Harvard Folding Box Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 14, 1984

273 N.L.R.B. 1031 (N.L.R.B. 1984)

HARVARD FOLDING BOX CO. 1031
Harvard Folding Box Co., Inc. and Boston Local
No. 600, Graphic Arts International Union,
AFL-CIO-CLC. Case 1-CA-17917
14 December 1984
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS ZIMMERMAN, HUNTER, AND
DENNIS
On 4 March 1982 Administrative Law Judge
Walter H. Maloney Jr. issued the attached decision.
The General Counsel and the Respondent filed ex-
ceptions and supporting briefs, and the Respondent
filed a brief in answer to the General Counsel's ex-
ceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and
conclusions, 2 except as modified below, and to
adopt the recommended Order as modified.3
We agree with the judge's conclusions that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5), (3), and (1) of
the Act by unilaterally instituting a formalized pro-
' The Respondent has excepted to sonic of the judge's credibility find-
ings The Board's established policy is riot to overrule an administrative
law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all
the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard Dry
Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951)
We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing
the findings
The Respondent also alleges bias on the part of the judge based solely
on the judge's reference to one of the Respondent's witnesses, whose tes-
timony on a particular matter was not found worthy of belief, as having
"botched his lines badly" We find this allegation to be totally without
merit
2 In finding that the Respondent discrimmatonly discharged employee
Lewis in violation of Sec 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, we rely on the fol-
lowing reasons, as well as those set forth by the judge Lewis was a well-
known, active union supporter who had been identified as the employees'
likely choice for union steward He had never been warned about his at-
tendance While other discharged employees were permitted to return if
their foreman agreed, Lewis was told it would be futile to seek reinstate-
ment because Ross, the Respondent's manager, did not want Lewis work-
ing for him Ross, who apparently made the decision to discharge Lewis,
did not ordinarily participate in such decisions (Both Ross and another
of the Respondent's witnesses, McGee, each testified that he made the
decision to terminate Lewis Such inc onsistent testimony lends further
support to the judge's finding of unlawful motive ) Finally, the Respond-
ent threatened to and did fire another vocal union activist, Maden, and
discharged Lewis within days of the Union's certification as the employ-
ees' collective-bargaining representative
Having adopted the judge's conclusion that employee Lewis was dis-
cnmmatonly discharged in violation of Sec 8(a)(3) of the Act, Members
Hunter and Dennis deem It unnecessary to reach the question as to
whether Lewis' discharge also violated Sec 8(a)(4) In their view, such a
finding would be cumulative
For the reasons stated by the judge, Member Zimmerman would find
the additional violation He considers such a finding necessary, in apply-
ing the Board's remedial powers, to fully restore the status quo ante
3 Certain inadvertent errors in the judge's decision have been noted
and corrected
We also correct the judge's erroneous finding that Lewis missed eight
Mondays in 1980 The accurate figure is 12 to 13 Mondays
gressive disciplinary system based on discriminato-
ry consideration and by unilaterally promulgating
an employee handbook which, among other things,
memorialized that system and invited employees to
take unresolved grievances directly to representa-
tives of management, thereby circumventing the
newly certified Union with whom it has a statutory
duty to bargain.4
We disagree, however, with the judge's finding
that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act by granting a wage increase. This
violation was not alleged in the complaint, argued
at the hearing, or urged in the General Counsel's
brief to the judge. Thus, because the Respondent
was deprived of notice and an opportunity to liti-
gate the issue, we reverse the judge's finding that
the Respondent thereby committed an unfair labor
practice. See Cardivan Co., 271 NLRB 563 (1984).5
Having found that the Respondent disciplined
employees in accordance with its unilaterally insti-
tuted progressive disciplinary system, discussed
above, the judge recommended, among other
things, that the Respondent be required to make
whole those employees affected, as a means of re-
storing the status quo ante. In his complaint, the
General Counsel alleged that the Respondent un-
lawfully "instituted" the offending disciplinary
system. Thereafter, 19 days before hearing, the
General Counsel amended the complaint by notify-
ing the Respondent that:
• . . the General Counsel intends to request, as
part of an appropriate remedy for the unfair
labor practices herein, that Respondent make
whole employees for any discipline or lost
wages suffered by employees . • • as a result
of Respondent's instituting a policy for sus-
pending or disciplining employees for tardi-
ness, absenteeism and leaving work early.
4 Inasmuch as Member Dennis agrees that the Respondent unilaterally
instituting a new disciplinary system for absenteeism and tardiness violat-
ed Sec 8(a)(5) and (I), she finds It unnecessary to consider whether that
same conduct also violated Sec 8(a)(3) As a practical matter, such a
finding and any additional remedy would be cumulative
5 Member Zimmerman finds, as did the judge, that the Respondent's
granting of a unilateral wage increase was fully litigated The facts sur-
rounding the violation were conceded by the Respondent's plant manag-
er During cross-examination the judge asked Plant Manager Swartz if
employees had received wage increases in the preceding 18-month
period Swartz admitted that management decided to grant its employees
a general cost-of-living Increase in September 1981 and that lower paid
personnel were given an additional increase No objection was taken to
this line of questioning, and Swartz' testimony stands uncontroverted
The Respondent also admitted that, despite the existence of a Board cer-
tification, it has refused to bargain with the Union Thus, unlike the situa-
tion in Cardivan Co, there is here an admission of the facts constituting
the unlawful conduct Member Zimmerman, therefore, would affirm the
judge's conclusion that the Respondent violated Sec 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act by making increases in wages without notifying the Union and
offering to bargain with it
273 NLRB No. 130
1032 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In these circumstances, the Respondent was plainly
apprised that it faced potential economic liability
for the consequences flowing from its implementa-
tion of the disciplinary system here found unlawful.
The Respondent's records bearing on the imple-
mentation were subpoenaed and, without objection,
adduced into evidence by the General Counsel.
Aided by these evidentiary tools, it is appropriate
to determine the extent of the Respondent's liabil-
ity at the compliance stage of this proceeding.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge as modified below and orders that the Re-
spondent, Harvard Folding Box Co., Inc., Lynn,
Massachusetts, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order
as modified.
1. Delete paragraph 1(c) and reletter the subse-
quent paragraphs.
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(e).
"(e) Unilaterally instituting bonus plans, or
changing bonus plans, without first notifying the
Union of the proposed changes and offering to bar-
gain collectively with it concerning such changes;
provided that nothing in the Order shall be con-
strued to require the Respondent to decrease the
compensation of any employee."
3. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(b).
"(b) Rescind and cease giving effect to any and
all changes in disciplinary procedures and work
rules which were announced to employees about 3
June 1980, or which were included in an employee
handbook which was distributed about 1 August
1981; expunge from employee personnel records
any notices or warnings which were given as a
result of the adoption of such rules and procedures;
and notify those employees affected that this has
been done and that the evidence thus expunged
will not be used as a basis for future personnel
action against them."
4. Insert the following as paragraph 2(e) and re-
letter the subsequent paragraphs.
"(e) Expunge from their files any reference to
the terminations of George Maden and Robert
Lewis and notify Maden and Lewis in writing that
this has been done and that evidence of their un-
lawful terminations will not be used as a basis for
future personnel actions against them."
5. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
administrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that they will be
fired because they have voted for the Union.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in or ac-
tivities on behalf of Boston Local No. 600, Graphic
Arts International Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, or any
other labor organization, by discharging employ-
ees, unilaterally instituting disciplinary rules and
procedures, or otherwise discriminating against
them in their hire or tenure.
WE WILL NOT make unilateral changes in bonus
plans, disciplinary procedures, grievance proce-
dures, or any other term or condition of employ-
ment without notifying the Union and affording it
an opportunity to bargain collectively concerning
such proposed changes.
WE WILL NOT by any other means or in any
other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them
by Section 7 of the Act. These rights include the
right to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in concerted ac-
tivities for their mutual aid and protection.
WE WILL cease giving effect to any changes in
work rules and disciplinary procedures which were
announced to employees about 3 June 1980, or
which are contained in an employee handbook
which was distributed about 1 August 1981, and
WE WILL expunge from employee personnel
records any disciplinary warnings which were
given as a result of the adoption of such rules and
procedures. WE WILL NOT discharge or suspend
employees pursuant to the provisions of illegally
instituted disciplinary rules or procedures, WE
WILL offer full and immediate reinstatement to any
employee who has been discharged pursuant to il-
legally instituted disciplinary procedures, and WE
WILL make whole any employees who have been
suspended or discharged pursuant to such proce-
dures, with interest.
WE WILL recognize and bargain collectively
with Boston Local No. 600, Graphic Arts Interna-
tional Union, AFL-CIO-CLC as the exclusive col-
lective-bargaining representative of all our produc-
tion and maintenance employees, including truck
drivers, employed at our Lynn, Massachusetts
HARVARD FOLDING BOX CO 1033
plant, exclusive of office clerical employees, sales
employees, professional employees, guards, and su-
pervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL offer to George Maden and to Robert
Lewis immediate and full reinstatement to their
former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to sub-
stantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to
their seniority or any other rights or privileges
which they previously enjoyed and WE WILL make
them whole for any loss of earnings and other ben-
efits resulting from their discharges, less any net in-
terim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL expunge from our files any reference
to the terminations of George Maden and Robert
Lewis and WE WILL notify them in writing that
this has been done and that evidence of their un-
lawful terminations will not be used as a basis for
future personnel actions against them.
HARVARD FOLDING BOX CO., INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WALTER H. MALONEY JR., Administrative Law Judge.
This case came on for hearing before me at Boston, Mas-
sachusetts, on an unfair labor practice complaint,' issued
by the Regional Director for Region 1 of the Board and
amended thereafter, which alleges that Respondent Har-
vard Folding Box Co., Inc. 2 violated Section 8(a)(1), (3),
(4), and (5) of the Act. More particularly, the amended
complaint alleges that Respondent told an employee that
he was going to be discharged because of his union sym-
pathies, discharged employees Robert Lewis and George
Maden because of their membership in and activities on
behalf of the Union, and refused to bargain collectively
with the Union by unilaterally instituting a new policy
with reference to discipline for absenteeism, unilaterally
discontinuing a bonus system, and unilaterally instituting
a performance bonus system. The complaint also alleges
that the Respondent discharged Lewis because he gave
testimony under the Act.
It should be noted that the Union herein was certified
and Respondent refused to bargain with it in order to
1 The pnncipal docket entnes in this case are as follows
Charge filed herein by Boston Local No 600, Graphic Arts Inter-
national Union, AFL-CIO-CLC (the Union), on October 2, 1980,
complaint issued by Regional Director for Region 1, on November
17, 1980, Respondent's answer filed on December 24, 1980, amend-
ment to complaint issued on May 28, 1981, Respondent's answer to
amendment to complaint filed on June 2, 1981, hearing held in
Boston, Massachusetts, on December 14-16, 1981, briefs filed by the
General Counsel and Respondent with me on February 16, 1982
2 Respondent admits, and I find, that it is a Massachusetts corporation
which maintains its principal office and place of business in Lynn, Massa-
chusetts, where it is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of
folding boxes and related products In the course and conduct of this
business, Respondent annually ships from its Lynn, Massachusetts plant
directly to points and places located outside the Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts goods valued in excess of 550,000 Accordingly, Respondent is
an employer within the meaning of Sec 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act The
Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec 2(5) of the Act
test the certification. The Board issued a bargaining
order on December 11, 1981, directing Respondent to
honor the certification (259 NLRB 686). Respondent
denies the commission of any independent violations of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, claims that Lewis was dis-
charged for chronic absenteeism, and asserts that Maden,
in effect, quit by refusing to abide by a company order
to work full time rather than part-time. Respondent in-
sists that a disciplinary system and procedure found in a
newly promulgated employee handbook merely incorpo-
rates in writing the practices of the Employer and thus
does not constitute a change in working conditions
which warrants bargaining with a certified union. Re-
spondent announced at the hearing in this case that it
would pursue its remedies respecting the bargaining
order Just issued against it in 259 NLRB 686 to the U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals On these contentions the issues
in this case were drawn.3
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ALLEGED
A. Background
Respondent operates a factory in Lynn, Massachusetts,
where it manufactures boxes and cartons used by busi-
nesses to display and package various products. These
boxes are cut to order and are completely fabricated at
Respondent's premises from cardboard stock. This fabri-
cation includes the design, cutting, printing, and gluing
of the finished product. Respondent's principals are Mel
Ross and Al Levine. It employs about 90-95 employees
although, at the time the events in this case took place, a
temporary upsurge in business required it to employ
about 115 persons.
Respondent has never had a collective-bargaining
agreement with any labor organization. In the spnng of
1980, the Union herein organized its production and
maintenance employees, petitioned the Board for a repre-
sentation election, and won the election conducted on
May 29, 1980, by a vote of 52 to 38. Despite the exist-
ence of a Board certification and a bargaining order
based on that certification, Respondent has yet to bar-
gam with the Union concerning any matter.
B. The Discharges of Robert Lewis and George
Maden
One of the principal in-house activists in the union
effort was pressman Robert Lewis. Lewis had worked
for Respondent since 1962, starting as a helper and work-
ing his way into one of the most skilled positions in the
plant. He was one of the senior employees at the plant.
Respondent's plant manager Michael Swartz, who once
was trained in the pressroom by Lewis, described him as
one of the most qualified men in that department. As a
pressman, Lewis reported to Jay Goldfarb, who in turn
reported to Swartz and Plant Superintendent James
McGee.
3 Certain errors in the transcript are noted and corrected
1034 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Lewis distributed union leaflets from time to time.
About May 1, 1980, along with one other employee, he
attended a representation case conference on behalf of
the Union at the Board office in downtown Boston. At
this conference a "stip" election agreement was worked
out with Respondent. Lewis then served as the union ob-
server at the election on May 29. At some point in time
between the date of the Union's election victory and
Lewis' discharge on September 16, Lewis was described
by a fellow employee to his supervisor, Goldfarb, as the
future shop steward.
The other discriminatee, George "Sandy" Maden,
started working for Respondent in 1956. His job was to
catalogue, file, and retrieve printing plates and dies and
make them available to operating personnel in accord-
ance with job tickets which he received from the front
office. He became quite ill in 1976 and, for that reason,
was anxious to retain his health insurance benefits with
Respondent until he became eligible for Medicare at age
65. Maden, who was approaching the age of 63 in 1979,
also desired to retire. He worked out an arrangement
with Swartz whereby he would reduce the number of
hours worked to 20 to 25 per week and would take a cut
in wages from $4.17 to $3 per hour (which was then the
minimum wage). In exchange for this cut in pay Re-
spondent would continue to pay Maden's health insur-
ance premium. With the reduction in hours and wages,
Maden would then become eligible for monthly social se-
curity payments. However, he had to be careful not to
earn in excess of $3480 per year or he would lose social
security. In 1979, the first full year of this arrangement,
Maden earned slightly in excess of $3400.
Late in 1979, Maden approached Swartz to request a
raise to $3.50 an hour. His justification for the raise was
the increase in the price of gasoline which made it diffi-
cult for him to make ends meet on the money he was re-
ceiving. Swartz told Maden that he would "get back to
him" but, according to Maden, he never did. The first
paycheck Maden received in 1980 did not even reflect a
10-cent increase in the minimum wage which went into
effect on January 1, 1980 After Maden complained to
Swartz about this omission, Respondent complied with
the law and began to pay him $3.10 an hour but, despite
repeated requests for additional money, Maden was
given nothing more. He signed a union card in April
during the organizing drive and, on two different occa-
sions, told Swartz and McGee that he hoped the Compa-
ny would lose the election by one vote because that one
vote would be his. He cast a challenged ballot at the
election. The challenge was never resolved because it
was not determinative of the results.
As noted above, Respondent decided to challenge the
results of the election and filed objections claiming that
the Union had engaged in misrepresentations during the
course of the campaign. On July 3, 1980, the Regional
Director issued a report recommending that the objec-
tions be overruled in their entirety. On September 11,
1980, the Board adopted the report and certified the
Union.
From February 1, 1979, until his discharge on June 17,
1980, Maden normally worked from 7 a.m. to 2 p m., 4
days a week. He did not work at all on Wednesday. The
record is clear that during this period of time he was
able to line up and make available to operating personnel
in advance of his off time the dies and plates which they
normally required. However, it occurred from time to
time that a job would suddenly be switched and a differ-
ent die would have to be pulled immediately and sent to
the cutting room or the pressroom. If Maden was absent,
someone from the die cutting department would get the
die. This task might take 15 minutes and it fell, on occa-
sion, to Dave Katz or to Remo Avellani, the foreman of
the die cutting department. Avellani complained to
Swartz from time to time about having to do so.4
Sometime early in June 1980, William Lemmo, the su-
perintendent in the die cutting department and a friend
of Maden, asked Maden if he had told Mel Ross that he
had voted for the Union. Maden replied that he did not
tell Ross but he had told just about everyone else in the
front office. I credit Maden's testimony that Lemmo told
Maden that he thought he was going to get "canned"
and suggested to Maden that he speak with Ross and ex-
plain the circumstances that prompted him to support the
Union. 5 Maden's reply was why should he go in and beg
for a job which only paid the minimum wage. Lemmo
asked Maden on a second occasion if he had spoken with
Ross about this question, but Maden had not done so.
Early in June, Maden was told to train David Barcalo,
a new employee, to classify, file, and retrieve plates and
dies. On June 17, early in the after noon, Lemmo told
Maden that he thought he would be "canned" at the end
of the week. Maden was scheduled to take a long-
planned vacation trip beginning at the end of the week,
so he told Lemmo that he was going to take the bull by
the horns and go into the front office to announce that
he was beginning his vacation at the end of the day in-
stead of on Friday, as originally scheduled. He did so,
and when he announced his intention to Swartz, the
latter made no reply. When Maden returned to his work
station, he saw Lemmo on the phone and overheard
Lemmo saying, "Why don't you tell him? I'm not his
boss." When Lemmo finished the conversation, he
slammed down the phone and told Maden, "Mike Swartz
says to tell you that you are all done." Maden picked up
his private belongings and immediately left the plant.
I credit Maden's testimony that at no time did Lemmo
or anyone else give him any explanation, either orally or
in writing, as to the reason for his discharge. I also credit
Maden's testimony that at no time did Lemmo or any
other supervisor tell him that he could continue to work
for the Company if he would do so on a full-time basis.
It is true that, in a conversation which took place some
days before the discharge, Lemmo had expressed to
Maden the opinion that he could think of no reason why
the Company might fire him, whereupon Maden had re-
4 Avellani was described by a fellow supervisor to Lemmo as a
"picker"
5 While denying the specifics of this conversation, Lemmo admits that
he told Maden that if he went around shooting his mouth off about the
Union Ross would "blast him"
HARVARD FOLDING BOX CO. 1035
plied that the only excuse that it could use was that he
was not a full-time employee.6
Respondent normally shuts down the plant for a 2-
week vacation early in July. In 1980, production sched-
ules were so demanding that while the vacation period
was taken much of the plant continued to operate. Lewis
was given a 2-week vacation in early July, during which
time he injured his back while performing some chores
at home. This was not the first time that Lewis had suf-
fered a back injury so he treated it without going to a
physician. When the back injury failed to respond quick-
ly enough to permit him to return to work as scheduled,
he called his foreman, Jay Goldfarb, and obtained per-
mission to take a third week of the 4 weeks of vacation
to which he was entitled. About July 25, Lewis visited
the plant, spoke with McGee, told him about the back
injury, and said he was ready to come back to work.
McGee complained that Lewis was missing a lot of time
but said he did not want him to return until he had the
approval of a physician. Lewis said this might take some
time to obtain since he was not under the care of a phy-
sician. McGee then suggested that Lewis go to the
Northgate Medical Clinic, to which the Company re-
ferred employees, and have an examination performed by
a physician at the clinic. Lewis did so and obtained a
letter saying that he could return but only to limited
duty. McGee said that such a letter was not satisfactory
and informed Lewis that he did not want him to return
until the doctor could certify that he was able to per-
form his job without restnctions. After a second exami-
nation, Lewis obtained unrestricted clearance to return
to work and did so on August 6.
Regardless of the hours which others might work at
the plant, Lewis' regular workday was from 7 a.m. to
5:30 p.m., 5 days a week. He refused to work more than
a 10-hour day and refused to work on Saturdays, Sun-
days, or evenings. His regular job was to operate a two-
color 40-inch press, the smallest of several presses which
Respondent owned. 7 Despite repeated requests over the
years from Respondent's management that he change to
one of the larger and more elaborate presses, Lewis in-
sisted that he did not want the responsibility associated
with operating one of those presses and insisted on work-
ing only the smaller two-color machine. When Lewis
was absent, Respondent either did not operate the two-
color machine, which it kept on hand for certain smaller
jobs which its major customers insisted that it perform,
or it shifted one of the pressmen assigned to a larger
press to operate Lewis' press. Such a personnel shift
might entail shutting down the larger machine.
Lewis missed 1 day of work in August after his return
to duty. He developed a case of bronchitis and missed
the 4 working days in the week following Labor Day.
8 Sometime after he was discharged, Maden returned to the plant and
spoke with Lemmo. He told L,emmo that he did not want to do anything
that would disturb their friendship and asked Lemmo if he would testify
on his behalf if he filed a grievance Lenuno's reply was that he would
have to say that he "assumed" that Maden had been fired because he
voted for the Union but that he could not honestly take the stand and
assert it as a fact Maden replied that this was good enough for him
7 Respondent regularly operated four-color and six-color presses
These presses could accommodate larger sheets of cardboard than the
two-color press.
He worked the entire week of September 8-12 but his
bronchitis flared up again over the weekend of Septem-
ber 13-14. He called in sick on Monday, September 15.
It was at this point that Respondent decided to discharge
Lewis. On the following day, when Lewis again called
in sick, he spoke with Swartz who informed him of the
discharge. Swartz read to Lewis the text of a discharge
letter which was later forwarded by mail. The letter
read:
Your employment by this Company is terminated
effective today.
This action is taken because of the numerous oc-
casions on which you have failed to report to work
when scheduled to do so.
The pressman's job for which you were em-
ployed is a full-time position. Your numerous ab-
sences, which have included absence from work on
Mondays, have created unnecessary difficulty in op-
erating our Press Department.
We have come to believe that you are either
unable or unwilling to perform a full-time job on a
regular full-time basis.
Swartz told Lewis that the decision to discharge him
was made "higher up" and that his hands were tied re-
specting it. Lewis then asked to speak with Ross, who
was not available at the time. Lewis called again the fol-
lowing day and asked to speak with Ross but was re-
ferred to a Quinn, the comptroller. Quinn told Lewis
that Ross was unavailable and suggested to Lewis that it
would be pointless to call back. He told Lewis that Ross
had made up his mind and that he did not want Lewis
working for him, adding that the matter was settled.
C. Unilateral Changes in Wages, Benefits, and
Working Conditions
Shortly after the election, Swartz and McGee held a
meeting of the employees in the printing department.
McGee complained about the poor attendance record of
the Printing Department employees and told employees
that their absentee record was fouling up the scheduling
of work. Swartz echoed McGee's statement and went on
to state that in order to combat the absenteeism problem
Respondent was instituting a new disciplinary system.
According to the new system, an employee would re-
ceive a verbal warning for his first tardiness or his first
failure to call in at the beginning of the day to notify the
Company that the employee would not be coming in.
For the second infraction, the offendmg employee would
receive a week's suspension. For the third infraction, the
employee in question would be discharged.
In the summer of 1981, the city of Lynn provided var-
ious business firms in the area with the services of an in-
dustrial relations or personnel consultant as a means of
inducing companies to remain in the city. The consult-
ant, Robert Bernstein, held a series of interviews with
various members of Respondent's management team and
wrote a personnel handbook based on his interviews.
This handbook was distributed to all of Respondent's
employees about August 1, 1981. It contained a wide va-
riety of items relating to an individual's employment
1036 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
status, including matters relating to attendance and to
grievances. On the subject of attendance, the booklet ex-
horted employees to come to work regularly and on
time, stating that "Repeated unsatisfactory attendance,
including reporting late or quitting early, may be cause
for disciplinary action. Employees are expected to leave
the plant at the end of their shift." It also outlined cer-
tain leaves of absence which would be available upon ad-
vance request but required employees to make their re-
quests in writing
With respect to disciplinary problems, the booklet out-
line noted that, for some infractions of company rules
there would be written warnings which would be kept in
an employee's personnel file for a period of year. For
other infractions there would be verbal warnings, a writ-
ten record of which would be put in an employee's per-
sonnel file and kept for a period of 1 year. For very seri-
ous infractions, immediate discharge would follow The
booklet then went on to outline the types of conduct
which would be considered major or minor infractions
of company rules and set forth the type of punishment
which would be imposed for major infractions or repeat-
ed for minor infractions. With respect to grievances, the
handbook said that any questions about the job, wages,
hours, or any other related matter should be discussed
with an employee's supervisor If an employee did not
receive word within 3 working days when an appoint-
ment is scheduled, he was authorized to go to the office
and speak with the plant superintendent without an ap-
pointment.
In September 1981, Respondent granted an across-the-
board cost-of-living increase of 8 percent to all employ-
ees. In addition, it granted other individual increases to
specific employees who were at the lower end of the
company wage scale. Late in 1980 or early in 1981, Re-
spondent made substantial revisions in its existing attend-
ance bonus and instituted a performance bonus. The
exact requirements of these incentive bonuses is rather
vague in the record. The previous attendance bonus op-
erated on a system of points given to each individual for
perfect attendance during a given workweek. At the end
of the year, the employee's total bonus points were
added up and he was given a certain amount per point
over and above his regular salary. The amount of money
assigned to each bonus point depended on the Compa-
ny's profit during the preceding year. Respondent's man-
agement was unhappy about the operations of the attend-
ance bonus. Absenteeism and tardiness was and remains a
serious problem at Respondent's plant and management
felt that deserving employees were not receiving a suffi-
cient incentive from the old bonus system. They held a
series of meetings with employees in which the manage-
ment's dissatisfaction with the plan was discussed and
during which the outlines of a new plan were also an-
nounced The new plan would permit foremen certain
flexibility in excusing absences and tardiness in a manner
which would not jeopardize attendance bonus points
Moreover, the awards would thereafter be computed and
distributed on a quarterly rather than an annual basis.
The performance bonus was also announced. It was a
new incentive award, whose exact requirements were not
set forth in the record except for the fact that the
amount of the bonus also depended on the profitability
of the Company.
II. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. The Discharges of George Maden and Robert
Lewis and Related Matters
It is an unfair labor practice for a supervisor to tell an
employee that he is going to be discharged because of
his union sympathies. H. B. Zachry Co., 233 NLRB 1143
(1977); Bradford Furniture Co., 254 NLRB 109 (1981).
When Lemmo told Maden that he thought Maden was
going to be discharged for voting for the Union, he vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, even if this prediction
did not express Lemmo's personal sentiments. This state-
ment, as well as Lemmo's admitted statement that Ross
would "blast" Maden for letting it be known he was a
union supporter, provides independent evidence of
animus as well as an admission against interest which
bears Respondent's true motivation in discharging Maden
and Lewis. Other evidence of animus can be derived
from the cavalier treatment given to the Union's bargain-
ing rights by Respondent following the election This
treatment is discussed more in detail, infra.
Maden had been with the Company for 26 years.
Company General Manager Ross testified that he did a
"hell of a job" when he was present. The problem assert-
ed by Respondent is that Maden was not always present
because of the arrangement he had concluded with
Swartz to work part-time in order to keep his earnings
below the statutory maximum allowed to a social securi-
ty annuitant who is under the age of 65. It was well
known that Maden was a union supporter and that he
voiced his support to Respondent's management in an
impertinent manner. The timing of his discharge, taking
place as it did within 3 weeks of a representation elec-
tion, gives rise to a suspicion of union animus, especially
when it was imposed on an employee of 26 years' service
whose only shortcoming was that he was not always
present for work under an arrangement of 17 months'
duration which Respondent had previously approved.
The actual job content of Maden's assignment did not
take more than 20 or 25 hours a week to perform and
Maden was able to keep up with its requirements within
that span of time. So were Maden's replacements, none
of whom worked at the job more hours than Maden did
and who were given other assignments, principally train-
ing as diemakers, to fill out the balance of their week.
The problem posed by Respondent is that an occasional
rush job meant that sometimes a die had to be pulled
from its shelf in a hurry and, if Maden was not around to
pull it, someone else had to perform this chore. This hap-
pened only rarely and, when it did, it consumed only a
few minutes out of another employee's day. Maden dis-
cussed this problem with Swartz in January 1979. When
his part-time working arrangement was first established,
Swartz told Maden that he was not at all concerned
about pulling dies for an occasional rush job and that
Avellani or Katz could take care of it. Suddenly, within
weeks of a union victory, to which Maden had tried to
make a contribution, an arrangement which had been sat-
HARVARD FOLDING BOX CO. 1037
isfactory for 17 months suddenly became intolerable. It
was the kind of complaint which was plainly contrived
and hardly the basis for the drastic personnel action
which took place on June 17.
Respondent insists, on the one hand, that Maden was
not discharged and that, in effect, he quit. It also argues
that he was discharged for cause. According to Re-
spondent, Maden was offered the option of working full-
time rather than leaving the Company so it was Maden
who made the choice which resulted in his final separa-
tion. The contention is wholly without merit. Swartz
admits that he never confronted Maden with this choice
at the time of his termination but left the matter to
Lemmo. Lemmo botched his lines badly when he testi-
fied on this point. He said that he told Maden that he
had to work full time or leave and asked Maden to think
the matter over on his vacation and let him have an
answer when he returned. Even Swartz commented on
this error in Lemmo's testimony, since the record is oth-
erwise undisputed that Maden was discharged before and
not after his vacation. I credit Maden, an unusually
straightforward and convincing witness, to the effect that
no one, including Lemmo, ever told him he could stay
on provided that he would work full time. The best and
only plausible explanation for Maden's discharge is the
one which Lemmo gave to Maden a few days before the
event took place, namely that he was being fired for
voting for the Union. Since this was the obvious motive
which prompted Respondent's action, I conclude that
Respondent, in discharging Maden, violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
Lewis, an employee of 18 years standing and admitted-
ly Respondent's best pressman, was fired for excessive
absenteeism. Respondent counted that Lewis was absent
from work during the calendar year 1980 some 36 days,
in addition to the period in July and early August when
he was on an extended vacation break because of a back
injury. In particular, Respondent contended that Lewis
missed an inordinate number of Mondays, this assertion
being evidence that Lewis was not interested in his job
and permitted weekend carousing to render him unfit for
work While Respondent's count of days missed by
Lewis was considerably in excess of the number of ab-
sences reflected on Lewis' timecards, it is indisputable
that Lewis missed a great deal of time in 1980. Of these
absences eight fell on Monday. Respondent admits that
Lewis always called in to notify the Company that he
would not be working but claims that such short notice
frequently interrupted or caused difficulties with its job
scheduling. Printing jobs are normally assigned to a par-
ticular press at the time the order is taken from the cus-
tomer and they cannot easily be shifted from one press
to another. Respondent asserts that it is not particularly
bothered by long-term injury, long absences due to ill-
nesses, or vacations because it has adequate advance
notice in such situations and can revise production
schedules to accommodate such problems. However, un-
anticipated absences can and do cause serious scheduling
headaches, especially when it involves a position as piv-
otal in the production process as that of a pressman. It
was these repeated and unanticipated daily absences
which Respondent claims it could no longer abide and
which prompted it to discharge Lewis when he called in
sick on Monday, September 15.8
Respondent was perennially plagued with absenteeism,
not only from Lewis but from its entire production staff.
Record evidence indicates that -Respondent experienced
and tolerated from other employees absentee records
comparable to that of Lewis. In 1978, Lewis was off the
job for several months and nothing in the way of disci-
pline was said or done concerning it. What Respondent's
basic contention fails to take into account is that in the
late summer of 1980, following Lewis' return to work
from his back injury, Lewis' attendance had improved
considerably over his record earlier in the year. What
Respondent's contention also fails to note is that, despite
Lewis' asserted indifference to the Company's produc-
tion schedules and business requirements, during 1980
Lewis worked 54 hours of premium overtime (at time
and one-half) during the first quarter, 50 hours of premi-
um overtime during the second quarter, and 20 hours of
premium overtime during the third and final quarter of
his employment. Moreover, Respondent admits that
Lewis was never suspended nor even warned about any
serious consequences which might flow from his own ab-
sentee record. Swartz admits that because of his long
personal acquaintance with Lewis he could not bring
himself to give Lewis any kind of verbal or written
warning, and McGee's complaint carried with it no
warning of any sort. In light of these facts, it is most un-
derstandable that Lewis could and should have believed
that his attendance pattern in August and September
1980 was acceptable to Respondent as it had been over a
long period of time, and that his decision to call in sick
on September 15, when in fact he was sick, would have
been treated by Respondent in the same manner that Re-
spondent had treated many such calls over a period of
many years. Moreover, when Lewis was discharged, Re-
spondent had no replacement available to take his place
and still has none. If the pressures of production were
the real motivating factor in eliminating Lewis at this
time, normal procedure would dictate that such action
would not be taken until Respondent had someone avail-
able to fill in and keep Lewis' press running. In fact,
Lewis' press operated only 3 or 4 days during August
and September, despite his continued presence at the
plant, and it was sold after he was terminated.
A more plausible explanation for Respondent's behav-
ior on this occasion is that it had just received from the
Board a certification, dated September 11, and was then
faced with the hard fact that it had in its midst a labor
organization with whom it was legally obligated to deal
and which Lewis was instrumental in organizing. It was
Lewis who assisted in representing the Union at the rep-
resentation case conference. It was Lewis who served as
the union observer at the election and who was adver-
tised to Respondent as being the Union's new shop stew-
8 Lewis' excuse for not coining to work on that occasion was that he
had a flareup of a bronchial condition and was confined to bed. Respond-
ent does not contest that Lewis was, in fact, sick on this occasion Imphc-
it in this position is the contention that Lewis should have showed up for
work on September 15, notwithstanding the fact that he had bronchitis,
in order to save his job
1038 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ard. And now it was Lewis who could be counted on to
provide leadership through the months ahead during
which Respondent would be trying to chew up time in a
tedious and fruitless effort to avoid meeting its duty to
engage in collective bargaining. Accordingly, I conclude
that Lewis' illness of September 15 was merely a pretext
for removing him from Respondent's payroll and that its
real reason for discharging him was, as in the Maden
case, to eliminate from its shop an active and vocal union
supporter. Accordingly, I find that by discharging
Robert Lewis Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the Act. Pyro Mining Co., 253 NLRB 233 (1977).
Inasmuch as Lewis' union activities included his presence
at the Board office at a representation case conference
(and hence a potential union witness if the conference
failed to produce agreement and the matter went on for
hearing before a hearing officer), the discharge also vio-
lates Section 8(a)(4) of the Act.
B. Unilateral Changes in Wages, Benefits, and
Working Conditions
It is well established that it is an unfair labor practice
for an employer in a represented shop to make unilateral
changes in the wages, benefits, or working conditions of
its employees without first notifying the bargaining rep-
resentative and giving it an opportunity to discuss the
proposed changes. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
This requirement of good-faith bargaining applies to
changes which are undertaken while objections to an
election are pending, as well as to changes which may be
made after a certification has issued. Mike O'Connor
Chevrolet Co., 209 NLRB 701 (1971); Portsmouth Lumber
Treating, 248 NLRB 1170 (1980); Evans Rotork, Inc., 251
NLRB 660 (1980). A new policy of strict enforcement of
previously existing work rules is subject to the require-
ment of notice and bargaining just as much as is the pro-
mulgation of brand new work rules. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co.,
241 NLRB 801 (1979). Likewise, the transformation of
an informal, unstructured system of work rules and prac-
tices into a formalized set of rules and procedures is a
mandatory subject of bargaining. Boland Marine & Mfg.
Co., 225 NLRB 824 (1976). In this case, it is Respond-
ent's initial position that it had no duty to bargain at all
with the Union, notwithstanding the certification, be-
cause the underlying representation election was tainted
with irregularity. The Board disposed of this defense by
its decision in 259 NLRB 686 (1976).
In this case, it is admitted on the record that after the
certification issued Respondent gave its employees an 8-
percent across-the-board cost-of-living increase and made
other adjustments in the wage rates of its lower paid per-
sonnel. There is no suggestion that these increases were
negotiated. While this element is not formally alleged as
a violation in the amended complaint, the matter was
fully litigated at the hearing, inasmuch as the facts of the
violation candidly admitted in the testimony of the Re-
spondent's plant manager. Accordingly, I find that by
making increases in wages without notifying the Union
and offering to bargain with it Respondent has violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
Shortly after the election, Respondent's management
held a meeting with its press department, at which time
it scolded employees about their repeated tardiness and
unannounced absences and informed them that new dis-
ciplinary procedures would be invoked to discourage
such practices. Among other things Respondent stated
that it was instituting a practice of progressive discipline
by terms of which offending employees would be subject
to a warning and then to suspension and discharge. The
failure of Respondent to negotiate these changes in its
disciplinary practice and its decision to institute them
unilaterally violates Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
The timing of this announcement, coming as it did imme-
diately following a union violation in the representation
election, makes it clear that the imposition of the new
rule was discriminatorily motivated and hence a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Electri-Flex Co., 228
NLRB 847 (1978); Transportation Management, 256
NLRB 101 (1981).
Late in the fall of 1980 and early in 1981, Respondent
announced to employees that it was instituting a per-
formance bonus, based in part on earnings, and that it
was changing the terms of its previous attendance bonus
because it was dissatisfied with the results it achieved
under old attendance bonus. The failure of Respondent
to negotiate changes in the old bonus system and its uni-
lateral institution of a new bonus arrangement violates
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
In August 1981, as a result of a study conducted by a
city-paid consultant, Respondent prepared and distribut-
ed to its employees a handbook in which it set forth a
highly structured disciplinary system replacing the flexi-
ble, unwritten rules and practices which Respondent had
formerly observed. A system of written warnings and
written records of verbal warnings was instituted. Re-
spondent argued that this was essentially the procedure it
followed before the representation election, but it was
unable to produce so much as one written warning
which had been issued to any employee previous to May
29, 1980. Indeed, it did not even keep personnel records
before this date, maintaining only a card file containing
the names and addreses of its current and former em-
ployees and an occasional note concerning their employ-
ment status The handbook outlined a detailed plan of
progressive discipline, as well as steps to be utilized by
an employee in presenting what the Employer calls a
grievance. The issuance of this handbook, containing as
it does formalized disciplinary rules and procedures as
well as new rules and procedures, took place without no-
tification to the Union or negotiation over the contents.
Though a detailed compendium of rules and procedures,
the handbook made no provision for participation by the
certified bargaining representative in the sensitive and
critical matter of handling grievances. Accordingly, the
issuance of this document and the institution of the mat-
ters set forth therein constitutes a violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act
On these findings of fact and on the entire record, I
make the following
HARVARD FOLDING BOX CO. 1039
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Harvard Folding Box Co., Inc. is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Boston Local No. 600, Graphic Arts International
Union, AFL-CIO-CLC is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees, includ-
ing truck drivers, employed by Respondent at its Lynn,
Massachusetts plant, exclusive of 25 office clerical em-
ployees, sales employees, professional employees, guards,
and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit
appropriate for collective bargaining within the meaning
of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. Since about May 29, 1980, Boston Local No. 600,
Graphic Arts International Union, AFL-CIO-CLC has
been and continues to be the exclusive representative of
the employees employed in the unit described above for
the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
terms and conditions of employment, within the meaning
of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By unilaterally granting an increase in wages; by
unilaterally changing the terms of its attendance bonus
and instituting a performance bonus; by unilaterally an-
nouncing and instituting a new disciplinary system re-
specting tardiness and attendance; and by unilaterally an-
nouncing and instituting a new system of discipline and
of processing grievances, all without notifying the Union
and offering it an opportunity to bargain, Respondent
herein violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
6. By discriminatorily discharging George Maden and
Robert Lewis because of their sympathies for and activi-
ties on behalf of the Union; and by instituting a system of
warnings, suspensions, and discharge in reprisal for the
action of employees in selecting the Union as their bar-
gaining representative, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
7. By discharging Robert Lewis because he gave or of-
fered to give testimony under the Act, Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(4) of the Act.
8. By the acts and conduct set forth above in Conclu-
sions of Law 5, 6, and 7; and by telling employees that
they were going to be discharged because they had
voted for the Union, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
9. The unfair labor practices recited above have a
close, intimate, and substantial effect on the free flow of
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and 2(7) of
the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I will recommend that it be re-
quired to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain
affirmative actions designed to effectuate the purposes
and polices of the Act. Since the violations of the Act
found herein are repeated and pervasive and evidence an
intention to ignore its basic purposes and policies, I will
recommend to the Board a so-called 8(a)(1) remedy de-
signed to suppress any and all violations of that section.
Hickmont Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979). I will recom-
mend that Respondent be required to bargain collective-
ly with the Union as the exclusive representative of its
production and maintenance employees, that it rescind
certain unilaterally imposed rules, regulations, and proce-
dures which it instituted in June 1980, and about August
1981, and that it cease and desist from instituting changes
in wages, benefits, or working conditions of its employ-
ees without first notifying the Union and offering to bar-
gain with it concerning such changes. I will also recom-
mend that Respondent be required to offer full and im-
mediate reinstatement to George Maden, to Robert
Lewis, and to any other persons who have been dis-
charged pursuant to illegally instituted rules and discipli-
nary procedures, and to make them whole for any loss of
earnings which they may have suffered by reason of the
discrimination practiced against them, in accordance
with the Woolworth formula, 9 with interest thereon at the
adjusted prime rate used by the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice for the computation of tax payments. Olympic Medi-
cal Corp., 250 NLRB 146; Isis Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB
716 (1962). I will also recommend that Respondent be re-
quired to post the usual notice, advising its employees of
their rights and the results in this case.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed"
ORDER
Respondent Harvard Folding Box Co., Inc., Lynn,
Massachusetts, its officers, agents, supervisors, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Telling employees that they are going to be dis-
charged because they have voted for the Union.
(b) Discouraging membership in and activities on
behalf of Boston Local No. 600, Graphic Arts Interna-
tional Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, or any other labor orga-
nization, by discharging employees, imposing stricter dis-
ciplinary rules and procedures, or otherwise discriminat-
ing against them in their hire or tenure.
(c) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against
employees because they have given or have offered to
give testimony under the Act.
(d) Refusing to recognize and bargain collectively
with Boston Local No. 600, Graphic Arts International
Union, AFL-CIO-CLC as the exclusive collective-bar-
gaining representative of all production and maintenance
employees, including truck drivers, employed by Re-
spondent at its Lynn, Massachusetts plant, exclusive of
office clerical employees, sales employees, professional
employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(e) Unilaterally making increases in wages, instituting
bonus plans, changing bonus plans, or otherwise chang-
ing the compensation of its employees without first noti-
9 F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950).
10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
1040 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
fying the Union of the proposed changes and offering to
bargain collectively with it concerning such changes;
provided that nothing in the Order shall be construed to
require Respondent to decrease the compensation of any
employee.
(f) Unilaterally instituting changes in disciplinary pro-
cedures concerning tardiness and absenteeism, unilateral-
ly instituting changes in disciplinary practices, work
rules, and grievance procedures, and unilaterally chang-
ing any other term or condition of employment without
first notifying the Union and giving it an opportunity to
bargain collectively concerning such changes.
(g) Discharging or suspending employees pursuant to
the provisions of an illegally instituted disciplinary pro-
cedure.
(h) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the purposes and policies of the Act.
(a) Recognize and, on request, bargain collectively
with Boston Local No. 600, Graphic Arts International
Union, AFL-CIO-CLC as the exclusive collective-bar-
gaining representative of all production and maintenance
employees, including truck drivers, employed by Re-
spondent at its Lynn, Massachusetts plant, exclusive of
office clerical employees, sales employees, professional
employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(b) Rescind and cease giving effect to any and all
changes in disciplinary procedures and work rules which
were announced to employees about June 3, 1980, or
which were included in an employee handbook which
was distributed about August 1, 1981, and expunge from
employee personnel records any notices or warnings
which were given as a result of the adoption of such
rules and procedures.
(c) Make whole any employees who were suspended
as a result of the implementation of changes in work
rules and disciplinary procedures which were made
about June 3, 1980, or in the employee handbook which
was distributed about August 1, 1981, with interest.
(d) Offer to George Maden, to Robert Lewis, and to
any other employees who have been discharged pursuant
to illegally instituted disciplinary procedures, full and im-
mediate reinstatement to their former or substantially
equivalent employment, without prejudice to their se-
niority or to other rights which they previously enjoyed,
and make them whole for any loss of pay or benefits
which they may have suffered by reason of the discrimi-
nation found herein, in the manner described above in
the section entitled "Remedy."
(e) Preserve and, on request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records nec-
essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Order.
(f) Post at its Lynn, Massachusetts plant, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 1, after being signed by Respondent's authorized
representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediate-
ly upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days
in conspicuous places including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other materi-
al.
(g) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps Respondent
has taken to comply.
" If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board"