Hala Farouk. El-Hmayssi et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 2, 2020

15188308 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/188,308 06/21/2016 Hala Farouk El-Hmayssi 31083.40US3 7045
34018 7590 04/02/2020
Greenberg Traurig, LLP
77 W. Wacker Drive
Suite 3100
CHICAGO, IL 60601-1732
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, THUY-VI THI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3664
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/02/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
chiipmail@gtlaw.com
clairt@gtlaw.com
jarosikg@gtlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte HALA FAROUK EL-HMAYSSI and GEOFFRY A. WESTPHAL
Appeal 2018-003917
Application 15/188,308
Technology Center 3600
Before JEAN R. HOMERE, MELISSA A. HAAPALA, and
AMBER L. HAGY, Administrative Patent Judges.
HAGY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–10, which are all of the pending
claims. See Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as the applicant,
W.W. Grainger, Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a system for presenting product review
information to a user. Appeal Br. 11 (Claims App’x). By way of
background, Appellant’s Specification notes that computer-implemented
systems and methods “for allowing users to collaborate in evaluating
products over a public network, such as the Internet, are known.” Spec. 1:9–
10. Appellant’s Specification describes one such prior-art system in which
users “assign ratings/comments to features of a product,” wherein “such
user-submitted ratings/comments can be qualified (or moderated) by other
users.” Id. at 1:10–14.
Appellant’s Specification describes and claims a system and methods
“allowing users to rate features of a product, for allowing users to comment
on features of a product, and for quickly displaying such user
ratings/comments as appropriate.” Id. at 3:15–18. In particular, “users are
preferably allowed to rate pre-defined characteristics of a product, e.g.,
characteristics of a product pre-selected by a vendor of product, and/or to
rate user-defined characteristics of a product.” Id. at 3:18–20. Appellant’s
Specification further describes that, in certain circumstances, a user can
provide a “tag” for a product, and the “tags can be used to generate ratable,
user-defined characteristics of a product.” Id. at 15:15–17. For example,
a user may tag that product “4EY97” is “good for use in
paintball.” If a predetermined number of additional reviewers
provide tags which use the same or similar keyword (with
similar keywords being established within a created thesaurus),
the system may automatically generate a ratable characteristic
using that keyword, e.g., a “good for paintball” ratable
characteristic.
Id. at 15:18–23. By way of another example, information provided by a user
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in a review can also be “examined to discern if there is a recurring use of
keywords or themes that would indicate that such keywords or themes would
be appropriate for use in auto-generating ratable characteristics (or manually
by a curator) in the manner discussed above.” Id. at 16:4–8.
Claim 1, reproduced below with disputed limitations italicized, is the
sole independent claim, and illustrates the claimed subject matter:
1. A computer-readable media embodied in a non-transient,
physical memory having stored thereon computer executable
instructions for presenting product review information to a user,
the instructions performing steps, comprising:
presenting on a plurality of client computing device user
interface elements for receiving review information from a
plurality of product reviewers for a product wherein the user
interface elements comprise at least one text entry field for
receiving from each of the product reviewers product reviewer
generated content;
using a parser to extract from each product reviewer
generated content one or more keywords;
automatically transforming a keywords extracted from
the product reviewer generated content into a ratable
characteristic of the product in response to a same or
equivalent keyword being used in product reviewer generated
content received from a plurality of different ones of the
plurality of product reviewers via the at least one text entry
field;
causing an image of a product and a ratings dashboard to
be presented on a further client computing device wherein the
ratings dashboard is associated with the image of the product
and wherein the ratings dashboard provides a quick visual
summary of review information provided by product reviewers
which information includes at least a visualization of an
average overall product reviewer rating for the product;
in response to a sensed user interaction with the ratings
dashboard retrieving from a database review information
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provided by product reviewers, using the retrieved information
provided by product reviewers to determine at least a number of
product reviewers that have given the product each of a
plurality of overall product reviewer ratings and an average
overall product reviewer rating of at least the ratable
characteristic of the product, and causing a quick review
summary for the product to be presented on the further client
computing device wherein the quick review summary for the
product provides a top line visual summary of at least the
number of product reviewers that have given the product each
of a plurality of overall product reviewer ratings and the
average overall product reviewer rating of at least the ratable
characteristic of the product; and
in response to a first sensed user interaction with the
quick review summary for the product causing a full review to
be presented on the further client computing device wherein the
presented full review includes information related to all product
reviewer reviews for the product, a user interface by which the
information is capable of being at least one of sorted and
filtered, and at least one user interface element for providing a
user rating to the ratable characteristic.
REFERENCES2
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Pinto
Dillard
US 8,504,486 B1
US 8,645,295 B1
Aug. 6, 2013
Feb. 4, 2014
Thorkelsson
Naveh
US 2011/0208801 A1
US 2013/0073378 A1
Aug. 25, 2011
Mar. 21, 2013

2 All reference citations are to the first named inventor only.
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REJECTIONS3
Claims 1–10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter (abstract idea). Final Act. 2–4.
Claims 1–3 and 7–10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Pinto and Dillard. Final Act. 4–14.
Claims 4 and 5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Pinto, Dillard, and Thorkelsson. Final
Act. 14–15.
Claim 6 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Pinto, Dillard, and Naveh. Final Act.
15–17.
OPINION
I. Section 101 Rejection
The Examiner rejects all of the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as patent-ineligible because they are directed to a judicial exception without
significantly more. Final Act. 2–4, 17–19; Ans. 17–19. Appellant argues
that the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, are directed to patent-
eligible subject matter, and the Examiner’s rejection should be reversed.
Appeal Br. 6–7; Reply Br. 2. For the reasons explained below, we are not
persuaded of Examiner error in the § 101 rejection, and we, therefore,
sustain that rejection.

3 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) included revisions to 35
U.S.C. § 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. Because the priority
application for the present application was filed before March 16, 2013, the
Examiner applies the pre-AIA version of the statutory bases for
unpatentability. See Final Act. 2.
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A. Principles of Law
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has interpreted § 101
to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S.
208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted).
The Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-part framework previously set
forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-
eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. The first
part in the analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed
to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. For example, abstract ideas
include, but are not limited to, fundamental economic practices, methods of
organizing human activities, an idea of itself, and mathematical formulas or
relationships. Id. at 218–20. The “directed to” inquiry asks not whether
“the claims involve a patent-ineligible concept,” but instead whether,
“considered in light of the specification, . . . ‘their character as a whole is
directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In that regard, we determine whether
the claims “focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology” or are “directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea
and merely invoke generic processes and machinery.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai
Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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If, in the first part of the Alice/Mayo analysis, we conclude that the
claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, we consider them
patent eligible under § 101 and our inquiry ends. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v.
CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the second
part in the Alice/Mayo analysis is to consider the elements of the claims
“individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there
are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S.
at 79, 78). In other words, the second part is to “search for an “‘inventive
concept’”—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original)
(quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73). The prohibition against patenting an
abstract idea “‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment’ or adding ‘insignificant
postsolution activity.’” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610–11 (2010)
(citation omitted).
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “Office”) has published
revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50–57 (Jan. 7,
2019) (“2019 Guidance”). Under the 2019 Guidance, the Office first looks
to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or
mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
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exception into a practical application. See 2019 Guidance at 52, 54–55; see
also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).4
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, does the Office then
look to whether the claim: (a) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (b) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. See 2019 Guidance at 56. We
follow this guidance here.5
In reviewing the Examiner’s rejection under § 101, we group all
claims together and select claim 1 as representative of the group, as the
Examiner and Appellant have done. See Final Act. 2–4, 18–19; Appeal Br.
6–7; 37 C.F.R. § 31.47(c)(1)(iv). Accordingly, all claims stand or fall with
claim 1.

4 Unless otherwise specified herein, all references to the MPEP are to Rev.
08.2017 (Jan. 2018).
5 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management,
expected to follow the guidance.” 2019 Guidance at 51; see also October
2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, 2 (Oct. 17, 2019) (“October 2019
Update”) (“Note, the feedback received was primarily directed to
examination procedures and, accordingly, this update focuses on clarifying
practice for patent examiners. However, all USPTO personnel are expected
to follow the guidance.”), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf.
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B. Application of Legal Principles6
1. Step 2A of 2019 Guidance
Prong 1: Claims Recite an Abstract Idea
In applying the framework set out in Alice/Mayo, and as the first part
of that analysis, the Examiner concludes the claims recite steps that amount
to “an idea of itself,” similar to “using categories to organize, store and
transmit information” (Final Act. 3 (citing Cyberfone7)), as well as
“mathematical relationships/formulas” in terms of calculating an “average
overall product reviewer rating” of a product (id. ). Appellant argues the
Examiner’s conclusion is in error, and asserts the claims are directed to more
than “an idea of itself” because they “set forth tangible elements.” Appeal
Br. 6.
