprising:
a housing comprising:
a plurality of walls each comprising an
interior surface and an exterior surface disposed
opposite the interior surface, the interior surfaces
of the walls defining an interior space
therebetween, and the exterior surfaces of the walls
defining an exterior of the housing;
a receiving port defined along the exterior
surface of one or more of the walls and configured
to receive at least a portion of the cartridge therein;
an entry opening extending through one or
more of the wall and disposed proximate the
receiving port, the entry opening configured to
allow the sheet product to pass from the cartridge
into the interior space; and
a dispensing opening extending through one
or more of the walls and spaced apart from the
entry opening, the dispensing opening configured
to allow the sheet product to pass form the interior
space of the housing; and
a drive mechanism disposed within the
interior space and configured to dispense the sheet
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product from the interior space out of the housing,
the drive mechanism comprising:
a motor; and
a driver roller disposed in operable
communication with the motor;
wherein the cartridge is configured to be disposed in
operable communication with the sheet product dispensing unit
such that the cartridge opening is disposed within the receiving
port and proximate the entry opening.
THE REJECTIONS2
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence in support of the
rejections:
NAME REFERENCE DATE
Kettles, Jr. US 2,092,166 Sept. 7, 1937
West US 2,440,993 May 4, 1948
Armbruster US 5,107,734 Apr. 28, 1992
Mitchell US 2004/0124202 A1 July 1, 2004
Lewis US 2006/0000845 A1 Jan. 5, 2006
Formon US 7,004,435 B2 Feb. 28, 2006
O’Neil US 2008/0223869 A1 Sept. 18, 2008
Leu US 7,837,093 B1 Nov. 23, 2010
Troutman US 2010/0314429 A1 Dec. 16, 2010

2 The Examiner objects to claims 7 and 13 “as being dependent upon a
rejected base claim,” and finds claims 7 and 13 “allowable if rewritten in
independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any
intervening claims.” Final Act. 19.
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The following rejections are before us for review:
I. Claims 1, 4, and 29–31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over West, Mitchell, Lewis, and
Armbruster.
II. Claim 2 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over West, Mitchell, Lewis, Armbruster, and
Formon.
III. Claims 3, 5, 9–12, 15, and 25–28 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over West, Mitchell,
Lewis, Armbruster, and Troutman.
IV. Claim 6 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over West, Mitchell, Lewis, Armbruster, and
O’Neil.
V. Claim 8 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over West, Mitchell, Lewis, Armbruster, O’Neil,
and Leu.
VI. Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over West, Mitchell, Lewis, Armbruster,
Troutman, O’Neil, and Leu.
VII. Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over O’Neil and Leu.
VIII. Claims 18–21 and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over O’Neil, Leu, and Armbruster.
IX. Claim 22 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over O’Neil, Leu, Armbruster, and Kettles.

