Guerra, Filipe et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 4, 2020

14687901 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 4, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/687,901 04/15/2015 Filipe Guerra 1301-062U 1319
112025 7590 02/04/2020
Shutts & Bowen LLP
Steven M. Greenberg, Esq.
525 Okeechobee Blvd
# 1100
West Palm Beach, FL 33401
EXAMINER
CUMMING, WILLIAM D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2645
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/04/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@crgolaw.com
patents@shutts.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte FILIPE GUERRA and VLADYSLAV KULCHYTSKYY
Appeal 2019-000782
Application 14/687,901
Technology Center 2600
Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and
NABEEL U. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. See Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as SugarCRM, Inc.
Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2019-000782
Application 14/687,901
2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to privacy assurance in location based
services. Spec., Title. To avoid revealing the actual location of a user, a
nearby public facility is presented instead. Claim 1. Claim 1, reproduced
below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A privacy assurance method for location based services, the
method comprising:
computing a location for a mobile device corresponding to
an end user of a multi-user enterprise application;
identifying a valid location of the mobile device that is at
least a threshold distance from the computed location and that is
a public facility; and
blurring the computed location to other end users of the
multi-user application by presenting the identified valid location
to the other end users in the multi-user enterprise application in
lieu of the computed location so as to maintain confidential the
computed location while instead revealing as a location of the
end user a location that is not the computed location but close to
the computed location.
REFERENCE
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Jackson US 8,655,389 B1 Feb. 18, 2014

REJECTION
Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being
anticipated by Jackson. Final Act. 2–10.

Appeal 2019-000782
Application 14/687,901
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OPINION
The Examiner finds Jackson’s location blurring in response to a user’s
proximity to a public location discloses the limitation of identifying a valid
location of the mobile device that is at least a threshold distance from the
computed location and that is a public facility. Final Act. 3 (citing Jackson
col. 4, ll. 51–63, col. 7, ll. 11–17, Fig. 3). The Examiner further finds
Jackson’s display of a blurred location (i.e., a wider geographic area in
which the user is located) discloses the blurring limitation (i.e., inter alia,
blurring the computed location by presenting the identified valid location to
other end users in lieu of the computed location). Id. at 3–4 (citing Jackson
Figs. 1, 3, 5; col. 4, ll. 39–50). Therefore, the Examiner finds Jackson’s
blurred location discloses presenting a nearby public facility. According to
the Examiner, displaying a wider geographic region “maintain[s]
confidential the computed location while instead revealing as a location of
the end user a location that is not the computed location but close to the
computed location” as required by claim 1. Id.
Appellant argues Jackson’s blurring of a user’s location by depicting
an imprecise wide radius in which the user is located, instead of the user’s
precise location, fails to disclose “presenting an identified valid location
to the other end users in the multi-user enterprise application in lieu of the
computed location where the identified valid location is (1) at least a
threshold distance from the computed location and (2) that is a public
facility.” Appeal Br. 8. Appellant argues “[i]n Jackson, an imprecise area
that includes the precise location of the end user is shown and Jackson
makes no reference to presenting [a] valid location that is a threshold
distance from the computed location and a public facility instead of the
computed location.” Id. Appellant alleges Jackson’s “reference [to public
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Application 14/687,901
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places] . . . is not to the blurred location, but to the ‘condition’ which if
satisfied, causes blurring.” Id. at 9.
We agree the Examiner erred in rejecting the claims as anticipated
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). In order to anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102, a
prior art reference must disclose all elements of the claim within the four
corners of the document (whether expressly or inherently) arranged as in the
claim. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed.
Cir. 1983). Jackson discloses a level of location blurring is triggered based
on proximity to designated locations such as a public place. Jackson 4:66–
5:7. Jackson describes “[b]lurring (or fuzzing) a location may be an
intentional introduction of inaccuracies into the location information and/or
direction for an entity or intentionally obfuscating the location information
of an entity by generalizing a precise location to a larger area or radius of
uncertainity.” Jackson 3:9–14. Thus, although Jackson describes blurring,
Jackson’s blurring introduces inaccuracies or generalizes a precise location
to a larger area. In contrast, claim 1 recites presenting a different location (a
valid location) “at least a threshold distance from the computed location . . .
that is a public facility.”
Although the location of the public place (valid location) might be
included within Jackson’s blurred location (e.g., expanded geographical area
in which the user is located), we find no disclosure that such would
necessarily be the case. For example, we might posit a scenario in which a
public location is within a threshold distance of a user’s computed location
so as to trigger location blurring and, if the threshold distance was set equal
to or less than a blurred location radius, the public location would be within
the blurred location. However, in the absence of Jackson’s disclosure of
such an arrangement, and because we are unable to ascertain from the record
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before us that Jackson’s public location inherently2 would be included
within an expanded, blurred location, we agree with Appellant that Jackson
fails to disclose the argued limitations and, correspondingly, fails to
anticipate claim 1.
Because we agree with at least one of the arguments advanced by
Appellant, we need not reach the merits of Appellant’s other arguments.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 or, for
the same reasons, the rejection of independent claims 7 and 15 under 35
U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Jackson or the rejection of
dependent claims 2–6, 8–14, and 16–20 which stand with their respective
base claims.
CONCLUSION

REVERSED

2 “[A]nticipation by inherent disclosure is appropriate only when the
reference discloses prior art that must necessarily include the unstated
limitation ....” Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “Inherency, however, may not be established by
probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result
from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” Cont’l Can Co. USA,
Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991). “Inherent
anticipation requires that the missing descriptive material is ‘necessarily
present,’ not merely probably or possibly present, in the prior art.” Trintec
Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(quoting In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 102(a)(1) Jackson 1–20