Hill Plumbing Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 30, 1971

190 N.L.R.B. 232 (N.L.R.B. 1971)

232 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Hill Plumbing Company and Local 529 , United As-
sociation of Journeymen and Apprentices of the
Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United
States and Canada , AFL-CIO
The Lane Company and Local 529, United Association
of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and
Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and
Canada , AFL-CIO.Cases 16-CA-3931, 16-CA-
4020, 16-CA-3930, and 16-CA-4019
April 30, 1971
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND JENKINS
On September 21, 1970, Trial Examiner William W.
Kapell issued his Decision in the above-entitled pro-
ceeding, finding that the Respondents had engaged in
certain unfair labor practices and recommending that
they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affir-
mative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondents filed
exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers
in connection with these cases to a three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Ex-
aminer made at the hearing and finds that no prejudi-
cial error was committed. The rulings are hereby
affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the
entire record in these cases, and hereby adopts only
those findings, conclusions, and recommendations of
the Trial Examiner consistent with this Decision and
Order.
Lane and Hill are parties to an associationwide con-
tract with the Union. The contract requires, inter alia,
that the Employer contribute 15 cents per hour worked
to a health and welfare fund, and 2 cents per hour
worked by journeymen to an apprenticeship training
fund. Other pertinent provisions of the contract con-
cern the use of the Union as a source for skilled work-
men and the utilization of a grievance procedure and
binding arbitration for contract disputes. Texas has a
right-to-work law and, therefore, the contract does not
contain a union-security clause.
The Trial Examiner found that Respondents Lane
and Hill had violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by: unilat-
erally terminating their contracts, refusing to recognize
and bargain with the Union, ceasing to contribute to
the health and welfare and apprenticeship funds, and
refusing to allow inspection of the payroll records. The
Respondents contend that the collective-bargaining
190 NLRB No. 45
agreement was terminated when the Union oreached it.
The Lane Company
On December 16, 1969, Union Business Representa-
tive Suggs told Lane to get rid of his nonunion em-
ployees if he wanted to continue to employ union mem-
bers. When Lane refused this request all of his union
employees quit. Lane testified that he viewed Suggs'
demand and the resignation of the union employees as
a breach of the contract. In December 1969 Lane
ceased making payments to the health and welfare
fund. He testified that he stopped payment because he
no longer employed union members, and he had never
made payments for his nonunion employees.
On March 31, 1970, 3% months after the cessation of
benefit payments, the Union sent Lane a letter demand-
ing that he recognize the Union and apply the contract.
The letter also demanded that he make restitution for
accrued payments and that he designate a representa-
tive to meet with the Union pursuant to the grievance
procedure. Lane did not reinstitute payments but he
did designate a representative, William Pakis,' to meet
with the Union. However, no meeting was held be-
tween the Union and Lane's representative, and there
was no further resort to the grievance procedures.
Shortly thereafter, Lane received another letter from
the Union, renewing its demands that he make restitu-
tion and honor the contract. On May 14, 1970, Lane
sent a letter to the Union requesting that it send him
three skilled plumbers for a job on May 18. The Union
sent Lane three plumbers who worked 4% days and
then quit. Suggs had ordered the three plumbers to quit
the job because Lane had "violated the contract." Lane
made contributions to the health and welfare fund for
the time the three plumbers had worked. On May 21,
1970, the Union sent a letter to Lane requesting permis-
sion to inspect his payroll records. Lane refused.
Hill Plumbing Company
In October 1969, Hill Plumbing was performing
work at a jobsite where there was a bricklayers strike.
A reserved gate2 for Hill's employees was established at
this jobsite. However, the union plumbers employed by
Hill refused to work there,' or at any of the other Hill
jobsites (where there was no picketing). All of Hill's
union plumbers quit their employment. Garland
Sharpless, president of Hill, testified that he considered
the collective-bargaining agreement terminated when
the Union breached it by refusing to allow its members
to work for him.
The Trial Examiner, contrary to the record, found that Lane had not
designated a representative.
A member of the Laborers Union picketed Hill Plumbing at the re-
served gate . The record offers no explanation as to why Hill was picketed.
There is no provision in the contract regarding crossing picket lines.
HILL PLUMBING CO.
Hill stopped making payments to the health and
welfare fund in October 1969. Hill also stopped making
payments to the apprenticeship fund in October 1969
(after his union apprentice quit), but resumed pay-
ments in March 1970 (when he had an apprentice in
school). Sometime in October 1969 Hill was picketed
by the Union with signs stating that Hill had violated
the contract. The record does not reveal how long the
picketing continued, nor does it indicate whether the
Union made any attempts to meet with representatives
of Hill. It was not until March 31, 1970, 6 months after
the employees left, that the Union sent Hill the same
letter that it had sent to Lane. On April 6, 1970, Hill
replied, accusing the Union of having breached the
contract.
Hill continued to employ two plumbers named Shel-
ton and Rash after October 1969. Suggs testified that
both of these employees were carried on the union
membership list, even though they had stopped paying
union dues. The Union claimed that Hill had failed to
make health and welfare payments for the two union
employees. Neither of these employees testified at the
hearing. We cannot determine from the record whether
these employees still considered themselves union
members or whether they had effectively resigned. On
May 21, 1970, the Union sent Hill a letter requesting
the opportunity to inspect his payroll records. Hill de-
nied this request.
The Respondents and the Union are parties to a
health and welfare trust agreement. This trust agree-
ment defined the employees eligible for benefits as: (a)
members of Local 529, (b) any other employee whose
wage rates and working conditions are established by
collective-bargaining agreements between the Union
and the association, and (c) business manager and/or
business agents of the Union (contributions paid by the
Union). Hill President Sharpless, who helped to estab-
lish the fund, testified that it was established for the
benefit of union employees only. Suggs testified that he
was aware that Hill and Lane had never made health
and welfare payments for their nonunion employees.
Furthermore, he stated that there have never been any
contributions made to the health and welfare fund by
any employer for its nonunion employees and that
nonunion employees are not covered under the present
benefit program (except for "travelers").
While the health and welfare agreement is nondis-
criminatory on its face, it appears that the parties have
given it a discriminatory application. The testimony
indicates that the Union acquiesced in such an applica-
tion. The record is incomplete concerning the practice
of the parties regarding payments to the apprenticeship
fund. The evidence suggests an inference that the ap-
prenticeship payments were made pursuant to certain
practices of the parties. However, the record is void of
any indications as to exactly what these practices were.
233
The duty to bargain collectively imposes an obliga-
tion upon the parties not to make any unilateral modifi-
cations of the terms of a contract. The short record in
this case indicates that the bargaining history of the
parties contains numerous instances in which each of
them participated in unilateral and bilateral modifica-
tions of the collective-bargaining agreement. We can-
not determine from the record the exact nature of these
modifications or whether particular modifications were
unilateral or bilateral. Apparently, the parties have a
history of following past practices and industry or area
practices as additional qualifications to the basic agree-
ment. The record does not contain sufficient evidence
for us to determine what these practices were and what,
if any, effect they had upon the bargaining relationship
of the parties. The fact that it took the Union several
months before it made any protest to the Respondents
is indicative of the intermittent nature of their relation-
ships. Based upon this record we cannot conclude that
there is a viable relationship between the Respondents
and the Union. Therefore, under all the evidence in this
case, we find that the General Counsel has not clearly
established facts which would justify a conclusion that
the Respondents have violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5).
Accordingly, we dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and
it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASES
WILLIAM W. KAPELL, Trial Examiner: These matters,
proceedings under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, herein called the Act, were heard in
Waco, Texas, on July 14, 1970,' with all parties participating
pursuant to due notice upon an amended consolidated com-
plaint2 issued by the General Counsel on June 22. The
amended consolidated complaint alleges, in substance, that
Hill Plumbing Company and The Lane Company, jointly
referred to as Respondents, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) of the Act unilaterally abandoned their separate collec-
tive-bargaining contracts with the Union and have refused to
comply with their terms concerning welfare, health, and ap-
prenticeship fund payments, and to furnish data to the Union
relating to wages and hours of work with respect to all em-
ployees engaged in plumbing work and to benefit payments
All dates hereafter refer to 1970 unless otherwise noted
Based upon an original charge and a first amended charge filed in Case
16-CA-3930 on Arpil 3 and May 19, respectively, an original charge and
first amended charge filed in Case 16-CA-3931 on April 3 and May 21,
respectively, a charge filed in Case 16-CA-4019 on June 12, and a charge
filed in Case 16-CA-4020 on June 12 All the charges were filed by Local
529, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing
and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO,
hereafter referred to as the Union
234 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to the aforesaid funds. Respondents in their duly filed an-
swers deny the commission of any unfair labor practices.
All parties were represented and were afforded an oppor-
tunity to adduce evidence, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and to file briefs. Briefs were received from the
General Counsel and Respondents and have been carefully
considered. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. COMMERCE
At all times material herein, Edward B. Lane, Jr., has been
an individual proprietor doing business under the trade name
and style of The Lane Company with offices in Waco, Texas,
where he is engaged as a plumbing and heating contractor.
During the past 12 months, which period is representative of
all times material herein, Lane in the course and conduct of
his business operations performed services valued in excess of
$50,000 for firms which made sales of their products to cus-
tomers located in States other than the State of Texas and
which sales were valued in excess of $50,000.
At all times material herein Hill Plumbing Company, a
corporation duly organized under and existing by virtue of
the laws of the State of Texas, has maintained its principal
office and place of business in Waco, Texas, where it is en-
gaged as a plumbing contractor. During the past 12 months,
which period is representative of all times material herein,
Hill in the course and conduct of its business operations made
purchases of materials valued in excess of $50,000 from firms
located in Texas, which firms had received the said materials
directly from points and places in States other than the State
of Texas.
Respondents admit, and I find, at all times material herein,
that each has been an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondents admit and I find, at all times material herein,
that the Union has been a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
A. Background
On or about April 4, 1968, Central Texas Plumbing, Heat-
ing and Air Conditiong Contractors Association of Waco,
Texas, hereafter referred to as the Association, entered into
a collective-bargaining contract with the Union for a term
ending on March 31, 1971. The contract provides, inter alia,
that the Union is the recognized representative for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining as to wages, hours, and working
conditions for all employees performing work covered by the
contract, and that, in addition to the specified hourly wage
rates for journeymen, 15 cents per hour shall be contributed
to a health and welfare fund, and 2 cents per hour worked by
journeymen shall be contributed to an apprenticeship train-
ing fund. The collective-bargaining contract and the trust
agreements set up pursuant thereto provide that payments to
these funds shall be based upon the number of journeymen-
plumbers employed and their hours of work. The health and
welfare trust agreement defines such employees as:
(a) A member of the Union; and
(b) Any other employee whose wage rates and working
conditions are established by a collective-bargaining
agreement or supplement thereto, now or hereafter en-
tered into between the Union and the Association.
Both Lane and Hill Plumbing are members of the Association
and covered by the collective-bargaining contract and its
trust agreements.
B. The Current Facts
1. The Lane Company
Pursuant to the Union's collective-bargaining contract,
Lane began making payments on October 1, 1968, to the
Union's health and welfare fund. In December 1969 he
ceased making such contributions because at the time he no
longer employed union members. He testified that his union
employees quit working for him following an employee meet-
ing on December 16, 1969, at which Union Business Repre-
sentative Suggs asked him what the nonunion employees
were doing on his job to which he sarcastically replied that
they were working. Suggs then allegedly asked him to get rid
of the nonunion employees in order to continue having union
employees work for him.' Lane viewed Suggs' demand as
constituting a breach of their bargaining contract, which jus-
tified his refusal to continue making payments to the health
and welfare fund and terminated the contract. He admitted
that his failure to notify the Union to that effect was due to
an oversight on his, part. He, however, continued making
payments to the apprenticeship training fund based on the
wages paid to his nonunion employees, and he continued to
apply the other provisions of the contract to his nonunion
employees.'
Thereafter, Lane received a letter dated March 31 from the
Union demanding recognition, and that he apply their con-
tract provisions, including immediate restitution of the requi-
site contributions in arrears to the health and welfare fund.
The letter also requested that he designate a representative to
confer with union counsel concerning his breach of the con-
tract. No payments or designation of a management repre-
sentative were made by Lane pursuant to the Union's request.
Shortly thereafter Lane received another letter (G.C. Exh.4)
from the Union renewing its demand that he make restitution
of all payments which had not been made although required
by their contract, and that he also implement all other provi-
sions of the contract. A day or two later on May 14, Lane
requested in writing that the Union furnish three skilled
plumbers to one of his jobs beginning on May 18.5 Pursuant
to said request, the Union dispatched three plumber-mem-
bers who worked on lane's job for 4% days and then quit. Lane
resumed making contributions to the health and welfare fund
for the 43/, days during which the three plumbers worked on
his job, and then again discontinued making such payments
after they quit. He discontinued making such payments be-
cause he had no other union employees on his payroll and was
under the impression that health and welfare contributions
inured only to the benefit of the union members, and he
therefore caesed making such payments when he no longer
employed such employees. He, however, continued making
contributions to the apprenticeship training fund because
those payments inured to the benefit of the industry.
' Ruling was reserved on the admissibility of the foregoing testimony at
the hearing. Such testimony is now admitted over the objections of the
General Counsel.
° Lane's admissions to that effect made as a Rule 43(b) witness on behalf
of the General Counsel are credited despite his later denials when testifying
on his own behalf.
' The collective-bargaining contract provided that the Employer, when
in need of employees, notify and use the Union as a source for positions
covered by the contract.
HILL PLUMBING CO.
By letter of May 21, the Union requested permission to
inspect Lane's payroll records for the preceding 6 months,
which would reflect the wages, hours of work, and benefit
payments based on all employees engaged in plumbing work
in order to ascertain what contributions were required to be
made to the trust funds. In reply, Lane telephoned Business
Agent Suggs and advised him that he could not make the
requested inspection because it was unnecessary.
Prior to stopping payments to the health and welfare fund,
Lane offered his employees the option of another health and
welfare insurance plan without notifying the Union.
2. The Hill Plumbing Company
Garland Sharpless, president of Hill Plumbing Company,
testified that the Company made payments to the health and
welfare and apprentice training program funds until October
17, 1969, which was as long as he continued to employ union
employess, and that he thereafter felt relieved of any obliga-
tion to make such payments because he had terminated the
contract after his union employees quit their jobs. He con-
tinued to employ nonunion members and paid them directly
the 15 cents an hour for health and welfare benefits and
advised them to obtain any insurance they desired with it. On
March 6 he resumed making payments to the apprenticeship
training fund when he hired an apprentice, basing his pay-
ments on the work of his nonunion journeymen employees.
He applied the terms of the Union's bargaining contract as
long as he employed union employees , admitted receiving
letters identical and to those sent to Lane demanding pay-
ments to the trust funds, and replied only to the Union's letter
of March 31 by a letter of April 6 in which he accused the
Union of having breached their contract. He claimed that he
refused to continue making contributions to the trust funds
because the Union contract was breached when his union
employees refused to use a separate gate set up for them on
one of his jobs where the bricklayers were striking and picket-
ing the general contractor6 or work on his unpicketed jobs.
He asserted that the Union ordered its members to quit work-
ing for him and thereby justified his termination of the con-
tract and refusal to continue making contributions to the
trust funds.
Business Agent Suggs testified that two of his members
have been on the Hill Company payroll continuously since
October 17, 1969,' but that no payments on their behalf were
made to the health and welfare fund, and that Sharpless
refused his request to inspect the payroll records of the Com-
pany to ascertain what payments were due to the health and
welfare fund.
C. Conclusions
Patently, the parties entered into valid collective-bargain-
ing contracts in the early part of 1968, which was subse-
quently supplemented by trust agreements for health, wel-
fare, and apprentice training plans. These agreements were
honored and implemented by Respondents until the latter
part of 1969 when they refused to continue making the re-
quired contributions to the trust funds. Lane contended that
he justifiably terminated his contract and was, therefore, no
longer obligated to make such contributions when Suggs ad-
vised him in December 1969 that he would have to get rid of
' He, however, admitted that there was a Laborers' picket at the separate
gate picketing his Company while the Bricklayers were picketing the general
contractor
' Although these employees had stopped paying union dues, they never-
theless were carried as members for a period of 12 months from the incep-
tion of their arrears pursuant to the union constitution.
235
his nonunion employees if he wanted to have union em-
ployees continue working for him. However, if he was no
longer bound by the contract he failed to explain why he
continued to apply the other provisions of the contract to his
nonunion employees or why in May he requested the Union
to furnish three plumbers for one of his jobs and then made
the requisite trust fund payments on their behalf. It is also
significant to note that at no time did he notify the Union he
was terminating their contract , and he explained his failure
to do so merely as an admitted oversight on his part. He also
justified his unilateral termination of the contract and his
refusal to make the trust fund payments on the ground that
he was bound to make such payments only as long as he
employed union employees. The bargaining contract, how-
ever, provided that he recognized the Union as the bargaining
representative of all his employees performing work de-
scribed in that contract; and the health and welfare trust fund
agreement defined the term "employees" on whose behalf
contributions were to be made as both union employees and
any other employees covered by the provisions of the collec-
tive-bargaining contract. I find that Lane's contentions not
only are inconsistent but also lack substance. If he wished to
be relieved of his contractual and statutory obligations he
should have restored to appropriate legal measures instead of
taking unwarranted unilateral action.
Sharpless also asserted that he terminated the contract
(without notifying the Union) when the union employees quit
working for the Company.' Sharpless (as well as Lane) con-
tended that when the Company no longer employed union
members, it was relieved of any contractual obligations to
contribute to the trust funds or of any duty to recognize and
bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of its
employees. Its unilateral decision to cease contributing to the
trust funds and to terminate the contract and withdraw
recognition of the Union based on what it construed to be
justifiable grounds without resorting to appropriate legal
measures was no more warranted than what Lane did.'
Respondents also attacked the jurisdiction of the Board on
the ground that only the courts have jurisdiction to rule on
breaches of contract. I find no merit in this contention.
"While it is true that a breach of contract is not ipso facto an
unfair labor practice, it does not follow from this that where
given conduct is of a kind otherwise condemned by the Act,
it must be ruled out as an unfair labor practice simply because
it happens also to be a breach of contract." C & S Industries,
Inc., 158 NLRB 454, 458. Nor, as claimed by Respondents,
does the existence of an arbitration provision in a contract
prevent the prosecution of an unfair labor practice. "There is
no necessary or automatic mutual exclusiveness as between
the contract remedy and the unfair labor practice remedy."
N.L.R.B. v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., Inc., 377 F.2d 964, 970
(C.A. 8). Any doubts as to the jurisdiction of the Board in
cases involving the interpretation of a labor contract or the
existence of an arbitration provision were definitely dispelled
by the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. C & C Plywood Corp.,
385 U.S. 421, and N.L.R.B. v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S.
432.
° It appears that these employees declined to continue working allegedly
because of labor disputes directly affecting the Company or the jobs on
which it was involved
' Thus, it was held in Ray Brooks v N.L.R B, 348 U S 96, 103, "If an
employer has doubts about his duty to continue bargaining, it is his responsi-
bility to petition the Board for relief, while continuing to bargain in good
faith at least until the Board has given some indication that his claim has
merit."
236 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Section 8(d) of the Act defines the phrase "to bargain
collectively" as "the performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
. and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation
of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder ... but
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession ...... It pro-
vides further that where a collective-bargaining agreement is
in effect, "the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that
no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such
contract" unless he complies with the notice provisions to the
other party, offers to meet and confer for the purpose of
negotiating any changes, and gives timely notification to the
specified Federal and state agencies. A refusal to bargain
collectively as so defined is an unfair labor practice in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. It is well settled that an
employer violates Section 8(a)(5) when it unilaterally changes
the terms and conditions of employment without giving the
union an appropriate opportunity to bargain about the
change. Changes in the health, welfare, and apprenticeship
training terms of the contract herein patiently affected the
terms and conditions of employment. N.L.R.B. v. Huttig
Sash & Door Co., supra. Thus, by refusing to make payments
to the trust funds for the erroneous reason that they believed
themselves relieved of the obligation to bargain because of the
position taken by their union employees regarding their right
not to work under certain conditions, Respondents, in effect,
thereby withheld from the Union, before they were legally
entitled to do so, the full measure of recognition that was
contractually and statutorily due to the Union. Accordingly,
Respondents' refusal to make the payments to the trust funds
they were obligated to make under the existing agreements
and their termination of those agreements constituted unilat-
eral modifications thereof in derogation of and in violation of
their obligations under Section 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the Act.
St. Louis Cordage Mills, 170 NLRB No. 7.
Furthermore, with respect to the Union's demand to in-
spect Respondents' payroll records to ascertain what pay-
ments were due under the trust funds, there can be no ques-
tion of their general obligations to provide information that
is needed by the bargaining representative for the proper
performance of its duties. N.L.R.B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351
U.S. 149. It, therefore, follows that Respondents' refusals to
permit such inspections are also violative of Section 8(a)(5).
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of each Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with their operations de-
scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and sub-
stantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among
the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening
and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire
record, I make the following:
4. By unilaterally terminating their collective-bargaining
contract with the Union, refusing to recognize and bargain
with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of
their employees, or to contribute the contractually required
payments to the health and welfare and apprenticeship train-
ing trust funds, or to permit inspection of their payroll
records to ascertain the moneys due to said funds, Respond-
ents have engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondents violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act, it will be recommended that they be
required to cease and desist therefrom, or from any like or
related conduct, and to take certain affirmative action de-
signed and found necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
Having found that Respondents violated Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act, it is recommended that Respondents be ordered to
recognize and bargain with the Union; to permit inspection
of their payroll records and to determine the moneys due to
the health and welfare and apprenticeship training trust
funds; and to contribute such sums found to be due to said
trust funds.
RECOMMENDED ORDER10
On the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law
and the entire record in the cases, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, it is
recommended that The Lane Company and Hill Plumbing
Company, their officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to recognize and bargain collectively with
Local 529, United Association of Journeymen and Appren-
tices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United
States and Canada, AFL-CIO; unilaterally modifying or ter-
minating their existing collective-bargaining agreement with
said Union; refusing to permit inspection of their payroll
records to ascertain the moneys due to their health and wel-
fare trust fund and apprenticeship training program trust
fund; or refusing to contribute the contractually required
contributions to said funds.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing their employees in the exercise of their rights
under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Recognize and bargain collectively with the aforesaid
labor organization, upon request, contribute the moneys re-
quired pursuant to their collective-bargaining agreement,
and, upon request, permit inspection of their payroll records
which indicate the contributions due to the aforesaid trust
funds.
(b) Post at their respective places of business copies of the
appropriate attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. At all times material herein , Respondents have been
engaged in commerce as employers within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. At all times material herein , the Union has been a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. At all times material herein the Union has been, and
continues to be, the exclusive bargaining representative of
Respondents ' employees covered by their collective -bargain-
ing agreement.
10 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions , recommendations , and Recommended Order herein
shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions , and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
" In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "POSTED
BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD"
shall be changed to read "POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN OR-
DER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD."
HILL PLUMBING CO.
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 16, after being duly signed by authorized representa-
tives of Respondents, shall be posted by them immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by them for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by them to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been
taken to comply herewith."
" In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondents
have taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize and bargain coljec-
tively with Local 529, United Association of Journey-
men and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting
Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, as
the exclusive bargaining representative of our plumbing
employees.
WE WILL NOT refuse to contribute the moneys re-
quired pursuant to the health and welfare and appren-
ticeship training trust funds set up pursuant to the exist-
ing collective-bargaining agreement between said Union
and Central Texas Plumbing, Heating and Air Condi-
tioning Contractors Association of Waco, Texas.
WE WILL NOT refuse inspection, upon request, by the
Union of our payroll records to ascertain the moneys due
to the aforsaid trust funds.
WE WILL contribute such sums as are found to be due
to the aforsaid trust funds. '
WE WILL permit inspection of our payroll records by
the Union, upon request.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally change, modify, or termi-
nate the terms of our existing collective-bargaining
agreement affecting the terms and working conditions of
any of our employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, coerce, or restrain our employees in the exercise of
their rights under Section 7 of the Act.
HILL PLUMBING
COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
237
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any-
one.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Room
8A24, Federal Office Building , 819 Taylor Street, Fort
Worth, Texas 76102, Telephone 817-334-2921.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
I WILL NOT refuse to recognize and bargain collec-
tively with Local 529, United Association of Journey-
men and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting
Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, as
the exclusive bargaining representative of my plumbing
employees.
I WILL NOT refuse to contribute the moneys required
pursuant to the health and welfare and apprenticeship
training trust funds set up pursuant to the existing col-
lective-bargaining agreement between said Union and
Central Texas Plumbing, Heating and Air Conditioning
Contractors Association of Waco, Texas.
I WILL NOT refuse inspection, upon request, by the
Union of my payroll records to ascertain the moneys due
to the aforesaid trust funds.
I WILL contribute such sums as are found to be due to
the aforesaid trust funds.
I WILL permit inspection of my payroll records by the
Union, upon request.
I WILL NOT unilaterally change, modify, or terminate
the terms of my existing collective-bargaining agreement
affecting the terms and working conditions of any of my
employees.
I WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, coerce, or restrain my employees in the exercise of
their rights under Section 7 of the Act.
THE LANE COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any-
one.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Room
8A24, Federal Office Building, 819 Taylor Street, Fort
Worth, Texas 76102, Telephone 817-334-2921.