Grover C. Duke, Complainant,v.Richard J. Danzig, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 8, 1999
05980121 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 8, 1999)

05980121

11-08-1999

Grover C. Duke, Complainant, v. Richard J. Danzig, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.


Grover C. Duke v. Department of the Navy

05980121

November 8, 1999

Grover C. Duke, )

Complainant, )

) Request No. 05980121

v. ) Appeal No. 01965346

) Agency No. 96-60258-010

Richard J. Danzig, )

Secretary, )

Department of the Navy, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION ON REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

On November 10, 1997, Grover C. Duke (complainant) timely initiated a

request to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the Commission)

to reconsider the decision in Grover C. Duke v. Richard J. Danzig,

Secretary, Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01965346 (October 10,

1997). EEOC regulations provide that the Commissioners may, in their

discretion, reconsider any previous decision. 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(a).

A party requesting reconsideration must submit written argument or

evidence which tends to establish one or more of the following criteria:

new and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(1);

the previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy, 29

C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(2); the decision is of such exceptional nature as to

have substantial precedential implications, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(3). For

the reasons set forth below, the complainant's request is denied.

On the Commission's own motion, we reconsider the previous decision.

The issue presented is whether the previous decision properly affirmed

the agency's dismissal of seven allegations, reversed the dismissal of

two allegations, and remanded one allegation for clarification.

Complainant contacted an EEO counselor on September 17, 1992, by

telephone, and filed his formal complaint on March 10, 1993. At the time

of his original complaint, complainant was a WG-10 Ordinance Equipment

Mechanic at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard (California) (LBNS). He was

subsequently dismissed in March 1993, having lost his security clearance

due to excessive personal debt incurred on a government credit card.

At the direction of the Commission in EEOC Appeal No. 01944653 (June 1,

1995), the agency supplemented the record and issued a new final agency

decision (FAD) on June 10, 1996. The agency identified the six issues

accepted for investigation, as follows.

Based on race (black), disability (leg, elbow and shoulder injuries), and

reprisal for prior EEO contact in March 1992, complainant alleged that:

2(a) from June 1990 to March 1993, complainant was denied "C" school

training;

2(b) from November 1991 through May 1993, complainant was treated

differently by the LBNS compensation office with regard to communications,

lost case files, lack of retraining, and denied physical accommodation;

2(c) between July 1991 and November 1992, the agency improperly processed

complainant's compensation claims;

2(d) the agency released complainant's credit card information without

his authorization;

2(e) on March 28, 1993, complainant was terminated while a similarly

situated employee was allowed to resign; and

2(f) from June 1991, he was never given a permanent job assignment.

The FAD also dismissed the following allegations of discrimination:

7(a) complainant's on the job injury of February 21, 1992, causing

complainant's June 18, 1992, surgery was not compensated;

7(b) subsequent to complainant's injury, LBNS received six letters and

memoranda from complainant's treating physician requesting vocational

rehabilitation, all requests were denied;

7(c) several management officials communicated both telephonically and

in writing to the Merit Systems Protection Board, unemployment office,

EEOC Washington, and the district court, that complainant was terminated

because of misconduct, theft, fraud, and dishonesty;

7(d) complainant's SF-50 stated that complainant "Failed to Meet

Requirement of Employment." There was no mention of misconduct;

7(e) complainant was terminated while under a doctor's care;

7(f) complainant's EEO Counselor wrote false statements concerning

complainant's case;

7(g) between June 26, 1991 and May 17, 1993, complainant was primarily

employed on temporary duty assignments;

7(h) complainant's EEO complaint of March 10, 1993 was not processed in

a timely manner;

7(i) between July of 1991 and May of 1993, specifically through August

1991, complainant was denied advancement and training opportunities; and

7(j) three of the four compensation claims were objected to by the agency,

however they were accepted by the Office of Workers' Compensation (OWCP).

The previous decision affirmed the agency's action dismissing #7(a),

#7(c), #7(d), #7(f), #7(h) and #7(j), finding that they were properly

dismissed for failure to state a claim; also, the decision found that the

agency properly dismissed #7(i) for untimely EEO contact. The decision

determined that #7(b) required clarification of whether complainant was

alleging that the agency failed to reasonably accommodate him.

