HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 24, 2020

2020002791 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 24, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/532,057 05/31/2017 Vimal V. Shah 2012-IP-063661 U1 US 5036
142050 7590 11/24/2020
HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC.
C/O PARKER JUSTISS, P.C.
14241 DALLAS PARKWAY
SUITE 620
DALLAS, TX 75254
EXAMINER
LOIKITH, CATHERINE A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3674
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/24/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@pj-iplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte VIMAL V. SHAH, NEAL G. SKINNER, and CHRIS GORDON
Appeal 2020-002791
Application 15/532,057
Technology Center 3600
Before JILL D. HILL, LEE L. STEPINA, and ARTHUR M. PESLAK,
Administrative Patent Judges.
STEPINA, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–4, 6, 8–15, and 17–20. See Final
Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Halliburton Energy
Services, Inc. Appeal Br. 3.
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Application 15/532,057

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s invention relates to pulse reflection travel time analysis to
track position of a downhole object. Claims 1 and 13 are independent.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method that comprises:
deploying an object downhole via a casing installed in a
well;
transmitting a pulse conveyed by fluid in the casing;
identifying a reflection in response to the pulse; and
analyzing a travel time of the reflection to determine a
position of the object, wherein:
the fluid is identified;
a pulse propagation speed of the fluid is assigned
based on the identified fluid prior to the analyzing; and
the determination of the position of the object is
based on the pulse propagation speed of the fluid.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Smith US 2,999,557 Sept. 12, 1961
Hill US 5,964,289 Oct. 12, 1999
Owens US 6,401,814 B1 June 11, 2002
LeBlanc US 2014/0034301 A1 Feb. 6, 2014
REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 8–11, 13–15, 17, 18, and 202 are rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Owens.

2 The Examiner’s inclusion of claims 5, 7, and 16 in the heading of the
rejection appears to be a typographical error in that these claims are
canceled. See Final Act.1; see also Appeal Br. 4.
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II. Claim 3 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Owens and Hill.
III. Claim 12 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Owens and Smith.
IV. Claim 19 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Owens and LeBlanc.
OPINION
Rejection I; Anticipation by Owens
Appellant makes arguments for the patentability of claims 1, 2, 4, 6,
8–11, 13–15, 17, 18, and 20 as a group. See Appeal Br. 5–8. We select
claim 1 as the representative claim, and claims 2, 4, 6, 8–11, 13–15, 17, 18,
and 20 stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Examiner finds that Owens discloses all the elements recited by
claim 1, including identifying the fluid and assigning a pulse propagation
speed of the fluid based on the identified fluid, prior to analyzing. Final Act.
3. The Examiner finds that because column 3, lines 39–56 and column 4,
lines 22–28 of Owens disclose that the speed through fluid 34 is accurately
determined and later used to determine the plug location, “a pulse
propagation speed of the fluid is determined before the analyzing of travel
time of the reflection to determine a position of the object,” and a pulse
propagation speed of the fluid is assigned based on the identified fluid prior
to the analyzing. Id. (emphasis omitted).
Appellant argues that Owens does not identify a fluid, but broadly
states that “fluid 34 is ‘typically water, mud or brine.’” Appeal Br. 6 (citing
Owens, 3:39–56). Appellant asserts, moreover, that Owens empirically
determines the pulse speed of its fluid based on knowing the distance to the
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float shoe and measuring time. Id. Thus, Appellant asserts that “Owens
does not disclose that a pulse propagation for its fluid is assigned based on
the identified fluid.” Id. According to Appellant, Owens uses the known
length of its casing to determine a position of an object within the casing,
whereas the claims do not require that a length of the casing be known, and
use a known velocity, v, instead. Appeal Br. 7. The distance D is
determined based on a travel time between an initial pressure pulse and first
reflection of the initial pressure pulse (Δt1), using the equation D = v(Δt1/2).
Id. Appellant further asserts that the missing disclosure of Owens is not
inherent. Appeal Br. 7–8.
The Examiner responds that because each fluid (water, mud, or brine)
has known characteristics, and because the “same” fluid is used to determine
the plug (object) location, the fluid is identified “in order to check if the fluid
40 is the same as the fluid 34 or not.” Ans. 9. The Examiner contends that
“Owens discloses that the speed of a pressure pulse through the fluid 34
must be assigned to, i.e. be paired with, that fluid 34 because the speed of a
pressure pulse through the fluid 34 is used later for the fluid 40, which is the
same as fluid 34.” Ans. 8–9.
On the last page of the Answer, as an apparent alternative finding
regarding the fluid identification step, the Examiner states,
Owens further discloses (column 5 lines 15–28)
“approximate pressure pulse speeds for various fluids (e.g.,
water, mud, brine, etc.) may be used to approximate a location
for the plug 42 based on the time measured for a pulse to be
reflected off of the plug.” Please note: a plural form for fluids
and speeds is used which means that various fluids are
distinguished from each other. In other word[s], Owens discloses
that each fluid of the various fluid is narrowly identified with a
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name in order to distinguish various fluids and its associated
pressure pulse speeds.
Ans. 11 (emphasis added). Thus, the Examiner notes that another
embodiment disclosed by Owens appears to disclose a different type of
“identification” of the fluid.
In Reply, Appellant asserts that the method as claimed determines a
position of an object in the casing “using only the assigned pulse
propagation speed of the identified specific fluid in the casing and a time
measured from transmission of an initial pulse in the specific identified fluid
in the casing and its reflection from the object back through the specific
identified fluid in the casing.” Reply Br. 2–3 (emphasis added). Appellant
contends that Owens does not identify the fluid or any characteristic or
feature of the fluid, and merely states which types of fluids could be used.
Reply Br. 4. Appellant thus asserts that “Owens cannot assign a pulse
propagation speed to a fluid based on the identified fluid as pending Claims
1 and 13 require, since Owens does not ascertain a characteristic or feature
of a fluid.” Reply Br. 5. According to Appellant,
Owens first empirically derives a pulse propagation speed of its
proxy fluid 34 by knowing a distance a pressure pulse travels in
proxy fluid 34 and a time it takes for its pulse to travel the known
distance in the proxy fluid 34 (i.e., the proxy) and then uses that
empirically derived pulse propagation speed for its proxy fluid
34 as a pulse propagation speed for a “generally same”
displacement fluid 40 to determine a distance to an object in
Owens' casing 12 (filled with Owens' displacement fluid 40).
Reply Br. 6–7.
Appellant also asserts that, even though the Examiner points to an
embodiment in the Specification that measures distance, that is but one
embodiment, and is not required by the claims. Reply Br. 8–9. Appellant
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reiterates that Owens does not assign a pulse propagation speed, and “always
us[es] whatever pulse propagation speed it empirically derives for its proxy
fluid 34 as its pulse propagation speed for its displacement fluid 40.” Reply
Br. 10. According to Appellant, Owens’s disclosure that the fluid is
“generally the same” means that the fluid could be “slightly different,”
which would yield inaccurate measurements. Reply Br. 10. Appellant
asserts that Owens avoids this problem by using “a pulse propagation speed
empirically derived from its proxy fluid 34 as its pulse propagation speed for
its displacement fluid 40.” Reply Br. 11.
Appellant also argues that, by referring to column 5 of Owens, the
Answer brings in a new ground of rejection, but that, in any event, any
approximation of pressure pulse speed disclosed in column 5 of Owens
“could [also] be slightly different than Owens actual pulse propagation
speed for its actual displacement fluid 40 and would cause the same
inaccurate determination of a position of Owens plug 42 described above.”
Id.
The Examiner has the better position. We agree with the Examiner
that the term “generally the same” as used by Owens means “usually the
same.” Thus, if water is used as the initial fluid, i.e., fluid 34, water is
usually used as the displacement fluid, i.e., fluid 40. See Ans. 9. This is
consistent with Owens, which discloses that “this information [about fluid
34] may be very useful later in the method 10 for accurately determining the
cementing plug’s location and/or displacement through the casing string 12.”
Owens, 3:53–56. If Owens did not know the identity of fluid 34 and the
corresponding pressure pulse speed through fluid 34, Owens would be
unable to use this information later “for accurately determining the
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cementing plug's location and/or displacement through the casing string 12.”
Owens, 3:51–56; see also Ans. 5. “[I]n considering the disclosure of a
reference, it is proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the
reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would
reasonably be expected to draw therefrom.” In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826
(C.C.P.A. 1968). Owens discloses that displacement fluid 40 is the same as
fluid 34, and because the fluids are the same, “the speed of the pressure
pulse through the fluid 40 is accurately known.” Owens, 4:38–39. In order
to choose the same fluid, one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably
infer that Owens consciously chooses fluid “X” to use as the displacement
fluid and thus knows that it is fluid “X” and knows its pressure pulse speed.
In order for Appellant’s assertion to be correct, the person of ordinary skill
practicing Owens’ method would have to blindly add a “same” fluid (as
described in Owens 4:21–24) without knowing what that fluid is.
Appellant’s assertion that the claims require an “identified specific
fluid” is not supported by the Specification. See Reply Br. 2–3. Appellant
does not point to any portion of the Specification, nor do we discern any
disclosure in the Specification, of a specific fluid, e.g., water, having a
temperature of X°C and a given density or other properties that would
distinguish it from water having different properties.
Further, Owens identifies a fluid consistent with the Specification.
The Specification disclose that “the fluid within the casing 92 may be
predetermined or sampled. Once the fluid within the casing 92 is identified,
its known pulse propagation speed properties can be used for pulse reflection
travel time analysis.” Spec. 4:32–34. Similarly, Owens samples fluid 34
and identifies the speed of sound of fluid 34. Owens then uses the identity
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of the fluid and its known speed of sound to determine the object distance.
See Owens, 4:38–45.
Accordingly, Owens method includes knowing what the fluid is, that
is, in Owens’ method, “the fluid is identified” as required by the claims.
Using this known fluid, “the speed (distance/time) of the pressure pulse
through the fluid 34 may be accurately determined.” Owens, 3:50–52.
Owens then uses (assigns) the determined pressure pulse speed of fluid 34 to
fluid 40 to detect the object. Specifically,
Since the speed of the pressure pulse through the fluid 40 is
accurately known, and the difference between the time the
pressure pulse is transmitted (as detected by the transducer) and
the time the pressure pulse is reflected back to the transducer may
be measured by the controller 30, the location of the plug 42 can
be readily computed (speed x time) at any point after the plug has
been released.
Owens, 4:38–45.
Although we appreciate that Owens empirically determines the
pressure pulse speed based on knowing the distance to the float shoe and
measuring time (see Appeal Br. 6), this determination is made prior to
detecting the object.
The law of anticipation does not require that the reference
“teach” what the subject [application] teaches. Assuming that a
reference is properly “prior art,” it is only necessary that the
claims under attack . . . “read on” something disclosed in the
reference, i.e., all limitations of the claim are found in the
reference.
Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 772 (Fed. Cir. 1983). That
Owens discloses additional steps is immaterial to whether Owens discloses
the claimed steps. Specifically, Owens determines the pressure pulse speed
for fluid 34 and assigns this determined value to fluid 40 prior to analyzing a
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travel time to determine a position of an object (in fluid 40). In addition,
because Owens’ fluid 40 is not in the casing prior to determining the
position of the object (“fluid 40 is pumped by the pump 20 on top of the
plug 42 [object]” (Owens, 4:21–22), the fluid to be pumped is identified
prior to pumping so that the same fluid is being used in order to accurately
determine the position of the object. Appellant does not explain why “using
whatever pulse propagation speed it empirically derives for its proxy fluid
34 as its pulse propagation speed for its displacement fluid 40” (Reply Br.
10) is not assigning a pulse propagation speed to displacement fluid 40. In
both cases, the fluid is known and the pulse propagation speed through that
fluid is determined and used in future calculations. Otherwise, as discussed
above, the fluid would be unknown and Owens would not be able to use this
information “for accurately determining the cementing plug's location and/or
displacement through the casing string 12.” Owens, 3:53–56.
With respect to Appellant’s contention that the Answer includes a new
ground of rejection, any request to seek review of the Primary Examiner's
failure to designate a rejection as a new ground of rejection in an Examiner's
Answer must be by way of a petition to the Director under 37 C.F.R. §
1.181, filed within two months from the entry of the Examiner’s Answer and
before the filing of any Reply Brief. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a).
Notwithstanding that the Examiner cited to this portion of Owens in the
Final Action (see Final Act. 4 “a processor (element 30; column 3 lines 57–
67) that analyzes a travel time of the pulse reflection represented by the
electrical signal to determine a position of the object (column 4 line 28 to
column 5 line 49)” (emphasis omitted)), Appellant did not file a petition and
instead, asserts that this additional disclosure of Owens “would cause the
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same inaccurate determination of a position of Owens plug 42 described
above.” Reply Br. 11 (citing Owens, 5:25–28). There, Owen states that
“approximate pressure pulse speeds for various fluids (e.g., water, mud,
brine, etc.) may be used to approximate a location for the plug 42 based on
the time measured for a pulse to be reflected off of the plug.” Appellant
does not identify any reason why Owens’ disclosure of determining that the
fluid is water, mud, or brine and using that identity of the fluid, is different
than Appellant’s disclosure that an identified fluid is a predetermined fluid.
See Spec. 4:32–33. Appellant’s arguments as to the level of specificity of
the identification disclosed by Owens does not patentably distinguish claim
1.
We have considered all of Appellant's arguments in support of the
patentability of claim 1, but find them unavailing. Accordingly, we sustain
the rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 8–11, 13–15, 17, 18, and 20.
Rejections II–IV—Owens, Smith, Hill, LeBlanc (Claims 3, 12, 19)
Appellant does not make arguments for the patentability of claims 3,
12, and 19 aside from those discussed above regarding claim 1. See Appeal
Br. 8–11. Specifically, Appellant argues that each of Smith, Hill, or
LeBlanc “fails to teach or suggest identifying a fluid in a casing or assigning
a pulse propagation speed of a fluid based on the identified fluid. Id. at 9.
Accordingly, for the same reasons set forth above regarding Rejection I, we
sustain Rejections II–IV.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed.

Appeal 2020-002791
Application 15/532,057

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DECISION SUMMARY

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4, 6, 8–
11, 13–15, 17,
18, 20
102(a)(1) Owens 1, 2, 4, 6, 8–
11, 13–15, 17,
18, 20

3 103 Owens, Hill 3
12 103 Owens, Smith 12
19 103 Owens, LeBlanc 19
Overall
Outcome:
1–4, 6, 8–15,
17–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED