HEWLETT-PACKARD DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, L.P.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 8, 2020

2019002418 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 8, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/765,323 07/31/2015 Gregory Thorn Springer 84300480 9068
22879 7590 06/08/2020
HP Inc.
3390 E. Harmony Road
Mail Stop 35
FORT COLLINS, CO 80528-9544
EXAMINER
NICHOLAS, WENDY K
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2174
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/08/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipa.mail@hp.com
jessica.pazdan@hp.com
yvonne.bailey@hp.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte GREGORY THORN SPRINGER,
CYRILLE de BREBISSON, and TIMOTHY JAMES WESSMAN
____________________

Appeal 2019-002418
Application 14/765,323
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before ERIC S. FRAHM, JASON J. CHUNG, and
JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges.

DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1–9 and 11–15. The Examiner has indicated that claim 16 is
allowable and claim 10 would be allowable if rewritten in independent form.
See Final Act. 3. We have jurisdiction over the remaining pending claims
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Throughout this Decision, we use the word “Appellant” to refer to
“applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2018). Appellant identifies
Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. as the real party in interest.
Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2019-002418
Application 14/765,323

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention generally relates to “an
electronic device that allows a user to zoom out and in on mathematical
representations, such as graphs (e.g., a graph of a mathematical relationship
in two or three variables) and tables of function values” using pinch and
spread touch gestures on a touch-sensitive display screen. Spec. 3:21–25.
Claims 1, 11, and 15 are independent claims.2 Claim 11 is
representative of the subject matter on appeal (see 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(iv))
and is reproduced below with the disputed limitation emphasized in italics:
11. An electronic device, comprising:
a touch-sensitive display screen to display a table of values
of a mathematical function and to enable a user to enter a touch
gesture thereon for performing an adjustment function for the
displayed table of values; and
a display adjustment module, including a processor, to
interpret the touch gesture and perform the adjustment function,
wherein the display adjustment module performs a zoom
adjustment function in response to one of a pinch touch gesture
and a spread touch gesture, wherein the zoom adjustment
function modifies a delta value between consecutive values in a
column of the table.

The Examiner’s Rejections
1. Claims 1–9 and 11–15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 3–8.
2. Claims 1–6 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Williams (US 2011/0007097 A1; Jan. 13, 2011) and

2 Claim 16 is also an independent claim, but is not the subject of this appeal.
Appeal 2019-002418
Application 14/765,323

3
Mullany (US 8,527,909 B1; Sept. 3, 2013 (filed May 29, 2012)). Final
Act. 8–15.
3. Claim 7 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Williams, Mullany, and Duke (US 6,407,749 B1;
June 18, 2002). Final Act. 15–17.
4. Claims 8 and 9 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Williams, Mullany, and Li et al. (US
2011/0012848 A1; Jan. 20, 2011) (“Li”). Final Act. 17–18.
5. Claims 11–14 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Willekes et al. (US 2010/0313155 A1; Dec. 9,
2010) (“Willekes”) and Kritt et al. (US 2013/0298085 A1; Nov. 7, 2013
(filed Jan. 31, 2013)) (“Kritt”). Final Act. 18–24.
6. Claim 15 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Hale et al. (US 2012/0047453 A1; Feb. 23, 2012)
(“Hale”) and Matsumura (US 2012/0327003 A1; Dec. 27, 2012). Final
Act. 24–28.

ANALYSIS3
Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Appellant disputes the Examiner’s conclusion that the pending claims
are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Appeal Br. 6–8; Reply
Br. 2–4. In particular, Appellant argues the Examiner overgeneralizes the

3 Throughout this Decision, we have considered the Appeal Brief, filed
October 10, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); the Reply Brief, filed January 28, 2019
(“Reply Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer, mailed November 29, 2018 (“Ans.”);
and the Final Office Action, mailed May 10, 2018 (“Final Act.”), from
which this Appeal is taken.
Appeal 2019-002418
Application 14/765,323

4
claims and asserts the Examiner’s characterization is untethered from the
language of the claims. Appeal Br. 7; Reply Br. 3–4. Moreover, Appellant
challenges that the claims recite generic computing elements performing
generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine, and
conventional. Appeal Br. 8; Reply Br. 3.
The Examiner concludes the claims are directed to “displaying a
graphical representation of a mathematical relationship and adjusting the
displayed representation,” which the Examiner further determines to be
similar to collecting, displaying, and manipulating data. Final Act. 4 (citing
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2017)). Moreover, the Examiner determines the additional
components (e.g., a touch-sensitive display, a display adjustment module,
and a processor) are recited at a high level of generality and are used to
perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine, and
conventional activities. Final Act. 4. Moreover, the Examiner finds that
when considered individually and as an ordered combination, the limitations
do not recite an improvement to the functioning of a computer of any other
technology. Final Act. 5.
The Supreme Court’s two-step framework guides our analysis of
patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 217 (2014). In addition, the Office has published revised guidance
for evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, specifically
with respect to applying the Alice framework. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Office
Guidance”). If a claim falls within one of the statutory categories of patent
eligibility (i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter)
Appeal 2019-002418
Application 14/765,323

5
then the first inquiry is whether the claim is directed to one of the judicially
recognized exceptions (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an
abstract idea). Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. As part of this inquiry, we must “look
at the ‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the
claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.”
Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). Per the Office Guidance, this first inquiry has two prongs of
analysis: (i) does the claim recite a judicial exception (e.g., an abstract idea);
and (ii) if so, is the judicial exception integrated into a practical application.
Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Under the Office Guidance, if the
judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, see infra, the
claim is patent eligible under § 101. Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–
55. If the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. See
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). However, if the claim is directed to a judicial exception (i.e.,
recites a judicial exception and does not integrate the exception into a
practical application), the next step is to determine whether any element, or
combination of elements, amounts to significantly more than the judicial
exception. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217; see also Office Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 56.
Here, we conclude Appellant’s claims recite an abstract idea because
they recite mental processes. If a claim, under its broadest reasonable
interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of
generic computer components, then it is still in the mental processes
category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind. See
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed.
Appeal 2019-002418
Application 14/765,323

6
Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps,
there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being
performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”); see also
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (holding that the incidental use of a “computer” or “computer
readable medium” does not make a claim otherwise directed to a process
that “can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and
paper” patent eligible); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) (explaining mental processes are not
patentable); Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–53 nn.14–15.
More specifically, Appellant’s claims are generally directed to
displaying information and adjusting the resolution of the displayed
information in response to user input. This is consistent with how Appellant
describes the claimed invention. See Spec. 3:21–27, 4:7–12, Abstract. But
for the recitation of generic computer components performing generic
computing functions (as discussed further below; see also Spec. 4:21–25),
displaying information and adjusting the resolution of the displayed
information in response to user input is a series of observations, evaluations,
judgments, and opinions that can be performed by a human, mentally or with
pen and paper.
Consistent with our Office Guidance and case law, we conclude
displaying information and adjusting the resolution of the displayed
information in response to user input is a mental process and, thus, an
abstract idea. See Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; see also Content
Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d
1343, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that claims drawn to data
Appeal 2019-002418
Application 14/765,323

7
collection, recognition, and storage are “undisputedly well-known” and,
absent more, are directed to an abstract idea); Elec. Power Grp., LLC v.
Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (concluding that
“analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by
mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes
within the abstract-idea category”); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc.,
839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (concluding claims directed to
“collecting and analyzing information to detect misuse and notifying a user
when misuse is detected” to be mental processes within the abstract-idea
category); CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1371–72 (concluding claims directed to
“detecting credit card fraud based on information relating [to] past
transactions” can be performed in the human mind and were drawn to a
patent-ineligible mental process); SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d
1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (concluding the claims directed to “selecting
certain information, analyzing it using mathematical techniques, and
reporting or displaying the results of the analysis” to be abstract); Digitech
Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (without more, “a process that employs mathematical algorithms
to manipulate existing information to generate additional information is not
patent eligible”).
Claim 11 is reproduced below and includes the following claim
limitations that recite displaying information and adjusting the resolution of
the displayed information in response to user input, emphasized in italics:
11. An electronic device, comprising:
a touch-sensitive display screen to display a table of values
of a mathematical function and to enable a user to enter a touch
Appeal 2019-002418
Application 14/765,323