With regard to #7(e) and #7(g), the decision reversed the agency's

dismissal and ordered continued processing on these claims. The decision

stated that #7(e), although possibly dismissable on other grounds, may not

be dismissed, since complainant's allegation regarding his termination

was accepted by the agency. Also, in reversing the dismissal of #7(g),

the decision found that the issue was not moot.

As discussed above, the Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider

any previous decision when the party requesting reconsideration submits

written argument or evidence which tends to establish that any of

the criteria of 29 C.F.R. �1614.407 is met. In order for a case to

be reconsidered, the request must contain specific information which

meets the requirements of this regulation. It should be noted that the

Commission's scope of review on a request to reconsider is limited. Lopez

v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05890749 (September 28,

1989). Furthermore, a request to reconsider is not "a form of second

appeal." Regensberg v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request

No. 05900850 (September 7, 1990); Spence v. Department of the Army,

EEOC Request No. 05880475 (May 31, 1988).

In his RTR, complainant argues the merits of his complaint, inappropriate

to a consideration of the terms of a complaint. Also, complainant

misstates some of the issues dismissed by the agency, leading to confusion

in the matters he addresses. We note, in addition, that complainant

has already been afforded ample opportunity to amplify the substance

of his claims and that he may further do so during the investigation.

Of relevance to the Commission's consideration herein, however, is that

complainant's RTR has not demonstrated that the claims found properly

dismissed by the previous decision for failure to state a claim, in fact,

state a claim under our regulations or that #7(i) was timely.

Nevertheless, on our own motion, the Commission reconsiders the previous

decision. The Commission is concerned that the issues accepted by the

agency and those remanded to the agency by the previous decision, i.e.,

#7(e), #7(g), and #7(b), will result in a fragmentation of complainant's

complaint. Upon review of the issues remanded by the previous decision

as compared to the issues accepted by the agency, we find that they are

repetitive of the pending claims. For that reason, we will direct that

the agency subsume the remanded allegations into the issues already

accepted by the agency, that is, #7(b) should be part of the agency's

investigation of #2(b); #7(e) should be contained in #2(e); and #7(g)

should be included with #2(f). Similarly, to the extent that any issues

dismissed by the agency provide relevant background to any pending issue

accepted for investigation, the agency should include that information

in its investigation.

CONCLUSION

After a review of the complainant's request for reconsideration,

the previous decision, and the entire record, the Commission finds

that the complainant's request fails to meet any of the criteria of 29

C.F.R. �1614.407(c), and it is the decision of the Commission to deny the

complainant's request. Upon our own motion, the Commission reconsiders

the previous decision. The decision in EEOC Appeal No. 01965346 (October

10, 1997) is MODIFIED, and the agency is directed to comply with the

Order, below. There is no further right of administrative appeal on a

decision of the Commission on a Request for Reconsideration.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to process the remanded allegations in accordance

with 29 C.F.R. �1614.108 and the Commission's decision herein by

incorporating the remanded allegations into the pending issues accepted

for investigation, that is, #7(b) should become part of the agency's

investigation of #2(b); #7(e) should become part of #2(e); and #7(g)

should become part of #2(f). The agency shall acknowledge to the

complainant that it has received the remanded allegations within

thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final.

If the agency has already conducted its investigation of the issues

accepted, it shall conduct a supplemental investigation incorporating

these remanded allegations. At a minimum, the agency should provide

complainant an opportunity to present testimony and evidence in support

of his claims. Thereafter, the agency shall issue to complainant a

copy of the investigative file and also shall notify complainant of the

appropriate rights within one hundred fifty (150) calendar days of the

date this decision becomes final, unless the matter is otherwise resolved

prior to that time. If the complainant requests a final decision without

a hearing, the agency shall issue a final decision within sixty (60)

days of receipt of complainant's request.

A copy of the agency's letter of acknowledgement to complainant and a

copy of the notice that transmits the investigative file and notice of

rights must be sent to the Compliance Officer as referenced below.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503 (a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503 (g). Alternatively,

the complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action

for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject

to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

STATEMENT OF COMPLAINANT'S RIGHTS - ON REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (P0993)

This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right of

administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the right

to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court.

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Nov. 8, 1999

Date Carlton Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations