Health Care Workers Union Local 250 (Trinity House)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 26, 2004

341 N.L.R.B. 1034 (N.L.R.B. 2004)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1034
Health Care Workers Union, Local 250, Service Em-
ployees International Union, AFL–CIO and
Catholic Pioneer Church d/b/a Trinity House.
Case 32–CB–5562
May 26, 2004
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND WALSH
On November 13, 2003, Administrative Law Judge
John J. McCarrick issued the attached decision. The
Respondent Union filed exceptions and a supporting
brief, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders the Respondent, Health Care
Workers Union, Local 250, Service Employees Interna-
tional Union, AFL–CIO, its officers, agents, and repre-
sentatives, to take the action set forth in the Order as
modified.
1. Insert the following as paragraph 2(a).
“(a) Execute the August 5, 2002 draft collective-
bargaining agreement modified to conform to the No-
vember 1, 2001 through October 30, 2004 effective dates
agreed to by the parties.”
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
2 In compiling the comprehensive agreement that it mailed to the
Union on August 5, 2002, the Employer erred in failing to include the
correct effective dates that had been specifically agreed to by the par-
ties. The judge’s recommended Order requiring the Union to sign the
August 5 draft failed to correct this technical error. Accordingly, we
have modified the judge’s recommended Order and notice to accurately
reflect the effective dates agreed to by the parties (November 1, 2001,
through October 30, 2004).
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist any union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf
with your employer
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT refuse to execute the terms of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement embodied in the August 5,
2002 draft prepared by Cathedral Pioneer Church d/b/a
Trinity House, amended to be effective from November
1, 2001, through October 30, 2004.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or
coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL execute the terms of the collective-bargaining
agreement embodied in the August 5, 2002 draft pre-
pared by Cathedral Pioneer Church d/b/a Trinity House,
amended to be effective from November 1, 2001,
through October 30, 2004.

HEALTH CARE WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 250,
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION,
AFL–CIO

Gary M. Connaughton, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Shirley Lee, Esq. (Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld), of Oakland,
California, for the Respondent.
Treavor K. Hodson, Esq. (Palmer, Kazanjian & Holden), of
Sacramento, California, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN J. MCCARRICK, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Sacramento, California, on August 19 and 20,
2003, upon the General Counsel’s complaint1 that alleged
Health Care Workers Union, Local 250, Service Employees
International Union, AFL–CIO (Respondent) violated Section
8(b)(3) of the Act by refusing to sign an agreed-upon collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with Cathedral Pioneer Church d/b/a
Trinity House (Employer). Respondent timely denied any
1 At the hearing counsel for the General Counsel moved to amend
the complaint at par. 8b to allege June 20, 2002, and par. 9 to allege
August 5, 2002. The amendments were granted.
341 NLRB No. 137
HEALTH CARE WORKERS LOCAL 250 (TRINITY HOUSE) 1035
wrongdoing.2 On the entire record, including my observation
of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the
briefs filed by the parties, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Employer, a California corporation, with an office and
place of business in Sacramento, California, has been engaged
in the business of operating a skilled nursing facility. During
the past 12 months, the Employer, in conducting its business
operations, derived gross revenues in excess of $100,000 and
purchased and received goods or services valued in excess of
$5000 which originated from points outside the State of Cali-
fornia. Respondent admits and I find the Employer is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. Respondent further admits and I
find that it is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
1. Introduction
Since 1998, Respondent has been certified as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the Employer’s employ-
ees located at its Sacramento, California facility including:

Certified nursing assistants, assisted living aides, dietary,
maintenance, housekeeping, and laundry department employ-
ees and the assistant activity director, excluding all registered
nurses, licensed vocational nurses, receptionists, medical re-
cords directors, confidential and administrative personnel,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.

Respondent and the Employer were parties to a collective-
bargaining agreement (Agreement) effective November 1,
2000, through October 31, 2001.3 On October 25, 2001, the
parties entered into a contract extension4 extending the Agree-
ment to November 30, 2001.
The parties entered into negotiations for a successor contract
on September 18, 2001. There were a total of 12 bargaining
sessions between September 18, 2001, and June 20, 2002.5
From September 18, 2001, until January 17, 2002, the Em-
ployer’s chief negotiator was Attorney Floyd Palmer (Palmer).
After Palmer’s death in January 2002, his partner, Larry Kazan-
jian (Kazanjian), became the Employer’s chief negotiator on
April 3, 2002. Respondent’s chief negotiator was Respondent’s
assistant director, convalescent division, Arnold Sails (Sails).
Carol Black (Black), Respondent’s field representative assisted
Sails. The sole issue for resolution is whether Respondent

2 At the hearing Respondent admitted pars. 2(b) and (c), 3, and 5 of
the complaint.
3 GC Exh. 2.
4 GC Exh. 3.
5 The parties stipulated the dates of the bargaining sessions were
September 18, October 8, 17, 23, and 31, November 9, December 10,
2001, and January 11 and 17, April 3, May 3, and June 20, 2002.
unlawfully refused to execute an agreed-upon collective-
bargaining agreement.
2. The bargaining sessions
a. The initial bargaining

At the parties’ first bargaining meeting on September 18,
2001, both parties submitted their proposals.6 From the outset
the Employer sought numerous changes in the Agreement,
including elimination of the union-security clause and pream-
ble. At the October 8, 2001 meeting, the Employer submitted a
proposed collective-bargaining agreement7 and the Respondent
offered its counterproposals.8 There were two tentative agree-
ments on jury duty and leave of absence. There was a Federal
Mediator at the October 17, 2001 bargaining session. From the
Respondent’s bargaining notes of October 17,9 it is clear that
all proposals were still on the table. The October 23, 2001
bargaining session resulted in the 1-month contract extension
mentioned above. The October 31, 2001 bargaining meeting
resulted in no agreements. At the November 9, 2001 session,
the Employer presented its last, best, and final offer (LBFO).10
Respondent told the Employer it would take the LBFO to the
membership but would recommend its rejection. The Employer
said that if the LBFO was not ratified by December 1, 2001, it
would be implemented. The Employer indicated that it was not
willing to bargain further if Respondent did not change its posi-
tion. On November 19, 2001, the membership rejected the
Employer’s LBFO.
b. The January 2002 bargaining
At the January 11, 2002 bargaining session, Respondent pre-
sented a proposal11 that the parties deal with only four issues:
wages, term of agreement, health and welfare, and pension.
After Palmer rejected Respondent’s proposal, Respondent made
a counterproposal to the Employer’s LBFO of November 9,
2001.12 However, there were no new agreements reached at
the January 11, 2002 session.
The January 17, 2002 bargaining session is critical since the
Respondent contends that the Employer agreed to drop all out-
standing proposals if Respondent would bargain over wages,
health and welfare, pension, grievance, access, and term of
agreement. Sails stated that during the January 17 meeting, the
mediator brought Respondent a proposal from the Employer
that if the Union agreed that only health and welfare, wages,
grievance procedure, term of agreement, access, and pension
remained on the table for negotiation all other issues would
remain as in the expired contract.13 However, contrary to Re-
spondent’s contention in its brief, Black testified that the pro-
posal the mediator brought from the Employer to Respondent
6 R. Exhs. 4 and 6.
7 R. Exh. 9.
8 R. Exh. 8.
9 R. Exh. 10
10 GC Exh. 4.
11 R. Exh. 14.
12 R. Exh. 16.
13 Tr. at 274.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1036
was that the Employer would drop all their outstanding propos-
als if the Union agreed to the Employer’s proposed wages,
health and welfare, pension, and term of agreement.14 Black’s
testimony is corroborated by her contemporaneous handwritten
notes of the January 17 bargaining session. The pertinent por-
tion of Black’s notes for the January 17 bargaining session
provide:

Mediator w/ ER position:

Willing to drop all if—wages as ER proposes

-disc. griev/access

-ER prop on H & W

-Pension no money toward pension

-term 2 run from date of ratification not Oct. 31, 2001

-HW remain as is for ER

only item w/ discuss per Union proposal is the term w/ their
date of ratification15

Contrary to Respondent’s position stated in its brief, a further
notation in Black’s January 17 bargaining notes reflects Re-
spondent’s position that it would only consider the issues the
Employer demanded the Union to concede as proposals:

Union-No problem w/ dealing w/ these as proposals negoti-
ated by the parties and all other items off the table.16

I do not credit Sails version of the Employer’s January 17,
2002 proposal. Sails was not credible. He had no independent
recollection of the facts and had to have his memory refreshed
repeatedly by Respondent’s counsel. Moreover, his testimony
is contradicted by both Black’s testimony and her contempora-
neous bargaining notes. Further, the Employer had already
rejected a similar proposal from Respondent on January 11,
2002. I find that the Employer proposed that it would drop all
their outstanding proposals if the Union agreed to the Em-
ployer’s proposed wages, health and welfare, pension, and term
of agreement.
It is clear from both the Respondent’s bargaining notes and
from the testimony of Carol Black that the Respondent rejected
the Employer’s proposal by submitting its own counterpropos-
als17 on the subjects of wages, health and welfare, term of
agreement, and pension.
c. The April, May, and June 2002 bargaining
Due to the death of the Employer’s chief negotiator, Floyd
Palmer, there was a hiatus in bargaining until April 2002. The
parties again met on April 3, 2002, with Kazanjian as the Em-
ployer’s chief negotiator. Kazanjian reviewed where the parties
stood on April 3 and upon which items they had tentative

14 Tr. at 186–187 and 256–259.
15 R. Exh. 17 at 1.
16 Id. at 2.
17 R. Exh. 18 and GC Exh. 5.
agreements. Kazanjian stated that the November LBFO, as
modified by subsequent tentative agreements, was the Em-
ployer’s bargaining position. While Black stated that Kazan-
jian said the Employer was still in agreement to bargain only on
wages, health and welfare, pension, grievance, access, and term
of agreement, there is nothing in her bargaining notes of April
3, 2002,18 that corroborates her testimony. In fact the Respon-
dent’s April 3, 2002 bargaining notes reflect that the Employer
consistently stated that their proposals were based on the No-
vember 9, 2001 last, best, and final offer.19 I do not credit
Black’s testimony.
The next meeting took place on May 3, 2002. The Respon-
dent provided its counterproposals20 and the Employer pre-
sented its handwritten last, best, and final offer.21 This was not
a complete document and referred only to Respondent’s last
counteroffer. However, the handwritten document indicated
that all previous tentative agreements were to be integrated into
a final contract to be provided to the Respondent. A list of
tentative agreements was prepared.22
When Respondent had not received the Employer’s May 3,
2002 offer by the morning of May 7, 2002, Black called Kazan-
jian’s office between 9 and 10 a.m. and left a message that
Respondent needed the Employer’s last, best, and final offer to
present to its members for a ratification vote that day. In re-
sponse, the Employer had the last, best, and final offer hand-
delivered to Respondent at about 11:23 a.m. that day.23 The
May 7 last, best, and final offer (LBFO) was a combination of
the November 9 LBFO, the counterproposals in the Employer’s
May 3, 2002 handwritten offer, together with the additional
tentative agreements the parties had reached in the interim as
reflected in General Counsel’s Exhibit 11.
By letter dated May 9, 2002, Respondent advised the Em-
ployer that the membership had rejected the Employer’s May 7,
2002 LBFO. On May 13, 2002, the Employer advised Respon-
dent that they were at impasse and stated that it would imple-
ment the May 7, 2002 LBFO.
Notwithstanding the Employer’s position, the parties met
again on June 20, 2002, and engaged in bargaining. Respon-
dent presented additional proposals24 and the parties reached
tentative agreement on two additional issues. The Employer
indicated it would implement its May 7, 2002 LBFO together
with the two new tentative agreements on June 27, 2002. The
Respondent agreed to present the May 7 LBFO with the two
additional tentative agreements to its membership. At no time
during this meeting did either Sails or Black raise any issue
about the terms of the Employer’s May 7, 2002 LBFO.
On June 26 Respondent presented its members with a sum-
mary of what it thought was the agreed-upon terms of the col-
lective-bargaining agreement.25 However, the terms of agree-
ment presented to the members were markedly different from
18 R. Exh. 19.
19 Id.
20 GC Exh. 6.
21 GC Exh. 9.
22 GC Exh. 10.
23 GC Exhs. 11 and 12.
24 R. Exhs. 15 and 16.
25 R. Exh. 22.

