Henry W. Mayfield, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 22, 2003
01A31797_r (E.E.O.C. Aug. 22, 2003)

01A31797_r

08-22-2003

Henry W. Mayfield, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Henry W. Mayfield v. United States Postal Service

01A31797

August 22, 2003

.

Henry W. Mayfield,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A31797

Agency No. 4G-752-0296-02

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

On June 17, 2002, complainant, a Part-Time Flexible City Letter Carrier

at the agency's facility in Irving, Texas, initiated contact with an EEO

Counselor. Informal efforts to resolve his concerns were unsuccessful.

On July 12, 2002, complainant filed a formal complaint, alleging that

the agency discriminated against him on the bases of race and age

when on June 7, 2002, he was issued a letter of warning for failure to

follow instructions; and that on an unspecified date, his work hours

were reduced.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge

or alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. When

complainant failed to respond within the time period specified in 29

C.F.R. � 1614.108(f), the agency issued a final decision.

In its final decision, regarding the issuance of the letter of warning,

the agency concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima

facie case of discrimination based on race and age. The agency further

determined that management articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for its actions. Specifically, the agency presented evidence

supporting a determination that complainant was issued the letter of

warning for failure to follow instructions. Further, the agency found

that complainant failed to present any evidence which demonstrated

that the agency's articulated reasons for its actions were a pretext

for discrimination

Regarding complainant's claim that his work hours were reduced, the agency

dismissed it pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 1614.107(a)(2) for failing to initiate

timely EEO Counselor contact. Specifically, the agency noted in its

Acceptance of Complaint, dated July 25, 2002, complainant was requested

to identify the specific date on which management reduced his work hours.

In his affidavit, complainant failed to identify a date for claim (2).

Furthermore, the agency found that in his affidavit, complainant's

Acting Supervisor stated that he was not aware of complainant's work

hours being reduced.

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that

a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment

action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction

Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to

the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the

complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder

by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of

a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502

(1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Letter of warning claim

Regarding the issuance of a letter of warning, the Commission finds

that the evidence supports a determination that the agency articulated

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its employment actions. The

agency determined that complainant was issued the letter of warning

for failure to follow instructions concerning mail preparation. The

record in this case contains an affidavit dated August 5, 2002, from

complainant's Acting Supervisor. Therein, the Acting Supervisor stated

that complainant was issued the letter of warning for failure to abide by

the Standard Operating Procedure for mail preparation. Complainant has

not demonstrated that the agency's articulated reasons for his letter

of warning were a pretext for discrimination.

Work hours reduction claim

With respect to complainant's claim that his work hours were cut, the

Commission finds that the agency properly dismissed it pursuant to 29

C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(2), for failing to initiate timely contact with

an EEO Counselor. The record indicates that complainant made initial

EEO contact on June 17, 2002; however, complainant did not show that

he was subjected to any cut in work hours within the applicable 45-day

limitation period. Moreover, the record in this case contains the

affidavit of an Acting Supervisor, who stated that he was unaware of

any cut in complainant's work hours.

Accordingly, the agency's final decision is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 22, 2003

__________________

Date