Guadalupe Lopez, Complainant,v.Mel R. Martinez, Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 27, 2001
01980214 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 27, 2001)

01980214

09-27-2001

Guadalupe Lopez, Complainant, v. Mel R. Martinez, Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Agency.


Guadalupe Lopez v. Department of Housing & Urban Development

01980214

09-27-01

.

Guadalupe Lopez,

Complainant,

v.

Mel R. Martinez,

Secretary,

Department of Housing and Urban Development,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01980214

Agency Nos. 93-28, 93-35, 93-48, 95-05

Hearing Nos. 310-97-5120X, 310-97-5121X, 310-97-5122X, 310-97-5123X

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts the complainant's

appeal from the agency's final decision in the above-entitled matter.

Complainant filed four complaints in which he claimed that the agency

discriminated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e, et seq., and Section

501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791.

The agency consolidated the four complaints, conducted an investigation,

and thereafter referred the matter to an administrative judge (AJ).

The AJ held a hearing and recommended a finding of no discrimination

in all four complaints. The agency subsequently adopted the AJ's

recommendation as its final decision. This appeal followed.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Whether the agency discriminated against complainant on the bases of

national origin (Hispanic), disability (back injury, post traumatic

stress disorder, internal injuries), and reprisal when it failed to

select complainant for a position as an Equal Opportunity Specialist

(EOS) between June 1991 and December 1992 (Complaint No. 93-28);

Whether the agency discriminated against complainant on the bases of

national origin and reprisal when, on unspecified dates, the enforcement

director told the acting supervisor to ask him to return to his desk,

inquired of his whereabouts, accused him of parking in the wrong area,

and accused him of defrauding the government with respect to a travel

voucher (Complaint No. 93-35);

Whether the agency discriminated against complainant on the bases of

national origin and reprisal when, on September 2, 1993, his supervisor

accused him of taking unauthorized leave for an extended lunch and

ordering him to submit a leave slip (Complaint No. 93-48); and

Whether the agency discriminated against complainant on the bases of

national origin and reprisal when, on September 9, 1994, his supervisor

and the fair housing director terminated his temporary appointment

(Complaint No. 95-05).

ANALYSIS

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant

must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme

Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). He

must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that

he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination or reprisal. Furnco

Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie

inquiry may be dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency

has articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for each of

the personnel actions at issue. See United States Postal Service Board

of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the agency's explanations for those actions are pretexts for

discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530

U.S. 133 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519

(1993); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

256 (1981). While disbelief of the agency's articulated reasons does

not compel a finding of discrimination as a matter of law, disbelief of

the reasons put forward by the agency, together with the elements of

the prima facie case, may suffice to show intentional discrimination.

Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511; EEOC Enforcement Guidance on St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks (April 12, 1994); Huerta v. Department of the Air Force,

EEOC Request No. 05930802 (April 1, 1994). With these principles in mind,

we now turn to the four complaints at issue.

93-28

Between May of 1991 and December of 1992, complainant applied for an

EOS position under two vacancy announcements, but was not selected for

either position. He contends that the agency selected candidates with

inferior qualifications. The enforcement division director, who served

as the selecting official, responded that complainant's name was not on

the rosters of best-qualified candidates from which the selections were

made. Moreover, the record establishes that complainant was eventually

hired either near the end of December of 1992 or in January of 1993,

from a displaced employee list forwarded by OPM. On appeal, complainant

maintained that he was entitled to priority consideration, and that his

qualifications were superior to those of the selectees.

The agency has broad discretion to set policies and carry out personnel

decisions, and should not be second-guessed by the reviewing authority

absent evidence of unlawful motivation. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259;

Vanek v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05940906 (January

16, 1997). Complainant may be able to establish pretext with a showing

that his qualifications were plainly superior to those of the selectee.

Wasser v. Department of Labor, EEOC Request No. 05940058 (November 2,

1995); Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 1981). He has not

done so, nor has he presented any other evidence which contradicts the

testimony of the selecting official and the other officials involved in

the two selections, or which undermines their credibility as witnesses.

Notwithstanding complainant's arguments to the contrary on appeal, we find

that the reasons given by the enforcement division director are supported

by substantial evidence in the record. We therefore concur with the

AJ's findings of no discrimination with respect to Complaint No. 93-28.

93-35

As previously noted, complainant had been hired as a temporary EOS by

January of 1993. The incidents at issue in this complaint occurred

during March and April of 1993. Complainant appears to be arguing that

the incidents complained of constituted discriminatory harassment.

On one occasion, the enforcement director personally observed that

complainant was away from his desk and not doing any work. He instructed

the supervisor on duty to tell complainant to return to his work station.

On several occasions, the enforcement director asked where complainant

was after observing that he was not at his work area. He testified that

he did so only as it related to the agency's business. Several other

employees testified that the enforcement director monitored them as well.

As to the parking incident, complainant testified that the enforcement

director asked him what he had done with a car in a harsh, accusatory

manner and in the presence of several people who were not employees.

The enforcement director denied that he had accused complainant of

anything, and reiterated that all he had asked complainant was where he

had parked the car. Finally, complainant maintains that the enforcement

director threatened to report him to the inspector general concerning

a $7.00-discrepancy in a travel voucher. The enforcement director

denied accusing complainant of defrauding the government, but stated

that complainant did not provide adequate documentation of the expenses

in question.

It is well-settled that harassment in the workplace that occurs because of

membership in a particular group or because of participation in protected

EEO activity violates Title VII. Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Liability

for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Notice No. 915.002, p. 2

(June 18, 1999). To prevail in a harassment claim, complainant must

show that: (1) he belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) he was

subjected to unwelcome conduct; (3) the conduct complained of was based

on his national origin or previous EEO activity; (4) the conduct had the

purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with his work performance

and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment;

and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer. McCleod

v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Appeal No. 01963810 (August 5,

1999). Although McCleod addressed sexual harassment, the same standards

apply to all types of prohibited harassment. 29 C.F.R. � 1604.11, n.1;

Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Liability for Unlawful Harassment by

Supervisors, EEOC Notice No. 915.002, p. 2 (June 18, 1999).

After reviewing the record, we find that none of the incidents, either

singly or collectively, rise to the level of harassment. Unless the

conduct is severe, a single incident or group of isolated incidents

will not be regarded as discriminatory harassment. Backo v. United

States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05960227 (June 10, 1996);

Frye v. Department of Labor, EEOC Request No. 05950152 (February 8,

1996); Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982).

These are merely a group of isolated incidents which appear to be no

more than legitimate exercises of supervisory oversight. Moreover, there

are no indications that the enforcement director treated complainant any

differently than he treated the other employees under his supervision.

We therefore find, as did the AJ, that complainant was not subjected to

unlawful discrimination with respect to any of the incidents described

in Complaint No. 93-35.

93-48

Complainant's supervisor stated that on September 2, 1993, he observed

that complainant and a female co-worker were away from their desks between

11:30 and 1:15. He also testified that complainant had been exhibiting a

pattern of taking extended lunches, which he characterized as an abuse

of leave. The supervisor sent a memorandum to complainant and his

co-worker in which he requested that they take leave whenever they stay

out of the office beyond the lunch hour. There are no indications in the

record that leave was actually charged to complainant or that complainant

was subjected to any disciplinary action as a result of the incident.

Complainant has not presented any documents or testimony showing that

the supervisor's action was based on anything other than his personal

observations of complainant. Accordingly, we agree with the AJ's finding

of no discrimination with respect to Complaint No. 93-48.

95-05

In a memorandum to the regional director dated September 5, 1994,

complainant's supervisor recommended that complainant be terminated

from his position as a temporary EOS. The reason the supervisor gave

for recommending complainant's removal was that complainant's actions

had compromised the agency's relationship with its clients and its

constituencies. In one incident, for example, complainant intervened in a

dispute between another agency employee and her landlord despite the fact

that no fair housing complaint was ever filed. Several months later, the

agency's general counsel reported that complainant had been researching a

case that was already closed. When questioned about why he was pursuing

a closed case, complainant opined that the determination was incorrect,

and stated that he would do something about it. At the same time, the

supervisor received a call from the public housing director, who stated

that complainant had berated a housing authority executive director.

Although one of complainant's co-workers expressed his belief that

complainant had been discriminated against, several others said that

they had no reason to believe that complainant's national origin or

previous EEO activity had played a role in the supervisor's decision to

recommend that complainant be fired. While complainant's appeal offers

an interpretation of the evidence which differs from that of the AJ,

we find that the AJ's findings and conclusions of no discrimination with

respect to Complaint No. 95-05 are supported by substantial evidence in

the record.

CONCLUSION

After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration

of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission to affirm the final agency decision

because the Administrative Judge's ultimate finding, that unlawful

employment discrimination was not proven by a preponderance of the

evidence, is supported by the record.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_____09-27-01_____________

Date