Hedison Manufacturing Company

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 2, 1982

260 N.L.R.B. 590 (N.L.R.B. 1982)

DECISIONS O)F NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Hedison Manufacturing Company and Rhode Island
Workers Union, Local 76, AFL-CIO, affiliated
with Service Employees International Union,
AFL-CIO. Cases I-CA-16694, 1-CA-16885,
and I1-CA-17038
March 2, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BYM I-MBI-.RS FANNING, JENKINS, ANI)
ZIMMI RMAN
On June 30, 1980, Administrative Law Judge
Charles M. Williamson issued the attached Deci-
sion in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
General Counsel filed a statement of limited excep-
tion and a memorandum of law to the Administra-
tive Law Judge. Subsequently, Respondent and the
Charging Party Union (hereinafter referred to as
the Union) filed a joint motion to modify the rec-
ommended Orders of the Administrative Law
Judges in this case and in Case 1-CA-15206, et al.
The General Counsel filed a response to that
motion.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs, and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,l and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge. The Board has considered the joint motion
to modify the Administrative Law Judge's recom-
mended Order, and the General Counsel's response
thereto, indicating that he does not oppose the
motion, and has decided to grant the motion and to
adopt the Administrative Law Judge's recommend-
ed Order as modified herein.
In their joint motion, Respondent and the Union
assert that, subsequent to the court's enforcement
of the Board's bargaining order in the earlier case
involving these parties,2 they have engaged in col-
t The record establishes that Christine Marcil was one of the employ-
ees whom Respondent unlawfully laid off on January 7, 1980 However,
apparently through inadvertence, Marcil's name does not appear on Ap-
pendix A to the Administrative Law Judge's Decision Accordingly. that
appendix is hereby amended to add the name Christine Marcil to the list
of employees laid off on January 7. 1980.
2 The Administrative Law Judge, as fully discussed in his attached De-
cision, concluded that Respondent violated Sec 8(a)(l) and (5) of the Act
by making certain unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employ-
ment, without first notifying the Union and giving it an opportunity to
bargain with Respondent about such changes In determining that Re-
spondent had an obligation to bargain with the Union about such matters.
the Administrative Law Judge relied on an earlier proceeding involving
these parties, in which the Administrative Law Judge therein recom-
mended, inter alia, the issuance of a bargaining order against Respondent
under the authority of N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575
(1969). At the time of the Administrative Law Judge's drafting of his in-
260 NLRB No. 76
lective bargaining with respect to both current
wages, hours, and working conditions, as well as
with respect to Respondent's unilateral layoffs and
changes in wages, hours, and working conditions
which the Administrative Law Judge found to be
unlawful in the instant case. Specifically, the Union
has retroactively agreed with Respondent to the
elimination of incentive rates, and they have fur-
ther agreed that such elimination did not result in
substantial detriment to unit employees. Additional-
ly, Respondent and the Union have agreed that the
layoffs in this case were based solely upon econom-
ic factors, and that no employment opportunities
existed at the time of the layoffs for the employees
who were laid off. Respondent and the Union have
also agreed that the laid-off employees need not
now be reinstated, and that no backpay is due
them.
Accordingly, Respondent and the Union jointly
move the Board to modify the Administrative Law
Judge's recommended Order by deleting para-
graphs 2(c) and (d) thereof. 3
In his response to the joint motion, the General
Counsel:
[D]oes not oppose the parties' Motion . . . and
agrees that, in light of the developments recit-
ed in the Joint Motion, modification of the
recommended orders as jointly moved will
serve to effectuate the purposes and policies of
the Act, and will not detract from the appro-
priateness of the remedy in the circumstances
of these cases.
Thus, the General Counsel withdrew its limited ex-
ception in the instant case, having to do with an
aspect of the remedy, on the grounds that, if the
joint motion is granted, the remedial issue raised by
the General Counsel's exception will be moot.
By their joint motion, Respondent and the Union
have, in effect, reached a settlement agreement in
resolution of certain remedial matters in this case.
The General Counsel has, in effect, endorsed that
settlement agreement. Accordingly, we hereby
grant the joint motion of Respondent and the
Union, and the Administrative Law Judge's recom-
mended Order is hereby modified accordingly.
stant Decision, the earlier Decision was before the Board on exceptions
from both Respondent and the General Counsel. The Board has subse-
quently rendered its decision in that case, affirming, inter alia, the Admin-
istrative Law Judge's finding therein that the Union has been the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in question
since January 12, 1978, and adopting his recommendation for issuance of
a Gissol bargaining order against Respondent Hedison Manufacturing
Company, 249 NLRB 791 (1980), enfd 643 F 2d 32 (Ist Cir 1981).
:1 Requiring Respondent to reinstate laid-off employees, and to make
them whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered as a result of
the layoff, and also requiring Respondent to make whole any employees
affected by the elimination of incentive wage rates
590
HEDISON MANUFACTUIRING CO.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
fied herein, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Hedison Manufacturing Company, Lincoln. Rhode
Island, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns.
shall take the action set forth in said recommended
Order, as so modified:
1. Delete paragraphs 2(c) and (d), and reletter
the subsequent paragraphs accordingly.
2. Substitute the attached notice marked Appen-
dix B for that of the Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEEI S
POSTEl) BY ORDER OF I HF
NATIONAL LABOR RILA1liONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu-
nity to present evidence and state their positions,
the National Labor Relations Board found that we
have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered us to post this notice.
WE WI.L NOT lay off employees without
notifying the Union and bargaining with the
Union respecting such layoffs and their impact
and implementation.
WE WILL NOT stop paying incentive pay-
ments without notifying the Union and bar-
gaining with the Union respecting the decision
to stop paying incentive payments and the
impact and implementation of such decision.
WE WILL NOT establish new reporting time
policies for employees unless we give notice
to, and bargain with, the Union.
WE Wll.L NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the Act.
HEDISON MANUFACTURING COMPANY
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CHARLES M. WIL LIAMSON, Administrative Law Judge:
Pursuant to charges and amended charges, filed on Octo-
ber 15, 1979, el seq., by Rhode Island Workers Union,
Local 76, AFL-CIO, affiliated with Service Employees
International Union, AFL-CIO, herein designated the
Charging Party, a consolidated complaint was issued by
Region I of the National Labor Relations Board on Feb-
ruary 14, 1980, alleging that Hedison Manufacturing
Company, herein designated Respondent, violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1), (3), (4), and (5) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. herein designated the Act, by the discharge
and layoff of certain of its employees, by its individual
bargaining with employees by its refusal to provide in-
formation to the Charging Party relevant to its collec-
tive-bargaining tasks, and by its unilateral changes in the
working conditions of its employees.
The hearing took place in Boston. Massachusetts, on
April 23, 1980.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due considera-
tion of the brief filed by the General Counsel' and the
oral argument of Respondent's counsel, I make the fol-
lowing: 2
FINDINGS O( F.ACT
1. JURISDICTION
Respondent has been, at all times material herein, a
corporation organized under the laws of the State of
Rhode Island. At all times material herein, Respondent
has maintained its principal office and place of business
in Lincoln, Rhode Island, where it is engaged in the
manufacture, sale, and distribution of jewelry and related
products. Respondent annually receives directly, from
points and places outside the State of Rhode Island.
