HELLER, Jonathan et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 19, 2020

11966893 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 19, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/966,893 12/28/2007 Jonathan HELLER 007412.02701 5943
71867 7590 03/19/2020
BANNER & WITCOFF , LTD
ATTORNEYS FOR CLIENT NUMBER 007412
1100 13th STREET, N.W.
SUITE 1200
WASHINGTON, DC 20005-4051
EXAMINER
WINTER, JOHN M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3685
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/19/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PTO-71867@bannerwitcoff.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JONATHAN HELLER, JINGCHUN (DIANE) YU, and
MICHAEL HENRY EVANGELISTA
____________

Appeal 2019-004562
Application 11/966,893
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JEFFREY S. SMITH, ERIC B. CHEN, and
AMBER L. HAGY, Administrative Patent Judges.

SMITH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the rejection of
claims 1, 40–52, 59–73, 75–82, and 85–89. We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Representative Claim
1. A method, comprising:
responsive to a user selecting a digital content asset
comprising an advertisement slot, determining, by at least one
processor of a computing device, a delivery platform, of a
network comprising a plurality of delivery platforms, via which
the digital content asset was selected by the user;
accessing, by the at least one processor of the computing
device and from a database, data correlating each of the
plurality of delivery platforms to one or more advertisements;
determining, by the at least one processor of the
computing device, based on the delivery platform via which the
digital content asset was selected by the user, and based on the
accessed data, an advertisement for the advertisement slot;
inserting, by the at least one processor of the computing
device, the determined advertisement in the advertisement slot;
delivering, to a device associated with the user and via
the delivery platform of the network comprising the plurality of
delivery platforms, the digital content asset comprising the
determined advertisement inserted in the advertisement slot;
and
determining, by the at least one processor of the
computing device, an allocation of revenue for the
advertisement between a party having rights in the digital
content asset and a party that contributed to the user selecting
the digital content asset.

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Prior Art
Linehan US 2004/0249726 A1 Dec. 09, 2004
Buchanan US 2005/0119936 A1 June 02, 2005
Herley US 2006/0092282 A1 May 04, 2006
Yan US 2008/0091524 A1 Apr. 17, 2008
Fassett US 2008/0109363 A1 May 08, 2008
Anderson US 8,108,895 B2 Jan. 31, 2012
Examiner’s Rejections
Claims 1, 40–52, 59–73, 75–82, and 85–89 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent ineligible subject matter.
Claims 1, 40–41, 44–48, 60–62, 65–69, 75, 77–79, and 85–89 stand
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Linehan, Anderson,
Herley, and Buchanan.
Claims 42, 43, 63, 64, and 76 stand rejected as unpatentable over
Linehan, Anderson, Herley, Buchanan, and Yan.
Claims 49–52, 70–73, and 80–82 stand rejected as unpatentable over
Linehan, Anderson, Herley, Buchanan, and Fassett.

