HEADWATER PARTNERS I LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 31, 2020

13802483 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 31, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/802,483 03/13/2013 Gregory G. Raleigh RALEP063 2594
106963 7590 07/31/2020
Headwater Research LLC
1011 Pruitt Place
Tyler, TX 75703
EXAMINER
MUHEBBULLAH, SAJEDA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2141
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/31/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patent@headwaterllc.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte GREGORY G. RALEIGH and
JAMES LAVINE
____________________

Appeal 2019-001059
Application 13/802,483
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before JENNIFER S. BISK, JENNIFER L. McKEOWN, and
JULIET MITCHELL DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judges.

DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 seeks review of the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–6, 8, 14, 16–21, and 26–27. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 This Decision uses the following abbreviations: “Spec.” for the original
Specification, filed March 13, 2013, which claims the benefit of earlier filed
applications (see Spec. ¶¶ 1–48); “Final Act.” for the Final Office Action,
mailed June 13, 2017; “Appeal Br.” for Appellant’s Supplemental Appeal
Brief, filed May 14, 2018; “Ans.” for Examiner’s Answer, mailed Sept. 21,
2018; and “Reply Br.” for Appellant’s Reply Brief, filed Nov. 20, 2018.
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, the real party in interest is
Headwater Research, LLC. Appeal Br. 3.
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BACKGROUND
Appellant’s disclosed embodiments and claimed invention relate to a
mobile device that attempts to connect to a network activation element for a
cellular network via that cellular network and via a WiFi connection. Spec.
¶ 50. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A method performed by a wireless device, the method
comprising:
attempting to connect to a network activation element for
a cellular network via communication with a base station for the
cellular network, using a first device credential recognizable by
the network activation element, to obtain information to assist
in presenting an on-device user service plan selection choice
through a user interface of the wireless device;
determining that the wireless device is not authorized to
connect to the network activation element over the cellular
network; and
in response to determining that the wireless device is not
authorized to connect to the network activation element over
the cellular network, automatically attempting to connect to the
network activation element over an available WiFi connection.
Appeal Br. 18 (Claims App.) (emphases added).3
REJECTIONS
R1. Claims 1, 6, 14, 16–17, 19–21, and 26–27 stand rejected under
pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over White (US 2006/0035631 A1,

3 In this Decision, we refer to: “attempting to connect . . .” as the “first
attempt limitation”; “determining that the wireless device is not authorized
. . .” as the “determining limitation”; and “in response to determining . . .” as
the “second attempt limitation.”
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published Feb. 16, 2006) and Harmon (US 2009/0047989 A1, published
Feb. 19, 2009). Final Act. 3–6.
R2. Claims 2 and 8 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over White, Harmon, and Salmela (US 2009/0217364
A1, published Aug. 27, 2009). Final Act. 6–7.
R3. Claims 3–4 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over White, Harmon, and Zimmerman (US 2009/0061839 A1,
published Mar. 5, 2009). Final Act. 7–8.
R4. Claim 5 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over White, Harmon, Zimmerman, and Smires (US 2009/0046707
A1, published Feb. 19, 2009). Final Act. 8.
R5. Claim 18 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over White, Harmon, and Macaluso (US 7,865,182 B2, issued Jan.
4, 2011). Final Act. 8–9.
ANALYSIS
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments
for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence
presented. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for
emphasis in our analysis below.
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Obviousness Rejection R1 of Claims 1, 6, 14, 16–17, 19–21, and 26–27
Claims 1, 6, 14, 16–17, 19–21, and 26–27 stand rejected as obvious
over White and Harmon. Final Act. 3–6. Appellant presents arguments
directed to independent claim 1 and separately addresses dependent claims 6
and 16. See Appeal Br. 11–14. Therefore, consistent with the provisions of
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we limit our discussion to claims 1, 6, and 16.
Independent claims 26–27 and dependent claims 14, 17, and 19–21 stand or
fall with claim 1.
Independent Claim 1
The Examiner pointed to White for the first attempt limitation, finding
that White’s mobile device attempts to connect to a network activation
element via an appropriate base station using the device’s IMSI4 (which
maps to the claimed “first device credential”). Final Act. 3–4 (citing White
¶¶ 35, 39, 43). For the determining and second attempt limitations, the
Examiner pointed to Harmon. Id. at 2–4. Specifically, the Examiner found
that Harmon’s mobile device connects to a web browser over a WiFi
connection when a cellular connection cannot be established. Id. 3–4 (citing
Harmon ¶ 63, Fig. 14C). In the Answer, the Examiner also found that White
checks to see if the mobile device is authorized to connect, and that White
discloses activation via either the cellular network or WiFi. Ans. 9–10
(citing White ¶¶ 17, 31, Fig. 5). Finally, the Examiner explained that it
would have been obvious to attempt a connection over WiFi if the device
was unable to connect via the cellular network. Final Act. 4; Ans. 10.

4 An “IMSI” is an international mobile subscriber identifier. White ¶ 35;
accord Spec. ¶ 61.
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Appellant presents various arguments alleging the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1 is in error. Appeal Br. 11–14; Reply Br. 2–5. We first
address the arguments that appear to dispute the Examiner’s factual findings
regarding the disclosure of White and Harmon. Next, we address
Appellant’s arguments that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not
have been motivated to combine the references.
Factual Findings Regarding Claim Limitations
First, Appellant appears to argue that White fails to teach or suggest
the first attempt limitation because White does not describe a connection
attempt that uses “a first device credential recognizable by the network
activation element,” as required by claim 1. See Appeal Br. 11–12. In
particular, Appellant argues that White does not “contemplate any situation
where the network activation element could recognize the credential, but the
cellular network will not authorize a connection.” Id. at 11. Rather,
according to Appellant, in White, “any credential recognizable by the
network allows the connection.” Id. at 12.
We are not persuaded by these arguments. White’s mobile device
selects “the most appropriate base station and sends a message (including the
IMSI) to this base station to register or affiliate to the network of the service
provider.” White ¶ 39; see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 35, 39, 42–43. We find that the
attempt by White’s device to send this message through the cellular
network—whether or not there is a match for the IMSI (see id. ¶ 42)—
discloses the first attempt limitation. We also find that White’s IMSI
discloses the claimed “device credential recognizable by the network
activation element.” See Final Act. 3–4 (making same finding).
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Appellant does not sufficiently explain its argument that an IMSI is
not “recognizable.” See Appeal Br. 11–12 (quoting White ¶ 42); see also id.
at 14 (stating that White’s IMSI cannot be the claimed “first device
credential” because “White would have found the IMSI in an HLR and
authorized connection”); cf. Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App.) (claim 16)
(specifying that the claimed device credential may be an IMSI). For
example, even if an IMSI does not appear in White’s HLR, the IMSI is still
“recognizable,” under the broadest reasonable interpretation of that term.5
See, e.g., White ¶ 38 (describing sequence of codes in an IMSI). Appellant
identifies (and we perceive) no passage of the Specification that provides a
more narrow meaning for this term.
Second, Appellant appears to argue that the references fail to teach the
determining limitation. Appeal Br. 12. In the Final Office Action, the
Examiner found this limitation disclosed by Harmon:
Harmon does teach the “determining that the wireless device is
not authorized to connect” thru the teaching of a cellular
network not being available as seen in the first step of Fig. 14C
in Harmon then in response providing available WiFi networks
for the user to attempt connection to.

5 During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation when reading claim language in light of the specification as it
would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under this standard,
we interpret claim terms using “the broadest reasonable meaning of the
words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of
ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way
of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description
contained in the applicant’s specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048,
1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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Final Act. 3 (citing Harmon ¶ 63, Fig. 14C). In response, Appellant quotes
from Harmon and states that the reference “merely teaches that when a
user’s cellular connection is not available for a user Web activity, the device
asks the user whether they would like to use an available WiFi connection
instead.” Appeal Br. 12.
We are not persuaded of Examiner error because Appellant fails to
address the Examiner’s findings or explain why those findings are allegedly
unclear or unsupported. In particular, Appellant appears to agree that
Harmon determines that a wireless device cannot connect to the cellular
network (see Appeal Br. 12), and Appellant fails to explain why this does
not teach or suggest the determining limitation, under the broadest
reasonable interpretation of that phrase.6 Indeed, Appellant’s Specification
further supports the Examiner’s factual finding, as it describes determining
that a device cannot connect to the cellular network. E.g., Spec. ¶ 65 (“In
some embodiments, the wireless access network is not available to the
device for some other reason. . . . If the wireless access network is
unavailable or if the device is not permitted to communicate with the
wireless access network, then the activation agent detects the condition that

6 In the Reply Brief, Appellant addresses the Examiner’s finding for the first
time, contending that the Examiner’s finding was first articulated in the
Answer. Reply Br. 2 (citing Ans. 9). This is incorrect—the Examiner
included the quoted finding, verbatim, in the Final Office Action. Compare
Ans. 9, with Final Act. 3. As a result, we do not consider Appellant’s
belated arguments. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2) (“Any argument raised in
the reply brief which was not raised in the appeal brief, or is not responsive
to an argument raised in the examiner’s answer . . . will not be considered by
the Board for purposes of the present appeal, unless good cause is shown.”).
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the device cannot communicate with the activation server over the wireless
access network.”); see also, e.g., id. ¶¶ 56, 66.
Moreover, we further find that the determining limitation is expressly
taught by White and also is suggested by White. White ¶ 42, Fig. 5, block
503 (determining whether the mobile device is authorized to access the
activation element); see id. White ¶ 39 (explaining that device “chooses the
most appropriate base station” and suggesting that network determines
whether device registered with that network); see also, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 59, 69,
73, 75 (wireless device may provide credentials to the network to determine
if it is authorized to gain access to the wireless network).
Third, Appellant argues that the references fail to teach an “automatic
activation re-route procedure as claimed”7 because “Harmon merely asks a
user if they want to select an available [WiFi] hotspot.” Appeal Br. 13; see
Reply Br. 5 (contending that the Examiner “ignores the manual process
disclosed” in Harmon).
We are not persuaded of Examiner error. Harmon discloses that if
cellular service cannot be established, the mobile device checks for available
WiFi networks. Harmon ¶ 63. If detected, “the user can be presented with a
choice to connect to one of these networks.” Id. Appellant appears to argue
that, because the user is presented with a choice, the device does not
“automatically” attempt to connect. See Appeal Br. 13; Reply Br. 5.
However, even if we were persuaded by Appellant’s interpretation of the
term “automatic[],” we would not be persuaded of error in the Examiner’s

7 We understand Appellant to be referencing the second attempt limitation,
which recites “automatically attempting to connect . . . over an available
WiFi connection.” Appeal Br. 18 (Claims App.).
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rejection. First, Appellant does not explain why the device’s query to the
user does not qualify as “attempting to connect . . . over an available WiFi
connection”—indeed, Harmon’s device is attempting to connect over WiFi
and, as part of that process, requires user permission. Alternatively, Harmon
states that the user can be presented with an option (Harmon ¶ 63), and
Appellant does not explain why a process that does not provide such an
option would not have been obvious in light of this disclosure. See MPEP
§ 2144.04 (automating a manual activity normally requires only ordinary
skill).
Accordingly, Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of error in the
Examiner’s factual findings that White and Harmon teach or suggest the
disputed limitations of claim 1.
Motivation to Combine References
In addition, Appellant argues that the limitations of claim 1 would not
have been obvious given the disclosures of White and Harmon. See
generally Appeal Br. 12–14; Reply Br. 2–6. We have considered each of
Appellant’s arguments, and we are not persuaded by them.
First, Appellant’s arguments erroneously assume that the White-
Harmon combination must describe a device that successfully sends a
connection request to a base station. See, e.g., Appeal Br. 13 (arguing that
“[i]n the claimed scenario, Harmon would detect that a cellular connection is
available and never drop . . . to the WiFi hotspot inquiry”). Claim 1 includes
no such requirement—rather, it simply requires that a wireless device
“attempt[] to connect to a network activation element . . . via
communication with a base station for the cellular network.” Appeal Br. 18
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(Claims App.) (emphasis added). Appellant identifies (and we perceive) no
limitation in the claim requiring that the device successfully sends a
connection request to a base station, or receives a response from the base
station. Further, Appellant identifies (and we perceive) no disclosure in the
Specification that would support such a requirement.
Second, Appellant’s arguments erroneously assume that the White-
Harmon combination must describe a device that is “admissible” to the
cellular network (e.g., the device is registered with the network) but yet not
“authorized” to connect over that network. See, e.g., Appeal Br. 11
(contending that, in White, “[a]ll devices that could be activated are also
admissible to the network”). Claim 1 also fails to include this requirement—
rather, it requires that a wireless device first “attempt[] to connect . . . via
communication with a base station for the cellular network, using a first
device credential recognizable by the network activation element” and then
“determin[e] that [it] is not authorized to connect . . . over the cellular
network.” Appeal Br. 18 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). Appellant
identifies (and we perceive) no limitation in the claim requiring that the
device be known to the network activation element (or “admissible” to it),
and Appellant identifies (and we perceive) no justification in the
Specification for importing such a limitation into the claim. See Ans. 10
(noting that the Specification “does not say anything about how using WiFi
somehow gives authorization to connect to the network activation element
instead of cellular service” (emphasis omitted)).
Third, contrary to Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 12–13), there is
no requirement that either reference recognize the problem addressed by the
invention. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007) (a
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reference need not address the same problem as the invention); In re Heck,
699 F.2d 1331, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting references can be used for
more than what the patentee described as its invention).
Appellant’s remaining arguments do not persuade us of error in the
Examiner’s conclusion that claim 1 would have been obvious to a person of
ordinary skill in the art in light of the White-Harmon combination. We
agree with the Examiner that the combination of references teach or suggest
all limitations of the claim. See Final Act. 2–4; Ans. 9–10. We provide the
following findings and explanation to further support and explain the
Examiner’s rejection.
White describes “activation of a mobile device by an end user” from
the mobile device itself. White, Abst. White’s mobile device sends a
request for access that includes a permanent identifier, such as an IMSI, to
the “most appropriate base station.” Id. at Abst., ¶¶ 35, 39. “If the network
recognizes the device as being inactive, it allows access to the activation
network.” Id. ¶ 39; see also id. ¶ 42 (“[I]f there is no match of the
permanent identifier, the routine 500 sends an error message to the mobile
device (block 505) and then ends.”). In addition, White specifies that the
activation may be accomplished via a cellular network and/or a WiFi
network. Id. ¶¶ 17, 23, 31, Figs. 1–2; accord Ans. 9–10 (citing White ¶¶ 17,
31, Fig. 5). In either case (i.e., via the cellular network or a WiFi network),
the mobile device communicates with an activation component to “facilitate
the activation of the mobile device.” White ¶ 33; see id. ¶ 43 (describing
activation process). White teaches most limitations of claim 1, but White
does not explain when the mobile device should use the cellular network
versus the WiFi network, and White does not explain what the mobile device
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should do if it does not locate an “appropriate base station” (White ¶ 39),
such as when it is out of range of the network.
However, Harmon provides this missing disclosure. In particular,
Harmon describes a mobile device that “automatically and transparently
access[es] Internet and other media or information services, via cellular
network access points including rollover to WiFi, WiMax, or other data
networks, upon need or demand.” Harmon ¶ 4. Harmon’s mobile device
first “check[s] whether a connection is possible via the user’s associated
cellular carrier”—“If a cellular connection cannot be established, then WiFi
module 1200 can check if any WiFi networks can be detected.” Harmon
¶ 63. “If a WiFi network . . . is detected, the user can be presented with a
choice to connect to one of these networks,” and if so, “the connection can
be made and the Web browser program can be launched.”8 Id.
The Examiner explained, and we agree, that it would be obvious to
supplement White with Harmon in order to specify that White’s device
should attempt to connect via the WiFi network if a connection could not be
accomplished via the cellular network. Final Act. 4; Ans. 10 (“Therefore, it
is obvious to use the ‘if no cellular, then try WiFi’ method from Harmon.”
(citing Harmon ¶ 63)). Appellant identifies no errors or inaccuracies in the
Examiner’s rationale, does not contend the Examiner’s proposals are beyond
the level of skill of one of ordinary skill in the art, and does not submit that
the White-Harmon combination would yield undesirable, unpredictable, or

8 Indeed, White also discloses use of the web for its activation procedure.
White ¶ 32 (“For example, the activation component 208 may include access
to a web site or to another feature that allows the user to provide activation
information.”), p. 7 (claim 14 specifying that WiFi network provides access
to “an activation web site”).
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unexpected results. Thus, we agree with the Examiner that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would have found the limitations of claim 1 to be
obvious based on the combined disclosures of White and Harmon.
Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not
persuaded of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art
combination to teach or suggest the limitations of claim 1, nor do we find
error in the Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
independent claim 1, as well as independent claims 26–27 and dependent
claims 14, 17, and 19–21, which fall therewith.
Dependent Claim 6
For dependent claim 6, Appellant reiterates one of its prior arguments
regarding the deficiencies of the Harmon-White combination. Compare
Appeal Br. 14, with id. at 13. Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive for
the reasons provided above for independent claim 1.
Moreover, Appellant fails to identify the claim language that is
allegedly not taught by the references, and Appellant fails to address the
Examiner’s findings or explain why those findings are allegedly unclear or
unsupported. See Appeal Br. 14 (characterizing Harmon and simply
concluding that “[t]he references do not suggest that a user connect to a
WiFi network so that cellular service can be initiated, or a later
automatically attempted activation connection once WiFi is found and
connected”). Appellant’s argument does not show examiner error. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“The arguments shall explain why the examiner
erred as to each ground of rejection contested by appellant.”).
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Accordingly, Appellant fails to show error in the Examiner’s factual
findings or the conclusion of obviousness of dependent claim 6, and we
sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of this claim.
Dependent Claim 16
For dependent claim 16, Appellant repeats one of the arguments
regarding White’s disclosure, advanced in the discussion of independent
claim 1. Compare Appeal Br. 14, with id. at 11–12.
As discussed above with respect to independent claim 1, Appellant’s
arguments are not persuasive. Consequently, Appellant fails to show error
in the Examiner’s factual findings or the conclusion of obviousness of
dependent claim 16, and we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
this claim.
Obviousness Rejection R2 of Claims 2 and 8
Dependent claims 2 and 8 stand rejected as obvious over White,
Harmon, and Salmela. Final Act. 6–7. Appellant argues these claims as a
group (see Appeal Br. 15–16), and so we limit our discussion to dependent
claim 2. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Claim 2 depends from claim 1. The Examiner found that the most of
the additionally recited limitations are taught by Harmon and White, and the
Examiner pointed to Salmela as teaching “receiving a second device
credential from the network activation element.” Final Act. 6 (citing
Harmon ¶ 63; White ¶ 43; Salmela ¶¶ 25, 28, 31, 35). The Examiner found
that it would have been obvious to add Salmela’s second device credential to
the White-Harmon combination “in order to access the network for initial
activation or renewal in case of expiration.” Id. (citing Salmela ¶ 8).
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Appellant alleges that the rejection is in error because “combining
Salmela with White and Harmon suggests, at most, a modification of White
such that multiple cellular credentials could be attempted for RAN [radio
access network] connection when White’s mobile device attempts
connection to White’s network and activation server.” Appeal Br. 15
(emphasis added). Appellant further states, “Nothing in the references
suggests to one skilled in the art to automatically use non-cellular radios to
solve a cellular activation problem, or supplying different device credentials
from the network.” Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error. First,
Appellant does not identify any claim limitations that are allegedly not
taught by one of these references, and Appellant does not dispute the
Examiner’s factual findings. See generally Appeal Br. 15–16. As a result,
Appellant fails to demonstrate error in any of the factual findings in the
rejection. Second, Appellant does not persuade us that the Examiner’s
conclusion of obviousness was erroneous. In particular, Appellant identifies
no errors or inaccuracies in this rationale, does not contend the Examiner’s
proposals are beyond the level of skill of one of ordinary skill in the art, and
does not submit that the combination of references would yield undesirable,
unpredictable, or unexpected results. Rather, Appellant merely asserts that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the combination
more narrowly than the Examiner, without specifically responding to the
Examiner’s rationale. See Appeal Br. 15–16. On this record, after
considering the references and Appellant’s arguments, we agree with the
Examiner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have found obvious
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the limitations additionally recited in dependent claim 2 in light of the
proposed combination.
Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not
persuaded of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art
combination to teach or suggest the limitations of claim 2, nor do we find
error in the Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 2
and claim 8, which falls therewith.
Obviousness Rejections R3–R5 of Claims 3–5 and 18
The Examiner rejects claims 3–5 and 18 over a combination of White,
Harmon, and one or more of Zimmerman, Smires, and Macaluso. Final Act.
7–9. For each of these claims, Appellant relies on the same arguments made
with respect to claim 1 and contends that the additionally cited references do
not cure the deficiencies previously identified. Appeal Br. 16–17.
As discussed above with respect to independent claim 1, Appellant’s
arguments are not persuasive. Consequently, Appellant fails to show error
in the Examiner’s factual findings and the conclusion of obviousness of
claims 3–5 and 18.
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CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 6, 14, 16–
17, 19–21,
26–27
103 White, Harmon 1, 6, 14, 16–
17, 19–21,
26–27

2, 8 103 White, Harmon,
Salmela
2, 8
3–4 103 White, Harmon,
Zimmerman
3–4
5 103 White, Harmon,
Zimmerman,
Smires
5
18 103 White, Harmon,
Macaluso
18
Overall
Outcome
1–6, 8, 14,
16–21, 26–
27

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED