Herbert J. Gulley, Complainant,v.Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 1, 2010
0120083383 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 1, 2010)

0120083383

04-01-2010

Herbert J. Gulley, Complainant, v. Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Herbert J. Gulley,

Complainant,

v.

Eric K. Shinseki,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120083383

Agency No. 200L-0635-2007103946

DECISION

On July 22, 2008, complainant filed an appeal from the June 30, 2008

final agency decision (FAD) concerning his equal employment opportunity

(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is

accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons,

the Commission AFFIRMS the FAD.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked as

a Housekeeping Aide at the agency's Medical Center facility in Oklahoma

City, Oklahoma. Complainant and the agency entered into a Memorandum

of Understanding (MOU) on April 9, 1998 whereby complainant was granted

a one-time priority consideration for a Painter/Paperhanger position

should it become available. The MOU stated that once complainant

exercised this priority consideration right, he would no longer have

priority consideration again. Complainant applied for a Painter position

advertised under Vacancy Announcement No. MP 2007-080. On August 2, 2007,

the Human Resources Specialist (HRS) informed the selecting official (SO)

that complainant needed to be given priority consideration because the

Office of Human Resources was unable to ascertain whether complainant had

submitted the MOU with a previous application. Complainant was found

qualified and was interviewed for the position. On August 24, 2007,

complainant learned that he had not been selected for the position.

On December 6, 2007, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that

he was discriminated against on the bases of race (Black), age (57),

and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under Title VII when, on

August 24, 2007, he was not selected for the position of Painter.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). In accordance with

complainant's request, the agency issued a final decision pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b). Initially, the FAD found that complainant had

failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the any of

the alleged bases. The FAD then assumed that complainant had established

a prima facie case and found that the agency had articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically, the selectee

had much more experience in painting including a great deal of experience

painting commercial buildings as well as homes. Further, the selectee had

been a full-time professional painter while complainant had painted only

part-time. The selectee had extensive supervisory experience while the

complainant possessed little or none. Finally, the FAD found that there

was no evidence that the agency's reasons were pretextual. The FAD noted

that it was clear from the MOU that complainant was entitled to priority

consideration only once and complainant's own statements indicated that

he has invoked the MOU previously. Nonetheless, the FAD determined that

complainant was accorded priority consideration in the instant case.

Therefore, the FAD concluded that complainant failed to prove that he

was subjected to discrimination or retaliated against as alleged.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

In support of his appeal, complainant submitted a list of his

qualifications, but presented no arguments or allegations of error.

The agency requests that we affirm the FAD.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo

review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management

Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999) (explaining that

the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine

the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the

previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements,

and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions

of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's

own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").

In general, disparate treatment claims, such as the matter before us,

are examined under a tripartite analysis whereby a complainant must

first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting

facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of

discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor

in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802-804 (1973); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438

U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the agency is

successful, the burden reverts back to the complainant to demonstrate by

a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reasons were a pretext

for discrimination. At all times, complainant retains the burden of

persuasion, and it is his/her obligation to show by a preponderance of

the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason.

St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-716 (1983).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

In the instant case, the agency has articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically, SO asserts that

complainant was not the most qualified candidate for the position. Report

of Investigation (ROI), SO's Aff. at 5. SO affirms that two staff members

interviewed the candidates and asked each candidate the same questions.

Id. at 3-4. SO reviewed each application and the panel's interview

notes, and questioned the interviewers about each candidate before he

made his selection. Id. at 3. SO avows that he sought a candidate

with professional commercial and/or residential painting experience.

Id. at 4. SO states that the selectee displayed significant professional

commercial and residential painting experience and exceptional customer

service skills and knowledge, while complainant did not demonstrate

the same level of experience. Id. at 5. SO asserts that complainant

possessed intermittent part-time experience in residential painting

and showed no proof of professional residential painting experience or

commercial experience. The record also reveals that pursuant to HRS's

memo regarding complainant's priority consideration, SO evaluated and

considered complainant's application first; however, complainant was not

the best qualified candidate. ROI, Exh. C-5. The recommending official

(RO) adds that the selectee was fully qualified and needed no training

while complainant lacked knowledge of commercial-based paints and any

experience in paper-hanging. ROI, RO's Aff. at 4.

Because the agency has proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for the alleged discriminatory event, complainant now bears the burden

of establishing that the agency's stated reasons are merely a pretext

for discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Administration, EEOC

Request No. 05960403 (December 6, 1996). Complainant can do this by

showing that the agency was motivated by a discriminatory reason. Id.

(citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)).

Complainant states that he believes that he was not selected because

the last three painters hired were outside his protected classes.

Complainant also asserts that since he was issued the MOU, he should

have been properly considered for the position.

We find that aside from complainant's bare assertions, the record is

devoid of any persuasive evidence that discrimination was a factor

in the agency's decision. We further note that the agency has broad

discretion to set policies and carry out personnel decisions, and should

not be second-guessed by the reviewing authority absent evidence of

unlawful motivation. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 259; Vanek v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request

No. 05940906 (January 16, 1997). At all times the ultimate burden of

persuasion remains with complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance

of the evidence that the agency's reasons were not the real reasons,

and that the agency acted on the basis of discriminatory animus.

Complainant failed to carry this burden. Accordingly, we find that

complainant has failed to show that he was discriminated against or

retaliated against as alleged.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

April 1, 2010_____________

Date

2

0120083383

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120083383