8
gesture thereon for performing an adjustment function for the
displayed table of values; and
a display adjustment module, including a processor, to
interpret the touch gesture and perform the adjustment function,
wherein the display adjustment module performs a zoom
adjustment function in response to one of a pinch touch gesture
and a spread touch gesture, wherein the zoom adjustment
function modifies a delta value between consecutive values in a
column of the table.
More particularly, displaying information and adjusting the resolution
of the displayed information in response to user input comprises
(i) displaying information (i.e., the claimed element of displaying a table of
values of a mathematical function); (ii) receiving user input indicating an
adjustment to the displayed information (i.e., the claimed elements of a user
entering a touch gesture (more specifically, a pinch or spread touch gesture)
and interpreting the touch gesture; and (iii) adjusting the displayed
information (i.e., the claimed element of performing the adjustment
function).
Because the claim recites a judicial exception, we next determine
whether the claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical
application. Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. To determine whether the
judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, we identify
whether there are “any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the
judicial exception(s)” and evaluate those elements to determine whether they
integrate the judicial exception into a recognized practical application.
Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (emphasis added); see also MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Here, we find the additional limitations do not integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. More particularly, the claims do not
Appeal 2019-002418
Application 14/765,323

9
recite (i) an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other
technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) a “particular
machine” to apply or use the judicial exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b));
(iii) a particular transformation of an article to a different thing or state
(see MPEP § 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other meaningful limitation
(see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). See Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Specifically, the additional limitations merely refine the abstract idea
by specifying the type of adjustment being made on the displayed
information (e.g., modifying a delta value between consecutive values in a
table, or modifying the displayed range of values in a graphical
representation (as in claim 1), or modifying the number of digits displayed
for a numerical result (as in claim 15)). Further the additional elements
recited in the independent claims (e.g., electronic device, touch-sensitive
display screen, and display adjustment module, including a processor) fail to
convert the judicial exception into a patent-eligible application. See Alice,
573 U.S. at 223 (“Stating an abstract idea ‘while adding the words “apply
it”’ is not enough for patent eligibility.”). Contrary to Appellant’s assertion
(see Appeal Br. 6–7), these components do not provide meaningful limits on
the claimed subject matter.
The claims do not recite an improvement to the functionality of a
computer or other technology or technical field. See MPEP § 2106.05(a).
As the court in Enfish explained, “the first step in the Alice inquiry . . . asks
whether the focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in
computer capabilities . . . or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an
‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.” Enfish,
LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also
Appeal 2019-002418
Application 14/765,323

10
Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance Ltd., 721 F. App’x 950, 956 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (explaining that the claims did not focus on the technical
implementation of details of the zooming functionality, but merely recited
the results of the zoom and, therefore, did not provide any technological
advancement). As discussed above, the focus of the pending claims is on
displaying information and adjusting the resolution of the displayed
information in response to user input and the recited computing elements are
invoked merely as a tool. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36. Further, we
note that using a computer to perform tasks more quickly or efficiently does
not confer patent eligibility on an otherwise ineligible abstract idea. See,
e.g., Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d
1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required calculations could
be performed more efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the
patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”); see also Ans. 4–6.
Additionally, we determine that the electronic device, as recited and
applied in the claims, is not a particular machine sufficient to confer patent
eligibility to the judicial exception. At the outset, we note that whether a
judicial exception is performed by a particular machine may be a clue of
patent eligibility, but it is not a stand-alone test. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S.
593, 604 (2010); see also MPEP § 2106.05(b). Here, Appellant’s recited
electronic device merely applies the judicial exception as does not qualify as
a particular machine. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709,
716–17 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Versata Dev. Grp, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc.,
793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that in order for a machine
to add significantly more, it must “play a significant part in permitting the
claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious
Appeal 2019-002418
Application 14/765,323

11
mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly”); MPEP
§ 2106.05(b).
For at least the foregoing reasons, the claims do not integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application.
Because we determine the claims are directed to an abstract idea or
combination of abstract ideas, we analyze the claims under step two of Alice
to determine if there are additional limitations that individually, or as an
ordered combination, ensure the claims amount to “significantly more” than
the abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77–
79). As stated in the Office Guidance, many of the considerations to
determine whether the claims amount to “significantly more” under step two
of the Alice framework are already considered as part of determining
whether the judicial exception has been integrated into a practical
application. Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Thus, at this point of our
analysis, we determine if the claims add a specific limitation, or combination
of limitations, that is not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in
the field, or simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities
at a high level of generality. Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
To the extent Appellant is asserting a traversal of the Examiner’s
rejections under § 103 (a premise with which we disagree, see infra),
suggests the instant claims do not recite well-understood, routine, or
conventional activities (see Appeal Br. 8; Reply Br. 3), we are not
persuaded. Subject-matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a requirement
separate from other patentability inquiries. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90
(recognizing that the § 101 inquiry and other patentability inquiries “might
sometimes overlap,” but that “shift[ing] the patent-eligibility inquiry entirely
Appeal 2019-002418
Application 14/765,323

12
to these [other] sections risks creating significantly greater legal uncertainty,
while assuming that those sections can do work that they are not equipped to
do”); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89 (1981) (“[t]he
‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is
of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls
within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter”); Two-
Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[e]ligibility and novelty are separate inquiries”).
Here, Appellant’s claims do not recite specific limitations (alone or
when considered as an ordered combination) that are not well-understood,
routine, and conventional. As set forth in the Specification, Appellant
describes that the use of pinch and spread touch gestures on a touch-
sensitive display were known and used in the art. See Spec. 3:25–27.
Further, when describing the electronic device, touch-sensitive display, and
display adjustment module for practicing the claimed invention, Appellant
describes the components at a high level of generality and notes that the
electronic device may be “any type of electronic device.” See Spec. 4:17–
5:10, Figs. 1, 2.
For the reasons discussed supra, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of claims 1–9 and 11–15 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Rejections under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C § 103(a)
a. Claims 1–9
In rejecting independent claim 1, the Examiner relies on the combined
teachings of Williams and Mullany. Final Act. 8–12. In particular, the
Examiner finds Williams teaches all of the limitations of claim 1, but does
Appeal 2019-002418
Application 14/765,323

13
not explicitly teach using pinch or spread gestures. Final Act. 8–10 (citing
Williams ¶¶ 18–19, 23–24, 26, 28, 42, 46, 52–53, 65, Figs. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 10).
The Examiner relies on Mullany to teach using conventional touch gestures
(i.e., pinch and spread gestures) to manipulate a view of data visualizations.
Final Act. 11–12 (citing Mullany, col. 4, ll. 35–53, col. 11, ll. 40–49, col. 12,
ll. 5–10, 46–55, col. 13, ll. 10–14, Figs. 4A, 4B, 5A, 5B). The Examiner
determines it would have been obvious to the ordinarily skilled artisan to
combine the adjustment interface of Williams with the conventional pinch
and spread gestures taught by Mullany “to enable easy, rich, intuitive, and
meaningful data visualization GUI element manipulation which takes
advantage of the growing popularity, availability and use of touchscreens.”
Final Act. 12 (citing Mullany, col. 1, ll. 31–58, col. 4, ll. 43–47).
Appellant asserts Mullany does not teach a graphical representation of
a mathematical relationship and, therefore, cannot teach using a pinch or
spread gesture to increase or decrease a displayed range of values for a
mathematical relationship in one dimension. Appeal Br. 9; Reply Br. 4–5.
Moreover, Appellant asserts the Examiner fails to support the proposed
combination of teachings and instead relies on improper hindsight. Reply
Br. 5.
We are unpersuaded of Examiner error at least because Appellant’s
arguments are not responsive to the rejection as articulated by the Examiner.
See Ans. 6–7. Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking
references individually where, as here, the ground of unpatentability is based
upon the teachings of a combination of references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d
413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Rather, the test for obviousness is whether the
combination of references, taken as a whole, would have suggested the
Appeal 2019-002418
Application 14/765,323

14
patentee’s invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art. In re Merck
& Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Here, as discussed above, the Examiner relies on the combined
teachings of Williams and Mullany. See Final Act. 8–12. As discussed
above and as set forth in the Final Rejection, the Examiner finds Williams
teaches, inter alia, a touch-sensitive display displaying a graphical
representation of a mathematical relationship and a display adjustment
module to interpret a one-dimensional touch gesture and perform the
adjustment. Final Act. 8–9 (citing Williams ¶¶ 19, 26, 42, 52–53, Figs. 1, 2,
7). In addition, the Examiner relies on Mullany to teach the use of pinch and
spread gestures on a touch-sensitive display. Final Act. 11–12 (citing
Mullany, col. 4, ll. 35–53, col. 11, ll. 40–49, col. 12, ll. 5–10, 46–55, col. 13,
ll. 10–14, Figs. 4A, 4B, 5A, 5B). Accordingly, Appellant’s argument that
Mullany fails to teach a graphical representation of a mathematical
relationship is unpersuasive of Examiner error.
In addition, we disagree that the Examiner relied on impermissible
hindsight in determining that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been
motivated to combine the pinch and spread gestures of Mullany with the
system of Williams. The Examiner cites to Mullany as suggesting the
benefits of using conventional pinch and spread gestures on a touch-
sensitive display. Final Act. 12 (citing Mullany, col. 1, ll. 31–58, col. 4,
ll. 43–47); see also Ans. 7. Appellant has not provided persuasive argument
or evidence that the proposed combination uses the elements of the
references in a way other than their established functions to achieve
predictable results. “The combination of familiar elements according to
known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield
Appeal 2019-002418
Application 14/765,323

15
predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416
(2007). Further, Appellant does not provide persuasive evidence or
reasoning that the proposed combination would be “uniquely challenging or
difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” or “represented an unobvious
step over the prior art.” Leapfrog Enters. Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d
1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–19).
For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner
error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 1 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). In addition, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejections of claims 2–9, which depend directly or indirectly
therefrom and were not argued separately with particularity. See Appeal
Br. 10; see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

b. Claims 11–14
Independent claim 11 recites a touch-sensitive display to display a
table of values of a mathematical function and further comprising a display
adjustment module that, in response to receiving a pinch or spread touch
gesture, performs a zoom adjustment feature to modify a delta value
between consecutive values in a column of the table.
In rejecting claim 11, the Examiner relies on the combined teachings
of Willekes and Kritt. Final Act. 18–22. In particular, the Examiner finds
Willekes teaches all of the limitations of claim 11, but does not explicitly
teach using pinch or spread gestures. Final Act. 18–21 (citing Willekes
¶¶ 79, 110, 120–121, 126–127, Figs. 2, 8C, 10B, 11A–11D). The Examiner
relies on Kritt to teach adjusting the displayed data of a table in response to
pinch and spread touch gestures. Final Act. 21–22 (citing Kritt ¶¶ 6, 13–14,
Appeal 2019-002418
Application 14/765,323

16
61, Figs. 6, 7). The Examiner also determines it would have been obvious to
the ordinarily skilled artisan to combine the table data zooming touch
controls taught by Willekes with the pinch and spread gestures taught by
Kritt to allow a user “to easily drill up and down on data provided by
mathematical functions to understand the effect in the result of the function
in response to changes in the independent variable.” Final Act. 22 (citing
Kritt ¶¶ 2–3).
Appellant asserts Kritt does not teach “a table of values of a
mathematical function . . . [or] modifying a delta value between consecutive
values in a column of such a table.” Appeal Br. 11; Reply Br. 6–7.
Moreover, Appellant argues the gestures of Kritt are used to “drill down” on
report data, not to modify a delta value. Reply Br. 7.
Similar to our reasoning discussed above with respect to claim 1, we
are unpersuaded of Examiner error because, at least, Appellant’s arguments
are not responsive to the rejection as articulated by the Examiner. See
Ans. 8–9. The Examiner relies on the combined teachings of Willekes and
Kritt and, more particularly, finds Willekes, not Kritt, teaches a zoom
adjustment function that modifies a delta value between consecutive values
in a column of the table. Final Act. 20 (citing Willekes ¶¶ 121, 123, 126,
Figs. 11A–11C).
For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner
error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 11 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). In addition, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 12–14, which depend directly or indirectly
therefrom and were not argued separately with particularity. See Appeal
Br. 12; see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appeal 2019-002418
Application 14/765,323

17
c. Claim 15
Independent claim 15 recites a touch-sensitive display to display a
numerical result and further comprising a display adjustment module that, in
response to receiving a pinch or spread touch gesture, performs an
adjustment on the numerical result to increase or decrease the number of
digits displayed for the selected numerical result.
In rejecting claim 15, the Examiner relies on the combined teachings
of Hale and Matsumura. Final Act. 24–28. In particular, the Examiner finds
Hale teaches all of the limitations of claim 15, but does not explicitly teach
using pinch or spread gestures. Final Act. 18–21 (citing Hale ¶¶ 47, 53, 56,
96, 98, Figs. 1, 7, 41–43). The Examiner relies on Matsumura to teach
narrowing and enlarging displayed character strings, which the Examiner
determines to be analogous to numbers or strings of digits, in response to
pinch and spread touch gestures. Final Act. 27–28 (citing Matsumura ¶¶ 5,
106, 114, 143, Figs. 12, 13, 20). The Examiner also determines it would
have been obvious to the ordinarily skilled artisan to modify the number of
digits displayed, as taught by Hale, by using the pinch and spread touch
gestures of Matsumura “to provide an improved, easy and intuitive operation
for enlarging and narrowing displayed character strings.” Final Act. 28
(citing Matsumura ¶¶ 3, 5, 23).
Appellant asserts Matsumura does not teach “a numerical result, or
rounding a numerical result to fewer places in response to a pinch touch
gesture.” Appeal Br. 12–13; Reply Br. 8. Appellant further asserts that the
Examiner engaged in improper hindsight reasoning in support of the
proposed combination of references. Reply Br. 8.
Appeal 2019-002418
Application 14/765,323

18
Similar to our reasoning discussed above with respect to claims 1 and
11, we are unpersuaded of Examiner error because, at least, Appellant’s
arguments are not responsive to the rejection as articulated by the Examiner.
See Ans. 9–10. The Examiner relies on the combined teachings of Hale and
Matsumura and, more particularly, finds Hale, not Matsumura, teaches
adjusting the number of digits displayed for a selected numerical result in
response to a touch gesture. See Final Act. 26. Matsumura is relied on to
teach the touch gesture could be a pinch or spread touch gesture. See Final
Act. 27–28.
In addition, we disagree that the Examiner relied on impermissible
hindsight in determining that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been
motivated to combine the pinch and spread gestures of Matsumura with the
system of Hale. The Examiner cites to Matsumura as suggesting the benefits
of using conventional pinch and spread gestures on a touch-sensitive display.
Final Act. 28 (citing Matsumura ¶¶ 3, 5, 23); Ans. 10. Appellant has not
provided persuasive argument or evidence that the proposed combination
uses the elements of the references in a way other than their established
functions to achieve predictable results. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416 (“The
combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be
obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”).
For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner
error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 15 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

Appeal 2019-002418
Application 14/765,323

19
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–9 and 11–15
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–9 and 11–15
under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–9, 11–15 101 Eligibility 1–9, 11–15
1–6 103(a) Williams, Mullany 1–6
7 103(a) Williams, Mullany,
Duke
7
8, 9 103(a) Williams, Mullany,
Li
8, 9
11–14 103(a) Willekes, Kritt 11–14
15 103(a) Hale, Matsumura 15
Overall
Outcome
1–9, 11–15

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED