Highway and Motor Freight Employees, Loc. 667

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 23, 1977

228 N.L.R.B. 398 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

398 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Highway and Local Motor Freight Employees Local
Union No. 667, affiliated with the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America (Owens-Cor-
ning, Fiberglas Corporation ) and Linda J. Smith.
Case 26-CB-1 158
February 23, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, PENELLO, AND
WALTHER
On December 8, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
Claude R. Wolfe issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and the General Counsel filed a reply brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and the
brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent Union, Highway
and Local Motor Freight Employees Local Union
No. 667, affiliated with the International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, its officers, agents, and represen-
tatives, shall take the action set forth in said recom-
mended Order.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CLAUDE R. WOLFE, Administrative Law Judge: This case
was heard before me at Jackson , Tennessee, on August 18
and 19, 1976, pursuant to charges filed on April 20 and May
26, 1976, and a complaint issued on May 27 and amended
on June 4, 1976, and again amended at the hearing. The
complaint alleges that Highway and Local Motor Freight
Employees Local Union No. 667, affiliated with the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, herein called
Respondent or the Union, by its agents violated Section
8(b)(IXA) of the Act by telling employees of Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corporation, herein called the Company
or the Employer, that it would not represent or process
grievances for employees who were not union members,
228 NLRB No. 52
that Respondent could require nonmembers to pay for the
processing of their grievances , that nonmembers could not
retrieve lost overtime pay, that nonmembers could be fired
for filing grievances, and that nonmembers could not file
grievances. It is further alleged that Respondent refused to
process grievances for employees because they were not
union members . Respondent denies the commission of any
unfair labor practices and affirmatively pleads that it has at
all times fairly represented all the members of the bargain-
ing unit involved herein regardless of their union member-
ship or lack of it. The General Counsel and Respondent
filed able posthearing briefs which I have carefully consid-
ered.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
witnesses, and after due consideration of the parties' briefs,
I make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. JURISDICTION
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find
that at all times material Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corpo-
ration has maintained an office and place of business at
Jackson, Tennessee , where it manufactures Fiberglas, and
has, during the past 12 months, purchased and received at
said location products valued in excess of $50,000 directly
from points outside the State of Tennessee , and sold and
shipped products valued in excess of $50,000 from said
location directly to points outside the State of Tennessee.
The Employer is, and has been at all times material, an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
U. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. AGENCY
The following named individuals, at all times material,
occupied the union positions set forth after their names:
Womack Johnson, steward and member of business com-
mittee ; Jim Alexander , steward and member of business
committee ; Gaylon Meals, steward and member of busi-
ness committee; George Droke, steward ; Barney Anderson,
steward ; Bill Maness, steward; John Mitchell, president;
Billy Latham, assistant business agent.
Respondent concedes that these persons occupied these
positions , but denies that they are agents of Respondent
within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act, and
contends that the actions of the stewards complained of, if
they in fact occurred, should be properly viewed as actions
of rank-and-file employees not acting in any capacity as
union agents at the time of the unfair labor practices
allegedly committed by them.
At the opening of the hearing I requested counsel for
Respondent to elucidate the Union's position on this
agency question, to which he responded, in substance, that
union stewards are also employees who can make state-
ments as individuals and still not be acting as union agents.
HIGHWAY AND MOTOR FREIGHT EMPLOYEES, LOC. 667 399
Respondent did not further amplify its position on agency
in its brief.
John Mitchell is, and has been since March 17, 1975, the
admitted president and business manager of Respondent
and is therefore, as its chief officer and managing agent, an
agent of Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(13) of
the Act. Billy Latham has occupied the position of assistant
business agent of the Union since March 17, 1975, and
represents the Union in the administration of the contractu-
al grievance procedure, beginning at step two of the
procedure and continuing through arbitration. I therefore
conclude that Billy Latham is, and has been since March
17, 1975, an agent of Respondent for the implementation of
the grievance procedure. Although his title indicates further
union responsibilities, they are not precisely spelled out in
the record, but it appears from the evidence that he is the
highest ranking official of Respondent regularly visiting the
Employer's premises for the purpose of administering the
existing collective -bargaining agreement.
The collective-bargaining agreement between Respon-
dent and the Employer provides that the Union may be
represented by departmental stewards appointed by the
Union and the authority of these stewards will be limited to
the handling of grievances. It further provides that the
steward and the aggrieved employee will be present
whenever a supervisor writes in an employee's record
concerning disciplinary measures, and the steward will sign
the record and has,the option of expressing his own opinion
concerning the matter in the same record. The contractual
grievance procedure requires that a steward will be present
at the first step of the grievance procedure when the
aggrieved employee verbally confers with his immediate
supervisor for adjustment of the matter, and, if the
grievance is not settled in the first step, it will be reduced to
writing by the employee and the steward and be presented
to the employee's department head for discussion and
settlement. Thereafter, if the grievance is not settled at this
second step, the union business agent conducts the presen-
tation and discussion of the grievance with higher manage-
ment. The official grievance form utilized in the procedure
contains a specifically designated space for the steward's
signature, and of the 43 written grievances submitted into
evidence by Respondent each was countersigned by a
steward. Stewards Anderson, Johnson, and Alexander and
Assistant Business Agent Latham testified that it was the
responsibility and the practice of the stewards to accompa-
ny and represent employees in the initial oral stages of the
grievance procedure and to write and process grievances for
aggrieved employees. Union President Mitchell confirmed
the duties of the stewards as agents of Respondent to
represent grievants, by his testimony that he personally
instructed the business agents and the stewards to represent
nonunion members just like they would a member. It is
abundantly clear that Respondent has empowered its
stewards to be its representative in the area of initiating and
processing grievances, and that they are Respondent's
agents for these purposes. Furthermore, even though
Respondent may not have specifically authorized its
stewards to make the alleged statements or take the alleged
actions herein complained of, all of these occurrences are
directly involved with the initiation and processing of
grievances which is the general area within which the
stewards may authoritatively act on behalf of Respondent
by virtue of the authority conferred on them by Respondent
and by the collective-bargaining agreement . It is obvious
from the record that the stewards are the union representa-
tives to whom employees look to represent them in filing
and prosecuting grievances.
The basic issues presented in this case are whether or not
the stewards fairly represented nonmembers in the griev-
ance procedure or restrained and coerced them in the use of
that procedure. These matters arose in the exact area where
the stewards clearly have express authority to act on behalf
of Respondent. I conclude that Stewards Womack John-
son, Jim Alexander, Gaylon Meals, George Droke, Barney
Anderson, and Bill Maness were acting within the scope of
their general authority as stewards, and as statutory agents
of Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the
Act when the acts and statements complained of occurred,
if they occurred, and that Respondent may be held
responsible for any of these acts and statements of its
stewards that may be found to be unfair labor practices.'
IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts Found2 and Conclusions Based
Thereon
1. Background
The Union and the Company have a collective-bargain-
ing agreement covering all of the Company's hourly
production and maintenance employees and all other
hourly employees at the Jackson, Tennessee, plant. All of
the employees involved in this case are members of that
unit. The contract does not require union membership as a
condition of employment. On October 31, 1975,3 30
employees submitted a joint petition to the Union with-
drawing as dues-paying members. At the November
meeting of the Union, some members asked if the Union
had to represent nonunion members in arbitrations and if
nonmembers could be made to pay for representation.
President Mitchell credibly testified that he replied that the
Union did have to represent nonmembers, that there was a
legal question as to whether or not nonmembers could be
made to pay for this service, and that the latter matter had
been referred to Respondent's attorney for study. After the
i International Longshoremen 's and Warehousemen 's Union, C.I 0, (Sunset
Line and Twine Company), 79 NLRB 1487 , 1508-09 ( 1948);,Umted Brother-
hood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local Union No. 2067, AFL-CIO
(Batterman Construction , Inc.), 166 NLRB 532, 539-540 (1967).
2 The facts set forth herein are based on a synthesis of the credited aspects
of the testimony of all witnesses , the exhibits , and careful consideration of
the logical consistency and inherent probability of the facts found. The
testimony of any witness materially inconsistent with or contradictory of the
facts found is discredited . I have rejected the thesis of General Counsel that
testimony given at the hearing is suspect merely because it was not included
in the witnesses' pretrial affidavit, for the simple reason that there is no
showing, and some testimonial denials, that the same questions were asked
on both occasions . Similarly, I do not base my findings, in whole or in part,
on the circumstance that certain witnesses were not called by either party,
although I note that certain witnesses who were called did not testify on
matters of which they purportedly had knowledge.
3 All dates are in 1975, unless specifically noted otherwise.
400 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
public meeting, Mitchell held a private meeting with the
members from Owens-Corning and told them that they
must give equal representation to members. This instruc-
tion did not sit will with some of the stewards. Steward
Alexander admittedly told as many as "a hundred a day"
that it made his blood boil when nonmembers asked for
representation, and Steward Meals testified that both he
and Alexander had said on several occasions to several
employees in the break area that they could not understand
how nonmembers could have the guts to ask the Union to
process their grievances when they were not paying dues. It
is within the general time frame of a number of withdrawals
from membership, Union President Mitchell's November
instruction, and the resentment of some stewards and
members of the free representation afforded employees
who were not members, that the incidents with which this
case is concerned arose.
2. The Mary (Pinson) Forthman incident
Mrs. Forthman, who was Mary Pinson at the time her
complaint arose but has remarried, will be referred to
herein, as she is in the record , as Pinson . Pinson is a 4-year
employee who has never been a union member. According
to Pinson, on an unspecified date in November Steward
Anderson spoke with her in the break area and told her that
a supervisor had been doing unit work, a grievance had
been filed, and Pinson would be getting some money
because she was the first employee on the call-in list. She
continued that 2 or 3 days later she met Anderson in the
canteen and asked when she was getting the money, to
which he replied that she was not getting it. She asked why
and Anderson replied "Because you don't belong to the
Union." She protested that this made no sense to her, and
Anderson again stated, "Well, you can't get the money
because you don't belong to the Union." A couple of days
later they again met in the canteen and Anderson explained
to her that he had signed the grievance himself because
other union members he had asked had refused to because
they liked the supervisor. Pinson said that she would have
signed the grievance if he had asked. Anderson replied that
he could not ask her because she did not belong to the
Union. She told him "that was against the law" and anyone
could sign a grievance. Anderson reiterated that she
couldn't sign because she did not belong to the Union.
Pinson and Anderson met again in the canteen before work
a couple days later . Anderson came in and sat with her and
employees Hines and Crossman. At some point in their
general conversation, a discussion ensued regarding the
overtime matter previously discussed between them. Pinson
does not recall how the topic was raised, except that she
asked Anderson again if he was saying she could not sign a
grievance, and he gave the same reply that she could not
because she was not a union member. When she then stated
that she was not going to get the money, Anderson agreed
and claimed that whoever signs a money grievance get the
proceeds. Pinson repeated her earlier comment that she
would have signed if asked, and Anderson reasserted that
he could not let her sign because she was not a union
member. At this point, Hines a union member, asked
Anderson if he meant to say that Pinson could not sign a
grievance. When Anderson gave an affirmative reply, Hines
told him to bring the papers to him and he would sign them.
Anderson jumped up, told Hines to go to hell, and left.
Hines testifies that the discussion of the grievance was
already going on when he entered the canteen, and that he
heard Pinson say that she should have been able to sign the
grievance. Hines does not recall who, but avers that
someone4 in the conversation said that Pinson couldn't sign
the grievance because it was already filed and that she
couldn't file the grievance because she was "nonunion."
According to Hines, he gave his opinion that the steward
should have filed a grievance on her behalf. Anderson then
told him to shut up and to go to hell and left. Hines claims
that sometime before Anderson left, he ( Hines) brought up
the fact that Tennessee is an open shop state and people did
not have to belong to the Union. Anderson's alleged reply
was that he could not see going around filing grievances for
nonunion people. Hines places these events in late fall or
early winter.
Anderson's version of the Pinson matter, which he thinks
happened in January 1976, is as follows: He was told by
Steward Meals, who gave no evidence on this affair
although testifying on other matters, that a supervisor had
been caught working, whereupon Anderson asked the first
two employees he encountered if they wanted to file a
grievance. Both refused, and Anderson reported this to
Meals who told Anderson to file the grievance on behalf of
the Union. Anderson had never filed a grievance on behalf
of the Union before so he completed and filed the
grievance, signing the grievance as both the steward and the
grievant, thinking that whoever was entitled to the money
would get it. He did not look at the employee roster to see
who was so entitled until after the grievance was filed. This
was the first time he had ever asked anyone if they wanted
to file a grievance because grievants always came to him
with their complaints. After filing the grievance and
checking the roster, Anderson concluded that Pinson was
due the money and went and told her it looked like she
would get 4 hours' pay. A couple of days later he found that
he was going to get approximately $18 because the
grievance was granted and he was the grievant .5 Anderson
says he knew at the time he got the award that Pinson
should have gotten it. Therefore, he went to Pinson and
explained to her that he got the $18 because he filed the
grievance. Pinson asked him why he had not asked her to
file it, and he answered that she knew about the matter
grieved and did not approach him to file a grievance and he
did not have time to ask everybody because he filed it on
the last day possible under the contract. He had had his
conversation with Meals the day before the date of filing.
Anderson generally denies telling any employee he would
not represent them if they were not union members, or
telling any employee they couldn't be compensated for lost
overtime, or refusing to file a grievance for anybody.
A copy of the grievance involved was not offered into
evidence, and it appears from Anderson's testimony that an
4 I find that someone to be Anderson in view of the credence I gave parties in 1974, an award of overtime pay was made to the grievant rather
Pinson's testimony. than to the employee who appeared to have the better claim but filed no
5 In an earlier arbitration award involving the Company and the Union as grievance.
HIGHWAY AND MOTOR FREIGHT EMPLOYEES, LOC. 667 401
attempt to locate it was unsuccessful. I conclude from the
testimony of Pinson and Hines that the grievance, and the
discussion about it, took place in November because
Pinson appeared more certain of the time than Anderson,
and Hines recalled it as being in late fall or early winter.
I am convinced from a careful examination of the three
witnesses and my observation of them as they testified that
Anderson filed the grievance not on behalf of the Union, as
Meals had suggested to him, but on his own behalf. The
award to Anderson was consistent with the arbitration
award in the prior case involving substantially the same
circumstances.
I credit Pinson, over Anderson's general de iials, that he
did tell her she could not sign a grievance because she was
not a union member on their third and fourth meetings in
the canteen in November, and that he did tell her during
their second meeting that she was not getting the money
because she did not belong to the Union. While Hines'
testimony is somewhat vague, and there is considerable
doubt that he was present throughout the conversation, I
credit him to the extent that I find Anderson told him to
shut up and go to hell when Hines said the grievance
should have been filed on Pinson's behalf, and I further
credit Hines' testimony that Anderson stated he could not
see going around filing grievances for nonunion people.
Accordingly, I conclude and find that Anderson failed
and refused to fairly represent Pinson by failing to secure
her signature on the grievance because she was not a union
member.6 This conclusion is supported by my further
finding that he restrained and coerced her in the use of the
grievance procedure by telling her that she could neither
sign a grievance nor collect money therefrom because she
was not a union member. Anderson's irritation at Hines'
intervention and his statement that he could not see going
around filing grievances for nonmembers fully displayed
his hostility toward any suggestion that he must represent
employees who did not belong to the Union, and betrayed
his motivation in failing to file on Pinson's behalf. Further,
I do not believe that Anderson, an employee of 7 years, who
has currently served as a steward for 1-1/2 years and
previously as a shop steward and a member of the grievance
committee of a predecessor union, was ignorant of the
precedential arbitrator's award on which the award to him
in the instant matter was apparently based.
3. The Rubie LaPointe incident of December
19757
Employee Greenway was assigned to do work out of her
regular classification during the shift immediately preced-
ing the shift on which she worked with LaPointe, and
Greenway then continued to work on through her regular
shift in her regular classification. This occurred on various
occasions. Shortly before Christmas, LaPointe complained
to Steward Womack Johnson that Greenway was being
granted an inordinate amount of overtime work, and that
LaPointe was not being called in to work the overtime.
Overtime is rotated among employees working within a
classification on each shift, but employees who are called to
work out of classification at work in another classification
for which they are qualified are not charged with overtime
within their original department and, therefore, out-of-
classification work does not affect their standing for
overtime eligibility within their home department. There is
no evidence LaPointe was qualified to do the out-of-
classification work that Greenway performed on the earlier
shift.
Johnson investigated LaPointe's complaint and reported
to her that Greenway had been working out of classification
and that LaPointe did not have a legitimate complaint.
LaPointe was not satisfied by his explanation. Johnson and
LaPointe met with Supervisor Forgette on December 25.
LaPointe repeated her complaint and received the same
explanation Johnson had given her earlier. A monthly
overtime roster, which shows who worked where and when
but is not always accurate or up to date, is maintained in
Forgette's office. The roster did not show that Greenway
had worked overtime as LaPointe claimed. LaPointe was
satisfied with neither the roster nor the explanation of out-
of-classification work and asked that Greenway's timecards
be checked. Johnson said he had no authority to do this,
and Forgette refused on the ground that it was contrary to
company policy to show an employee the timecards of
another employee. Forgette further advised LaPointe that
to obtain an examination of the timecards she would have
to file a grievance and thereby get the Union to look at
Greenway's timecards . Later in the day, LaPointe asked
Johnson to file a grievance for her over Greenway's alleged
excessive overtime. Her admitted purpose was to secure an
examination of Greenway's timecards . Johnson refused to
process her grievance. According to LaPointe, when asked
why he refused, Johnson told her he would not fill out the
grievance because she was not a union member. Johnson
testified that he did not process the grievance because there
was no contractual violation and the grievance would be
without merit. Johnson denies saying employees couldn't
file grievance unless they were union members.
LaPointe admittedly became angry at Johnson when he
refused to accept the grievance, told him to "take his Union
and go to hell with it," and thereafter, on a daily basis for
about 2 weeks and then about once every 2 months,
LaPointe asked him to file a grievance for her which he
refused to do. LaPointe concedes that these requests after
December 25 were only for the purpose of harassing
Johnson. She further concedes that there has not seemed to
be any further overtime problems and has since turned
down overtime work.
Johnson impressed me as a far more credible witness than
LaPointe. He was attentive, articulate, direct, and sponta-
neous in giving his answers to questions posed, and a
conscientious witness whose account of the LaPointe affair
appeared completely honest. LaPointe, on the other hand,
was not in anyway as impressive a witness and admittedly
was given to harassment for the sake of harassment.
I conclude that, in this instance, Johnson did not refuse to
accept her grievance because she was not a union member,
nor did he tell her that was the reason as she claims he did.
6 Anderson had ample time to solicit Pinson 's signature, as he did of the 7 The factual account herein is a synthesis of the credited aspects of the
two union member employees who refused , because he did not sign and file it testimony of LaPointe , Steward Womack Johnson , and Supervisor Paul
until the day after he solicited others. Forgette
402 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In fact, he did investigate her complaint and went with her
to discuss the matter with Forgette . His conclusion that her
complaint was without merit is supported by the credible
evidence, and, in the circumstances , his refusal to process
her grievance was not unreasonable . That LaPointe was not
satisfied with the explanation of Johnson and Forgette,
which appears to be consistent with the evidence , did not
require Johnson to go further and file a grievance merely to
satisfy her desire to know what was on Greenway's
timecard . There is no showing whatsoever that the timecard
would indicate anything contrary to the explanation given
to her.
4. The Rubie LaPointe and Linda Smith
complaint of April 12, 1976
On April 12, 1976, LaPointe and Smith went to Steward
Womack Johnson with a complaint that their supervisor
required his shift to work until 15 minutes of quitting time,
whereas other supervisors were letting their shifts quit
earlier. The two told Johnson they wanted to file a
grievance on the matter against their supervisor, Bradford.
LaPointe testified that Johnson refused and, when
pressed for a reason , said "Because you are not in the
Union." According to Smith, Johnson said they had no
reason to file a grievance because the contract called for 7
hours and 10 minutes of work, but she and LaPointe said
they wanted to file one anyway and he replied that he
would not file one because they were not in the Union.
Smith further testified that she and LaPointe said they were
going to the Labor Board if he didn 't file one, at which time
he laughed and said he didn 't cares
Johnson claims that he told the two women that he could
not tell any supervisor how to run his shift, and then went to
Supervisor Bradford and asked in jest "How about letting
Ruby (sic) and Linda leave an hour early ." Bradford
replied that they were going to work 7 hours and 10
minutes .9 Johnson concedes that he was not seriously
contending to Bradford that the employees should be
allowed to quit early because he believed the complaint had
no merit . He denies telling employees they could not file
grievances unless they were union members.
Johnson further testified , without contradiction, that he
represented Linda Smith on three or four occasions and on
one of these occasions he interceded with her supervisor,
Bradford, after he came upon her crying , and successfully
arranged for her to leave work an hour early so that she
could get a ride home.
I conclude that Johnson , who is corroborated by Smith
on this point,10 advised LaPointe and Smith that their
complaint would not constitute a meritorious grievance.
This does not, in view of the contractual provisions , impress
me as an arbitrary or capricious action.
b The original charge filed by Smith and LaPointe on April 20, 1976,
alleges a refusal by Respondent to process their grievances but alleges no
reason for this refusal . The amended charge filed by Smith on May 26, 1976,
specifically alleges a refusal to file a grievance , concerning supervisory
harassment , because of their lack of union membership.
6 The contract provides that employees are to have two 10-minute paid
relief breaks and a 30-nunute paid lunchbreak during an 8-hour workday.
10 LaPointe did not mention it, and as I have previously indicated I do
not credit her where her otherwise unsupported testimony contradicts that of
Johnson.
In assessing the testimony of the three as to whether or
not Johnson told Smith and LaPointe that he would not file
a grievance for them because they were not union members,
I have carefully considered the hostility of some of the
stewards against representing nonmembers ; the prior
harassment of Johnson by LaPointe; the superior impres-
siveness of Johnson on the witness stand when compared
with that of Smith and LaPointe; the disparity between the
testimony of Smith and LaPointe as to what was said; 11 the
failure of Smith and LaPointe to allege in the original
charge, which they filed within 8 days of April 12, that
Respondent had refused to process their grievance because
they were not union members, even though they now
contend this reason was given by Johnson ; and the inherent
lack of commonsense , which Johnson appears to possess in
ample quantity, and logical consistency in positing a
statement of the type complained of immediately following
a straightforward denial of the grievance as lacking in merit
on patently colorable grounds . Although the matter in not
entirely free from doubt , all the foregoing factors , particu-
larly the distinctly superior demeanor of Johnson as a
witness, persuade me that Womack Johnson did not tell
Rubie LaPointe and Linda Smith that he would not file a
grievance for them because they were not in the Union.12
5. Statements of Billy Latham
Martha Morriss signed the petition withdrawing from
union membership on October 31, 1975. She testifies that
she called Billy Latham on November 18 or 19 and told him
that employees were not getting the representation they
were paying for. She did not tell him she wanted to file a
grievance . According to Morriss , Latham told her that if he
was to represent her, she would pay him $11 a month by
check directly to him . She refused . She further claims that
Latham told Steward Evans to settle a later grievance she
had or drop it. As to this Evans matter , her testimony is that
Evans told her "I've either got to settle it or drop it," and
she settled it herself with the department head . On cross-
examination, she stated that Evans was not the steward on
her shift. It developed later that he had handled her
grievance or grievances as a committeeman in what appears
to have been an entirely proper manner.
Although Respondent submitted two grievances filed on
her behalf on November 17, for which the parties stipulated
she received payment, Morriss only acknowledged they
were indeed signed by her and filed on her behalf after
denying she filed them , stating she didn 't remember, and
considerable equivocation and evasion as to whether or not
she filed or received payment for them. I fmd her a most
incredible witness with a very unreliable memory. Her
entire demeanor was one of uncertainty and evasion. I
therefore discredit her testimony in its entirety . According-
'i LaPomte does not mention Johnson's explanation that their complaint
was without merit.
12 That Johnson later jocularly informed Bradford that the two women
wanted to leave an hour early is, in my opinion , irrelevant . Nor does it make
the purported grievance of LaPointe and Smith any more valid that the
Employer subsequently required all other employees to stay on the job later,
for this afforded no relief for Smith and LaPointe but merely confirms the
lack of validity in their basic complaint , when viewed as a contractual
grievance, that they should be let off earlier.
HIGHWAY AND MOTOR FREIGHT EMPLOYEES , LOC. 667 403
ly, I credit Latham's testimony , which was direct and to the
point without indication of prevarication , that Martha
Morriss never approached him about handling grievances,
but, rather, offered to send him a check for $11 to stay in
good standing in the Union which he refused . I further
credit his testimony that he correctly instructed her on the
proper method to follow in applying for reinstatement and
the appropriate fees and dues required to support that
application.
Furthermore, I do not credit her claim that Latham gave
Steward Evans instructions to settle her grievance or drop
it, or that Evans so told her. There is no allegation that
Evans in any way violated the Act and the complete
incredibility of Morriss on the matter persuades me that his
conduct did not occur as she alleges.
6. Statements of Jim Alexander
Billy Webb , a union member, testified that shortly after
the 30 members dropped out of the Union on October 31,
he stopped Alexander in the lab, asked him what was going
on, and commented that it didn't seem right not to
represent nonmembers . Alexander's answer, according to
Webb , was that Billy Latham had said that , due to some
new legislation, the Union did not have to represent
nonmembers , and that in order to get union representation
these employees would have to join the Union and pay
back dues.
Billy Don Brown avers that , during the second week of
October, in a conversation about a possible dues increase
among employees, including himself and Stewards Alexan-
der and Droke , employee Powell 13 said that he would
withdraw if the dues were raised to $ 11, and Alexander
stated that he would not represent anybody who did not
belong to the Union . Brown claims that Alexander repeated
this statement on several later occasions.
Dorothy Cunningham , says that, during the last week in
October at her work station , Alexander told her that if her
supervisor harassed her Alexander would take care of him
and then asked her when she was going to join the Union.
According to Cunningham , she told him that she had seen
nothing the Union had done to make it worth her while.
This angered Alexander who said , "Well, we are not putting
on any show . That makes my ulcer boil up . I can't stand
statements like that ." Alexander then told her that there
was a short period of time during which she could join the
Union at a reduced price and if she ever needed to write a
grievance , or had any trouble, or needed help, "You needn't
to call on us because we will not help you. We have
previously been helping nonunion members but we are not
going to anymore ." Cunningham further testified that
Alexander remarked that he was "tired of scabs riding free
horses."
Alexander denies ever telling any employee he would not
represent them or that he ever refused to process a
grievance . He denies ever having any conversation with her.
He concedes that he may have told a 100 people a day that
it made his blood boil when nonmembers asked for
representation, and testified that this is how he felt about it.
13 Powell did not testify.
14 See N.L R.B. v. Walton Manufacturing Company & Loganville Pants
Company, 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962).
Alexander also asserts that he told employees that he had
heard that there was a rumor that a law had been passed
permitting the Union to refuse to represent nonmembers
and to charge them a fee for representation given to them,
but denies telling anyone that Billy Latham had told him
this, or that any union official ever told him he did not have
to represent nonmembers . Alexander remembers no con-
versations of any kind with Billy Webb , but concedes it is
possible that he may have mentioned the rumors to him as
he did anyone who asked him.
Alexander is adamantly opposed to representing non-
members, as reflected by his testimony , that of Gaylon
Meals regarding statements made by Alexander to the
effect he didn't see how nonmembers had the guts to ask for
representation, and his entire demeanor while he testified. I
am convinced that his hostility colored his testimony, and
that he did make the statements to which Webb , Cunning-
ham, and Brown testified . I do not believe his testimony
that he never talked to Webb and Cunningham, who
appeared to be testifying credibly without ulterior motive or
intent to deceive, nor do I believe his testimony that he did
not say to anyone that he would not represent nonmem-
bers. His testimony was so incredible that it reinforced the
truth of the testimony of Webb , Cunningham, and
Brown.14
I do not conclude that Billy Latham did in fact make the
statements reported by Alexander to Billy Webb.
7. Statements of George Droke
Droke , Billy Don Brown, Alton Hart, and Billy Webb
were in a conversation in the lab sometime shortly after
October 31 .15 Lanny Powell and Lewis Wilkins were also
present . Powell and Wilkins were no longer union mem-
bers . A discussion of processing grievances ensued.
Brown testified that Droke said he had been instructed by
Union President Mitchell not to process a grievance for
anybody that didn't belong to the Union and would follow
this instruction until Mitchell rescinded it. Brown avers that
this statement by Droke ended the conversation.
Hart says that the men were joking with each other and
somebody called Powell or Wilkins a "scab." He believes it
was Powell, and that Powell said it was all right because he
was not paying the $11 a month . Something about
representation was said and Powell commented that Droke
would have to represent him anyway . Droke replied, in a
joking way, that he did not have to . Hart says that at the
time this occurred there was a lot of jesting going on
because of the petition signed by employees to withdraw
from the Union, and that the conversation on this topic
usually got started by someone calling another employee a
"scab."
Webb's version is that Hart, Brown, and Droke were
telling Powell and Wilkins that they had better not get into
any trouble "and all that they couldn't represent them."
The thrust of his testimony is that all three told Powell and
Wilkins they could get no representation. Webb is vague as
to whether or not Droke said this on any other occasion for
the asserted reason that he doesn 't recall who said it at
15 1 place the date as after October 31 because Powell and Wilkins signed
the petition withdrawing from membership on that date.
404 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
various times . Droke told Webb , after the charges were
filed, that until he got something in writing to the contrary
he would continue to represent nonunion people. Webb
testified that Droke represents anyone who asks him to, and
that everyone was poking fain at the people who had
dropped out of the Union , but he doesn't know whether or
not Droke was joking when he said he couldn 't represent
Powell and Wilkins.
Droke first denies he ever told anyone he would not
represent them and testified that while the conversation was
proceeding in a "joking way," Powell and Wilkins said they
had got out of the Union and Droke still had to represent
them like union members and that they were saving $11 a
month being represented for nothing. Droke says that he
responded that they should have to pay back dues if the
Union represented them, but never said "we" would not
represent them, and did say to them that if they had a
grievance he would file it the same way he had in the past.
On cross-examination , Droke first denied telling Powell
and Wilkins at anytime that he would not represent them,
but concedes telling them that he did not have to represent
them. Droke then denied that Union President Mitchell
told him that the Union did not have to process nonmem-
bers' grievances but would if they were requested. When
General Counsel showed him his pretrial affidavit wherein
he says that Mitchell did make such a statement to which
Droke replied that he would continue to represent employ-
ees until he received something in writing that said he was
not to do so, Droke - testified that he still did not remember
Mitchell making that statement . I credit Droke 's sworn and
cross-examined testimony on this subject and, with all due
regard to the care exercised by the Board agent taking the
statement , would observe that it is not uncommon for one
to misconstrue what another says and that it is not
uncommon for persons to hastily read over important
documents under the general impression that all is well
therein without scrutinizing each jot and tittle of its
contents . Thus , I place no importance on this variation
between the pretrial statement and the sworn testimony.
After a comparison of the foregoing testimony, with due
consideration for the surrounding circumstances and the
fallibility of the human memory, I conclude that Droke did
tell Powell and Wilkins that he did not have to represent
them. That he may have said this in a joking manner does
not lessen its import for, as General Counsel contends,
what may have been said in jest by one may be taken in
earnest by another. I found Webb's testimony to be quite
uncertain as to specifics and cannot on the basis of this
shaky testimony conclude that Droke said he couldn't
represent Powell and Wilkins . I do not credit Brown's claim
that Droke said he was under instructions not to represent
nonmembers because it is totally unsupported by the other
witnesses to the conversation and is a statement of a type,
invoking as it does the name of the highest union official,
is I find it of no significance that Meals ' pretrial affidavit merely states
that he told employees he "heard there was a law that just came out of the
Supreme Court" that a union could require nonmembers to pay back dues
for the processing of grievances , and does not contain the word "rumor."
General Counsel 's attempt to make much of this pretrial omission is, in my
opinion , a naive exercise in semantics.
IT I conclude , although the matter is not free from doubt, that Meals
made this statement in late October , within 6 months of the charge , because
that might be reasonably expected to impress itself on the
memory of the hearers.
8. Statements of Gaylon Meals
Employee Billy Don Brown claims that Meals, during a
discussion sometime in October concerning the filing or
processing of grievances , stated that he would not represent
anybody that didn't belong to the Union . Meals denies
making any such statement to any employee , but states that
several employees asked him if it was true that nonmembers
could be charged for any grievances they might wish to
process . He further states that he told them he did not know
and it was just a rumor that he had heard16 to the effect
there had been a Supreme Court ruling that the Union
could charge nonmembers back dues for the processing of
grievances but there had been nothing in writing on it and
all it was a rumor.
Respondent , in its answer to the complaint , admits that
Meals had informed employees that he had heard there was
a decision from the Supreme Court that the Union could
require nonmembers to pay dues if they wanted a grievance
processed on their behalf.
Meals' admission that he had called nonmembers
"scabs" and had said several times to several employees
that he did not see how nonmembers could have the guts to
ask the Union to process their grievances when they were
not paying dues, and his further testimony that he still felt
that way about it, amply demonstrates his hostility toward
representing nonmembers. With this in mind and consider-
ing that I did not observe his demeanor to be superior to
that of Brown, I credit Brown and conclude that Meals did
tell Brown, in October ,17 that he would not represent
anybody that did not belong to the Union. I further
conclude, as Meals and Respondent admit, that he did tell
employees, in response to their question , that he had heard
a rumor, which was only a rumor and not a definite fact,
that the Supreme Court had ruled that unions could require
nonmembers to pay for the processing of their grievances.
9. Statements of Bill Maness
In February 1976,18 William Grantham and the six other
employees in his classification complained to Steward
Womack Johnson that their supervisor was harassing them
by standing around and watching them. Grantham told
Johnson that he wanted to file a grievance on the matter.
Johnson expressed his opinion, after talking to the supervi-
sor, that they had no legitimate complaint and the supervi-
sor was paid to watch them, but Grantham still wanted to
file the grievance. Johnson consulted with Billy Latham
who told him to let them file. Johnson then wrote up the
it appears from the record that the discussions of employees withdrawing
from membership and their right to use the grievance procedure were
intensified and became a common topic about the time 30 did withdraw on
October 31, and it was in the context of these discussions that Meals made
his statement.
18 Although Grantham places the time as February or March , I conclude
It was February because he was a member at the time and testified he
withdrew in February.
HIGHWAY AND MOTOR FREIGHT EMPLOYEES, LOC. 667 405
grievance and took it around to all seven employees, two of
whom were not members. Only four signed.19 Two subse-
quently withdrew their names from the grievance and the
remaining signers destroyed it. There is no allegation or
evidence of impropriety by Johnson in handling this
grievance.
Grantham testified that after initiating the grievance with
Johnson he went to Steward Bill Maness 20 and asked him if
a nonunion member could sign the grievance. Maness
purportedly told Grantham not to let the two nonmembers
sign the grievance. I do not credit Grantham because
Johnson credibly testified that it was he who took the
grievance around to all employees to have it signed, and
there is no evidence that Johnson barred anyone from
signing . On the contrary, I believe his testimony that he did
give everyone a chance to sign. It is incredible that
Grantham would go to a steward other than the one already
handling the grievance for advice, and then not report
Maness' advice to Johnson who had not at the time,
according to Grantham, even written up the grievance for
signatures . In all the circumstances , including Grantham's
rather confused and hesitant manner as he testified, I do
not believe his testimony that Maness said not to let
nonunion members sign, and the failure of Maness to
appear and deny this testimony does not alter my conclu-
sion.21
10. Miscellaneous
Anderson testified, and I conclude, that he told several
employees that he had heard a rumor that nonmembers
could be charged for back dues if a grievance was filed on
their behalf. It appears from the record that these remarks
were prompted by employee questions.22
Cunningham testified that, in about November, she told
Womack Johnson that another nonmember had told her
that he had been told he would be fined up to $500 if he
turned in a grievance, and asked Johnson if it was true
nonmembers could not turn in a grievance, to which he
replied "That's what they have told us to do." Johnson
denies telling any employee that nonmembers could not file
a grievance. Although I have heretofore found Cunning-
ham credible on other matters, Johnson was far and away
the most credible witness to testify before me in this
proceeding, and I accordingly conclude that he did not say
"That's what they have told us to do," as Cunningham
claims.
Grantham testified that he overheard part of a conversa-
tion between employee Daniels and Steward Johnson
wherein Daniels asked if a nonmember can file a grievance.
Grantham claims he volunteered that they could not, and
that Johnson said they could not unless they were planning
to join the Union and they would have to pay back dues.
19 1 do not credit Grantham's testimony that he told the two nonmembers
they couldn't sign, or that the two never saw the written grievance.
9 Maness and the other six potential grievants were not called as
witnesses.
21 Respondent proffered, without contradiction, that Maness is no longer
an employee of the Company and could not be contacted to testify.
22 As in the case of Meals, I find for the same reasons that the distinction
between "heard" in an affidavit and "heard a rumor" on the witness stand is
not material.
23 Daniels has since left the Company and moved out of State. She did
not appear at the hearing.
Johnson explains that Daniels had come to him and
requested resignation from the Union because she was
planning on leaving. He told her he wouldn't advise it
because if she didn't go and wanted to rejoin she would
have to pay $30 plus all back dues, which he later found out
was in error because all that was required was $30 plus 1
month's dues. Johnson denies telling Daniels she would not
be represented unless she paid back dues.
I conclude that Grantham, who I have earlier discredited
vis-a-vis his conversation with Bill Maness , only heard a
small portion of the conversation and testified to a garbled
version of what actually was said, confusing his own
statement with that of Johnson. I credit Johnson's version
and conclude he did not make the statement to Daniels 23
that Grantham claims he did.
B. Concluding Findings
It is so well settled as to render supporting citations
superfluous that once a labor organization enters into a
collective-bargaining agreement with an employer it is
bound to fairly and equally represent all employees covered
thereunder. Respondent has, by its agents, breached that
duty and violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act in the
following respects:
1. Steward Anderson failed and refused to fairly repre-
sent Mary Pinson in November 1975 by deliberately failing
to file and process a meritorious grievance on her behalf,
and arbitrarily and unfairly deprived Mary Pinson of the
proceeds of that grievance by filing it on his own behalf, all
because she was not a member of the Union.
2. Steward Anderson plainly coerced Mary Pinson in
the exercise of her right to refrain from joining the Union
and threatened her with a deprivation of union representa-
tion, to which she was entitled, unless and until she joined
the Union by telling her that she could not sign a grievance
because she was not a union member and could not receive
the proceeds of a grievance because she was not a member.
3. Steward Alexander coerced employees in the exercise
of their rights set forth above by (a) telling employee Webb,
in early November 1975, that he had been instructed by the
Union's business agent that Alexander did not have to
represent nonmembers, and in order to get representation
nonmembers would have to join the Union and pay back
dues; (b) telling employees on several occasions after the
second week in October 1975 that he would not represent
anyone who didn't belong to the Union; 24 and (c) telling
employee Cunningham, during the last week of October
1975, after she declined to join the Union and expressed her
displeasure with it, that the Union would not help her with
her problems and was no longer going to help nonmembers.
4. Steward Droke, in early November 1975, similarly
coerced employees Powell and Wilkens by telling them he
24 Although I find that Alexander told employee Powell, during the
second week of October 1975, that he would not represent anyone who didn't
belong to the Union , I do not find this to be an unfair labor practice because
the second week ended on October 11 and thus preceded the filing of the
original charge by more than 6 months. This conclusion that the statement
was made more than 6 months prior to the charge is based on the testimony
of Brown that it happened then and that Powell was then considering
withdrawing from the Union. Powell withdrew on October 31.
406 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
did not have to represent them because they were not union
members.
5. Steward Meals, in late October 1975, coerced em-
ployee Brown in the same manner by telling him that he
would not represent anybody that did not belong to the
Union.
These acts and statements of Respondent 's agents
coercively impressed on employees that unless they joined
the Union they would receive no representation from it in
the grievance procedure. This not only is in direct disregard
of Respondent's obligation to represent nonmembers and
members equally, it is in flagrant violation of the right
guaranteed to employees by Section 7 of the Act to refrain
from union activity, and the collective-bargaining agree-
ment expressly permits them to refrain from, or to resign
from, membership in the Union. I therefore conclude that
Respondent by the actions and statements of its agents
Anderson , Alexander, Droke, and Meals in each and every
instance detailed above violated Section 8(b)(IXA) of the
Act.25 The fact that Respondent has accepted and pro-
cessed grievances for nonmembers does not mean that it
will continue to do so and does not lessen the impact of the
above-enumerated actions on employees ' rights.
Although the record clearly reveals that certain of
Respondent's agents , notably Anderson, Alexander, and
Meals , did tell numerous employees , in response to their
questions, that they had heard rumors that Respondent
need not represent nonmembers and might be able to
charge them for back dues as a condition of processing their
grievances, I do not find these recitations of rumors , clearly
labelled as such , to be violations of the Act. That these
responses to their questions may have made employees
apprehensive I do not doubt, but I do not view them as
coercive threats , as General Counsel suggests. I can
conceive of no other reply, other than to stand mute,
Respondent's agents could make . Furthermore, the answers
were truthful and were not given as positive affirmation of
the speculative content of the rumors related.
I find that, apart from items 1 through 5 hereinabove
found to be unfair labor practices, the General Counsel has
not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that any
other unfair labor practices occurred as alleged in the
complaint.
V. THE REMEDY
In order to remedy the unfair labor practices found
herein my recommended Order will require Respondent to
cease and desist therefrom , and, in view of their serious
nature which effectively deprived nonunion employees of
access to the grievance procedure and directly obstructed
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, to cease
and desist from infringing upon the employees ' Section 7
rights in any manner . Additionally, my recommended
Order will affirmatively require Respondent to post an
25 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Local
Union 1504 ( Western Electric Company, Inc.), 211 NLRB 580 (1974);
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local Union
No. 697, AFL-CIO (H.O Canfield Rubber Company of Virginia, Inc), 223
NLRB 832 (1976); United Steelworkers o(America, Local No. 937, AFL-
CIO-CLC (Magma Copp er Commppaany), 200 NLRB 40 (1972); International
Union of District 50 AUed and Technical Workers (Dow Chemical Company-
Rocky Flats Division), 187 NLRB 968 (1971)
appropriate notice to its members and all other employees
in the form and manner described below, and make Mary
Pinson Forthman whole for the 4 hours' pay of which she
was deprived by Steward Anderson's action, with interest
computed thereon at 6 percent per annum in accordance
with Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and the
entire record in the case , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation is an employ-
er within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
2. Respondent is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent , at all times material herein , acted as
collective-bargaining representative of the employees of the
Employer, in an appropriate unit, including , among others,
all employees named in this Decision.
4. Womack Johnson, Jim Alexander , George Droke,
Gaylon Meals , Barney Anderson , Bill Maness, John
Mitchell , and Billy Latham are and have been, with the sole
exception of Bill Maness whose employment terminated
some time after February 1976, at all times material agents
of the Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(13) of
the Act.
5. By the above-found statements and acts of Alexan-
der, Droke, Meals, and Anderson , set forth under "Con-
cluding Findings ," Respondent has coerced and restrained
employees of the Employer in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act and thereby violated,
and is violating, Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
6. Respondent has not committed any other unfair
labor practices alleged in the complaint.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 26
The Respondent, Highway and Local Motor Freight
Employees Local Union No. 667, affiliated with the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, its officers, agents,
and representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Failing and refusing to process grievances against the
Employer on behalf of Mary Pinson Forthman, or any
other employee, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment, because of nonmembership in Respondent.
(b) Restraining and coercing employees in the exercise of
their Section 7 rights by refusing or threatening to refuse to
26 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec . 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions and Order , and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
HIGHWAY AND MOTOR FREIGHT EMPLOYEES, LOC. 667
represent them or to permit them to sign a grievance
because they are not members of Respondent.
(c) Threatening to refuse to represent employees unless
they become members of Respondent and/or pay back
dues to Respondent.
(d) Processing and retaining the proceeds of grievances
rightfully due employees because said employees are not
members of Respondent.
(e) In any other manner restraining or coercing employ-
ees of the Employer in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act:
(a) Upon request, investigate and process grievances for
Mary Pinson Forthman, or any other member of the
bargaining unit, without regard to union membership of the
grievant.
(b) Make Mary Pinson Forthman whole for the loss of 4
hours' pay she incurred by reason of Respondent's failure
and refusal to represent her in the grievance procedure
because of her lack of union membership, in accordance
with "The Remedy" herein.
(c) Post at its business office and meeting halls copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 27 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 26, after being duly signed by the authorized
representative of Respondent, shall be posted by Respon-
dent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to members and
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Furnish to the Regional Director for Region 26 signed
copies of said notice in sufficient number for posting by
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corporation at its Jackson,
Tennessee, location, if said Employer is willing to so post.
27 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading"Posted by Order of
the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
407
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be,
and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges unfair labor
practices not found herein.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing in which all parties had an opportunity to
present evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has
found that we have violated the National Labor Relations
Act and has ordered us to post this notice.
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to faithfully process any
employee's grievances because he or she is not a
member of this union.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that their grievances will
not be initiated or processed because they are not union
members.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that they must join the
Union or pay back dues in order to get their grievances
processed.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7
of the Act.
WE WILL make Mary Pinson Forthman whole for the
loss of 4 hours' pay she suffered because we did not file
and process a grievance on her behalf.
HIGHWAY AND LOCAL
MOTOR FREIGHT
EMPLOYEES LOCAL UNION
No. 667, AFFILIATED WITH
THE INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS,
WAREHOUSEMEN AND
HELPERS OF AMERICA