OPINION
Rejection I
Regarding independent claim 1, the Examiner finds that West
discloses, inter alia, a sheet product dispensing unit comprising: (i) a
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housing (i.e., outer housing 10) with walls having interior surfaces defining
an interior space and exterior surfaces defining the housing’s exterior; (ii) a
receiving port (i.e., “covered by” removable cover 11) defined along one or
more of the wall’s exterior surfaces; (iii) an entry opening (i.e., “defined by
[shelves] 28, 29”) disposed proximate the receiving port; (iv) a dispensing
opening (i.e., charge opening or slot 12); and (v) a drive mechanism (i.e.,
pair of rollers 15, 16). Final Act. 4–5 (West, Figs. 1, 9); see also West 2:27–
28, 31–33, 37–41, 4:12–14. More specifically, the Examiner finds that
“[West’s] wall configurations” disclose the claimed walls “when the lid
member 11 is removed,” for example, West’s shelves 28, 29 are walls
having internal and external surfaces when cover 11 is removed from West’s
dispensing unit, wherein the external (or upper) surfaces of shelves 28, 29
form the bottom surface of a receiving port, and the internal (or lower)
surfaces opposite the exterior surfaces of shelves 28, 29 form an interior
space, as claimed. Id. at 5; see also Ans. 8, 9 (wherein the Examiner
provides an Annotated Figure 9 of West identifying external surfaces of the
housing as including the exterior of rectangular housing 10 as well as the
walls’ surfaces defining the receiving port, which include surfaces of
shelves 28, 29).
The Examiner determines that West fails to disclose, inter alia, (i) “a
cartridge,” as claimed; (ii) “an entry opening extending through one or more
of the walls,” as claimed (as compared to an entry opening extending
between one or more shelves as in West); (iii) “a motor; and a drive roller,”
as claimed; and (iv) “wherein the cartridge is configured to be disposed in
operable communication with the sheet product dispensing unit such that the
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cartridge opening is disposed within the receiving port and proximate the
entry opening,” as claimed. Final Act. 4–5.
The Examiner relies on Mitchell for disclosing “a cartridge
comprising: an enclosure comprising a cartridge opening; and sheet product
disposed within the enclosure and configured to be dispensed through the
cartridge opening,” as claimed (i.e., container 30, 131). Final Act. 5 (citing
Mitchell, Figs. 1–8). The Examiner reasons, inter alia, that it would have
been obvious “to combine the teachings of West with the cartridge of
Mitchell so as to . . . limit[] sheet contact with the outer environment to
protect against contamination.” Id.; see also Ans. 11 (reasoning that “one of
ordinary skill in the art would have seen inserting a packaged product
capable of dispensing through a device for protection of the product to be
dispensed,” because “[t]here would be no need to handle the bare product,
thus, potentially contaminating it with possible debris”). The Examiner also
finds that
the combination is further capable of providing [a] cartridge . . .
configured to be disposed in operable communication with the
sheet product dispensing unit such that the cartridge opening is
disposed within the receiving port and proximate the entry
opening by using parts within their normal known usage by way
of placing a cartridge inside an outer housing.
Id.
The Examiner also relies on Lewis for disclosing an entry opening
(i.e., opening 18) “extending through one or more of the walls.” Final Act. 5
(citing Lewis, Figs. 8–11). The Examiner reasons, inter alia, that it would
have been obvious to combine the teachings of West, as modified to include
a cartridge as disclosed by Mitchell, to further include “the entry opening of
Lewis to provide greater surface area contact for more stable supporting.”
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Id. at 6; see also Ans. 12 (“Lewis provides the teaching of an entry opening
with more surface contact, thus, being capable of providing a better
supporting surface of the product above”). In other words, we understand
that the Examiner is proposing to modify West’s shelves 28, 29, which are
spaced apart to define an entry opening, to be a single wall with an entry
opening, as taught in Lewis.
The Examiner further relies on Armbruster for disclosing a drive
mechanism comprising a motor (i.e., motor 54) and a driver roller (i.e., roller
44). Final Act. 6 (citing Armbruster, Fig. 4). The Examiner reasons that it
would have been obvious “to combine the teachings of West, with that of
Mitchell, Lewis, and Armbruster so as to provide an automatic means
alternative to a manual means of dispensing as obvious to one of ordinary
skill in the art.” Id.
Thus, we understand that the Examiner’s proposed modification
results, inter alia, in West’s dispensing unit having a single wall with an
entry opening (as taught in Lewis) in place of West’s individual, spaced
apart shelves 28, 29 (hereinafter “the Lewis wall”), to provide a greater
surface area for supporting the towels above it, and that West’s individually
stacked towels are enclosed in a cartridge (as taught in Mitchell), which is
received in West’s dispensing unit in place of West’s individually stacked
towels in a receiving port, and particularly, in a space that is now defined by
exterior walls of the housing because West’s cover 11 is no longer required
to maintain the towels in a sanitary condition within the receiving port.
Appellant argues that the cited references “fail to disclose or teach a
housing that includes a receiving port as recited in claim 1,” and specifically,
“a receiving port defined along the exterior surface of one or more of the
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walls and configured to receive a portion of the cartridge therein,” as
claimed. Appeal Br. 12; see also Reply Br. 3–4. In support, Appellant
contends that (i) the interior surface of a lower portion of a sidewall of
West’s housing 10 cannot be considered an interior surface defining an
interior space (for example, enclosing West’s rollers 15, 16), while an upper
portion of the same interior surface of the sidewall is considered an exterior
surface defining a receiving port); (ii) “[t]he interior surfaces of [West’s
front, back and side walls] of the housing 10 and [] top surfaces of [] shelves
28, 29 do not become ‘external surfaces’ even when the cover 11 is in an
open position, as these surfaces do not define the exterior of housing 10”;
and (iii) “the top edges of [the front, back, and side walls] of the housing 10
cannot reasonably be considered the claimed ‘external surfaces’ because
such edges are not disposed opposite ‘internal surfaces’ that define the
interior space of the housing 10.” Appeal Br. 13–14.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. Claim 1 recites “a
housing comprising: a plurality of walls.” The transitional phrase
“comprising” is open-ended, and, as used here, does not exclude additional
structures (or additional walls) from being included as part of the housing.
We find that claim 1 reads on the Examiner’s proposed modification of West
when two (i.e., a plurality, or more than one) walls are selected: first, the
wall (as taught in Lewis) that replaces West’s shelves 28, 29 (or the Lewis
wall), and second, the bottom wall of West’s housing, which has slot 12.3
Considering these two walls and the limitations of claim 1, each wall has

3 Notably, West itself recognizes the structural separability of the walls of
housing 10, referring, for example, to “an end wall of the outer housing.”
West 2:42–43.

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interior surfaces (i.e., the lower surface of the Lewis wall and the upper
surface of West’s bottom wall) and exterior surfaces disposed opposite the
interior surfaces, respectively (i.e., the upper surface of the Lewis wall and
the lower surface of West’s bottom wall), wherein the interior surfaces of the
walls define an interior space therebetween (i.e., the space enclosing West’s
rollers 15, 16) and the exterior surfaces of the walls define an exterior of the
housing. In this respect, we agree with the Examiner that the Examiner’s
proposed modification (i.e., removing West’s cover 11) results in the upper
surface of the Lewis wall defining an exterior of the housing because such
surface is open to the atmosphere prior to insertion of a cartridge.
Appellant’s arguments supra regarding the sidewalls and top edges of walls
of West’s housing are moot.
Appellant also argues that the prior art references relied on by the
Examiner “fail to disclose or teach a housing that includes an entry opening
as recited in claim 1.” Appeal Br. 14; see also Reply Br. 3–4. In support,
Appellant contends that: (i) “shelves 28, 29 of West cannot be considered
one of the claimed walls of the housing because no surface of either of the
shelves 28, 29 defines an exterior of the housing 10, as required by claim 1”;
(ii) “the opening defined between the shelves 28, 29 does not extend through
one or more of [the front, back, top, bottom, or side walls] of housing 10
(i.e., the walls of the housing 10 which include the interior surfaces that
define the interior space of the housing 10 and the opposite exterior surfaces
that define an exterior of the housing 10”; and (iii) “the opening defined
between shelves 28, 29 is not disposed proximate a receiving port as recited
in claim 1,” because “the housing 10 of West does not even include a
receiving port as recited in claim 1.” Appeal Br. 15.
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We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. As discussed supra,
we agree with the Examiner that eliminating cover 11 from West’s housing
exposes the upper surface of the Lewis wall, which becomes an exterior
surface of housing 10. We also are not apprised of error in the Examiner’s
identification of an entry opening extending through one of the plurality of
walls (i.e., the Lewis wall), as required by claim 1. See also Ans. 10
(correctly finding that claim 1 does not require the claimed entry opening to
extend through a front, back, top, bottom, or side wall of the housing,
although we note that removing cover 11 results in the Lewis wall becoming
a top wall of West’s housing 10). Notably, as discussed supra, the Examiner
modifies West’s shelves 28, 29 to be a wall as taught by Lewis (the Lewis
wall), and identifies the space above the Lewis wall, including West’s
sidewalls above the shelves 28, 29 (or the Lewis wall according to the
modification), as forming a cavity4 for receiving a cartridge (i.e., a receiving
port5), so according to the Examiner’s proposed modification, the entry
opening in West, as modified by Lewis, is proximate (or in close
relationship to) a receiving port, as required by claim 1, because the entry
opening is in the Lewis wall that defines the bottom wall of the receiving
port. Cf. Spec., Figure 7 (cavity or receiving port 28 in dispensing unit 20,
entry opening 23).
Appellant also argues that the prior art references relied on by the
Examiner “fail to disclose or teach the relationship between a cartridge and a