In rejecting the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner analyzes
the claims using the Mayo/Alice two-step framework, consistent with the
guidance set forth in the USPTO’s “2014 Interim Guidance on Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility,” 79 Fed. Reg. 74618 (Dec. 16, 2014), in effect at
the time the rejection was made, i.e., on February 24, 2017. The Examiner’s
Final Office Action notifies Appellant of the reasons for the rejection

6 Because it is undisputed that Appellant’s claims are directed to recognized
statutory categories of processes and machines, we move directly to the two-
part Alice/Mayo analysis. 2019 Guidance at 53 (“Examiners should
determine whether a claim satisfies the criteria for subject matter eligibility
by evaluating the claim in accordance with the criteria discussed in MPEP
2106, i.e., whether the claim is to a statutory category (Step 1) and the
Alice/Mayo test for judicial exceptions (Steps 2A and 2B).”).
7 Cyberfone Sys., LLC v. CNN Interactive Group, Inc., 558 F. App’x 988,
992 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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“together with such information and references as may be useful in judging
of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of . . . [the] application.” 35
U.S.C. § 132. See Final Act. 2–3. In doing so, the Examiner sets forth a
prima facie case of unpatentability such that the burden of production shifted
to Appellant to demonstrate that the claims are patent-eligible. We agree
generally with the Examiner’s rejection under § 101. We clarify and expand
the Examiner’s reasoning below.
The 2019 Guidance uses enumerated groupings of abstract ideas that
are rooted in U.S. Supreme Court precedent, as well as Federal Circuit
decisions interpreting that precedent. See 2019 Guidance at 51–52. By
grouping the abstract ideas, the 2019 Guidance synthesizes the holdings of
various court decisions to facilitate examination. The 2019 Guidance
describes one category of abstract ideas as including “[m]ental processes”;
that is, “concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion).” Id. at 52 (footnotes omitted). The October
2019 Update provides additional clarification on “mental processes” by
providing an example of claims that recite mental processes as including “a
claim to ‘collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results
of the collection and analysis,’ where the data analysis steps are recited at a
high level of generality such that they could practically be performed in the
human mind.” October 2019 Update at 7 (citing Electric Power Group8).
The October 2019 Update also gives as an example of a claim reciting a
“mental process” a “claim to collecting and comparing known information

8 Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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. . . , which are steps that can be practically performed in the human mind.”
Id. at 8 (citing Classen9).
We determine that the claims recite steps that fall within the category
of mental processes, consistent with the 2019 Guidance. See 2019 Guidance
at 52; see also October 2019 Update at 7–8. In particular, claim 1 recites
steps of “receiving review information from a plurality of product reviewers
. . . ,” “extract[ing] from each product reviewer generated content one or
more keywords,” “automatically transforming a keywords [sic] . . . into a
ratable characteristic of the product . . . ,” and “using the retrieved
information provided by product reviewers to determine at least a number of
product reviewers that have given the product each of a plurality of overall
product reviewer ratings and an average overall product reviewer rating of at
least the ratable characteristic of the product, . . .” Appeal Br. 11–12
(Claims App’x). Each of these steps pertains to “presenting product review
information to a user” by allowing a user to rate or review items (products)
based on ratable characteristics (data), receiving rating values (data),
summarizing, sorting, and filtering review information (data), and producing
a result (a rating or review) for each item based on review information
provided.
A person can perform the functions of “receiving review information”
and “extract[ing] . . . one or more keywords” from review information
mentally, or by using pen and paper. A person can similarly employ a
mental process to “automatically transform[]” a keyword into a ratable
characteristic in response to “a same or equivalent keyword being used in

9 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
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product reviewer generated content” in multiple reviews, as recited. For
example, a person could perform a survey of shoppers to obtain their
reviews or ratings of a product; if the surveyor noticed that many shoppers
commented on the “durability” of a product in their reviews, the surveyor
could make a mental note to add that characteristic to the survey questions.
We also determine, under the circumstances of this case, that the additional
recited steps of retrieving, sorting, and summarizing review information
amount to data collection and analysis that is part of the mental process. As
our reviewing court has held, even if an analysis requires one to access and
gather data from a database or to utilize a pen and paper in the analysis, such
analysis may still be an abstract mental process. See, e.g., CyberSource
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“[E]ven if some physical steps are required to obtain information from the
database . . . such data-gathering steps cannot alone confer patentability.” A
claim focused on verifying credit card transaction information is directed to
“unpatentable mental processes” because the claim’s steps “can be
performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper.”); see
also SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1165, 1167–68 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (claims reciting “[a] method for providing statistical analysis”
were determined to be “directed to an abstract idea”; noting that “even if a
process of collecting and analyzing information is limited to particular
content or a particular source, that limitation does not make the collection
and analysis other than abstract”); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital
One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (identifying the
abstract idea of collecting, displaying, and manipulating data); Elec. Power
Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354 (characterizing collecting information, analyzing
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information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical
algorithms, and presenting the results of collecting and analyzing
information, without more, as matters within the realm of abstract ideas).
In summary, we conclude Appellant’s claim 1 recites a judicial
exception (USPTO’s Step 2A, Prong 1; see 2019 Guidance). Specifically,
claim 1 recites steps of presenting product review information to a user,
including receiving data in the form of product review information,
extracting keywords from that information to create a ratable characteristic
of a product, and sorting and summarizing product reviews based on overall
product reviewer rating as well as reviewable characteristics. The review /
rating process consists of mental processes capable of being performed in
the human mind (or utilizing pen and paper) including observation,
evaluation, or judgment. See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 53 (listing
“[m]ental processes--concepts performed in the human mind (including an
observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion)” as one of the “enumerated
groupings of abstract ideas” (footnote omitted)). The 2019 Guidance
explains that “mental processes” include acts that people can perform in
their minds or using pen and paper, even if the claim recites that a generic
computer component performs the acts. See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52 n.14 (“If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers
performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer
components, then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim
cannot practically be performed in the mind.”). Because each of the
limitations discussed above encompasses one or more acts that people can
practically perform in their minds or using pen and paper, claim 1 recites
mental processes. Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us otherwise.
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Prong 2: Claims Fail to Integrate the Abstract
Idea Into a Practical Application
In accordance with Prong 2 of Step 2A of the 2019 Guidance, we
evaluate the claims to determine whether they recite additional elements
beyond the abstract idea, and, if so, we evaluate the additional elements to
determine whether they integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application. 2019 Guidance at 54. The 2019 Guidance at page 55 provides
exemplary considerations, including whether an additional element:
• “reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or
an improvement to other technology or technical field”;
• “implements a judicial exception with, or uses a judicial
exception in conjunction with, a particular machine or
manufacture that is integral to the claim”;
• “effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article [or
thing] to a different state or thing”; or
• “applies or uses the judicial exception in some other meaningful
way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception
to a particular technological environment.”
The 2019 Guidance also highlights certain examples in which courts
have held that “a judicial exception has not been integrated into a practical
application,” such as where the claims “merely use[] a computer as a tool to
perform an abstract idea” or the additional element adds “insignificant extra-
solution activity” to the abstract idea. 2019 Guidance at 55 (emphasis
added); see also October 2019 Update at 11–15.
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The Examiner acknowledges the claims recite additional elements
beyond the abstract idea, such as a “parser” to extract keywords and
“providing an image of a product.” Final Act. 18. We also note claim 1
recites steps that entail using a “client computing device” to receive product
review information through a user interface, and to cause an image of a
product and a “ratings dashboard” (visual user interface) to be displayed
along with a visualization of the product review information in various
formats (such as a “quick review summary” or a “full review”). We agree
with the Examiner’s findings that such additional elements employ generic
computer elements that “do not add a meaningful limitation[s] to the abstract
idea because they would be routine in any computer implementation.” Id. at
3. In that regard, we note Appellant’s Specification describes an “exemplary
computing system” for use in the claimed invention as a “device having
conventional computer components,” and also describes all of the
components of such a computing system as generic components, including a
“personal computer” or “mobile computing device” with standard
processors, memories, and displays. See Spec. 4:1–7:17. Nothing in
Appellant’s claims or Specification indicates any components that represent
a technological improvement, nor does Appellant argue as such.
Therefore, we agree with the Examiner’s determination that the claims
do not include an improvement to another technology or technical field or an
improvement to the functioning of the computer itself. See Final Act. 7; see
also Ans. 3–6. Nor do the claims implement the judicial exception with “a
particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim Appellant’s
invention.” Rather, Appellant’s invention is directed to the information
collection problem of gathering and presenting product review information
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to a user, and the claims are directed to the information collection solution of
extracting keywords from product reviews and using them to form ratable
characteristics, and providing review information to users in the form of
quick summaries as well as full reviews—a process in which a computer is
used as a tool in its ordinary capacity to automate a process that could
otherwise be carried out in the human mind, or with the aid of pen and
paper.10 See Final Act. 7. As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, “if a
patent’s recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to
‘implemen[t]’ an abstract idea ‘on . . . a computer,’ that addition cannot
impart patent eligibility.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at
84).
We also determine the claims do not recite elements beyond the
abstract idea that include a “transformation or reduction of a particular
article [or thing] to a different state or thing.” The only “transformation”
indicated by the claims is “automatically transforming” keywords extracted
from the product review into a “ratable characteristic.” But, as noted above,
this step is part of the process involving a manipulation of data that could be
performed in the human mind, and, thus, is part of the recited abstract idea.
We also determine, for the foregoing reasons, that the claims do not apply
the abstract idea beyond generally linking the use of an abstract idea to a
generic computing environment. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223–24
(“[W]holly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of
‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical assurance that the process

10 Appellant’s Specification confirms that computer-implemented steps may
be performed by a “general-purpose computing device.” Spec. ¶ 33.
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is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea]
itself.”’ (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)).
In summary, we conclude the claims do not integrate the abstract idea
into a practical application. Accordingly, in the first part of the Alice/Mayo
analysis, we conclude the claims are directed to an abstract idea.
2. Step 2B of 2019 Guidance – Claims Fail to Recite Significantly More
Than the Abstract Idea
Regarding the second part of the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner
finds the elements of the claims, when considered individually or as an
ordered combination, do not recite significantly more than the abstract idea.
Final Act. 2–3, 18. In particular, the Examiner finds “the claimed invention
is merely using the generic computer as a tool to implement the abstract
idea.” Id. at 18. We agree.
We find the steps beyond the recited abstract idea, such as “presenting
on a plurality of client computing device user interface elements for
receiving review information”; “causing an image of a product and ratings
dashboard to be presented on a further client computing device”; and
providing “visualization” of summary reviews, overall product ratings, or
full reviews to be insignificant extra-solution activity. As our reviewing
court has explained, such data gathering and transmissions simply provide
data for other method steps. See, e.g., CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We have held that
mere ‘[data-gathering] step[s] cannot make an otherwise nonstatutory claim
statutory.”’(alterations in original) (quoting In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840
(Fed. Cir. 1989))); see also 2019 Guidance at 55 (identifying “add[ing]
insignificant extra-solution activity to the” abstract idea as an example of
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when an abstract idea has not been integrated into a practical application).
In particular, as also noted above, the claim elements beyond the abstract
idea recite only generic computer functions and components that are well-
understood, routine, and conventional—that is, receiving, storing, and
displaying data; such generic computer functions and components do not
convey an inventive concept. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. Appellant is
reminded that in most cases, “relying on a computer to perform routine tasks
more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent
eligible.” OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (citing
Alice, 573 U.S. at 224 (holding that “use of a computer to create electronic
records, track multiple transactions, and issue simultaneous instructions” is
not an inventive concept)); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank,
792 F.3d 1363, 1370 (“[M]erely adding computer functionality to increase
the speed or efficiency of the process does not confer patent eligibility on an
otherwise abstract idea.”).
Appellant argues the claimed invention “cannot be said, as a matter of
law, to have been conventional or generic” because “the prior art of record
fails to disclose the claimed solution to the computer-centric problem that is
being solved by the [claimed] invention,” citing further to Appellant’s
traversal of the prior-art rejection. Appeal Br. 7 (emphasis omitted). But
even if Appellant’s invention is novel relative to the prior art, that does not
necessarily render it patent-eligible under § 101. Even a novel and
nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-
ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90. Indeed, “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any
element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance
in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101
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categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 188–189 (1981).
For the reasons discussed above, we determine that the functions
recited in Appellant’s claims, considered individually or an ordered
combination, do not add any meaningful limitations beyond generally
linking the abstract idea to a generic technological environment.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35
U.S.C. § 101 as patent-ineligible. We also sustain the rejection of claims 2–
10, which are not separately argued (see Appeal Br. 6–7), as patent-
ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
II. Section 103 Rejections
The Examiner rejects independent claim 1 over the combination of
Pinto and Dillard, finding Pinto discloses most of the recited limitations.
Final Act. 4–7. The Examiner acknowledges Pinto does not disclose inter
alia, the disputed limitations noted above, for which the Examiner relies on
Dillard in combination with Pinto. Id. at 7–10. With regard to the disputed
limitations, the Examiner finds Dillard “discloses the characteristics/
attributes received from reviewers for reviewing product[s] are generated
based on the common key word/phrase from the reviewers.” Id. at 9 (citing
Dillard, Fig. 9). In Figure 9, Dillard depicts a user interface “with a text box
or similar element enabling the user to enter text and/or other information
for a review.” Dillard, Fig. 9, 8:55–58. “As part of the display, the user can
be presented with information . . . that other users might care about for the
item,” such as, in the example provided, “motion blur, sound quality,
stylishness, value, battery life . . . .” Id. at 8:58–60, Fig. 9. Dillard explains
that “[a]ny appropriate criteria can be utilized to select attributes in
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accordance with the various embodiments,” including based on “user data,
historical information, geographical information, or seasonal data,” or based
on the “number of reviews per attribute.” Id. at 8:66–9:11.
As Appellant aptly notes, although Dillard discloses various ways in
which attributes may be selected as prompts for user reviews, Dillard does
not expressly disclose that the attributes are automatically transformed from
keywords included in user reviews. See Appeal Br. 8–9. The Examiner
finds that Dillard “inherently” discloses parsing user review information or
identifying keywords from user reviews to generate the ratable
characteristics. Ans. 20–21.
As our reviewing court has held, “inherency may supply a missing
claim limitation in an obviousness analysis.” PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI
Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1194–95 (Fed. Cir. 2014). But “the use of
inherency, a doctrine originally rooted in anticipation, must be carefully
circumscribed in the context of obviousness.” Id. at 1195. Inherency “may
not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a
certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.”
In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (CCPA 1981).
Here, the Examiner points to insufficient evidence to support a finding
that Dillard inherently discloses that user reviews are parsed to extract
keywords that are then transformed into ratable attributes, as required by
claim 1. To the extent Dillard discloses how ratable attributes are initially
chosen, Dillard discloses they are pre-selected by an administrator or other
entity and programmed into the system. See Dillard, 13:9–46 (describing
scenarios in which a “retailer” or “set of workers” determine relevant
attributes). The system may then use various criteria, disclosed in Dillard, to
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select from those pre-programmed attributes to determine which attributes to
display as user prompts. See id. at 8:55–9:11. Although it is possible that
attributes may also be based on keywords parsed from user reviews, the
Examiner does not point to any teaching in Dillard of an embodiment in
which this is necessarily the case.
Thus, the Examiner has not provided sufficient evidence or reasoning
to support a finding that Dillard teaches or suggests
using a parser to extract from each product reviewer
generated content one or more keywords; [and]
automatically transforming a keywords extracted from
the product reviewer generated content into a ratable
characteristic of the product in response to a same or equivalent
keyword being used in product reviewer generated content
received from a plurality of different ones of the plurality of
product reviewers via the at least one text entry field;
as recited in claim 1. This gap in the Examiner’s findings is fatal to the
Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of independent claim 1 over the
combination of Pinto and Dillard, and we, therefore, do not sustain that
rejection. Although the Examiner relies on additional references
(Thorkelsson and Naveh) in the rejection of some of the dependent claims,
the Examiner does not rely on those references in a manner that would
remedy the deficiency we have determined in the Examiner’s findings as to
independent claim 1. Therefore, all of the dependent claims 2–10 stand with
independent claim 1.

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CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of claims 1–10 is affirmed.
The Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections of claims 1–10 are
reversed.
Because we affirm the rejection of each pending claim, the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–10 is affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis/References Affirmed Reversed
1–10 101 Ineligible subject
matter
1–10
1–3, 7–10 103(a) Pinto, Dillard 1–3, 7–10
4, 5 103(a) Pinto, Dillard,
Thorkelsson
4, 5
6 103(a) Pinto, Dillard, Naveh 6
OVERALL OUTCOME

1–10
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED