Holly Gage, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 15, 2007
0120063303 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 15, 2007)

0120063303

11-15-2007

Holly Gage, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Holly Gage,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01200633031

Agency Nos. 4G-720-0056-00,

4G-720-0115-98,

4G-720-0116-01,

4G-720-0163-98

DECISION

Complainant and the agency executed a settlement agreement dated December

1, 2003, that resolved complainant's four EEO complaints. The settlement

agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:

(1) As a final and complete settlement to the above-referenced EEO

complaint, the complainant will be placed in an Unassigned Full-time

Regular Clerk position at the Batesville, AR Post Office. She will

be assigned to Tour 1 with non-scheduled days of Sunday and Wednesday.

Complainant will be placed in this position as soon as possible upon final

execution of this settlement agreement. Once placed in this position,

all contractual provisions will apply to the employee's scheduling and

assignments, including those governing seniority, bidding and excessing.

(2) The complainant has been notified that, because of periods of

Leave Without Pay in excess of six pay periods, the layoff protection

afforded by Article 6, �2 of the APWU National Agreement has lapsed.

As a condition of this settlement agreement, the Postal Service agrees

to treat the complainant as though she had uninterrupted service since

her initial Entered on Duty date with the Postal Service, ONLY for

the purposes of Article 6 protections. This is not to be construed as

entitling the complainant to leave or to any other benefit she did not

accrue as a result of the periods of Leave Without Pay.

By letter to the agency dated March 28, 2006, complainant alleged that the

agency breached the settlement agreement and requested that the agency

reinstate her complaints. Specifically, complainant alleged that the

agency breached the settlement agreement by changing her seniority date

from May 27, 1995 to November 29, 2003. Complainant stated that when she

entered into the settlement, she was immediately reinstated to her former

position with all of her seniority restored. Complainant noted that she

had been working and bidding according to the seniority date of May 27,

1995, until March 15, 2006, when a new seniority list was issued as a

result of the settlement of a grievance filed against her settlement

agreement. Complainant argued that the grievance settlement rendered

the instant settlement agreement null and void since the settlement

agreement is now unenforceable.

On May 4, 2006, complainant filed the instant appeal with the Commission.

Complainant states that the agency did not issue a final action with

regard to her allegation of breach.

In response, the agency asserts that it did not breach the settlement

agreement. According to the agency, neither of the aforementioned

provisions specifies a date certain for complainant's seniority date.

The agency maintains that in the absence of such a provision, it cannot

be found in breach. The agency asserts that its utilization of a modified

seniority list from complainant's reinstatement of November 2003 to March

2006, did not stop it from changing her seniority date in March 2006.

The agency notes that the change in complainant's seniority date was

the result of the settlement of a grievance filed by another employee

under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and that the

last sentence of the aforementioned first provision of the settlement

agreement contemplated, and provided for, an event such as that at issue.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at

any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.

The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a

contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules of

contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,

EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further

held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,

not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.

Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795

(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard

to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally

relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states

that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,

its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument

without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery

Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

Initially, we observe that subsequent to the instant appeal, complainant

filed a claim of breach with regard to a purported settlement agreement

executed on June 22, 2006. This purported settlement agreement provided

that:

Being interviewed for the Postmaster position in Magness Arkansas -

EAS 11, and if selected for that position and placed in the position

no later than two full pay periods from the date of selection, will

resolve the allegation of a breach of agreement of the EEO Settlement

dated 12/1/2003 for the cases listed above.

I further voluntarily agree that this EEO Settlement Agreement supersedes

and replaces the EEO Settlement dated 12/1/2003.

Complainant claims that she was not interviewed for the Postmaster

position. Upon review of this purported settlement agreement dated

June 22, 2006, we find that this is not a valid agreement in light of

the uncertainty of the consideration being received by complainant.

In fact, we observe that complainant received no consideration given

that she was not chosen for the position. Therefore, the settlement

agreement executed on June 22, 2006, was not valid and the settlement

agreement executed on December 1, 2003 remains intact.

In terms of the December 1, 2003 agreement, complainant contends

that the agency breached the settlement agreement when it changed her

seniority date. The settlement agreement provides that once complainant

was reinstated in her position, all contractual provisions would apply

to her scheduling and assignments, including those governing seniority,

bidding and excessing. A reading of the settlement agreement reveals

that no date certain was established as complainant's seniority date.

Therefore, the change in complainant's seniority date as precipitated by

the grievance settlement did not violate the terms of the settlement

agreement. Moreover, the grievance settlement did not render the

settlement agreement at issue unenforceable and null and void. The

grievance settlement stated that complainant's seniority date would be

adjusted to November 29, 2003. The grievance settlement further stated

that complainant would remain a full-time clerk. In light of the fact

that the grievance settlement did not affect the terms of the settlement

agreement, the settlement agreement was not rendered null and void.

Accordingly, we find that the agency did not breach the settlement

agreement.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous

interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact

on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

November 15, 2007

__________________

Date

1 Due to a new data system, this case has been redesignated with the

above referenced appeal number.

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2

01200633

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

5

0120063303