HEALTH CARE WORKERS LOCAL 250 (TRINITY HOUSE) 1037
that which Respondent had agreed on in bargaining. On July 1,
2002, Respondent advised the Employer that the membership
had ratified the Employer’s offer. On August 5, 2002, the Em-
ployer forwarded to Respondent the proposed collective-
bargaining agreement consisting of the Employer’s May 7
LBFO together with the two tentative agreements reached on
June 20.26
Having received no signed agreement from Respondent, on
October 2, 2002, the Employer sent Respondent another copy
of the August 5, 2002 proposed agreement. However, Respon-
dent failed to execute the agreement.
There was no contact from Respondent until December 6,
2002, when Respondent sent its version of the collective-
bargaining agreement to the Employer, which included inter
alia a union-security clause.27 By letter dated December 18,
2002, the Employer advised Respondent that its version of the
collective-bargaining agreement was unacceptable and did not
represent the agreement the parties had reached and which was
ratified by Respondent’s members.
The parties met on January 30, 2003, to discuss differences
between the two draft agreements. Sails said he was there to
negotiate a contract. Kazanjian said that there had been a last,
best, and final offer agreed to by the parties and there were no
further negotiations to be had. He left the meeting. There have
been no further negotiations and Respondent has not executed
the August 5, 2002 draft agreement.
B. The Analysis
The General Counsel and the Charging Party contend that
Respondent refused to execute the August 5, 2002 draft agree-
ment after reaching a clear and unambiguous assent to the Em-
ployer’s last offer. Respondent contends that there is no con-
tract because there was no “meeting of the minds” by the par-
ties concerning the terms of the August 5, 2002 agreement.
1. The law
Section 8(d) of the Act requires parties to bargain in good
faith, which includes “the execution of a written contract incor-
porating any agreement reached if requested by either party.”
Either an employer or a labor organization violates the Act if it
refuses to sign a collective-bargaining agreement incorporating
terms agreed to by the parties during negotiations. H. J. Heinz
Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941); Hospital Employees Local
1199 (Lenox Hill Hospital), 296 NLRB 322 (1989).
The question of whether the parties had reached agreement
on June 20, 2002, as embodied in the August 5, 2002 draft
agreement depends on whether they reached a “meeting of the
minds” on the terms of the August 5 draft document. Diplomat
Envelope Corp., 263 NLRB 525, 535–536 (1982); and Ebon
Services, 298 NLRB 219, 223 (1990). Subjective misunder-
standings or misunderstandings as to the meaning of terms
which have been agreed to are irrelevant, provided that the
terms themselves are unambiguous judged by a reasonable
standard. Ebon Services, supra. The Board is not strictly
bound by the technical rules of contact law in deciding whether,
in light of all the circumstances, the employer and the union

26 GC Exh. 18.
27 GC Exh. 19.
have arrived at an agreement, which must be reduced to writing
and executed by the parties. Kelly’s Private Car Service, 289
NLRB 30 (1988).
It is well established that the formation of a binding contract
may be affected by a mistake. Thus, a contract may be avoided
on the ground of mutual mistake of fact where the mistake is
common to both parties and by reason of it each has done what
neither intended. 17 Am.Jur. 2d, § 146 at 490.
If the situation herein is viewed as one of unilateral mistake,
then there is considerable authority to the effect that if in the
expression of the intention of one of the parties to an alleged
contract, there is error, and that error is unknown to, and unsus-
pected by, the other party, that which was so expressed by the
one party and agreed to by the other is a valid and binding con-
tract, which the party not in error may enforce. In other words,
a party to a contract cannot avoid it on the ground that he made
a mistake where there has been no misrepresentation, there is
no ambiguity in the terms of the contract, and the other contrac-
tor has no notice of such mistake and acts in perfect good faith.
17 Am.Jur. 2d, § 146 at 492–493.
The Board has held that rescission for unilateral mistake is,
for obvious reasons, a carefully guarded remedy reserved for
those instances where the mistake is so obvious as to put the
other party on notice of an error. Apache Powder Co., 223
NLRB 191 (1976).
2. The discussion
I am persuaded, after reviewing the law applicable to the
facts of this case that the General Counsel has established that
the parties had a “meeting of the minds” and reached agreement
on the terms and conditions of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment on June 20, 2002. In reaching my conclusion I note that
both parties were represented by skilled negotiators, that the
parties had the assistance of a mediator at many sessions and
that the parties exchanged written proposals and counterpro-
posals. It is clear that at all times from November 9, 2001, on,
the Employer negotiated from its LBFO as modified by subse-
quent tentative agreements, including the May 7, 2002 LBFO.
The June 20, 2002 agreement, as embodied in the August 5,
2002 draft document, represented the parties’ final agreement,
which Respondent’s membership ratified.
The January 17, 2002 bargaining session is the lynchpin of
Respondent’s defense that there was no agreement reached.
Respondent argues that there was no “meeting of the minds”
concerning a collective-bargaining agreement since the Union
agreed at the January 17 session that only specific topics would
be “on the table” for negotiations and that all other issues
would remain as they were in the previous Agreement. Hence,
Respondent argues it believed that the Employer’s May 7
LBFO, other than the items dealing with wages, health and
welfare, pension, and term of agreement, included all other
terms as provided in the previous Agreement. However, this
position is not supported by the evidence.
Respondent’s bargaining notes reflect that the Employer’s
January 17 proposal made the Union’s acceptance of the Em-
ployer’s terms for wages, health and welfare, pension, and term
of agreement the quid pro quo for the Employer dropping all of
its other proposals. It is not credible to argue that the Employer

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1038
acquiesced to all of Respondent’s other proposals in exchange
for Respondent’s mere promise to bargain regarding wages,
health and welfare, pension, grievance, access, and term of
agreement. The Employer would have gained nothing from
this position. On January 12, 2002, the Employer’s had just
rejected Respondent’s proposal to bargain only the issues of
wages, term of agreement, health and welfare, and pension. It
was Respondent who rejected the Employer’s offer to limit
bargaining by refusing to accept the Employer’s terms regard-
ing wages, health and welfare, pension, and term of agreement.
There was no confusion or misunderstanding on the part of
Respondent regarding the issues that were on the table. More-
over, the Employer has consistently taken the position that it
was bargaining from the terms of the November 9 LBFO, a
comprehensive set of proposals that changed many of the pro-
visions of the previous Agreement. The Employer reiterated at
the April 3, 2002 bargaining session that its position on the
issues was the November 9 LBFO. Again Respondent can have
no reasonable doubt that the Employer’s position on May 3,
2002, as embodied in its May 7 LBFO, included numerous
changes to the previous Agreement. Since May 7, 2002, Re-
spondent had in its possession a comprehensive draft document
that represented the Employer’s last, best, and final offer,
which modified substantial portions of the previous Agreement.
The agreement reached on June 20, 2002, and ratified by Re-
spondent’s members, represented the May 7 LBFO together
with two additional tentative agreements. At no time from May
7 until December 6, 2002, did Respondent dispute the terms of
the draft agreements the Employer provided. I find that the
terms of the Employer’s final offer of June 20 are clear and
unambiguous.
Moreover, there is no evidence that there was either a mutual
or unilateral mistake as to the terms of the June 20 agreement.
The evidence establishes that the Employer’s final offer to Re-
spondent on June 20 was clear and unambiguous. There was
no basis for a mutual misunderstanding as to the Employer’s
final offer. There was no fact or issue upon which both Re-
spondent and the Employer were in error nor did both do what
neither intended. The Employer made no mistake concerning
the terms of its final offer. Assuming arguendo there was a
misunderstanding, it was unilateral on the part of Respondent.
However, Respondent has no basis to argue its mistake voided
the contract since there was no misrepresentation by the Em-
ployer, no ambiguity in the terms or the Employer’s final offer,
no notice to the Employer of Respondent’s misunderstanding
until months after the membership ratified the agreement and
no evidence that the Employer acted in bad faith. Respondent’s
misunderstanding was based on its subjective misunderstanding
of the contents of the Employer’s offer unknown to the Em-
ployer and not on its face so palpable as to put a person of rea-
sonable intelligence on their guard. Apache Powder Co., supra
at 195.
On the basis of the foregoing, I conclude that Respondent
has violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act by refusing to execute
the August 5, 2002 agreement.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Cathedral Pioneer Church d/b/a Trinity House is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Health Care Workers Union, Local 250, Service Employ-
ees International Union, AFL–CIO is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The following employees of the Employer constitute a
unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:

All full time and regular part-time certified nursing assistants,
assisted living aides, dietary, maintenance, housekeeping, and
laundry employees, and assistant activity directors employed
by the Employer at its 2701 Capital Avenue, Sacramento,
California facility; excluding all other employees, registered
nurses, licensed vocational nurses, receptionists, medical re-
cords directors, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.

4. At all times material, Respondent has been the exclusive
representative of all the employees in the above-described unit
for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By refusing since on or about August 5, 2002, to execute
the agreed-upon collective-bargaining agreement embodied in
the August 5, 2002 draft document, Respondent has been, and
is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(b)(3) of the Act.
6. The unfair labor practices affect commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act, I
shall recommend it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action designated to effectuate the policies of the
Act. Respondent shall be ordered to execute the August 5,
2002 draft agreement.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, I issue the
following recommended28
ORDER
The Respondent, Health Care Workers Union, Local 250,
Service Employees International Union, AFL–CIO, its officers,
agents, representatives, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to execute the August 5, 2002 draft collective-
bargaining agreement.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.

28 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.

HEALTH CARE WORKERS LOCAL 250 (TRINITY HOUSE) 1039
(a) Execute the August 5, 2002 draft collective-bargaining
agreement.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its un-
ion office in Sacramento, California, copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix.”29 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 32, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be

29 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that during the pendency of these proceedings, Respondent has
gone out of business or closed its offices, Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current and former employees employed by the Employer at
any time since February 3, 2003.
(c) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient copies
of the notice for posting by the Employer, if willing, at all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps Re-
spondent has taken to comply.