goods having a value in excess of $50,000. During the
same period of time, Respondent ships goods valued in
excess of $50,000 directly to points and places outside
the State of Rhode Island. Respondent admits, and I
find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
Respondent admits, and I find, that the Charging
Party is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
111. THli REPRSFSENTATIVE STATUS OF THE CHARGIN(;
PARTY
To show the representative status of the Charging
Party, the General Counsel relies on a Decision issued
on May 18, 1979, by Administrative Law Judge Benja-
min Schlesinger in Cases I-CA-14050, 1-CA-14085, I-
CA 14086, 1-CA-14273, 1-CA-14274, I-CA-14600, and
I-RC-15542 (249 NLRB 791, 799-832). In that case, Ad-
ministrative Law Judge Schlesinger determined that an
order to bargain was necessary to remedy Respondent's
violations of the Act. The unit found appropriate3 was:
This term is used to designate counsel for the General Counsel
2 Case I-CA-16885 was severed from its companion cases by my
ruling at the hearing Immediately following severance, Respondent and
the Charging Party entered into an out-of-Board settlement with the ap-
prov.l (of the Regional Office. I therefore do not make any findings with
regard to the discharge of employee Marilyn Jellison. alleged to have
been in violation of Sec 8(aH I). (3). and (4) of the Act, nor ws ith regard
to Respondent's failure to provide the Charging Party with certain infor-
mation regarding Jellison's discharge, alleged to hase been in siolation of
Sec. 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act These allegations directly involved pars
8 I and 18 20 of the consolidated complaints and, indirectly, portions of
conclusionar) pars 22 26
" Taken from the "Notice to Employees" attached as an appendix to
the Board's Decision (See 249 NLRB 791 )
591
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
All full-time and regular part-time production
and maintenance employees employed by us at our
11 Wellington Road, Lincoln, Rhode Island and 116
Chestnut Street, Providence, Rhode Island facilities,
including leadpersons-floor ladies and plant clerical
employees, but excluding all office clerical employ-
ees, technical employees, professional employees,
salespersons, seasonal employees, guards, foremen,
assistant foremen and all other supervisors as de-
fined by the National Labor Relations Act.
Administrative Law Judge Schlesinger found the collec-
tive-bargaining obligation to have arisen on January 12,
1978, the date on which the Charging Party attained ma-
jority status. Respondent had already "embarked on a
clear course of unlawful conduct" by that date. (249
NLRB 791.) Administrative Law Judge Schlesinger's
Decision is presently before the Board on Respondent's
exceptions. The Board has not, as of the time this Deci-
sion is being written, ruled on the validity of Administra-
tive Law Judge Schlesinger's findings.
IV. THE AI.LEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Piece Rate Wages and the Layoffs
The parties entered into the following stipulations at
the hearing:
(1) On Thursday, August 2, 1979, "Respondent
eliminated its incentive program involving the
paying of piece rate wages in addition to hourly
rate wages. The departments affected by the elimi-
nation of this program are as follows: Cardage,
wrapping, linking/gluing, press, stringing and rack-
ing, joyal soldering, torch soldering, torch soldering
setup, oven soldering setup and fusion department
. . prior to the change all employees involved had
a base hourly rate and could earn a percentage in-
centive rate based on production above a minimum
set hourly production rate which was set for each
operation within each department. After the change
employees were paid on the basis of an hourly wage
rate alone. The hourly rates of all employees affect-
ed by the change were adjusted after the change by
the Respondent to partially compensate for the
elimination of the piece rate wages . . . the elimina-
tion of the piece rate wages was done without noti-
fying the Union or giving the Union an opportunity
to bargain over the change or its effects."
(2) The parties stipulated "that as indicated on
Joint Exhibit[s] 1, 2 and 3, on January 2, 1980, Jan-
uary 7, 1980, and January 8, 1980, Respondent laid
off approximately, a total of approximately 77 em-
ployees as listed by departments in the Joint Exhib-
its. ... That this was out of a total number of em-
ployees in the unit prior to the layoff of approxi-
mately 215 employees. That this was done by Re-
spondent by reverse order of seniority within the
departments. That Respondent hired no new em-
ployees in the departments affected by the layoff
between January 2, 1980, and January 9, 1980. That
General Counsel is not contending that the January
2, January 7 or January 8, 1980, layoffs were other
than economically motivated and that the layoffs
were done by Respondent without notifying the
Union or affording the Union the opportunity to
bargain about the layoffs including the method of
implementation or its impact prior to instituting the
layoffs."
B. Starting Time
The General Counsel presented witnesses Joseph Pine
and Marilyn Jellison to testify concerning an alleged
change by Respondent in the morning time employees
were required to be at their work stations. Pine testified
that around the beginning of August 1979 Supervisor
Donald Banks called the employees in the plating depart-
ment to a meeting. Pine stated that Banks told the em-
ployees that "because employees were being late getting
to their departments that we had to be in our depart-
ments 5 minutes ahead of schedule, because of people
being late getting to the departments." Following Banks'
announcement, Pine testified, an additional bell was rung
at 7:25 a.m., 5 minutes ahead of the previous 7:30 a.m.
starting time bell. After the institution of this system, the
employees, who had normally lingered in the plant cafe-
teria until the 7:30 a.m. bell, started leaving the cafeteria
at the 7:25 a.m. bell.4
In the latter part of August 1979, Pine had occasion to
speak with Production Manager Don Fontaine about the
change in morning reporting. Pine had received a verbal
warning for being late and inquired of Fontaine as to the
proper procedure and the exact dates on which he had
been late. During their conversation, Fontaine stated,
"You guys are supposed to be in the plating room 5 min-
utes ahead of time." 5 No evidence was presented to
show that any employee was disciplined or warned for
violating the new procedure. The rule was not reduced
to writing and was not, therefore, posted on the bulletin
boards. Pine testified that the new rule had an apprecia-
ble effect on the break time employees had previously
enjoyed in the cafeteria.
Marilyn Jellison testified that the change involved a
new requirement that employees were to be in their de-
partments "5 minutes before the starting time which was
7:30." Following the change, Jellison stated, employees
who had previously lingered in the cafeteria until 7:30
a.m. began leaving at 7:25 a.m.
The parties stipulated that prior to the institution of
the new procedure "that at no time . . . was the Union
notified or afforded an opportunity to bargain about any
change in a report for work time."
Respondent presented William H. O'Brien, Jr., its
former vice president of operations, to testify concerning
the alleged reporting time change. O'Brien testified that
in August 1979 he became concerned because he ob-
served employees lingering in large numbers on the way
4 Pine testified that "a few . stayed in the cafeteria but mostly ev-
erybody went to their departments."
I All parties agree that the warnings received by Pine were unrelated
to the new procedure for reporting to work. An employee was account-
ed "late" if he began working more than 3 minutes after 7:30 a m The
latter rule has not changed.
592
HEDISON MANUFACTURING CO.
to work in the morning and congregating in the cafete-
ria. He stated that this situation had resulted in an in-
crease of reported latenesses. To remedy the situation he
instructed Respondent's foremen "to speak to the em-
ployees in their departments and bring to their attention
that 7:30 was the start of the work day, not of the begin-
ning of breaking up the congregating that was going on
in the corridors and the cafeteria. So that employees
would be aware of the fact that they should be at their
work stations at 7:30 or at the official end of their lunch
break, we would put in a 5 minute warning bell to let
people know you have 5 minutes to clean up, finish up
your gab sessions with your fellow employees and be
ready to go to work at the start of the official work
day." O'Brien specifically denied that his instructions to
the foremen contemplated that employees would have to
be in their respective departments 5 minutes prior to the
7:30 a.m. starting time. O'Brien admitted, however, that
he did not know of his own knowledge what the fore-
men may have told the employees. He stated that he had
never discussed the matter with the foremen following
the initial announcement. 6 Following the institution of
the new system, O'Brien testified, the lingering by em-
ployees "cut down probably 90 percent immediately."
V. ANAI YSIS AND CONCL USIONS7
All parties agree, and I find, that the result in the in-
stant case hinges on the Board's Decision in Case 1-CA-
14050, et al. If the Board finds in the earlier case that Re-
spondent was obligated to bargain with the Charging
Party on and after January 12, 1978,8 the Charging Party
possesses the requisite representative status in this case. If
the Board finds in the earlier case that Respondent was
not obligated to bargain, then the complaint in the case
at bar should be dismissed.
In order to expedite the Decision in this case, I will
assume, without deciding, that Administrative Law
Judge Schlesinger's Decision in Case 1-CA-14050, et al.,
is correct. See Local Union No. 103, International Associ-
ation of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers,
AFL-CIO. and its agent Charles Tremper (Associated Gen-
eral Contractors of America, Evansville Chapter, Inc.), 195
NLRB 980, 981-984 (1972).
The stipulations of the parties make it clear that the
layoffs of January 1980 and the termination of incentive
pay were imposed by Respondent without prior notice
to, and bargaining with, the Charging Party. Respond-
ent, by virtue of the bargaining order granted by Admin-
istrative Law Judge Schlesinger, was contemporaneously
6 Neither Banks nor any other foreman testified about the institution of
the new reporting time requirement. Banks, who was no longer in Re-
spondent's employ at the time of the hearing, was contacted during the
hearing by counsel for Respondent and the General Counsel. They re-
ported that Banks had no recollection and could not "offer any testimony
he knows of."
I The General Counsel moved to withdraw par. 16 of the consolidated
complaint. This paragraph alleges that Respondent bargained on an indi-
vidual basis with employees I granted the General Counsel's motion.
' Or at any date prior to the changes outlined in this Decision Admin-
istrative Law Judge Schlesinger found that there was a request to bargain
made of Respondent by the Charging Party on January I, 1978 Re-
spondent refused on January 13, 1978 Cf Beasley Energy. Inc., d/b/a
Peaker Run Coal Company. Ohio Division, 228 NL RB 93 (1977).
under a duty to bargain with the Charging Party. The
failure to do so constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the Act because these items involved terms
and conditions of employment of employees in the bar-
gaining unit. N.L.R.B. v. Benne Katz, etc. d/b/a Wil-
liamsburg Steel Products Co., 369 U.S. 736 (1962); Well-
man Industries, Inc., 222 NLRB 204, 206 (1976) (layoffs
and reductions in pay). That Respondent may have been
economically motivated in its decision does not, in this
instance, affect its duties under the statute. Wellman In-
dustries, Inc., supra.
The situation is less clear as to the morning starting
time change. Respondent's position is that starting time
remained 7:30 a.m. and that there was no change in the
rules governing lateness. The only change to which Re-
spondent admits is the addition of a warning bell at 7:25
a.m. Respondent further argues that there are no sanc-
tions for violation of the supposed new "rule" and that
no employee has been disciplined on the basis of the rule.
Respondent's position depends, in large measure, on the
testimony of O'Brien who was not, in fact, a witness to
the announcements to employees concerning this matter
by Respondent's lower level supervision. Respondent
presented no evidence or witnesses as to the actual an-
nouncements made to employees. 9
The failure to bring before the tribunal some cir-
cumstance, document, or witness when either the
party himself or his opponent claims that the facts
would thereby be elucidated, serves to indicate as
the most natural inference, that the party fears to do
so, and this fear is some evidence that the circum-
stance or document or witness, if brought, would
have exposed facts unfavorable to the party. [2
Wigmore, Evidence §285 (3d ed. 1940).]
See also Interstate Circuit. Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S.
208, 226 (1939): "The production of weak evidence when
strong is available can lead only to the conclusion that
the strong would have been adverse." I find that Re-
spondent's failure to present any supervisory or manage-
rial individual who was involved in making the an-
nouncements to employees concerning the reporting time
change gives rise to the inference that their testimony
would not have been favorable to Respondent.' ° Ac-
cordingly, I find, as Pine testified, that Respondent re-
quired its employees to be in their departments 5 minutes
earlier than had been the practice. Crediting both Pine
a While Respondent made an effort to contact Banks. the parties
agreed that Banks had no recollection of his role in this matter Under
the circumstances, I find Pine's testimony to be undenied and I credit it
The various matters adduced by Respondent on cross-examination of
Pine concerning the circumstances of his leaving Respondent's employ
are not sufficient to cause rejection of his testimony.