4 Appellant does not argue that the receiving port identified by the
Examiner, according to the Examiner’s proposed modification of West in
view of Lewis, is not, or must be, a cavity. Appeal Br. 7–40.
5 See Spec. ¶ 52 (“dispensing unit 20 includes a cavity 28 (alternatively
herein referred to as a receiving port) that provides room for receiving or
nesting the cartridge 25 therein”).
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sheet product dispensing unit as recited in claim 1.” Appeal Br. 16. In
support, Appellant concludes that the Examiner “fails to explain how the
combination of the teachings of the cited references would satisfy the
claimed relationship.” Id. at 17. We disagree with Appellant’s conclusion.
As discussed supra, the Examiner identifies the space above the Lewis wall
as forming a receiving port for receiving a cartridge, as taught by Mitchell.
Appellant further argues that “the asserted rationales for combining
the teachings of [the prior art relied on by the Examiner] are legally
insufficient,” because
[the Examiner does not explain] with sufficient articulated
reasoning why one of skill in the art would have started with the
disclosure of West, looked to the teachings of Mitchell, Lewis,
and Armbruster, and then – when considering the prior art for all
that it teaches – combine and modify the teachings of the
references to derive the dispensing apparatus combination of
claim 1.
Appeal Br. 17; see also Reply Br. 5–6. In support, Appellant characterizes
the Examiner’s rationale for modifying West, in view of Mitchell, to use a
cartridge of paper towels rather than individually stacked towels, as “vague
and generic,” and argues that “[West’s] housing 10 already includes the
cover 11 for covering and protecting paper towels 32 from the surrounding
environment, and thus it is unclear how use of a cartridge would provide a
further benefit that would have led one skilled in the art to make the asserted
modification.” Appeal Br. 18.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. Where “a patent
claims a structure already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere
substitution of one element for another known in the field, the combination
must do more than yield a predictable result.” See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex,
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Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). Alternatively, “if a technique has been used
to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would
recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the
technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”
Id. at 417. Here, the Examiner has provided sufficient rationale supra for
substituting West’s individually stacked towels with a paper towel package
known in the art of paper towel dispensers, namely, a cartridge, by
determining that a cartridge for enclosing individually stacked paper towels
to protect the towels against contamination is a known substitute for a
receptacle that receives individually stacked paper towels and has a cover for
protecting the towels against contamination.
Appellant also characterizes the Examiner’s rational for modifying
West, in view of Lewis, as “vague and generic,” in that “it is unclear how
forming an opening in a housing would provide ‘greater surface area
contact.’” Appeal Br. 18–19. Again, however, we determine that the
Examiner’s reasoning is factually supported because replacing two
shelves 28, 29, with cutaways that define an opening, as disclosed in West,
with a single tray or wall defining an opening, is an alternative, known
construction that may indeed result in a greater surface area for supporting
towels placed in a receptacle above the shelves or Lewis wall. See, e.g.,
West 4:12–19 (“[t]wo horizontal shelves 28 and 29 . . . are provided in the
dispenser for supporting the stack of paper towels,” wherein “[t]he edges of
the shelves are cut away”); Lewis ¶ 34 (“dispenser housing 12 provides an
internal compartment 14 and the housing 12 is configured to hold a rolled
sheet material product . . . within the internal compartment 14, desirably
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upon a base or tray 16 . . . which has a dispensing port or opening 18”
(emphasis added)).
Finally, Appellant argues that the Examiner improperly relied on
hindsight. Appeal Br. 19; see also Reply Br. 6. In support, Appellant
contends that “the cited references fail to disclose or reasonably teach the
receiving port, the entry opening, and the relationship between the cartridge
and the sheet product dispensing unit as recited in claim 1,” nor do the cited
references “include any teaching that would have led one of ordinary skill in
the art to combine and modify the teachings of the references in a manner
that would result in these features of claim 1.” Appeal Br. 19–20. However,
for the reasons discussed supra, we are not persuaded that the Examiner’s
findings or reasoning are deficient as argued by Appellant, and Appellant
does not identified any knowledge that the Examiner relied upon that was
gleaned only from Appellants’ disclosure and that was not otherwise within
the level of ordinary skill at the time of the invention. See In re
McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392 (CCPA 1971).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 1. Appellant chose not present any arguments for the patentability of
dependent claims 4 and 29–31 apart from the arguments presented for
independent claim 1 supra, and therefore, we also sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 4 and 29–31. Appeal Br. 20.

Rejection III
Regarding independent claim 9, Appellant chose not present any
arguments for the patentability of claim 9 apart from the arguments
presented for independent claim 1 supra, and therefore, we also sustain the
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Examiner’s rejection of claim 9. Appeal Br. 20–246; see also Reply Br. 7.
Additionally, Appellant chose not to present any arguments for the
patentability of dependent claims 3, 5, 10–12, 15, and 25–28 apart from the
arguments presented for independent claim 1 supra, and therefore, we also
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3, 5, 10–12, 15, and 25–28.
Appeal Br. 20.

Rejection VII
Regarding independent claim 16, the Examiner finds, inter alia, that
O’Neil discloses the claimed cartridge including a verification feature, as
claimed, however, O’Neil fails to disclose that the rejection feature is one of
the specific rejection features recited in claim 16. Final Act. 15–16
(citations omitted). The Examiner relies on Leu for teaching a rejection
feature that is an RFID tag, as claimed, reasoning that it would have been
obvious to combine the teachings of O’Neil and Leu “to provide an
alternative verification means of a finite number of choices for a product and
corresponding holder as known to one of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 16
(citing Leu 3:38–43).
Appellant argues that Leu is nonanalogous art and, therefore,
improperly relied on by the Examiner, because Leu is in the field of
endeavor of “a system for filling prescription bottles,” which is not in
Appellant’s field of endeavor, namely, “a sheet product dispensing unit,” nor
is Leu “pertinent to problems faced by the inventors of the present

6 Notably, in the rejection of independent claim 9, the Examiner relies on
Troutman for disclosing a sensor, as claimed.
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application, [namely,] verifying that a cartridge is authorized for use with a
sheet product dispensing unit.” Appeal Br. 27–28; see also Reply Br. 7–8.
The precedent of our reviewing court establishes a two prong test for
determining whether art is analogous: “(1) whether the art is from the same
field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the
reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the
reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which
the inventor is involved.”’ In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(quoting In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
Here, we agree with Appellant that the field of endeavor of
Appellant’s invention is “sheet product dispensers,” which is disparate from
Leu’s branding verification system for pharmaceutical/medical containers.
See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 3; Leu 1:31–33. Notwithstanding, we find that Leu’s
disclosure is reasonably pertinent to the inventors’ problem of verifying that
a cartridge is the intended cartridge for use in a dispensing unit, by
disclosing a system that verifies whether the branding of a container is
correct for dispensing systems that dispense medication for multiple
pharmacy brands—or in other words, a product verification feature. Leu
5:48–54, 6:14–24; see also Spec. ¶ 69 (disclosing “a verification feature . . .
utilized and activated to signal . . . insertion of a non-authorized product that
would result in a product-verification-failure-signal”). Thus, we find that
Leu is analogous art properly relied on by the Examiner in the rejection of
independent claim 16.
Appellant also argues that the Examiner’s rationale lacks sufficient
factual underpinnings and is “vague and generic.” Appeal Br. 28; see also
Reply Br. 7–8. In support, Appellant contends that
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[the Examiner] does not provide a specific, relevant reason why
one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to combine
the respective teachings of O’Neil and Leu such that the refill
pack 11 of O’Neil includes an RFID tag instead of the conducting
strips for completing the circuit 22.
Appeal Br. 29. Appellant also contends that
[the Examiner] fails to provide any explanation as to the alleged
“finite number of choices” that one skilled in the art would
choose from in selecting an “alternative verification means” or
why the selection of an RFID tag would have been an obvious
selection for the refill pack 11 of O’Neil . . . and the RIFD tag of
Leu in a manner that is not supported by the asserted explanation.
Id. Appellant concludes that the Examiner impermissibly relies on
hindsight. Id. at 29–30.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. O’Neil discloses the
desirability of including a compatibility actuator on a refill pack of wet
wipes, for example, which is designed to interact with a compatibility sensor
on a container, wherein “[t]he interaction between the compatibility sensor
and compatibility actuator can be mechanical, electrical, magnetic or by any
other means.” O’Neil ¶¶ 2, 25 (emphasis added). Thus, O’Neil itself
suggests that other known verification sensor technologies may be employed
to determine whether the pack of wet wipes is intended or authorized for use
in the dispensing container. As relied on by the Examiner, Leu discloses
that one such known means for product verification is “[a]n RFID tag
reader.” Leu 3:38–43. Thus, the Examiner’s reasoning is supported by
rationale underpinning, in that it would have been obvious to select RFID
technology as a verification system for use with O’Neil’s wet wipe
dispenser, because Leu discloses RFID technology as an available choice for
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product verification systems. As such, the Examiner did not improperly rely
on hindsight.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 16.

Rejections II, IV–VI, VIII, and IX
Appellant chose not to present any arguments for the patentability of
dependent claims 2, 6, 8, 14, 18–22, and 24, apart from the arguments
presented for independent claims 1, 9, and 16 supra, and therefore, we also
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 6, 8, 14, 18–22, and 24.
Appeal Br. 20, 24, 30.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 4, 29–31 103(a) West, Mitchell, Lewis,
Armbruster
1, 4, 29–31
2 103(a) West, Mitchell, Lewis,
Armbruster, Formon
2
3, 5, 9–12,
15, 25–28
103(a) West, Mitchell, Lewis,
Armbruster, Troutman
3, 5, 9–12,
15, 25–28

6 103(a) West, Mitchell, Lewis,
Armbruster, O’Neil
6
8 103(a) West, Mitchell, Lewis,
Armbruster, O’Neil, Leu
8
14 103(a) West, Mitchell, Lewis,
Armbruster, Troutman,
O’Neil, Leu
14
16 103(a) O’Neil, Leu 16
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Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
18–21, 24 103(a) O’Neil, Leu, Armbruster 18–21, 24
22 103(a) O’Neil, Leu, Armbruster,
Kettles
22
Overall
Outcome
1–6, 8–12,
14–16, 18–
22, 24–31

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED