HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 23, 2020

14478552 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 23, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/478,552 09/05/2014 Gregory J. Chapman H0044187 (002.4690) 7973
89955 7590 10/23/2020
HONEYWELL/LKGLOBAL
Intellectual Property Services Group
300 S. Tryon Street
Suite 600
Charlotte, NC 28202
EXAMINER
MIKUS, JASON
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3745
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/23/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
DL-PMT-SM-IP@Honeywell.com
honeywell@lkglobal.com
patentservices-us@honeywell.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte GREGORY J. CHAPMAN
Appeal 2020-001411
Application 14/478,552
Technology Center 3700
Before CHARLES N. GREENHUT, LEE L. STEPINA, and
ERIC C. JESCHKE, Administrative Patent Judges.
GREENHUT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–6, 8–13, and 15–20. See Final Act. 1.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM–IN–PART and designate new grounds of rejection.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Honeywell
International, Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2020-001411
Application 14/478,552
2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to an engine-induced aircraft cabin resonance
reduction system and method. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of
the claimed subject matter:
1. A method of reducing engine induced aircraft cabin resonance,
comprising the steps of:
sensing core engine speed of a first turbofan gas turbine
engine;
sensing core engine speed of a second turbofan gas turbine
engine; and
in a control system:
processing the core engine speed of the first turbofan gas
turbine engine and the core engine speed of the second turbofan
gas turbine engine to determine a core engine speed difference
between the first and second turbofan gas turbine engines;
processing the core engine speed difference to supply a
variable inlet guide vane (VIGV) offset value;
receiving a signal indicating that fan speed
synchronization of the first and second turbofan gas turbine
engines has been enabled;
upon receipt of the signal, processing the core engine
speeds of the first and second turbofan gas turbine engines to
determine which has a lower core engine speed; and
applying the VIGV offset value to a VIGV reference
command associated with the turbofan gas turbine engine having
the lower core engine speed, to thereby cause the VIGV s of the
turbofan gas turbine engine having the lower core engine speed
to move to a more closed position.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Pollak US 4,947,643 Aug. 14, 1990
Snow US 5,224,340 July 6, 1993
Mannarino US 2003/0066294 A1 Apr. 10, 2003

Appeal 2020-001411
Application 14/478,552
3
REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 6, 8, 13, 15, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)
as being anticipated by Snow. Final Act. 3.
Claims 2, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 16, 18, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Snow, and Pollak. Final Act. 6.
Claims 3, 10, and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Snow, Pollak, and Mannarino. Final Act. 13.
OPINION
Undermining all of the Examiner’s rejections is an incorrect factual
determination regarding how the device disclosed by Snow operates:
Appellant’s argument that the master engine and the slave engine
are predetermined and are always the same engines is
conclusory. Appellant points to no part of Snow that indicates
that the master engine is the same engine at all times and offers
no support for such argument. . . . The master and slave engines
are not predetermined. The fan speed error signal is then used in
the synchrophasing system to adjust the fan speed of the slower
engine. The adjustment is performed by biasing the variable
stator vanes. This function is plainly explained in Column 3 of
Snow (Snow - Column 3, lines 16-68). Appellant’s argument that
Snow does not teach recognition of a slower engine or applying
a command to speed up the slower engine is simply inaccurate.
Ans. 5–6 (emphasis added); see Appeal Br. 13; Reply Br 6.
Contrary to the Examiner’s assertion, Snow plainly and repeatedly
teaches that it is the so-called “slave” engine which is always adjusted to
replicate the speed of the so-called “master” engine. Snow col. 1, ll. 19–26;
col. 2, ll. 39–42; col. 5, ll. 1–3, 30–36. Indeed, Snow’s Figure 3 schematic
illustrates a Variable Stator Vane (VSV) actuator 88 only “to control the
positioning of the variable stator vanes within the slave engine.” Snow col.
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Application 14/478,552
4
4, l. 62–col. 5, l. 3. No such mechanism for control is mentioned or
illustrated regarding the master engine. Thus, we agree with Appellant that,
in Snow’s system, the slave engine is adjusted regardless of whether the
slave engine is operating at a lower or a greater speed than that of the master
engine. Thus, Snow’s error signal will not always be used to adjust the
slower engine, as the Examiner apparently determined.
Despite the Examiner’s apparently incorrect reading of Snow, we are
nonetheless mindful that sometimes, Snow’s error signal will be used to
adjust the slower engine, so long as the slave engine is the slower engine.
Accordingly, we affirm the rejection of claim 1 and its dependent claims not
separately argued, but designate our affirmance as being based on “new
grounds” of rejection so as to afford Appellant a fair opportunity to respond.
“[T]he law is, and long has been, that ‘if a previously patented device,
in its normal and usual operation, will perform the function which an
appellant claims in a subsequent application for process patent, then such
application for process patent will be considered to have been anticipated by
the former patented device.’” In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (citations omitted). Further, analogous to the familiar rule that subject
matter that sometimes infringes, nonetheless infringes (Bell Commc’ns
Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Commc’ns Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 622–23 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (“product that sometimes, but not always, embodies a claim[] . . .
nonetheless infringes”) (internal citations omitted)) would be the rule that
subject matter that sometimes anticipates, nonetheless anticipates. See, e.g.,
Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“That
which would literally infringe if later in time anticipates if earlier than the
date of invention.”).
Appeal 2020-001411
Application 14/478,552
5
Because Snow’s system, in its usual and ordinary course of operation
will sometimes anticipate the method of claim 1, Snow can still be said to
fairly anticipate the method of claim 1. Contrary to Appellant’s assertion
(Appeal Br. 11–13; Reply Br. 4–6), by characterizing the ΔN1 as being
positive or negative“±”, Snow can reasonably be said to “determine which
[engine] has a lower core engine speed” as recited by claim 1. It is of no
moment for purposes of claim 1 that Snow does not use the results of that
determination as a basis to determine to which engine to apply the variable
inlet guide vane (VIGV) offset or VSV actuator signal because claim 1
recites no such requirement. Rather, claim 1 only requires the application of
the VIGV offset to the engine having the lower speed, and this will occur, as
would be expected at least some of the time in Snow. A control system need
not be constrained to always apply a correction to the lower speed engine in
order for that control system to apply such a correction some of the time.
The same analysis cannot be said to apply to the system or apparatus
claims 8 and 15. Although in the context of conditional language, Ex parte
Schulhauser, 2013-007847 (PTAB April 28, 2016) (precedential) discusses
principles associated with why method claims can often be broader than
apparatus claims reciting logic or other means for performing steps similar
to those recited in the method.
Claim 15 requires “a control system to. . . set the turbofan gas turbine
engine having a lower core engine speed as a slave turbofan gas turbine
engine.” Claim 8 recites “the control system configured . . . to. . . apply the
VIGV offset value to a VIGV reference command associated with the
turbofan gas turbine engine having the lower core engine speed.” The
recitation of “a control system to” or “configured . . . to” implies the
Appeal 2020-001411
Application 14/478,552
6
presence of some software logic or other structure programmed to perform
the specific tasks recited.
Our reviewing court has held that a “programmed machine is
structurally different from a machine without that program.” In re Noll, 545
F.2d 141, 148 (CCPA 1976); see also In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1399–
1400 (CCPA 1969) (“[I]f a machine is programmed in a certain new and
unobvious way, it is physically different from the machine without that
program; its memory elements are differently arranged. The fact that these
physical changes are invisible to the eye should not tempt us to conclude that
the machine has not been changed.”); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545
(Fed. Cir. 1994); Ultramercial v. Hulu, 657 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2011). If the prior-art apparatus lacks the logic to perform the function stated
in the claim the prior-art apparatus cannot be said to anticipate. See Typhoon
Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
It is clear with regard to claim 15 that Snow contains no such
programming, logic or other means to “set the turbofan gas turbine engine
having a lower core engine speed as a slave turbofan gas turbine engine.” As
Appellant correctly points out, the slave engine in Snow always remains the
slave engine.
Although perhaps a closer call, we reach a similar conclusion with
regard to claim 8. Snow’s control logic will always apply the error
correction, be it to increase or decrease speed, to the slave engine. Although,
as discussed above in the context of method claim 1, Snow’s control logic
may sometimes result in the performance of the method steps recited in
claim 1, it cannot be said that the Snow algorithm or logic itself is the same
as that recited in claim 8, which requires the controller to “apply the VIGV
offset value to a VIGV reference command associated with the turbofan gas
Appeal 2020-001411
Application 14/478,552
7
turbine engine having the lower core engine speed.” That identical processes
might sometimes be performed with, or identical results might sometimes be
achieved by, Snow’s controller and the controller of claim 8 is not sufficient
to demonstrate that the system of claim 8 including that controller is
anticipated by Snow.
We have considered Appellant’s additional argument regarding the
supposed absence of “receiving a signal indicating that fan speed
synchronization of the first and second turbofan gas turbine engines has been
enabled” according to claim 1 (Appeal Br. 11) and find it to be without
merit. Either of the signals originating from initialize logic 92 described in
the cited portion (col. 5, ll. 16–25; Fig. 2) of Snow would seem to satisfy
this limitation. We recognize the Examiner did not adequately set forth the
portion of Snow’s disclosure relied upon by the Examiner until the Answer.2
Appellant did not elect to address the matter in the Reply Brief or by way of
petition under 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.41 or 41.40 (citing 37 C.F.R. §1.181). In any
case, the issue of the Examiner’s tardy explanation is moot in light of our
new grounds designation.

2 A rejection must be set forth in sufficiently articulate and informative
manner as to meet the notice requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 132, such as by
identifying where or how each limitation of the rejected claims is met by the
prior art references. In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see
also 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c)(2) (“When a reference is complex or shows or
describes inventions other than that claimed by the applicant, the particular
part relied on must be designated as nearly as practicable. The pertinence of
each reference, if not apparent, must be clearly explained and each rejected
claim specified.”); Gechter v. Davidson, 116 F.3d 1454, 1460 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (PTO must create a record that includes “specific fact findings for
each contested limitation and satisfactory explanations for such findings.”).
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Application 14/478,552
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CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections of claim 1–6 are AFFIRMED, but we
designate our affirmance as including new grounds pursuant to 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(b).
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 8–13, and 15–20 are
REVERSED.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed New
Grounds
1, 6, 8,
13, 15,
20
102(a)(1) Snow 1, 6 8, 13, 15,
20
1, 6
2, 4, 5, 9,
11, 12,
16, 18,
19
103 Snow, Pollak 2, 4, 5 9, 11, 12,
16, 18, 19
2, 4, 5
3, 10, 17 103 Snow, Pollak,
Mannarino
3 10, 17 3
Overall
Outcome
1–6 8–13, 15–
20
1–6

RESPONSE
This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection
pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.”
Section 41.50(b) also provides:
When the Board enters such a non-final decision, the appellant,
within two months from the date of the decision, must exercise
one of the following two options with respect to the new ground
of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected
claims:
Appeal 2020-001411
Application 14/478,552
9
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate
amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to
the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered
by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be
remanded to the examiner. The new ground of rejection is
binding upon the examiner unless an amendment or new
Evidence not previously of Record is made which, in the opinion
of the examiner, overcomes the new ground of rejection
designated in the decision. Should the examiner reject the claims,
appellant may again appeal to the Board pursuant to this subpart.
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be
reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The
request for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection
and state with particularity the points believed to have been
misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new ground of
rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing
is sought.
Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be
found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1214.01.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED IN PART; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)