'o While it might he argued that such individuals were equally availa-
ble to the General Counsel, such a view appears contrary to the weight
authority. "Available" in this sense implies more than mere physical pres-
ence or accessibility for service of a subpena The potential witness' con-
nection with one or another of the parties and a party's superior knowl-
edge of what testimony might be elicited play a role. Here. the supervi-
sory or managerial individual's close connection with Respondent tip the
scales in fa'or af drawing the inference See 2 Wigmore. Evidence §288
(3d ed 1977 supp )
593
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and Jellison " as to the effect of the new rule on em-
ployee practices and habits at the morning hour, I find
that the rule had a substantial effect on the employees'
working conditions as it substantially diminished their
prior practice of relaxation and refreshment in the cafete-
ria prior to starting work. Whatever O'Brien may have
stated to Respondent's supervisors at the meeting to
which he testified, it is clear, on this record, that Re-
spondent's supervisors instructed employees to be in
their respective departments prior to starting time. 2
While it is true, as Respondent argues, that no sanc-
tions were announced and that there is no evidence that
employees have been disciplined because of this change,
I do not find that these considerations are dispositive of
the issue. Employees must be presumed to place great
weight on the express wishes of their employer even in
the absence of express sanctions designed to enforce
those wishes. Such regard for the employer's wishes in-
evitably results in such modifications of behavior as ex-
hibited by the employees in the instant case. These em-
ployees no longer enjoy the free time previously spent in
the cafeteria. The Board has affirmed an Administrative
Law Judge's Decision finding a violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) under similar circumstances even in the
absence of evidence that the rule change was enforced.
See Electri-Flex Company, 238 NLRB 713 (1978).'3
Accordingly, I find that Respondent, by its announced
change in morning reporting practice, violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
CONCI.USIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Charging Party is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All full-time and regular part-time production and
maintenance employees of Respondent employed at its
11 Wellington Road, Lincoln, Rhode Island and 116
Chestnut Street, Providence, Rhode Island facilities, ex-
cluding all office clerical employees, technical employ-
ees, professional employees, salespersons, seasonal em-
ployees, guards, foremen, assistant foremen, all other su-
pervisors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act, consti-
tute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. On or about January 12, 1978, and at all times mate-
rial thereafter, the Union represented a majority of em-
ployees in the appropriate unit, and has been the exclu-
sive representative of said employees for the purpose of
1 Respondent's cross-examination of Jellison regarding her lease of
absence does not, in my view, affect the credibility of her testimony.
Jellison testified that Lisa Nadeau, floorlady in the press department, told
the employees that "Dick Corrigan, the foreman, had told her [Nadeau]
to tell us to be there 5 minutes ahead of time." I put no weight on this
assertion because floorladies are included in the appropriate unit found by
Administrative Law Judge Schlesinger and are, therefore, not supervi-
sors. The statement is hearsay as to Corrigan.
12 Pine testified, and I credit him, that the change applied to the whole
plant.
1-a Victor Patino and Nydia Patino. Victor Patino and Yyvdia Patina d/b/a
Jean Pier, Richard Erquiaga d/b/a California Sewing, 241 NLRH 774
(1979), cited by the General Counsel, does appear to be in point because
the question of enforcement was not specifically discussed in the opinion
by Administrative L aw Judge Irving Rogosin.
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a)
of the Act.
5. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the Act by unilaterally eliminating incentive payment of
piece rate wages in its Cardage, wrapping,
linking/gluing, press, stringing and racking, joyal solder-
ing, torch soldering, torch soldering setup, oven solder-
ing setup, and fusion department; unilaterally laying off a
total of 77 employees on January 2, 7, and 8, 198014; and
unilaterally instituting a new reporting time procedure
for its employees.
6. The foregoing unfair labor practices, occurring in
connection with the operations of Respondent described
in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial
relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States and tend to lead to labor disputes, burden-
ing and obstructing commerce and the free flow of com-
merce.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order Re-
spondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take cer-
tain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
Having found that Respondent laid off the employees
named in Appendix A [omitted from publication] of this
Decision in violation of the Act, I shall recommend that
it be ordered to offer immediate and full reinstatement to
each of them to their former positions, or, if those posi-
tions are no longer available, to substantially equivalent
positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights and privileges. Respondent shall make each of
them whole for any loss of earningsl5 which he or she
may have sustained as a result of Respondent's unlawful
conduct, less interim earnings, if any. The amount of
backpay shall be computed in the manner set forth in F.
W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), together
with interest thereon as computed in the manner pre-
scribed in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651
(1977).
I find that Respondent's unilateral elimination of incen-
tive payments in its departments named above has caused
monetary loss to employees in those departments. Ac-
cordingly, I shall recommend that those employees be
made whole for such losses in the manner set forth
above for employees affected by the January 1980 lay-
offs.
Having found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the Act by unilaterally establishing a new
'4 The employees laid off on these dates are listed in Appendix A
[omitted from publication] of this Decision The appendix is based on Jt.
Exhs 1, 2. and 3
5r It is possible, as a result of Respondents economic condition, that
no employmenit opportunity exists or existed for the employees in Appen-
dix A [omitted from publication] and that they have sustained no com-
pensable loss of earnings as a result of the January 1980 layoffs If this be
the case. Respondent will have its opportunity to demonstrate these facts
in a compliance proceeding if the parties cannot agree. Ramos Iron
WorLs. Inc and Rasol Engineering, 234 NLRB 896. 906 (1978); Wellman
Industries Inc, supra.
594
HEDISON MANUFACTURING CO.
policy concerning reporting time, I shall recommend that
such policy be rescinded and withdrawn.
I find that Respondent has a proclivity to violate the
Act and has engaged in such egregious and widespread
misconduct as to demonstrate a general disregard for its
employees' fundamental statutory rights. In reaching this
conclusion I have taken account of the numerous viola-
tions found by Administrative Law Judge Schlesinger in
Case 1-CA-14050. et al., as well as the fact that the
three violations found in the instant case affect the entire
complement of Respondent's employees. I shall therefore
issue a broad injunctive order against Respondent. Hick-
mott Foods, Inc., 242 NLRB 1357 (1979). Cf. Pier 29,
d/b/a The Ark, 244 NLRB 198 (1979). My use of Ad-
ministrative Law Judge Schlesinger's Decision in this
regard assumes, of course, that exceptions to it have been
filed and that the Board will substantially affirm it. See
Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Local No.
70, etc. (H. A. Carney and David Thompson, Partners,
d/b/a C & T Trucking Co.), 191 NLRB 11 (1971), affd.
sub nom. Bob's Casing Crews, Inc. v. .NL.R.B., 458 F.2d
1301 (5th Cir. 1972).
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recom-
mended:
ORDER 16
The Respondent, Hedison Manufacturing Co., Lincoln,
Rhode Island, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Laying off employees, or eliminating incentive pay-
ments, without first bargaining with the Union about the
decision and its effects.
(b) Unilaterally establishing a new reporting time
policy without notice to and bargaining with the Union.
(c) Taking any other action affecting the wages, hours,
or terms and conditions of employment of employees in
the appropriate bargaining unit without first notifying
and consulting with the Union.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request of the Union, rescind the layoffs of
January 2, 7, and 8, 1980; the unilateral elimination of in-
centive payments; and the reporting time policy.
'6 In the event no exceptions are filed a, provided by Sec 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of Ihe National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein, shall, as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations. be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes
(b) Upon request by the Union, bargain collectively
with the Union with respect to the decision to lay off
employees; bargain collectively with the Union with re-
spect to the impact and effects of such layoff; bargain
collectively with the Union with respect to the decision
to eliminate incentive wages and the impact and effect of
such decision; bargain collectively with the Union con-
cerning reporting time rules; and, if an understanding is
reached with the Union, reduce to writing and sign such
agreement, if requested by the Union.
(c) Offer to each employee laid off on January 2, 7,
and 8, 1980, if it has not already done so, immediate and
full reinstatement to his or her former job, or, if that job
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent job, with-
out prejudice to his or her seniority or other rights and
privileges, and make each of said laid-off employee and
those employees affected by the elimination of incentive
wages whole in the manner provided above in the sec-
tion of the Decision entitled "The Remedy" for any loss
of pay he or she may have suffered from the date of his
or her unlawful layoff or the termination of incentive
wages.
(d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, and personnel records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this recom-
mended Order.
(e) Post at Respondent's places of business in lincoln
and Providence, Rhode Island, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix B." " Copies of said notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 1,
after duly being signed by Respondent's representatives,
shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained by Respondent for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including Re-
spondent's bulletin boards and any other places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this
Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
with it.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dis-
missed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act other
than those here found.' 8
" In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Ciourt of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order (of the National Labor Relations Board."
'" Certain errors in the transcript are hereby noted and corrected
595