ANALYSIS
I. Section 101 Rejection
The Examiner rejects all of the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as patent-ineligible because they are directed to a judicial exception without
significantly more. Final Act. 3–5. Appellant argues that the claims are not
directed to an abstract idea, recite significantly more than an abstract idea,
and the Examiner’s rejection should be reversed. Appeal Br. 6–14. For the
reasons explained below, we are not persuaded of Examiner error in the
§ 101 rejection, and we, therefore, sustain that rejection.
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A. Principles of Law
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has interpreted § 101
to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S.
208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted).
The Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-part framework previously set
forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-
eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. The first
part in the analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed
to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. For example, abstract ideas
include, but are not limited to, fundamental economic practices, methods of
organizing human activities, an idea of itself, and mathematical formulas or
relationships. Id. at 218–20. The “directed to” inquiry asks not whether
“the claims involve a patent-ineligible concept,” but instead whether,
“considered in light of the specification, . . . ‘their character as a whole is
directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). In that
regard, we determine whether the claims “focus on a specific means or
method that improves the relevant technology” or are “directed to a result or
effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and
machinery.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc.,
837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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If, in the first part of the Alice/Mayo analysis, we conclude that the
claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, they are considered
patent eligible under § 101 and the inquiry ends. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v.
CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2016). If the claims are
directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the second part in the Alice/Mayo
analysis is to consider the elements of the claims “individually and ‘as an
ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements
that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). In other words,
the second part is to “search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an element
or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (brackets in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 72–73). The prohibition against patenting an abstract idea
“‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a
particular technological environment’ or adding ‘insignificant postsolution
activity.’” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610–11 (2010) (internal citation
omitted).
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “Office”) has published
revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50–57 (Jan. 7,
2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, the Office first looks to whether
the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception
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into a practical application. See Guidance at 52, 54–55; see also MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, does the Office then
look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance at 56.
B. Application of Legal Principles
1. Step 2A of the Guidance
Prong 1: Do the Claims Recite an Abstract Idea
In applying the framework set out in Alice/Mayo, and as the first part
of that analysis, the Examiner concludes the claims are directed to the
abstract idea of allocating revenue from advertising. Final Act. 3–4.
According to the Examiner, the steps recited in claim 1 “describe the
concept of using advertising as an exchange or currency, which corresponds
to concepts identified as abstract by the courts.” Id. at 4 (citing
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
In challenging the Examiner’s determination that the claims recite an
abstract idea, Appellant argues that the Examiner “ignores the vast majority
of features recited in claim 1” and “improperly overgeneralizes the claims.”
Appeal Br. 7. According to Appellant, the Federal Circuit’s decision in
“Ultramercial does not support the alleged abstract idea of ‘allocating
revenue from advertising.’” Id. at 8; see Reply Br. 3–4.
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We evaluate the Examiner’s § 101 rejection by applying the
Guidance, which uses enumerated groupings of abstract ideas that are rooted
in U.S. Supreme Court precedent, as well as Federal Circuit decisions
interpreting that precedent. See Guidance at 51–52. By grouping the
abstract ideas, the Guidance synthesizes the holdings of various court
decisions to facilitate examination. The Guidance describes one category of
abstract ideas as including “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity”
such as “commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form
of contracts; legal obligations; advertising; marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations).” Id. at 52. We agree with the Examiner that
the claims recite steps that fall within the category of organizing human
activity (see Ans. 3–5), consistent with the Guidance. See Guidance at 52.
Appellant’s contention that the steps are not directed to organizing
human activity, such as commercial interactions, is not persuasive. As the
Guidance states, “commercial interactions” include “advertising.” See
Guidance at 52 n.13 (citing, inter alia, Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772
F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that a claim “describ[ing] only the
abstract idea of showing an advertisement before delivering content” is
patent ineligible)). Here, claim 1 recites the steps of “responsive to a user
selecting a digital content asset comprising an advertisement slot,
determining . . . a delivery platform;” “accessing . . . data correlating . . .
delivery platforms to one or more advertisements;” “determining . . . an
advertisement for the advertisement slot;” “inserting . . . the advertisement in
the advertisement slot;” “delivering . . . the determined advertisement
inserted in the advertisement slot;” “and determining . . . an allocation of
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revenue for the advertisement,” which all fall within the category of
organizing human activity, such as commercial interactions (advertising).
Thus, we find that the claims recite an abstract idea.
Prong 2: Do the Claims Integrate the Abstract
Idea Into a Practical Application
In accordance with Prong 2 of Step 2A of the Guidance, we evaluate
the claims to determine whether they recite additional elements beyond the
abstract idea, and, if so, we evaluate the additional elements to determine
whether they integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
Guidance at 54. The Guidance at page 55 provides exemplary
considerations, including whether an additional element:
• “reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or
an improvement to other technology or technical field”;
• “implements a judicial exception with, or uses a judicial
exception in conjunction with, a particular machine or
manufacture that is integral to the claim”;
• “effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article [or
thing] to a different state or thing”; or
• “applies or uses the judicial exception in some other meaningful
way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception
to a particular technological environment.”
The Guidance also highlights certain examples in which courts have
held that “a judicial exception has not been integrated into a practical
application,” such as where the claims “merely use[] a computer as a tool to
perform an abstract idea” or the additional element adds “insignificant extra-
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solution activity” to the abstract idea. Guidance at 55 (emphasis added); see
also October 2019 Update at 11–15.
The Examiner determines that the “claim recites the additional
limitations of a processor of a computing device.” Final Act. 4. Appellant
argues that the method of claim 1 reflects an improvement in the functioning
of a computer by solving the problem of delivering content assets across a
distributed set of access points, and improves upon prior methods for
determining advertisements. Reply Br. 4; see Appeal Br. 11–12.
We find the claims do not reflect an improvement in the functioning
of a computer or other technology or technical field. See Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 55; cf. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1090
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (“This invention makes the trader faster and more efficient,
not the computer. This is not a technical solution to a technical problem.”).
Further, we do not find Appellant’s arguments persuasive because the claims
utilize general purpose hardware, such as a processor of a computing device
and a delivery platform. See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327,
1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]e find it relevant to ask whether the claims
are directed to an improvement to computer functionality versus being
directed to an abstract idea . . . the focus of the claims is on the specific
asserted improvement in computer capabilities (i.e., the self-referential table
for a computer database) or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an
‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.”);
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d at 1370
(“[M]erely adding computer functionality to increase the speed or efficiency
of the process does not confer patent eligibility on an otherwise abstract
idea.”).
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We agree with the Examiner that the claimed additional elements
(e.g., a processor of a computing device, a delivery platform, and a device
associated with the user) encompass general purpose computer components
that merely provide conventional computer implementation. See Ans. 5
(citing Linehan, Fig. 1); see Spec. 16–19 (disclosing an exemplary
architecture of the invention as modules for performing functions). As the
U.S. Supreme Court has explained, “if a patent’s recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to ‘implemen[t]’ an abstract idea ‘on . . . a
computer,’ that addition cannot impart patent eligibility.” Alice, 573 U.S. at
223 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 84).
Consistent with the Examiner’s determination, we determine that the
claims do not include an improvement to another technology or technical
field or an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself; we also
find that the claims do not include a transformation of an article or
meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of an abstract idea
to a particular technological environment. See Ans. 3–6.
We conclude that the claims are directed to an abstract idea that is not
integrated into a practical application.
2. Step 2B of the Guidance – Do the Claims Recite Significantly More Than
the Abstract Idea
Regarding the second part of the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner
finds the elements of the claims, when considered individually or as an
ordered combination, do not recite significantly more than the abstract idea.
Final Act. 4–5. We agree with the Examiner that the claimed additional
elements (e.g., a processor of a computing device, a delivery platform, and a
device associated with the user) encompass general purpose computer
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components that perform well-understood, routine, and conventional steps,
and merely provide conventional computer implementation. See Ans. 5
(citing Linehan, Fig. 1); see Spec. 16–19 (disclosing an exemplary
architecture of the invention as modules for performing functions).
Here, the claim elements beyond the abstract idea, “at least one
processor of a computing device, a delivery platform,” and “a device
associated with the user,” where the processor performs “determining,”
“accessing,” “determining,” “inserting,” and “determining,” recite only
generic computer functions and components that are well-understood,
routine, and conventional, and do not convey an inventive concept. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. Appellant is reminded that in most cases, “relying on
a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is
insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.” OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 224
(holding that “use of a computer to create electronic records, track multiple
transactions, and issue simultaneous instructions” is not an inventive
concept)); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d 1363,
1370 (“[M]erely adding computer functionality to increase the speed or
efficiency of the process does not confer patent eligibility on an otherwise
abstract idea.”).
To the extent Appellant relies on the particular manipulation of data
recited as indicative of an inventive concept, we have determined above that
such steps amount to organizing human activity, which is categorized in the
Guidance as abstract ideas. Appellant is reminded that “the ‘inventive
concept’ [under the second part of the Mayo/Alice test] cannot be the
abstract idea itself” and “Berkheimer . . . leave[s] untouched the numerous
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cases from this court which have held claims ineligible because the only
alleged ‘inventive concept’ is the abstract idea.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890
F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring). “It has been clear
since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which
it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention
‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC v.
Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Further, as the
Federal Circuit has explained, a “claim for a new abstract idea is still an
abstract idea.” Synopsis, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138,
1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Even assuming the technique claimed was
“[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant,” that would not be enough
for the claimed abstract idea to be patent eligible. See Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013).
We determine that the components and functions recited in
Appellant’s claims do not add any meaningful limitations beyond generally
linking the abstract idea to the particular technological environment.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 40–52,
59–73, 75–82, and 85–89 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as patent-ineligible.

II. Section 103 rejections
We adopt the findings of fact made by the Examiner in the Final
Action and Examiner’s Answer as our own. We agree with the conclusions
reached by the Examiner for the reasons given in the Final Action and
Examiner’s Answer. We address the following arguments to complete the
record.
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Claim 1 recites “responsive to a user selecting a digital content asset
comprising an advertisement slot, determining, by at least one processor of a
computing device, a delivery platform, of a network comprising a plurality
of delivery platforms, via which the digital content asset was selected by the
user.” The Examiner finds that Appellant’s Specification “lack[s] any
specific definition of the term ‘platform,’” and that a channel of Anderson
teaches a “delivery platform” as claimed. Ans. 7–8 (citing Anderson 15:15–
27, Figs. 5 and 6). In contrast, Appellant contends that there is no
reasonable basis to interpret the claimed “delivery platform” to encompass
the channel disclosed by Anderson. Reply Br. 8.
Appellant asserts support for the claimed “delivery platform” in the
Specification’s disclosure of an access point to access content such as a
video. See Appeal Br. 3 (citing, inter alia, Spec. 9:7–12 (“[T]he audience
accesses the content [such as video] from many aggregator/distributor access
points.”). Appellant’s Specification gives an example of an access point as a
programming channel. See id. at 2:5–11 (an “access point” is, for example,
a “network, broadcast affiliate, or cable programming channel”). We agree
with the Examiner that Appellant’s Specification does not expressly define
the claimed “delivery platform,” but rather, gives non-limiting examples,
including a cable programming channel. See Ans. 7. We find that the
broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed “delivery platform,” read
in light of Appellant’s Specification, encompasses a channel. See In re
Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Absent an express definition
in their specification, the fact that appellants can point to definitions or
usages that conform to their interpretation does not make the PTO’s
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definition unreasonable when the PTO can point to other sources that
support its interpretation.”).
Appellant also contends that even if the claimed “delivery platform”
does encompass a channel, Anderson’s disclosure of a user viewing a
specific channel does not teach the claimed steps of “determining . . . a
delivery platform,” “accessing . . . data correlating each of the plurality of
delivery platforms to one or more advertisements,” and “determining [an
advertisement] based on the delivery platform [and] the accessed data.”
Appeal Br. 8–9. Appellant contends that Anderson lacks disclosure,
anywhere in the 78 columns or 51 drawing sheets of Anderson, of a digital
content asset being selected via a programming channel. Id. at 9.
We disagree. Anderson discloses selecting a sports program “digital
content asset” via a sports channel “delivery platform.” See Anderson,
69:66–70:12. Anderson discloses designating ads relating to men’s shaving
products, such as ads for razors and shaving cream, to the sports channel.
Id. We find that Anderson’s teaching of a user selecting a sports program
delivered on a sports channel, correlating the sports channel with ads for
men’s shaving products, determining, from the ads for men’s shaving
products, ads for razors and shaving cream, inserting the ads for razors and
shaving cream into the sports program, and delivering the sports program
along with the ads for razors and shaving cream, teaches the “selecting . . .
determining . . . accessing . . . determining . . . inserting . . . and delivering”
steps as claimed. Id.; see id. at Fig. 6, 15:48-51 (“[I]t is likely that different
users (such as 600-602 shown in Figure 6) will receive different
[advertisements] due to differences in classification parameters.”).
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We also find that the scope of the claimed “delivery platform”
encompasses customer premises equipment (CPE) such as a set top box as
taught by Anderson. The title of Anderson is “content selection based on
signaling from customer premises equipment in a broadcast network.”
Anderson teaches inserting assets into content, such as video programming,
according to specific audience classifications (e.g., gender, income level,
locale, or age). Anderson, Abstract. The CPE monitors channel selections
or video-on-demand selections of its user and determines a user profile of
classification parameters, using the monitored user selections and the
audience classifications. Id. at 3:11–28, 5:32–35. The classification
parameters are also associated with assets such as advertisements, so that an
asset can be delivered to a CPE user with matching classification
parameters. Id. at 3:31–38, 5:35–39, 14:50–15:15, 69:36–65.
For example, Figure 5 shows three different users each receiving the
same content, the movie of the week, but with different advertisement assets.
Id. at 15:16–24. In particular, along with receiving the movie, user 500
receives an ad for a digital music player, user 501 receives an ad for a luxury
car, and user 502 receives an ad for a minivan. Id. at 15:24–28. In this
manner, ads are better tailored to particular viewers of a given program who
fall into different demographic groups. Id. at 15:36–38; see id. at 74:3–63,
Figs. 39A and 39B.
The broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed “responsive to a
user selecting a digital content asset comprising an advertisement slot,
determining, by at least one processor of a computing device, a delivery
platform, of a network comprising a plurality of delivery platforms, via
which the digital content asset was selected by the user,” read in light of the
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Specification, encompasses a user using a set top box “delivery platform” to
select a movie (on a channel or on demand), and in response, determining,
by the system, the set top box and associated user profile as taught by
Anderson. We also find that the “accessing . . . determining . . . inserting . . .
and delivering” steps as claimed are taught by Anderson’s teaching of
accessing the user profile, determining an advertisement by matching
classification parameters from the user profile with classification parameters
of advertisements, inserting the advertisement into breaks in the movie, and
delivering the movie along with the advertisement to the user’s set top box.
See Anderson 3:8–38, 5:32–39, 14:50–15:40, 15:48–16:3, 74:3–63, Figs. 5,
6, 39A, and 39B.
Appellant contends that the cited art does not teach “determining . . .
an allocation of revenue for the advertisement between a party having
rights in the digital content asset and a party that contributed to the user
selecting the digital content asset” as claimed. Appeal Br. 17. We agree
with the Examiner that Linehan’s disclosure of providing payment to a cable
provider who is providing the broadcast, and providing a payment to the ad
agency responsible for the advertisement, teaches “determining . . . an
allocation of revenue for the advertisement between a party having rights in
the digital content asset and a party that contributed to the user selecting the
digital content asset” as claimed. See Ans. 10–11 (citing Linehan, Abstract).
Appellant contends that the Examiner did not articulate how the
combination of Linehan, Anderson, Herley, and Buchanan is supposed to
work. Appeal Br. 18. As discussed above, we find that Anderson teaches
the steps of the claimed method except for “determining, by the at least one
processor of the computing device, an allocation of revenue for the
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advertisement between a party having rights in the digital content asset and a
party that contributed to the user selecting the digital content asset,” which is
taught by Linehan. We find that the teachings of Herley and Buchanan are
cumulative to the teachings of Anderson. We agree with the Examiner that
adding the method of television commerce payments taught by Linehan to
the method of selecting content based on signaling from customer premises
equipment taught by Anderson yields the predictable benefit of allowing the
creators and distributors of advertisements delivered to Anderson’s customer
premises equipment to realize a profit. Ans. 12; Linehan, Abstract.
We sustain the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Claims
40–48, 60–73, 75–82, and 85–89, which were not separately argued, fall
with claim 1.

DECISION
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1, 40–52, 59–
73, 75–82, 85–
89
101 patent-ineligible 1, 40–52, 59–
73, 75–82,
85–89

1, 40–41, 44–
48, 60–62, 65–
69, 75, 77–79,
85–89
103 Linehan,
Anderson, Herley,
Buchanan
1, 40–41, 44–
48, 60–62,
65–69, 75,
77–79, 85–89

42, 43, 63, 64,
76
103 Linehan,
Anderson, Herley,
Buchanan, Yan
42, 43, 63, 64,
76

49–52, 70–73,
80–82
103 Linehan,
Anderson, Herley,
Buchanan, Fassett
49–52, 70–73,
80–82

Overall
Outcome
1, 40–52, 59–
73, 75–82,
85–89

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED