Grosvenor Resort

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 30, 2001

336 N.L.R.B. 613 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

GROSVENOR RESORT 613
Grosvenor Orlando Associates, Ltd. d/b/a The Gros-
venor Resort and Hotel Employees and Restau-
rant Employees, Local 55, AFL–CIO. Cases 12–
CA–18190, 12–CA–18381 (–2, –4, –5), 12–CA–
18467, 12–CA–18518, 12–CA–18576, and 12–
CA–18830
September 30, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS
TRUESDALE
AND WALSH
On May 18, 1998, Administrative Law Judge Pargen
Robertson issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General
Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting and an-
swering brief,1 and the Charging Party filed cross-
exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified and set
forth in full below.2

1 The General Counsel also moved to strike the Respondent’s brief
because it does not include a subject index with page references and an
alphabetical table of cases and other authority as required by the
Board’s Rule 102.46(j). Subsequently, the Respondent submitted a
corrected copy of its brief with an index and table of cases. The Gen-
eral Counsel and Charging Party did not object to this filing. As a
result, we deny the General Counsel’s motion to strike.
2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
We find merit in the General Counsel’s exception that the judge
erred by failing to include in his recommended Order and notice the
standard remedy that the Respondent is required to rescind its unlawful
unilateral changes on the Union’s request, which the judge inadver-
tently omitted. Accordingly, we correct the Order and notice to include
this standard remedy. See, e.g., J. W. Rex Co., 308 NLRB 473, 475–
476 (1992), enfd. mem. 998 F.2d 1003 (3d Cir. 1993); and Intermoun-
tain Rural Electric Assn., 305 NLRB 783, 791 (1991), enfd. 984 F.2d
1562 (10th Cir. 1993). We shall also modify the judge’s recommended
Order in accordance with our recent decision in Ferguson Electric Co.,
335 NLRB 142 (2001). We shall further modify the judge’s recom-
mended Order in accordance with our decisions in Indian Hills Care
Center, 321 NLRB 144 (1996), and Excel Container, 325 NLRB 17
(1997). As further discussed below, we modify the judge’s remedy and
recommended Order to reflect that the Respondent discharged the un-
fair labor strikers on September 30, 1996.
For the reasons set forth below, we adopt the judge’s
finding that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by
bargaining in bad faith.
The Facts
The Respondent operates a resort hotel in Lake Buena
Vista, Florida, and has had a series of collective-
bargaining agreements with the Union’s predecessor,
Local 737, covering a bargaining unit of the Respon-
dent’s housekeeping, service, and maintenance employ-
ees. The parties began bargaining for a successor agree-
ment in November 1995 and the Respondent declared
impasse in May or June 1996. Jose Navedo represented
the Union in negotiations until April 1996, when Harvey
Totzke began serving as the chief union negotiator.
Margie Engles served as a union negotiator with both
Navedo and Totzke. Director of Human Resources Gary
Lambert and Attorney Bob Murphy began negotiations
for the Respondent. Attorney Arch Stokes replaced
Murphy beginning with the parties’ February 14, 1996
meeting.
On December 5, 1995, the Union presented its first
draft collective-bargaining agreement and on December
13, the Respondent presented its draft agreement. At the
February 21, 19963 meeting, the Union presented a
grievance regarding an employee’s loss of seniority,
which the parties settled in the employee’s favor. The
Respondent also presented and the parties debated a plan
that included a 401(K) pension plan. At the close of the
meeting, the Respondent stated that it would present a
new wage proposal at the next meeting, amend its pro-
posal on seniority, show documents to the Union sup-
porting its wage proposal, and in the meantime, study
another hotel’s collective-bargaining agreement. On
February 28, the parties discussed various provisions.
The Respondent rejected the Union’s proposal granting
housekeeping employees $3.25 for each extra room
cleaned over 15. The Union then offered $3 for each
extra room for the first year, $3.10 for the second year,
and $3.25 for the third year.
On March 18, Totzke informed the Respondent that,
due to administrative changes and restructuring of Local
55, certain individuals would now serve as union busi-
ness representatives with regard to the Respondent. At
Totzke’s first meeting with the Respondent as the Un-
ion’s chief negotiator on April 19, 1996, the Union pre-
sented a counterproposal, working from the Respon-
dent’s draft agreement, which showed movement to-
wards the Respondent’s position.4 The parties agreed to
3 All dates are in 1996, unless otherwise noted.
4 Lambert testified that the Respondent’s representatives preferred to
work from their own draft agreement rather than the expired agreement
336 NLRB No. 57
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 614
meet the following Tuesday, April 23. Totzke stated that
he was ready to negotiate a final agreement on that date
and Stokes replied that he no longer bargained for 24
hours a day but would meet for several hours to address
the issues.
The Respondent’s bargaining notes reflect that, when
the parties met on April 23, Stokes asserted that the total
union proposal was $215,000 higher than the Respon-
dent’s, that he had reviewed the specifics and considered
how the parties’ philosophies differed, and that they
would quickly reach impasse if the Union were to stand
on its economic demands. Stokes stated that the sick pay
proposal would cost $62,000 and, although he had in the
past agreed on “compensable non-productive time,” he
preferred not to. Stokes added that the Respondent pro-
posed to pay for worktime and that the company needed
to pay rates that would attract employees from its com-
petitors. At that meeting, the Respondent agreed to some
of the Union’s proposals and rejected others. At the next
meeting, on May 6, the Respondent proposed that em-
ployees waive their rights to any recourse other than
arbitration and, after initial opposition, the Union agreed
to it. The Respondent’s notes show that, as of their May
6 meeting, the parties were in agreement on 14 articles
and portions of other articles.5

because they disagreed with Navedo’s interpretation of the expired
agreement’s provisions. He also testified that he had a good working
relationship with Navedo’s predecessors, who worked for the Union’s
Local 737, before jurisdiction was transferred to Local 55, which was
led by Navedo. Lambert further testified that he had problems with
Navedo’s insistence on allowing Union members to wear Union pins at
work because he thought it conflicted with the uniform policy. As the
judge found, the Respondent had experienced friction with Navedo
because of his declaration that he would use the Union’s agreement to
organize other hotels.
The Respondent’s April 19 bargaining notes state that Totzke
opened the meeting by stating that the Union may have had unreason-
able expectations, that he had always reached a good agreement with
the Respondent in the past, that he considered all previous offers off the
table and that the Union was prepared to negotiate and provide a 4-year
agreement to show their “change in attitude.” Those notes further state
that Stokes told the Union that the Respondent would like to express its
desire to have the employees’ representatives changed back to 737 and
that the Respondent could not negotiate to impasse over the issue but it
would if it could. Totzke, who served as secretary-treasurer of Local
737 and vice president of the national union’s District 4, replied that he
was unable to change the name at that time but that the Union would
eventually change it and that “for all intents and purposes and interpre-
tations it is reverting back to the way it was and as it will remain.”
5 The Respondent’s May 6 bargaining notes reflect that the parties
agreed on articles concerning, among other things, employer/union
cooperation, management rights, nondiscrimination, the treatment of
underpayment or overpayment of wages, interchangibility of work
assignments, promotions and transfers, leaves of absence, uniforms and
equipment, and interpretation of the agreement. The Respondent’s
notes also reflect that the parties had substantial or partial agreement on
articles addressing work stoppages, hours of work, overtime, job classi-
fications, and wage rates (including shift differentials).
At the parties’ May 7 meeting, the Union agreed to the
Respondent’s proposal on personal days, though they
disagreed over whether personal days could be used as
sick days, and the Union reduced its proposed pay in-
crease and pay for extra rooms cleaned. The Union ac-
cepted some other proposals and maintained its position
on others. On May 10, the Respondent provided a draft
contract and the Respondent’s notes reflect that Stokes
stated, “Contract indicated as ‘final’ is reference to eco-
nomics maxed out in this offer.” The Respondent stated
that it continued to adhere to its positions on articles in-
volving the definition of part-time employees, work
stoppages, overtime, and vacations; that it would work
with the Union on articles involving union activ-
ity/checkoff and hours of work; and that it would modify
its proposals involving layoffs and recalls, promo-
tions/transfers, and leaves of absence. With regard to
part-time employees, the Respondent proposed reducing
the scope of the bargaining unit by changing the recogni-
tion article to define “part-time” employees as those who
work fewer than 30 hours a week, rather than 24 as pro-
vided in the parties’ previous agreement, and excluding
them from the agreement’s coverage. The parties agreed
to pare down their proposals in order to reach an agree-
ment that could be ratified and agreed to meet at a later
date.6
On May 14, the Respondent mailed to the Union a
draft marked “final collective bargaining proposal.”
Both the Respondent’s May 10 and 14 drafts include
provisions changing the health and medical coverage by
giving the Respondent authority to unilaterally determine
the benefits, costs, and rates of contribution.
In the June 24 meeting, the Union presented its coun-
teroffer. However, the Respondent stated that it was not
meeting to negotiate and that the Union had its final of-
fer. The Respondent refused to discuss the Union’s
counteroffer, stating that the parties were at impasse, and
advised the Union of its implementation of some provi-
sions in its offer. The union representatives expressed
their desire to negotiate. Although the parties had agreed
to meet on June 25 (prior to their June 24 meeting), they
did not do so. On June 26, the Union presented the Re-
spondent’s last proposed agreement to its membership,
who voted it down. The membership authorized the call-
ing of a strike but did not strike. By letter dated June 27,
the Union informed the Respondent that the membership
had rejected its offer and that the Union stood ready to
continue negotiations and suggested mediation.
6 Union Negotiator Engles, who was credited by the judge, testified
that the Respondent’s representatives did not say that the Respondent’s
draft was its final offer.
GROSVENOR RESORT 615
The parties stipulated that sometime in or about July,
the Respondent unilaterally implemented a general wage
increase in accord with its May 14 offer, and a general
increase in the culinary chef’s pay level. Consistent with
its final proposal giving it the unilateral right to raise
employee premiums, the Respondent informed employees
in its July 3 newsletter that it was increasing the employ-
ees’ insurance premiums. In its July 12 newsletter, the
Respondent informed employees of its unilateral imple-
mentation of a more liberal policy than it had proposed in
negotiations allowing 11 personal days off per year.
The parties met with a Federal mediator on September 5
and 6 without resolving their disagreements. At the hear-
ing, the parties stipulated that the Respondent informed
employees in September that it had negotiated agreements
with suppliers that would result in the Respondent paying
an additional $1 bonus to employees cleaning more than
15 rooms (for a total $3 bonus per room), which increase
had been proposed by the Union and rejected by the Re-
spondent.
On September 27, the Union struck and set up a picket
line. As discussed in more detail below, the Respondent
gave strikers a letter on the morning of September 27
warning that they might be replaced if they did not return
to work immediately and a second letter on September 30
stating that they had been permanently replaced and that
they should bring their uniforms, work identification, and
other items to the Respondent’s office on October 3, at
which time they would receive their “final check” for their
“final wages.” On November 15, the strikers uncondition-
ally offered to return to work and, on December 27, the
Respondent gave the strikers a third letter stating that the
Respondent had given them an opportunity to return to
work, that it had hired permanent replacements, and that it
would only consider the strikers for a few new positions.
I. BAD-FAITH BARGAINING
A. The Judge’s Findings
The judge found that the Respondent did not engage in
unlawful regressive bargaining and that the record did not
adequately support the complaint allegation that the
Respondent bargained without intent to reach agreement
when that issue “is isolated from all the circumstances.”
However, he found that the Respondent bargained in bad
faith in three discrete respects. First, he found that the
Respondent unlawfully and prematurely declared impasse
at a time when it continued to engage in “give and take”
bargaining. Second, he found that the Respondent’s inclu-
sion in its final proposal of a provision that would remove
coverage for part-time employees constituted bad-faith
bargaining because a proposed change in the established
bargaining unit is a nonmandatory subject. Third, he
found that the Respondent engaged in bad-faith bargaining
by unilaterally implementing a general wage increase, a
general increase in culinary chef’s pay level, a personal
days-off policy more liberal than that proposed by the Re-
spondent in bargaining, and an additional $1 bonus for
each room cleaned over 15.7
B. Discussion
We agree with the judge that the Respondent engaged in
bad-faith bargaining. In contrast to the judge, however,
we find, consistent with the complaint’s allegation, that the
Respondent’s conduct constitutes evidence of overall bad-
faith bargaining rather than individual violations of Sec-
tion 8(a)(5). In short, we find that the Respondent’s bad
faith in bargaining is shown through its conduct in declar-
ing impasse prematurely, insisting to the declared impasse
on a nonmandatory subject, and unilaterally implementing
new terms and conditions of employment without bargain-
ing to lawful impasse.
In the process of collective bargaining, there must be a
“willingness among the parties to discuss freely and fully
their respective claims and demands, and, when these are
opposed, to justify them on reason.” NLRB v. George P.
Pilling & Son Co., 119 F.2d 32, 37 (3d Cir. 1941). The
determination as to whether a party’s conduct in bargain-
ing evinces a sincere desire to reach an agreement is made
by “drawing inferences from the conduct of the parties as a
whole.” NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ Union, 361 U.S. 477,
498 (1960). “Specific conduct, while it may not, standing
alone, amount to a per se failure to bargain in good faith,
may when considered with all of the other evidence, sup-
port an inference of bad faith.” Continental Ins. Co. v.
NLRB, 495 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing NLRB v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962)). Although much of the
Respondent’s conduct in bargaining may not indicate bad
faith when considered “in isolation,” we find the Respon-
dent’s entire course of conduct did not evince a sincere
desire to reach agreement by the time it prematurely de-
clared impasse, insisted to the declared impasse on a non-
mandatory subject of bargaining, and unilaterally imple-
mented new terms and conditions of employment.
The Board has long held that premature declaration of
impasse may support a finding of bad-faith bargaining.
CJC Holdings, Inc., 320 NLRB 1041, 1044–1046 (1996),
enfd. mem. 110 F.3d 794 (5th Cir. 1997). Impasse is
reached only “‘after good-faith negotiations have ex-
hausted the prospects of concluding an agreement,’ and
there is no realistic possibility that continuation of discus-

7 We agree with the General Counsel that the judge erred by failing
to reflect in his conclusions concerning unilateral changes that the
Respondent also unilaterally increased the employees’ insurance pre-
miums.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 616
sion at that time would be fruitful.” Id. at 1044 (quoting
Television Artists AFTRA v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622, 624
(D.C. Cir. 1968), enfg. Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 NLRB
475 (1967)).8 See also NLRB v. WPIX, Inc., 906 F.2d 898,
901–902 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 921 (1990)
(parties’ exaggerated expressions of offense, posturing and
dilatory tactics did not end prospects of reaching agree-
ment). The party asserting impasse has the burden of
proving that it exists. Outboard Marine Corp., 307 NLRB
1333, 1363 (1992), enfd. mem. 9 F.3d 113 (7th Cir. 1993).
Where there is genuine impasse, neither party is willing to
move from its position in spite of the parties’ best efforts
to achieve agreement. E.g., Grinnell Fire Protection Sys-
tems Co., 328 NLRB 585, 586, and 596–599 (1999), enfd.
236 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2000).
We find that the Respondent prematurely declared im-
passe and its doing so was indicative of bad faith.
Throughout negotiations, and in particular during the
weeks prior to the Respondent’s declared impasse, the
Respondent and the Union exchanged offers, debated pro-
posals, agreed to reevaluate their positions and, in fact,
modified their proposals. For example, in Totzke’s first
meeting as chief union negotiator on April 19, the Union
presented a counteroffer that showed movement towards
the Respondent’s positions, and on April 23, the Respon-
dent agreed to some of the Union’s proposals and rejected
others. On May 6, the record reflects that the parties had
reached agreement on many articles and, after debating the
issue, the Union agreed to a proposal waiving employees’
rights to recourse outside of arbitration. On May 7, the
Union reduced the amount it proposed for housekeeping
pay and agreed to the Respondent’s personal day proposal
while disagreeing on other matters.
Although the Respondent’s notes indicated that its rep-
resentative stated on May 10 that the draft contract was
“indicated as ‘final’” in a reference to “economics are
maxed out in this offer,” it continued to negotiate over
substantive proposed terms. In the May 10 meeting, it
explained that it was willing to work with the Union con-
cerning articles involving hours of work, union activity
and checkoff, promotion and transfers, and leaves of ab-
sence. As the judge found, these comments show that the
parties continued to engage in give-and-take bargaining on
May 10. At the end of the meeting, the parties agreed to
pare down their proposals to reach agreement in future
meetings and the Respondent did not inform the Union

8 In Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 NLRB at 478, the Board set forth the
following factors for determining whether parties have reached im-
passe: the parties’ bargaining history, their good faith, the length of
time spent in negotiations, the importance of the issues about which the
parties disagree, and the parties’ contemporaneous understanding of the
status of negotiations.
that it viewed negotiations as having been concluded.
Thus, both parties demonstrated considerable flexibility
and willingness to compromise their positions. See Wycoff
Steel, Inc., 303 NLRB 517, 523 (1991) (no impasse where
both parties showed movement and union advised em-
ployer of its willingness to be flexible on terms and times
of meeting).
Despite the apparent flexibility demonstrated by the par-
ties at the May 10 meeting following the presentation of
the Respondent’s final offer, the Respondent thereafter
insisted that its draft proposal of May 10 was on its face a
“final offer.” The Respondent then submitted a finished
contract proposal to the Union by mail dated May 14,
1996. When the parties next met on June 24, the Union
presented a counterproposal but the Respondent replied
that it was not there to negotiate and that the Union had
received its final contract proposal.
In light of the flexible bargaining postures of both the
Union and the Respondent following the presentation of
the “final offer,” the Union on May 10 reasonably be-
lieved, and expressed its belief, that further negotiations
might produce an agreement. Thus, at that time, the par-
ties did not have a contemporaneous understanding that
they were at impasse. See Huck Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 693
F.2d 1176, 1186 (5th Cir. 1982) (neither party must be
willing to compromise for impasse). See also Beverly
Farm Foundation, 323 NLRB 787, 793 (1997), enfd. 144
F.3d 1048 (7th Cir. 1998) (no impasse where union not
wedded inalterably to any particular position and parties
not stalemated). Despite this flexibility, the Respondent
thereafter simply stated that it had made a final proposal
on May 10 and that the parties were at impasse. We find
that this declaration of impasse while there was still flexi-
bility in the bargaining positions was premature.9
9 We find no merit in the Respondent’s assertion, in essence, that it
lawfully declared impasse because it had bargained for 6 months with-
out resolution of important issues and the Union changed negotiators.
As discussed above, the parties reached full or partial agreement on
many substantive issues and the parties were not deadlocked on any
issue. See NLRB v. WPIX, Inc., 906 F.2d at 901–902 (“If—as the Com-
pany claims—all parties knew those key economic issues could not be
resolved, one might well wonder why the parties would have bothered
to discuss in the meantime what the company now dismisses as
insignificant issues”). With regard to remaining issues, the Respon-
dent, until it declared impasse, and the Union showed a willingness to
discuss the issues and potentially make further concessions.
Nor do we find that the Union’s change in negotiators supports a
finding that the Respondent lawfully declared impasse. The Respon-
dent admits that the first negotiator, Navedo, caused friction. The
second negotiator, Totzke, expressed and showed his willingness to
compromise and bargain, agreed to work from the Respondent’s draft
agreement, and did not delay bargaining. Cf. Bottom Line Enterprises,
302 NLRB 373, 374–375 (1991), enfd. mem. 15 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir.
1994) (union’s cancellation of bargaining session insufficient to show
intransigence to justify employer’s unilateral implementation).
GROSVENOR RESORT 617
We also find that the Respondent’s insistence on chang-
ing the scope of the bargaining unit by expanding the defi-
nition of the excluded part-time employees supports a
finding of bad-faith bargaining. The Board has long held
that “[u]nit scope is not a mandatory bargaining subject,
and consequently a party may not insist to impasse on
alteration of the unit.” E.g., Bozutto’s, Inc., 277 NLRB
977 (1985). See also Frontier Hotel & Casino, 318 NLRB
857, 868, 872 (1995), enfd. in relevant part sub. nom. Un-
believable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(bargaining unit description clauses are nonmandatory
subjects of bargaining and may be altered only by mutual
agreement); and Idaho Statesman, 281 NLRB 272, 275–
277 (1986), enfd. 836 F.2d 1396 (1988) (unit scope is
permissive subject). Here, the Respondent presented the
Union with a draft agreement that included this provision
covering a permissive subject of bargaining, declared that
its draft was its last and final offer, and declared impasse.
This conduct is evidence of bad faith.10
We further find that the Respondent showed bad faith in
bargaining by unilaterally implementing new terms and
conditions of employment. As the Supreme Court decided
in NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962), an employer’s
unilateral change in conditions of employment under
negotiation is tantamount to a “refusal to negotiate in
fact.” Consistent with the Court’s holding, the Board has
long held that an employer’s unilateral changes in
mandatory conditions without bargaining to a lawful
impasse indicates bad faith in bargaining. E.g., Fitzgerald
Mills Corp., 133 NLRB 877, 882 (1961), enfd. 313 F.2d
260 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 834 (1963).
Moreover, “[t]he employer is prohibited from making
unilateral changes in working conditions during
negotiations—even though the terms of employment are
thereby improved—lest the union be denigrated in the
employees’ eyes and its existence, as an inevitable result,
imperiled.” General Transformer Co., 173 NLRB 360,
376 (1968) (citing NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills,
Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949) (employer unlawfully improved
wages during bargaining)). Even after a valid impasse has
been reached, the implementation of terms more favorable
than those offered during bargaining constitutes evidence
of bad faith. NLRB v. Katz, supra, 369 U.S. at 745. In this
case, the Respondent unilaterally implemented a general
wage increase, a general increase in culinary chef’s pay
level, a personal days-off policy more liberal than that it
proposed in bargaining, and increased the employees’
insurance premiums consistent with a provision in its final

with a provision in its final offer giving it the unilateral
right to raise employee premiums. Several months after
announcing these changes, the Respondent announced and
implemented an additional $1 bonus for each room
cleaned over 15. The Respondent’s unilateral
implementation of these terms, which both take from and
add to the employees’ wages and benefits, also support our
finding of bad-faith bargaining.
10 The Respondent defends by arguing that the parties never bar-
gained over the exclusion and thus never bargained to impasse over it.
That fact is beside the point; the Respondent clearly insisted to impasse
on alteration of the unit by including the provision in its “final” offer
and declaring imasse.
II. THE DISCHARGES
A. The Judge’s Findings
We agree for the reasons set forth by the judge that the
strike, beginning on September 27, 1996, constituted an
unfair labor practice strike. The judge also found, albeit
implicitly, that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) by refusing to reinstate the strikers after they un-
conditionally offered to return to work on November 15 or
soon thereafter. The judge further found that the Respon-
dent unlawfully discharged the strikers through its letter to
them on December 27 in which it stated that it had hired
permanent replacements and would only consider them for
new employment. The judge, however, failed to find that
the Respondent’s previous letter to the strikers, dated Sep-
tember 30, constituted an act of discharge. We agree with
the General Counsel’s and the Charging Party’s exceptions
to this aspect of the judge’s decision.
B. Discussion
The Respondent gave strikers a letter on the morning of
the first day of the strike on September 27 stating that they
should return to work their shifts immediately or they
“may be replaced.” The Respondent gave them a second
letter on September 30 stating that they had been perma-
nently replaced and that they should bring “all their uni-
forms, hotel ID/timecard, and any other [of the Respon-
dent’s] property” to the Respondent’s office on October 3,
at which time they would receive their “final check” for
their “final wages,” including any outstanding vacation
pay. Under both the parties’ expired collective-bargaining
agreement and the terms implemented by the Respondent
after it declared impasse, employees are entitled to out-
standing vacation pay, in lieu of time off, only when their
employment has been terminated. On November 15, the
strikers unconditionally offered to return to work and, on
December 27, the Respondent gave the strikers a third
letter stating that the Respondent had given them an op-
portunity to return to work, that it had hired permanent
replacements, and that it would only consider the strikers
for a few new positions.
The test for determining whether employees have been
discharged is “whether the employer’s statements or con-
duct ‘would reasonably lead the employees to believe that
they had been discharged.’” Kolkka Tables & Finnish
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 618
American Saunas, 335 NLRB 844, 845 (2001), quoting
NLRB v. Hilton Mobile Homes, 387 F.2d 7, 9 (8th Cir.
1967). “Moreover, the employer will be held responsible
when its statements or conduct create an uncertain situa-
tion for the affected employees.” Id. The employees
would reasonably have understood that they were dis-
charged through the September 30 letter. It directed the
strikers to return their uniforms, hotel identification and
timecards, and any other property of the Respondent and
pick up their final paycheck for their final wages that
would include any outstanding vacation pay. While some
of these actions may be, without more, consistent with
how employers would treat strikers, the requirement that
they pick up vacation pay would lead reasonable employ-
ees to conclude that they had been discharged because,
here, they would receive such vacation pay only after dis-
charge.11
Although economic and unfair labor practice strikers
generally must request reinstatement to return to work,
“[w]hen strikers are unlawfully discharged, they are not
required to request reinstatement since, by discharging
them, the employer has signaled that he does not regard
them as strikers entitled to reinstatement upon request.”
Naperville Ready Mix, Inc., 329 NLRB 174, 185 (1999),
enfd. 242 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, as the Board has
long held, “a discharged striker is entitled to backpay from
the date of discharge until the date he or she is offered
reinstatement.” Abilities & Goodwill, Inc., 241 NLRB 27
(1979), enf. denied on other grounds 612 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.
1979). See also Citizens Publishing Co., 331 NLRB 1622
fn. 2 (2000), enfd. 263 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2001) (backpay
from date of discharge rather than date of unconditional
offer to return); and Garrett Railroad Car & Equipment,
Inc., 683 F.2d 731, 740–741 (3d Cir. 1982) (backpay is
awarded to wrongfully discharged striker from date of
unlawful discharge rather than subsequent date on which
strike ended). Accordingly, September 30 is the date of
discharge for purposes of calculating back pay in compli-
ance proceedings, and, accordingly, we amend the judge’s
remedy and order.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(5), (3), and (1) of the Act, we shall order the Respon-
dent to cease and desist from engaging in such conduct

11 With regard to four strikers (Andres Alvarez, Martin Malagon,
Earl Rankin, and Isidro Rodriquez), the General Counsel and the
Charging Party argue that the Respondent discharged them for reasons
the Board found unlawful in American Linen Supply Co., 297 NLRB
137 (1989), enfd. 945 F.2d 1428 (8th Cir. 1991). Because we find that
all of the strikers were discharged on September 30, we find it unneces-
sary to address that question.
and to take certain steps to effectuate the policies of the
Act. In view of our finding that the Respondent was dis-
charged on September 27, 1996 (the beginning of the
strike), and refused to reinstate, the employees who en-
gaged in an unfair labor practice strike, we shall order the
Respondent to offer them immediate and full reinstatement
to their former positions or, if any of those positions no
longer exist, to a substantially equivalent positions, dis-
placing, if necessary, employees hired since on or about
September 30, 1996, without prejudice to their rights and
privileges previously enjoyed, and to make each of them
whole for all loss of wages or other benefits suffered as a
result of the Respondent’s unfair labor practices. Backpay
is to be computed in the manner set forth in F. W. Wool-
worth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest to be com-
puted in the manner prescribed in New Horizons for the
Retarded, 289 NLRB 1173 (1987).
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recom-
mended Order of the administrative law judge, as modified
below, and orders that the Respondent, Grosvenor Orlando
Associates, Ltd. d/b/a the Grosvenor Resort, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening its employees that there was no contract
with their exclusive collective-bargaining agent and that it
could unilaterally make changes in wages, hours, and
working conditions; prohibiting its employees from dis-
cussing the Union during work and threatening its em-
ployee with being sent home or fined if the employee
talked to another employee about the Union; discriminato-
rily prohibiting its employees from wearing union baseball
caps; threatening its employee that the employee would be
replaced and recalled at the Respondent’s discretion; and
promising its employee that it had instituted a unilateral
change by scheduling work by seniority and planning to
grant a $3 bonus for cleaning rooms in excess of 15 each
because of its employees’ union activities.
(b) Refusing to bargain in good faith with Hotel Em-
ployees & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 55, AFL–
CIO, as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of its employees in the following appropriate collective-
bargaining unit:

All housekeeping employees, bellpersons, cashiers,
convention setup employees, lounge employees, din-
ing room employees, pool bar and grill employees,
kitchen department employees, room service employ-
ees, banquet employees, servi-bar employees, and
maintenance department employees, but excluding
casual employees, guards, and supervisors as defined
in the Act.

GROSVENOR RESORT 619
(c) Unilaterally changing bargaining unit employees’
wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employment
without bargaining with the Union to an agreement or a
lawful impasse.
(d) Bypassing the Union and dealing directly with bar-
gaining unit employees.
(e) Discharging employees because the employees en-
gaged in protected strike or picketing activities in support
of the Union.
(f) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, meet and bargain with Hotel Employees
& Restaurant Employees Union, Local 55, AFL–CIO, as
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its
employees in the above stated appropriate collective-
bargaining unit and reduce to writing and execute all
agreements reached through bargaining.
(b) On the Union’s request, cancel and rescind all or
part of the terms and conditions of employment unilater-
ally implemented by the Respondent on or after June 1996
following the Respondent’s premature declaration of im-
passe and retroactively restore preexisting terms and con-
ditions of employment, but nothing in this Order is to be
construed as requiring the Respondent to cancel any uni-
lateral change that benefited the unit employees without a
request from the Union.
(c) Offer each of the below listed employees immediate
and full reinstatement to their former positions or, if any of
those positions no longer exists, to substantially equivalent
positions, displacing if necessary, employees hired since
on or about September 27, 1996, without prejudice to their
rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make each
whole for all loss of wages or other benefits:

Andres Alvarez Robert Baity
Rosetta Brown Hector Caban
Gilberto Caranza Dorothy Collier
Ella Mae Davis Lindsey Day
Carlos Delgado Enoch Deneus
Oslaine Desir Aida Febles
Maria Gillaspie Deborah Goodman
Israel Hernandez Lidia Hernandez
Maria Hernandez Betty Jackson
Mollie Jackson Jules Josaphat
Therese Josaphat Dorzelia Joseph
Marie Laguerre Paul Leblanc
Adisseau Louisius Martin Malagon
Lourdes Matos Frederick Meradin
Deborah Montgomery Chaeirable Ovince
Joseph Pascal Louis Preval
Maria Quevedo Earl Rankin
Isidro Rodriquez Feleza Ryland
Andriana Sepulueda Raymond Smith
Flor Javier Cleofas Viscaine
Margarita Jimenez Flossie Williams
Francisco Abrell Norma Jiminez

(d) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files any reference to the unlawful discharge of
the above-named employees, and notify each one of those
employees in writing that this has been done and that the
discharge will not be used against them in any way.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility in Orlando, Florida, copies of the attached no-
tice marked “Appendix.”12 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 12, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon
receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall dupli-
cate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed by
the Respondent at any time since November 1, 1995.
(f) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social
security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records, including an electronic
copy of such records if stored in electronic form, necessary
to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of
this Order.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with
the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsi-
ble official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY THE ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 620
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered
us to post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid and protection
To choose not to engage in any of these concerted
activities.

WE WILL NOT threaten our employees that there is no
collective-bargaining contract and that we may unilaterally
change wages, hours, and terms and conditions of em-
ployment.
WE WILL NOT prohibit our employees from discuss-
ing the Union during work.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with being sent
home or fined because they discuss the Union with another
employee during work.
WE WILL NOT discriminatorily prohibit our employ-
ees from wearing union insignia including baseball caps.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees that they may
not picket on behalf of the Union.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees that employees
may be considered strikers and replaced if they picket on
their own time.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees that picketing
employees may be reinstated at our discretion.
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to bargain in good faith
with Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union,
Local 55, AFL–CIO, as collective-bargaining representa-
tive of the employees in the following appropriate bargain-
ing unit:

All housekeeping employees, bellpersons, cashiers,
convention setup employees, lounge employees, din-
ing room employees, pool bar and grill employees,
kitchen department employees, room service employ-
ees, banquet employees, servi-bar employees, and
maintenance department employees, but excluding
casual employees, guards, and supervisors as defined
in the Act.

WE WILL NOT unilaterally change wages, hours, and
terms and conditions of employment for bargaining unit
employees at a time when negotiations are not at impasse.
WE WILL NOT discharge our employees because they
engage in an unfair labor practice strike.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL bargain in good faith with Hotel Employees
& Restaurant Employees Union, Local 55, AFL–CIO, as
collective-bargaining representative of the employees in
the above-described appropriate bargaining unit.
WE WILL, on the Union’s request, cancel and rescind
all or part of the terms and conditions of employment uni-
laterally implemented on or after June 1996 following the
premature declaration of impasse and retroactively restore
preexisting terms and conditions of employment, but noth-
ing in the Board’s Order is to be construed as requiring us
to cancel any unilateral change that benefited the unit em-
ployees without a request from the Union.
WE WILL offer each of the below listed employees
immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions
or, if any of those positions no longer exist, to a substan-
tially equivalent position, displacing if necessary, employ-
ees hired since on or about September 27, 1996, without
prejudice to their rights and privileges previously enjoyed,
and make whole for all loss of wages or other benefits,
caused by our failure to reinstate each employee immedi-
ately upon that employee’s unconditional offer to return to
work:

Andres Alvarez Robert Baity
Rosetta Brown Hector Caban
Gilberto Caranza Dorothy Collier
Ella Mae Davis Lindsey Day
Carlos Delgado Enoch Deneus
Oslaine Desir Aida Febles
Maria Gillaspie Deborah Goodman
Israel Hernandez Lidia Hernandez
Maria Hernandez Betty Jackson
Mollie Jackson Jules Josaphat
Therese Josaphat Dorzelia Joseph
Marie Laguerre Paul Leblanc
Adisseau Louisius Martin Malagon
Lourdes Matos Frederick Meradin
Deborah Montgomery Chaeirable Ovince
Joseph Pascal Louis Preval
Maria Quevedo Earl Rankin
Isidro Rodriquez Feleza Ryland
Andriana Sepulueda Raymond Smith
Flor Javier Cleofas Viscaine
Margarita Jimenez Flossie Williams
Francisco Abrell Norma Jiminez

GROSVENOR ORLANDO
ASSOCIATES, LTD. D/B/A THE GROS-
VENOR RESORT

Dave Anhorn, Esq. and Michael Mac Harg, Esq., for the General
Counsel.
Arch Stokes, Esq. and Christopher Terrell, Esq., of Atlanta,
Georgia, for the Respondent.
GROSVENOR RESORT 621
Richard Siwica, Esq., of Orlando, Florida, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PARGEN ROBERTSON, Administrative Law Judge. This
hearing was held on January 5–8, 1998, in Orlando, Florida.
All parties were represented and afforded full opportunity to
be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to intro-
duce evidence. Respondent, Charging Party (Union), and Gen-
eral Counsel filed briefs. Upon consideration of the entire record
and the briefs, I make the following findings.
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent has been wholly owned by Grosvenor Orlando
Associates, Ltd. at material times. Grosvenor is a partnership
doing business as the Grosvenor Resort, with an office and place
of business in Lake Buena Vista, Florida, where it is engaged in
the operation of a hotel providing food and lodging. During the
past 12 months, Respondent, in its business operations, derived
gross revenues in excess of $500,0000 and purchased and re-
ceived at its Lake Buena Vista facility products, goods and mate-
rials valued in excess of $5000 directly from points outside Flor-
ida. I find that Respondent has been an employer engaged in
commerce at material times.
Respondent’s Lake Buena Vista facility is located at Walt
Disney World.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
The parties stipulated that both the Charging Party (Union) and
its predecessor (Local 737) have been at material times, labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
The record showed that Respondent and Local 737 have been
parties to a series of collective-bargaining agreements.
A. Supervisory Issue
The parties stipulated that the employees alleged to be supervi-
sors are supervisors as defined in the Act.
B. The Contested Issues
General Counsel alleged that Respondent engaged in viola-
tions of Section 8(a)(1):
By Mike Childs threatening employees that there was no con-
tract and Respondent could make changes in wages, hours, and
working conditions:
Debra G. Goodman worked for Respondent in housekeeping.
Mike Childs is Respondent’s chief engineer. After the employ-
ees voted to strike in June 1996, Goodman had a conversation
with Childs in the hallway going back to the human resource
department. Goodman explained to Childs that she was upset
about Respondent implementing the contract the employees had
rejected. Goodman testified:

(Childs told her) you all was stupid for not reading the con-
tract because if you read it, you’d know the Company gave
a fair contract. And he said but you just went by what your
union people said, and he says—I said that we voted no on
that contract. How can you implement something on it like
the vacation when we said no. He said you voted no, that
means you have no contract that means we can implement
any part of the contract that we want to.

Childs did not dispute Goodman’s testimony.
Findings
Credibility
In view of Debra Goodman’s demeanor and the full record, I
credit her testimony. Mike Childs did not dispute her.
Conclusions
The credited testimony proved that employee Goodman was
told by a supervisor, an agent of Respondent, that the employees
did not have a collective-bargaining agreement and that Respon-
dent could implement changes. Childs made that comment to
Goodman while the Union represented unit employees and the
parties were involved in collective-bargaining negotiations. I
find that those comments had the tendency to coerce employees
from engaging in protected activity and constitute violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

By Mike Childs threatening employees with suspension or
discharge for talking about the Union:
By Mike Childs prohibiting employees from being present
in a break/lunch area before employees’ scheduled shift
time:

Around September 23, 1996, Mike Childs came to Earl Ran-
kin and said “if I hear you speaking about the Union during work
hours, I am going to send you home or fine you.” According to
Earl Rankin, he had talked with an employee named Calvin at
work earlier that day about Calvin not going out if a strike was
called.
Michael Childs testified but he did not admit or deny the above
allegations.
Arley Arwood works for Respondent as a maintenance II en-
gineer. Arwood was called by Respondent. He testified that
there is a rule that employees cannot talk about the Union except
during break and lunchtime.
Findings
Credibility
Although I was not impressed with Earl Rankin’s demeanor
during cross-examination where he was somewhat evasive in his
answers, I do credit his testimony regarding Mike Childs. Childs
testified but he did not dispute Rankin’s testimony.
Conclusions
General Counsel cited Our Way, Inc., 268 NLRB 394 (1983),
to support its contention that Respondent engaged in unlawful
conduct by prohibiting Rankin from discussing the Union during
work. There was no showing that employees were prohibited
from discussing any other subject. I find that Childs did prohibit
employee Rankin from discussing the Union and that Childs
threatened Rankin with being sent home or fined. I find that
activity constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

By Gary Lambert prohibiting an employee from wearing a
Union cap:
By Bob Jeremiah prohibiting an employee from wearing a
Union cap:

Earl Rankin testified that he was formerly employed by Re-
spondent for 14 years. He was a carpenter in the engineering
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 622
department and he was the head shop steward for the Union for
the last 3 years he worked. Rankin was the employee that solic-
ited union cards from maintenance department employees. That
action eventually resulted in the maintenance department being
added to the recognized collective-bargaining unit. Rankin was
on the union negotiating committee.
Rankin testified that he wore baseball caps to work every day
including caps with insignia from building supply, paint, wallpa-
per and plumbing companies and the Union. Rankin also wore
union buttons to work.
On June 27, 1996, Director of Engineering Mike Childs
stopped Earl Rankin at work and told him to take off his union
pin. The pin was about one inch by an inch and a quarter and
read “H.E.R.E., AFL–CIO, Local 55.” Childs told Rankin that
Lambert and Goss wants the pin off. Rankin removed the pin
and did not wear that particular pin to work after that incident.
Earl Rankin testified that Bob Jeremiah came to Rankin at
work on July 2, 1996, and told Rankin to remove his union base-
ball cap. Jeremiah told Rankin that he could not wear the cap
again. Jeremiah said that Lambert had given those directions.
Rankin removed the cap and did not wear it to work again.
Michael Childs testified that he told Earl Rankin that the only
hats that are allowed to be worn by employees are hats that have
no logos and hats that have a Grosvenor logo. He recalled telling
Earl Rankin to remove a hat with a union logo. Childs testified
that he also told Rankin on occasion that he could not wear hats
with other logos. Childs denied that Rankin wore hats to work
other than the one with the union logo and one with AGRA.
Around 4 p.m. on July 2, Earl Rankin talked with Gary Lam-
bert. Rankin asked why he was being harassed. Lambert replied
that “we had spoken about the pin and had made the decision.”
Lambert said that as far as the hat is concerned, there is too much
friction and Rankin could not wear the hat. Lambert said that the
shop stewards may wear the union pins but that the members
could not. At the time of that conversation people were wearing
a smaller union pin. The new pin was about one inch by one
inch.
Gary Lambert testified that Earl Rankin did come into his of-
fice around July 1, 1996, and that he told Rankin that he could
not wear his union hat. Lambert testified that Respondent had
made a tentative agreement with Jose Navedo permitting union
stewards to wear particular union pins that had been obtained by
Navedo. Lambert told Rankin that he could wear his union pin
but not his union hat.
Supervisor Bob Jeremiah did not testify. Arley Arwood works
for Respondent as a maintenance II engineer. He testified that
employees in engineering are allowed to wear white hats if they
are painters, and otherwise to wear hats with no logo or with the
Grosvenor logo and that when supervisors notice anyone wearing
a hat that does not meet those standards, the supervisor tells the
employee to take off the hat.
Findings
Credibility
Again, although Earl Rankin appeared to be somewhat evasive
on cross examination, the events on July 2, 1996, are not seri-
ously disputed. I credit the evidence showing that two or three of
Respondent’s supervisors told Earl Rankin to remove his union
cap. Michael Childs admitted that he told Rankin to remove his
union cap. Childs also testified that he has on other occasions
told Rankin to remove other baseball caps.
Childs’ testified that he told Rankin on occasion that he could
not wear hats with logos other than Respondent’s. He also testi-
fied that he saw Rankin wear only two of several hats that did not
comply with Respondent’s rule. Those two were the union cap
and an AGRA cap. The evidence regarding why Rankin was told
to remove the union cap is inconsistent. Childs testified that he
told Earl Rankin that he could not wear the union cap because
employees were prohibited from wearing caps with logos other
than Respondent’s. Rankin’s testimony that Jeremiah told him
that Lambert had given instructions that Rankin must remove the
union cap and not wear it again, was unrebutted. Gary Lambert
testified, on the other hand, that he told Rankin that he could not
wear the union cap because Respondent had an agreement with
Union Agent Jose Navedo that union stewards could wear a par-
ticular union pin.
As shown herein, Arley Arwood demonstrated poor recollec-
tion during cross-examination. I was not impressed with his
demeanor and I do not credit his testimony.
In view of the entire record, I am convinced and credit Earl
Rankin’s testimony showing that employees were permitted to
wear caps other than caps without logos and caps with Respon-
dent’s logo. I find that the full credited record proved that Re-
spondent required Earl Rankin to remove his union cap even
though it permitted employees to wear caps with logos other than
that of the Union or Respondent.
Conclusions
As shown herein the parties did not reach a collective-
bargaining agreement and it was proposed by Respondent that
any agreement was contingent on agreement for an entire con-
tract. With that in mind I find that the record failed to show that
Respondent and the Union, through Jose Navedo, ever reached
binding agreement to limit the wearing of union insignia.
Respondent offered evidence that it was required to enforce
rules promulgated by Disney. However, there was no showing
that those rules, referred to on occasion as grooming books, were
ever applied to employees that did not have regular guest contact
nor was there a showing that Respondent could discriminatorily
prohibit the wearing of union insignia because of grooming re-
quirements.
The credited testimony supports General Counsel’s allega-
tions. Michael Childs first told Earl Rankin to remove his union
pin. Afterward, Supervisors Jeremiah and Childs told Rankin to
remove his union cap.
Michael Childs testified that Rankin was in violation of rules
prohibiting any caps with logos other than Respondent’s. Direc-
tor of Human Resources Gary Lambert testified but he did not
mention a rule against wearing caps with logos other than Re-
spondent’s. Instead, according to Rankin’s recollection of his
meeting with Lambert, Lambert told him that “there was too
much friction and Rankin could not wear the hat.” Lambert testi-
fied that he told Rankin the decision was based on Respondent’s
agreement with Jose Navedo that union stewards could wear a
particular union pin.
GROSVENOR RESORT 623
In view of my credibility findings including the testimony that
employees wore caps other than Respondent’s or the Union’s, I
find that Respondent promulgated and applied a rule against
wearing a union hat in a disparate manner. I find that conduct
constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

By Ethyl Brenner threatening employees with discharge and
that recall after strike would be at Respondent’s discretion:
By Ethyl Brenner threatening to continue scheduling by sen-
iority despite Respondent having demanded elimination of
seniority during negotiations:
By Ethyl Brenner bypassing the Union and dealing directly
with employees by announcing an increase in premium pay
for extra rooms:

In early September 1996, Debra Goodman talked to Supervi-
sor Ethyl Brenner about whether she should strike. Goodman
suggested to Brenner that she could go out and picket on her days
off, on her own time. Brenner said no, if you go out there on the
picket line, you’re classified as a striker, and you can be replaced.
Goodman said that after this is over Respondent would have to
give her back her job. Brenner said no, not necessarily, if the
replacement is good we do not have to bring you back. Brenner
asked Goodman why she was going out on strike and Goodman
replied because Respondent has taken her seniority. Brenner said
no, we’re scheduling by seniority. Goodman said that Respon-
dent would not budge on room bonus and Brenner said you’re
going to be getting $3 for every extra room after 15 starting Sun-
day. Brenner asked Goodman why did she want to sacrifice her
job when Respondent was scheduling by seniority and giving the
$3.
Ethyl Brenner is Respondent’s assistant executive house-
keeper. She testified that Goodman did come into her office and
ask if she went out on strike would she lose her job. Brenner
testified that she told Goodman that he job could be replaced.
Brenner denied telling Goodman that she could be fired.
Findings
Credibility
As shown above, I credit the testimony of Deborah Goodman.
Ethyl Brenner’s testimony was in substantial accord with Good-
man.
Conclusions
The credited testimony proved that Respondent supervisor
Brenner told Goodman that she could be replaced even if Good-
man picketed on her own time. Brenner went on to say that if
Goodman was replaced, Respondent would not have to give her
job back after the strike and Brenner told Goodman that Respon-
dent would schedule by seniority. Goodman was aware that
Respondent was insisting during negotiations that the contract
would not include a requirement that it schedule by seniority and
Respondent’s last contract offer had excluded a provision that it
would schedule work by seniority. Brenner also told Goodman
that Respondent would give housekeeping employees $3 for each
extra room over 15. At that time Goodman knew that Respon-
dent had refused to agree to the Union’s proposal that it give $3
for each extra room over 15.
The full record proved that Goodman was relying on correct
information. Respondent had bargained to remove from the con-
tract seniority for scheduling and it had rejected the Union’s pro-
posal to give housekeeping employees $3 for each extra room
over 15.
The Board has found that an employer engages in illegal activ-
ity by threatening employees with loss of jobs for striking. In
Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310 NLRB 1286 (1993), the employer
wrote employees that it would “begin to hire and train new em-
ployees immediately so you should understand that you have a
right to work here which is protected by federal and state law if
you return to work before you are replaced. It really is up to
you.” The employer concurrently published a notice in the news-
papers indicating the rights of replacement workers would be
protected. The Board held that Gibson Greetings violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) through the above action in that it constituted threats
that employees by striking, will be deprived of their right to get
their jobs back. The Board explained that even economic strikers
that are permanently replaced, have the right to their jobs back
whenever their jobs become available.
Here, Respondent went further than the employer in Gibson
Greetings, Inc., by threatening Debra Goodman with loss of job
for picketing on her own time even though Goodman indicated
that she would continue to work. I find that Respondent’s con-
duct constituted another violation of Section 8(a)(1). I also find
that Brenner told Goodman that Respondent would schedule by
seniority and institute an increase in premium pay for extra
rooms, at a time when the parties were not at impasse, in further
violation of the Act.

By Mark Rawlins bypassing the Union and dealing directly
with employees by announcing an increase in premium pay
for extra rooms:
By Mark Rawlins by passing the Union and dealing directly
with employees by announcing a bonus program, parties
and gifts for housekeeping employees:

Feliza Ryland and Debra Goodman attended a meeting in the
cafeteria. Executive Housekeeper Mark Rawlins spoke. Other
housekeeping supervisors were with Rawlins. Rawlins told the
employees that Respondent was going to start giving them $3
extra for each room cleaned over 15 and that Respondent was
working to give the employees additional incentives.
The parties stipulated that Mark Rawlins met with housekeep-
ing employees in September 1996 and informed those employees
that Respondent had negotiated contracts with wholesale suppli-
ers whereby those suppliers agreed to pay an additional amount
of money which would be given to housekeeping employees in
the amount of an additional $1 per room and that that additional
$1 per room was paid over and above the contract amount of $2
premium pay from September 1996.
Findings
Credibility
I credit the testimony of Feliza Ryland and Debra Goodman.
That testimony was not disputed. I also credit the stipulation that
Mark Rawlins met with housekeeping employees in September
and told employees that Respondent would pay housekeeping
employees an additional $1 per room over and above the contract
amount of $2 per room.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 624
Conclusions
The credited testimony proved that Mark Rawlins told em-
ployees at a time when the parties were not at impasse, that Re-
spondent was going to give them $3 extra for each room over 15
and that Respondent was working to grant additional benefits.
Rawlins also announced to housekeeping employees they would
receive an additional $1 per room over and above the contract
amount of $2 premium pay. By those actions Respondent was
dealing directly with employees and bypassing the Union, over
matters that were under discussion in negotiations with the Union
in violation of Section 8(a)(1).

General Counsel alleged that Respondent engaged in other
violations of the Act:
General Counsel alleged that the Union or its predecessor,
represented Respondent’s employees in the following de-
scribed appropriate unit:

All housekeeping employees, bellpersons, cashiers, conven-
tion setup employees, lounge employees, dining room em-
ployees, pool bar and grill employees, kitchen department
employees, room service employees, banquet employees,
servi-bar employees, and maintenance department employ-
ees, but excluding casual employees, guards, and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.

Findings
Respondent and the Union or its predecessor were parties to
collective-bargaining agreements. The last agreement was effec-
tive on its terms from 1992 until October 31, 1995, for employees
in the above unit. The record shows without dispute that the
parties met and negotiated toward a successor contract, until
negotiations terminated as shown herein. Those negotiations
involved the same bargaining unit shown above which was the
unit included in the parties’ last contract. In view of the full re-
cord I find that the Union has represented the unit employees at
all material times.
General Counsel alleged that Respondent engaged in bad-faith
bargaining by:

regressive bargaining proposals:
demanding a change in the scope of the Unit:
demanding the unilateral right to terminate negotiated
benefits:
refusing to engage in substantive discussions with a me-
diator:
threatening to declare impasse:
prematurely declaring impasse:

The parties met at various times from November 1995 through
September 1996 in collective-bargaining negotiations. Negotia-
tions including Jose Navedo for the Union, occurred before April
1996. The parties stipulated into evidence Respondent’s notes of
bargaining sessions including sessions on December 4, 5, 13, and
14, 1995, February 14, 21, and 28, March 7, April 19 and 23,
May 6, 7, and 10, and June 24, 1996 (Jt. Exh. 1). The March 7
negotiations were conducted on the phone.
The Union proposed a collective-bargaining agreement on De-
cember 5, 1995 (GC Exh. 34).
Respondent’s bargaining notes received as Joint Exhibit 1
show that Respondent expressed a willingness to supply the Un-
ion with information on request during the December 5, 1995
meeting.
During the December 13 session Respondent presented a pro-
posed contract and pointed out that the shaded areas in that pro-
posed contract represented topics or areas agreed to during the
last negotiation session. The parties met on December 14.
Respondent’s notes of negotiation meetings show that Murphy
appeared as Respondent’s attorney at the December 14, 1995
negotiation meeting. Arch Stokes first appeared as Respondent’s
attorney at the February 14, 1996 meeting.
The notes of the February 14, 1996 meeting show Lambert,
Attorney Stokes, Navedo, and members of the union negotiating
committee were present. Navedo, Stokes, and each member of
the union negotiating committee explained what each of them
wanted to get from the negotiations.
Lambert, Stokes, Navedo, and employee members of the union
negotiating committee met again on February 21, 1996. A griev-
ance was presented regarding loss of seniority by employee Mary
Woodard because she did not return from a medical leave of
absence until shortly after 90 days. The parties agreed to resolve
the grievance in favor of Mary Woodard. Respondent presented
the Union with a proposal that included a 401K plan. After the
Union took time to examine the proposal the mater was debated.
At the close of the meeting Respondent stated it would present a
new wage proposal at the next meeting; that its proposal on sen-
iority would be reviewed and amended; Respondent agreed to
show the Union its documents used to arrive at its wage proposal
and Respondent would study and compare the collective bargain-
ing at the Royal Plaza Hotel with its own proposals. The bar-
gaining notes show that the Union stated among other things, that
it needed to be presented with a final contract.
Respondent’s bargaining notes, Joint Exhibit 1, include hand-
written notes of a February 28, 1996, meeting involving Lambert,
Stokes, and Navedo. Stokes presented pie charts to the Union.
The parties discussed various proposed provisions in the contract.
Respondent rejected the Union’s proposal to grant housekeeping
employees $3.25 for extra rooms. The Union countered by offer-
ing $3 for 1st year, $3.10 for year 2 and $3.25 for year 3.
Jose Navedo was removed as the union’s negotiator. Harvey
Totzke of the Union, wrote Respondent on March 18, 1996, that
two other union agents had been assigned to function as union
business representatives.
Ruth Cinque testified for Respondent. She is a waitress for
Respondent and was a member of the union negotiating commit-
tee. She testified that the parties reached tentative agreement on
a number of issues while Jose Navedo represented the Union.
Those agreements included that five people at a table rather than
eight, were all that was required to justify an automatic service
charge in the Baskerville dining room of the hotel.
Arthur Wilton testified that he is a bartender for Respondent.
Wilton was a shop steward and he met with Jose Navedo regard-
ing negotiations with Respondent. Once, shortly before Navedo
left the Union, Navedo told Wilton that negotiations were going
smoothly and that things should be wrapped up soon.
Harvey Totzke was the chief union negotiator from April 19,
1996. Union Business Agent Margie Engels was also involved in
GROSVENOR RESORT 625
negotiations from that time. Both Totzke and Engels testified.
Earl Rankin testified that he was on the union negotiating com-
mittee during 1995 and 1996.
At the time Totzke and Engels became involved, the parties
had not reached agreement. The prior agreement was still in
effect (GC Exh. 5). The parties had before them a proposal by
Respondent dated December 13, 1995 (GC Exh. 4). That pro-
posal was captioned “Employer’s First Complete Contract Pro-
posal.” After having submitted a contract proposal on December
5, the Union submitted a counterproposal during the first meeting
attended by Totzke and Engels on April 19, 1996 (GC Exh. 6).
Respondent’s notes for a April 19, 1996 meeting show that
Lambert, Stokes, Union Representatives Totzke, Fabian, and
Engels were present along with employee members of the union
negotiating committee. The Union presented a revised counter
proposal on wages, which showed movement toward Respon-
dent’s position. The parties agreed to meet “next Tuesday.” The
notes show that Harvey Totzke stated he was ready to negotiate
to finalize on Tuesday, and Stokes replied that he doesn’t negoti-
ate 24 hours per day any longer but would meet for several hours
to address all necessary issues.
When the parties met in negotiations on April 23, 1996, Re-
spondent addressed the proposals included in the Union’s April
19 counter-proposal. Respondent stated that the Union’s pro-
posal was $215,000 higher than Respondent’s and that parties
would quickly reach impasse if the Union were to stand on their
economic demands. Respondent’s spokesman argued that the
Union’s proposal was for a five percent increase in wages with
tip, and that Respondent’s proposal was for a 3.4 percent in-
crease. The parties discussed the provisions of the Union’s pro-
posals. Respondent agreed to some of the union proposals and
rejected others.
The parties met on May 6. Respondent’s notes show the par-
ties may have been in agreement as to articles 1, 2, 4, 6, 11, 13,
14, 15, 16, 26, 27, 28, 30, 33, and portions of other articles. Har-
vey Totzke testified that Respondent proposed that in exchange
for grievance with arbitration the employees waive their rights to
any other recourse. Totzke took the position that the Union could
not agree to waive employees’ inherent rights including their
right to complain to the NLRB or the EEOC. Respondent argued
that such a provision had been agreed to on the west coast by
Union Leader John Wilhelm. After a phone call to Wilhelm
Totzke agreed to the provision proposed by Respondent.
At a meeting on May 7, Margie Engels presented the Union’s
position on outstanding issues. The Union agreed to Respon-
dent’s proposal to go to personal days off rather than Federal
holidays, but there was disagreement on whether personal days
could be used as sick days. The Union made some concessions
including reducing its proposal for housekeeping pay for extra
rooms over 15, to $3 and its proposed pay increase. Other pro-
posals were either accepted or the Union stood by its former
position.
Another meeting was held on May 10. At that meeting, ac-
cording to Respondent’s notes, Respondent spokesman Stokes
stated “Contract indicated as “Final” is reference to economics
are maxed out in this offer.” Respondent explained that it contin-
ued to adhere to its position regarding articles 3, 5, 6, 9, and 21
and that it would work with the Union regarding articles 7, 8 and
would modify 13, 14, and 15. At the end of that meeting the
parties agreed to meet again on May 30 or 31.
Later on May 10, Respondent’s attorney requested a meeting
and gave Margie Engels a draft document. Stokes discussed the
document with Engels. According to Engels’ testimony, nothing
was said to her about the document being Respondent’s final
offer (GC Exh. 8). On May 14, Respondent mailed its final draft
to the Union. That draft was marked “Grosvenor Resort’s final
collective-bargaining proposal, May 10, 1996.”
Respondent’s contract proposal was presented to the Union
membership and was voted down. The members also voted to
strike but did not strike pursuant to that strike vote. Harvey
Totzke testified that he did not intend to strike.
The Union received a letter from Respondent’s attorney sug-
gesting consolidation of negotiations into 1 day, May 31. The
parties were unable to agree to devote all of May 31 to negotia-
tions. Negotiations were rescheduled to June 24 and 25. The
Union prepared a counter-proposal and gave it to Respondent on
June 24 (GC Exh. 12). Respondent told the Union that Respon-
dent was not there to negotiate but that the Union had its final
offer. Respondent refused to discuss the Union’s counter offer
saying the parties were at impasse. Respondent advised the Un-
ion of its implementation of some of its contract offers. The
parties did not meet on June 25.
The parties exchanged letters with Respondent taking the posi-
tion the parties were at impasse. The Union argued they were not
at impasse.
Subsequently Engels and Totzke met with Respondent repre-
sentatives at Morton’s restaurant. The parties met again the fol-
lowing Monday. The Union took down a picket line when Re-
spondent agreed to meet that Monday. The parties negotiated
some bargaining issues. The Union agreed to a proposal by Re-
spondent to prohibit striking or picketing.
The parties met again on November 12. Respondent advised
the Union that it was not in their interest to continue negotiations.
There have been no negotiations since November 12, 1996.
Findings
Credibility
There is no substantial conflict in the context of the bargaining
sessions. In large regard I have used and credited the Respon-
dent’s notes of several negotiating sessions found in Joint Exhibit
1. To the extent there are conflicts I credit the testimony of Har-
vey Totzke and Margie Engels in view of my impression of their
demeanor and the full record.
Conclusions
Counsel for General Counsel argued that Respondent bar-
gained without intention to reach agreement. In support of that
argument General Counsel pointed to several matters. Those
included Respondent beginning in January 1996 to prepare for a
strike (see testimony of Gary Lambert at Tr. 502–503). Respon-
dent attorney’s comments during the April 19, 1996 negotiations
that if the Union “continued to propose sick leave then we will be
at impasse quickly.” (See Tr. 42, 219, 474.) Respondent’s initial
contract proposal (December 13, 1995) included some 25 items
that were regressive when viewed against the parties last contract
and that proposal showed no consideration of the Union’s De-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 626
cember 5, 1995, proposal. In its final contract proposal of May
10, Respondent sought to reduce the scope of the bargaining unit
by proposing an increase in the number of hours required before
an employee ceased to be part-time from 24 to 30 hours a week
and the inclusion of a phrase showing that part-time employees
“shall not be covered by this Contract and shall not receive any
benefits under this Contract.” Respondent proposed on December
13, that it retain the right to unilaterally withdraw vacation, holi-
day, and health benefits. In its last proposal Respondent sought
to retain the right to withdraw health insurance. General Counsel
argued that Respondent’s attorney engaged in similar tactics in
Radisson Plaza Minneapolis, 307 NLRB 94, 95 fn. 8 (1992),
enfd. 987 F.2d 1376 (8th Cir. 1993). Respondent engaged in
holistic bargaining, meaning that there would be no agreement on
individual matters unless the parties agreed to the whole contract.
General Counsel argued that Respondent prematurely declared
that the parties were at impasse and that Respondent made unilat-
eral changes.
Respondent argued that it did not engage in bad-faith bargain-
ing. Instead it pointed out that the initial Chief Union Negotiator
Jose Navedo, became more aggressive in the enforcement of the
1992 contract and Navedo told Respondent that he planned to use
the 1996 Grosvenor collective-bargaining agreement as a model
to assist him in organizing other hotels in the area. (See Tr. 485–
486; 206–207; 459, Jt. Exh. 1, December 5, 1995 notes.) Those
events led Respondent to believe that the negotiations may be
more difficult and contributed to their decision to hire an attor-
ney. Respondent made complete contract proposals on Decem-
ber 13, 1995 and May 10, 1996. It negotiated with the Union 12
times. It presented the Union with pie charts which broke down
the hourly pay of every employee and answered the Union’s
information requests. (See Tr. 58, 280, 282.) Respondent and
the Union have had a collective-bargaining relationship for over
25 years and Respondent voluntarily recognized the Union in its
maintenance department. The parties agreed on significant is-
sues. Respondent did not engage in regressive bargaining. Re-
spondent cited Chevron Oil Co. v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 1067 (5th
Cir. 1971); Illinois-American Water Co., 310 NLRB 218 (1991);
Concrete Pipe & Products Corp., 305 NLRB 152 (1991); Atlas
Metal Parts Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1981). Respon-
dent also argued that the Union’s conduct was inconsistent point-
ing out that it changed negotiators midstream.
The record evidence showed that in some respects Respondent
engaged in hard bargaining. In that regard, I find that General
Counsel’s arguments that Respondent bargained without inten-
tion of reaching agreement, was not adequately supported by the
record when that issue is isolated from all the circumstances
herein. General Counsel pointed out that Respondent made strike
preparations beginning in January 1996. I disagree that the re-
cord illustrated that Respondent did anything in that regard which
illustrated bad faith. I find that there was confusion as to what
was occurring in January 1996 and that confusion cut both ways.
As argued by Respondent, the record evidence showed that Jose
Navedo, the initial chief Union negotiator, told Respondent that
he planned to use the 1996 Grosvenor collective-bargaining
agreement as a model to assist him in organizing other hotels in
the area. (See above.) That action could justify some alarm by
any employer which may result in some strike preparations.
I also find that Respondent attorney’s comments to the effect
that the Union could cause quick impasse, does not demonstrate
bad faith. That comment was made during the heat of negotia-
tions and shows nothing more than Respondent’s refusal to con-
sider the Union’s proposal at that moment.
General Counsel argued that Respondent’s initial contract pro-
posal included some 25 items that were “regressive when viewed
against the parties last contract and that proposal showed no con-
sideration of the Union’s December 5, 1995, proposal.” I find
that Respondent’s actions in that regard when considered in isola-
tion, do not demonstrate bad faith. I am unaware of jurispru-
dence showing that an employer may not under any circum-
stances, propose a collective bargaining agreement that is more
favorable than its last agreement and whether or not, the Respon-
dent’s proposal demonstrated on its face, consideration of the
Union’s contract proposal, does not establish that Respondent did
not consider the Union’s proposal. (See, for example, A.M.F.
Bowling Co., 314 NLRB 969 (1994).)
General Counsel argued that Respondent’s position on “holis-
tic” bargaining demonstrated bad faith. However, the record
failed to show that matter became an issue and there was no
showing that Respondent resisted efforts to discuss individual
issues.
Nevertheless, I am convinced that the record does show that
Respondent bargained in bad faith.
Respondent declared and continued to insist that its contract
proposal dated May 10 was its final offer. As shown above the
parties did meet on May 10. According to Respondent’s notes, its
spokesman stated, “Contract indicated as ‘Final’ is reference to
economics are maxed out in this offer.” Respondent’s May 10
bargaining session notes show that its spokesman’s comments
include the following:

Article 7—Will work with union to derive accept lan-
guage (Prefer shortened)
Article 8—(8.03 needs further modified) Reviewed
modified position of 8.07 (Meals) only new hires beyond
contract execution would pay
. . . .
Articles 13, 14 and 15—Need modified yet today
. . . .
Went through several of the Articles to simplify lan-
guage to make contract more easily read.
Article 31—Reviewed corrections

Those comments show that the parties continued to engage in
give and take bargaining on May 10. Both parties showed a
willingness to move toward agreement.
At the end of the May 10 meeting, the parties agreed to spe-
cific future meetings. Union Representative Engels testified that
the parties agreed that “each side would go back and prepare—
you know, pair down their proposals to what they actually
needed, the Union, in order to get a contract that could be ratified
and that we would be meeting again then.” Subsequently, on
May 10, Respondent met with Engels and showed her a contract
draft showing on its face that it was their final offer. Respondent
then submitted a finished contract proposal to the Union by mail
dated May 14, 1996.
GROSVENOR RESORT 627
On June 24, when the parties next met, the Union presented
Respondent with a counter-proposal but Respondent replied it
was not there to negotiate and that the Union had received its
final contract proposal. Respondent was referring to the pro-
posed contract marked as “Grosvenor Resort’s final collective-
bargaining proposal, May 10, 1996.” Respondent stated that the
parties were at impasse and that it was implementing some of its
contract proposals. As shown above, Respondent has continued
to insist that the parties were at impasse and has refused to nego-
tiate from its May 10 offer in actual negotiations even though it
has met with Union representatives on several occasions since
June 24, 1996. By its insistence of impasse when its own notes
of the last bargaining session show that it continued to engage in
give and take negotiations with the Union, Respondent engaged
in bad-faith bargaining.
I am also concerned about Respondent’s inclusion in its final
contract proposal a provision that part-time employees shall not
be covered by the contract. That provision must be considered
along with Respondent’s final contract proposal including the
increased limitation of part time up to 30 hours a week. The
Board has held that a proposed change in the established collec-
tive bargaining unit is a nonmandatory subject of bargaining and
that bad faith is proven when a party insist to impasse on a non-
mandatory subject. See Idaho Statesman, 281 NLRB 272
(1986).
Respondent also included in its last contract proposal its right
to unilaterally withdraw health insurance (GC 9, Art. 33.02).
General Counsel argued that was tantamount to insisting on
elimination of the Union’s right to negotiate over a mandatory
issue and constituted evidence of bad faith (Radisson Plaza Min-
neapolis, 307 NLRB 94, 95 fn. 8 (1992), enfd. 987 F.2d 1376
(8th Cir. 1993)), and that Respondent would not have been privi-
leged to impose that change even if impasse had been reached
because to do so would effectively serve as a waiver of the Un-
ion’s right to bargain (McClatchy Newspapers, 321 NLRB 1386,
1390–1391 (1996)).
As shown above Respondent’s agents engaged in unfair labor
practices away from the bargaining table. Respondent’s supervi-
sor told an employee in June 1996 there was no collective-
bargaining agreement and that Respondent could implement
changes. Respondent supervisors prohibited an employee from
wearing a union baseball cap and threatened that employee with
suspension or fine, if he talked to other employees about the Un-
ion during work hours. In September, a supervisor told an em-
ployee that she could be replaced if she picketed for the Union on
her own time and that she may not be given her job back after the
strike. The supervisor told the employee that Respondent would
implement a change to $3 for each extra room cleaned by house-
keeping employees over 15. Then, as shown herein, Respondent
did implement a change to $3 for each extra room cleaned over
15.
Unrebutted evidence showed that Respondent announced and
unilaterally implemented a change to $3 in housekeeping for
extra rooms over 15. Respondent did not make that proposal
during negotiations. In fact that proposal was made by the Union
and rejected by Respondent. By unilaterally implementing that
practice Respondent illustrated bad faith. Respondent also en-
gaged in bad-faith negotiations regarding the issue of personal
days off. The record showed that the Union agreed to Respon-
dent’s proposal to substitute 11 personal days off rather than the
former practice of 3 personal days and 8 holidays. However,
when Respondent instituted a personal days off policy it included
a provision that employees need no longer give 2 weeks’ advance
notice and that for the first year employees would not be charged
for holidays used since their last anniversary date. That evidence
showed that the implemented personal-days off policy was more
liberal toward the employees that what Respondent had proposed
during negotiations. In that regard, see GC 28 and the testimony
of Feliza Ryland which is credited below.
As shown above, Respondent argued that the Union’s conduct
was inconsistent pointing out that it changed negotiators mid-
stream. However, Respondent also offered testimony showing
that it was unhappy with the Union’s initial negotiator and it was
due in some measure to comments by him that Respondent pre-
pared itself for more difficult bargaining. Within 3 weeks after
the Union brought in its new chief negotiator on April 19, Re-
spondent presented the Union with what it has continued to claim
was its final offer. I am convinced that the change in chief nego-
tiators by the Union did nothing, which justified Respondent’s
action. There was no showing that Respondent expressed dissat-
isfaction with the Union’s change in negotiators at the time the
change was made. Nor is there support for a contention that the
Union’s change contributed to difficulties in negotiations. As
shown, Respondent’s notes of negotiation sessions show that the
parties were moving toward agreement when they last negotiated
on May 10, 1996.
Subsequent to June 24, Respondent agreed to the Union’s re-
quest that the parties meet with a federal mediator on September
5 and 6, 1996. General Counsel argued that action, among oth-
ers, shows that the parties had not exhausted collective bargain-
ing, citing Powell Electrical Mfg. Co., 287 NLRB 969 (1987). I
agree with counsel for General Counsel. Respondent appeared to
try and play both hands of declaring impasse while holding out
the possibility of further concessions through negotiations.
Respondent was premature in declaring impasse. The evi-
dence shows that Respondent first presented the Union with a
draft of its final contract on May 10. Earlier on May 10 during
negotiations, Respondent had advised the Union among other
things, that it would work with the Union regarding articles 7, 8
and would modify articles 13, 14, and 15 and it agreed to future
negotiation meetings.
As shown above, the record also shows that Respondent’s final
contract proposal was dated some 3 weeks after the Union
changed negotiators on April 19, 1996. According to the testi-
mony of Gary Lambert of Respondent, the Union removed a
negotiator that was causing friction with Respondent by, among
other things, declaring that he would use the Union’s contract
with Respondent to organize other hotels in the area. Neverthe-
less, Respondent gave the new union negotiators inadequate time
to engage in meaningful negotiations before declaring impasse.
The record shows that the parties were never “at the end of their
rope” in negotiations and that Respondent’s declaration of im-
passe was made in bad faith1 (Larsdale, Inc., 310 NLRB 1317,

1 Respondent pointed out in its brief, testimony on cross examination
of Margie Engels, about a meeting involving Totzke, Engels and Arch
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 628
1318 (1993); RBE Electronics of S.D., Inc., 320 NLRB 80
(1995).
General Counsel alleged that Respondent engaged in unilateral
changes since June 28, 1996, including:

General Wage Increase:
Increase in insurance premiums:
New personal days off program:
Premium pay for culinary chefs:
Premium pay for cleaning extra rooms:

Feliza Ryland had worked in housekeeping for 12 years and
was the Union steward. She was on the negotiating committee.
Ryland testified that the Union first proposed an increase from $2
to $3.50 as extra pay for cleaning rooms in excess of 15. Eventu-
ally the Union reduced its proposal to $3 but Respondent never
agreed to that proposal. However, Respondent implemented an
increase to $3 even though it had refused to agree to that proposal
during negotiations. The Union also eventually agreed to Re-
spondent’s proposal to use 11 personal-days off rather than 3
holidays and 8 personal days. Ryland testified that Respondent
implemented an 11 personal days off practice which included a
more liberal practice than Respondent proposed during negotia-
tions (see above).
The parties stipulated that Respondent implemented a general
wage increase on or about July 1997 in accord with proposals
included in the wage scale attachments to Respondent’s May 14
contract proposal (GC Ex 9). The parties stipulated that Respon-
dent implemented a general increase in the culinary chefs’ pay
level and the parties stipulated that Mark Rawlins met with
housekeeping employees in September 1996 and informed those
employees that Respondent had negotiated contracts with whole-
sale suppliers whereby those suppliers agreed to pay an addi-
tional amount of money which would be given to housekeeping
employees in the amount of an additional $1 per room and that
that additional $1 per room was paid over and above the contract
amount of $2 premium pay from September 1996.
Findings
Credibility
I was impressed with the demeanor of Feliza Ryland and I
credit her testimony. I also credit the parties’ stipulation.
Conclusions
The credited evidence proved that Respondent unilaterally im-
plemented $3 premium pay for cleaning in excess of 15 rooms; a
more liberal 11 personal days off per year policy; a general wage

Stokes at the Hyatt Regency on June 4, 1997. That was a year after
Respondent’s declaration of impasse and there was no showing that
meeting was intended to serve as a negotiation meeting. Engels admit-
ted that Harvey Totzke stated they were not there to negotiate. The
credited record failed to support Respondent’s argument that that meet-
ing was the parties last chance to resolve economic issues that precipi-
tated the strike. Respondent had consistently refused to negotiate since
June 1996. It had not given the Union an opportunity to resolve eco-
nomic issues since that time. Moreover, the strike had occurred some 9
months before the June 4, 1997 meeting, and the striking employees
had made unconditional offers to return to work in November 1996.
Therefore, it is illogical to believe that a meeting in June 1997, could
have prevented the strike.
increase and a general increase in culinary chefs’ pay level; and
an additional $1 per room over and above the $2 premium pay
for housekeeping employees.

General Counsel alleged that the employees engaged in an un-
fair labor practice strike since on or after September 27, 1996.
General Counsel alleged that Respondent discharged the em-
ployees alleged in paragraph 16(a), because they engaged in a
strike:
On September 24, 1996, the Union held a meeting for mem-
bers. Union members were notified of the meeting by a flyer that
mentioned the pending unfair labor practice charge involving
Earl Rankin. Harvey Totzke and Margie Engels spoke. The
employees were told that the Union had filed unfair labor prac-
tice charges against Respondent regarding allegations that Re-
spondent had unlawfully prohibited display of union insignia,
that Respondent had unilaterally changed working conditions
including increasing its housekeeping room bonus from $2 to $3
and that Respondent had engaged in bad-faith bargaining. Gen-
eral Counsel introduced a June 26, 1996 memo from Respon-
dent’s director of human resources to all management and super-
visors, stating that Respondent was ready to implement the terms
of its last contract offer and recommending that managers follow
principles of scheduling by seniority whenever possible (GC
Exh. 26). The July 3, 1996 Grosvenor News, set out some
changes in working conditions including an increase in group
insurance premiums, that July 4 is a paid holiday, and a change in
the personal time/holidays policy from 1 of 3 personal days and 8
holidays to 1 of 11 personal days a year (GC Exh. 28).
Feliza Ryland and Debra Goodman testified about the Sep-
tember 24, 1996 union meeting. Harvey Totzke talked to them
about unfair labor practices. He said the Union had an unfair
labor practice charge alleging that Respondent had unlawfully
prevented Earl Rankin from wearing his union hat. Ryland,
Goodman, Totzke, and Engels testified that they were told the
strike would be an unfair labor practice strike. Totzke said that
Respondent had implemented different things like the $3 bonus
for housekeepers. A vote was taken. The ballots stated “Should
we strike the Hotel to protest their bad-faith bargaining and unfair
labor practices?” The members voted to strike. Those including
housekeeping employees Feliza Ryland and Debra Goodman
struck Respondent beginning on September 27, 1996.
Feliza Ryland testified that she was given a letter from Re-
spondent (GC Exh. 29) on the morning of September 27. The
letter stated:

Please return to work to your scheduled shift immediately or
you may be replaced.

The parties stipulated that everyone named in paragraph 16(a)
of the complaint received letters similar to the one received by
Ryland on September 27. Those listed in paragraph 16 (a) in-
clude:

Andres Alvarez Robert Baity
Rosetta Brown Hector Caban
Gilberto Caranza Dorothy Collier
Ella Mae Davis Lindsey Day
Carlos Delgado Enoch Deneus
Oslaine Desir Aida Febles
GROSVENOR RESORT 629
Maria Gillaspie Deborah Goodman
Israel Hernandez Lidia Hernandez
Maria Hernandez Betty Jackson
Mollie Jackson Jules Josaphat
Therese Josaphat Dorzelia Joseph
Marie Laguerre Paul Leblanc
Adisseau Louisius Martin Malagon
Lourdes Matos Frederick Meradin
Deborah Montgomery Chaeirable Ovince
Joseph Pascal Louis Preval
Maria Quevedo Earl Rankin
Isidro Rodriquez Feleza Ryland
Andriana Sepulueda Raymond Smith
Flor Javier Cleofas Viscaine
Margarita Jimenez Flossie Williams
Francisco Abrell Norma Jiminez

Ryland received a second letter (GC Exh. 30) from Respon-
dent dated September 30, 1996:

FELIZA RYLAND, you were given notification advising
you to report to work as scheduled. You failed to report to
work.
We had an obligation to operate this hotel and service
our guests. This our product. This is not a manufacturing
plant. Service is our business. Therefore, YOU HAVE
BEEN PERMANENTLY REPLACED.
Please come to the entrance of the westside parking lot
(the lot nearest the Disney Village MarketPlace) between
Noon and 2PM on Thursday, October 3rd, 1996. Bring all
your uniforms, hotel ID/timecard, and any other property
belonging to Grosvenor Resort in your possession, and we
will release your final check to you at that time at this loca-
tion. We will have a van parked on the grass so that you do
not have to enter the parking lot. If you have any out-
standing vacation pay, that will be included with your final
wages paid at that time.

The parties stipulated that all those named in paragraph 16(a)
of the complaint received letters similar to General Counsel Ex-
hibit 30.
Feliza Ryland received another letter (GC Exh. 31) from Re-
spondent dated December 27, 1996:

You went out on strike effective September 27th, pursu-
ant to the economic position of your union at the bargaining
table. We encouraged you not to strike, but to continue
working. We offered you the opportunity to continue in
your job despite the economic impasse between the union
and the hotel. You struck anyway and have been on strike
ever since. We hired permanent replacements for you and
other strikers, since we had to operate the hotel.
While these permanent replacements are still working at
the hotel in each of the positions of the strikers, there will be
a few positions for which we will hire new employees.
If you wish to apply for a position of Room Attendant,
please apply between the hours of 9:00 am and 4:00 pm,
Monday through Thursday, in the Human Resources office.
As is the case with other applicants, you are not authorized
to visit other areas of the hotel while you are applying for a
position.
Please note that this is a brand new position subject to
all conditions of new employment.

The parties stipulated that all those named in paragraph 16(a)
of the complaint received letters similar to General Counsel Ex-
hibit 31.
Respondent mailed a letter similar to General Counsel Exhibit
31, on May 5, 1997, to the following employees:

Deborah Goodman Feleza Ryland
Raymond Smith Chaeirable Ovince
Martin Malagon Dorzelia Joseph
Mollie Jackson Betty Jackson
Lindsey Day Maria Gillaspie
Ella Mae Davis Rosetta Brown
Hector Caban-Gaston Jules Josaphat
Adisseau Louisius Frederick Meradin
Israel Hernandez Lourdes Matos
Maria Hernandez Lidia Hernandez
Norma Jimenez Flossie Williams
Enoch Deneus Cleofas Viscaino
Adriana Sepulueda Robert Baity
Dorothy Collier Oslaine Desier
Joseph Paschal

Around the middle of July 1997, Feliza Ryland received an-
other letter from Respondent:

You went out on strike effective September 27th, pursu-
ant to the economic position of your union at the bargaining
table. We encouraged you not to strike, but to continue
working. We offered you the opportunity to continue work-
ing. We offered you the opportunity to continue in your job
despite the economic impasse between the union and the ho-
tel. You struck anyway and have been on strike ever since.
We hired permanent replacements for you and other strik-
ers, since we had to operate the hotel.
Our records reflect that your permanent replacement has
left and you will be considered on a priority re-hire basis for
a new opening in that classification as it becomes available.
However, you must apply for that position within a reason-
able time once it is available or we will be forced to con-
sider other applicants to fill the opening.
If you wish to apply and be considered for a newly open
position, please apply between the hours of 9:00 am and
4:00 pm, Monday through Thursday, in the Human Re-
source office. As is the case with other applicants, you are
not authorized to visit other areas of the hotel while you are
applying for a position.
Please note that this is a brand new position subject to
all conditions of new employment.

The parties stipulated into evidence similar letters received by
Louis Preval, Therese Josaphat, and Flor Javier (see GC Exh.
32).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 630
Findings
Credibility
In view of my findings, the demeanor of the witnesses and the
full record, I credit the testimony of Feliza Ryland, Debra Good-
man, Harvey Totzke, and Margie Engels and stipulations of the
parties. Respondent’s witnesses either did not attend the Sep-
tember 24 meeting (Ruth Cinque) or confessed to failure to recall
matters that did not directly affect him (Arley Arwood).
Conclusions
Respondent argued that the September 1996 strike was an
economic strike. In support of that argument it pointed out that
the Union had filed only one unfair labor practice charge between
the June 1996 strike vote and the September 27 strike. Actually,
as Respondent correctly noted earlier in its brief, the Union filed
a charge in Case 12–CA–18190 on July 3, 1996, and another
charge, in Case 12–CA–18381, on September 23, 1996. The July
charge involved the allegations regarding Earl Rankin and the
September charge involved alleged unilateral changes. Addition-
ally, as shown, on the day after the Union filed the charge in
Case12–CA–18381, it held a meeting and voted to strike.
The strike vote was taken on September 24, 1996. Before that
vote representatives of the Union explained the significance of an
unfair labor practice strike and that Respondent had engaged in
unfair labor practices by unlawfully preventing employee Earl
Rankin from wearing a union cap; that Respondent had engaged
in bad-faith bargaining and that Respondent had unlawfully im-
plemented changed working conditions. The employees then
struck on September 27, 1998. Leaflets were distributed by pick-
eting employees that stated, among other things, that the employ-
ees of Grosvenor Resort are on strike protesting the Employer’s
unfair labor practices. The evidence proved and I find that the
employees were motivated to engage in the September 27 strike
by Respondent prohibiting Earl Rankin from wearing a union
cap, by Respondent’s bad-faith bargaining any by Respondent’s
unilateral changes. In view of my findings herein that Respon-
dent did thereby engage in unfair labor practices, I find that the
employees strike was an unfair labor practice strike from its in-
ception. R & H Coal Co., 309 NLRB 28, enfd. 16 F.3d 410 (4th
Cir. 1994); C-Line Express, 292 NLRB 638 (1989).
In view of my determination that Respondent’s employees en-
gaged in an unfair labor practice strike from September 27, I shall
apply the rule that Respondent is obligated to reinstate unfair
labor practice strikers upon their unconditional offer to return to
work. As shown below I find that the striking employees made
unconditional offers to return to work on or around November
15, 1996. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270
(1956).
Despite those findings, I am not convinced that the Respon-
dent’s letters to striking employees as shown above, on Septem-
ber 27, and September 30, constitute notification of termination.
However, the letter of December 27 was mailed by Respondent
after the striking employees’ November 15, unconditional offers.
Respondent advised the strikers in that letter of their permanent
replacement and that it would consider them only for new posi-
tions. In view of the fact that unfair labor practice strikers are
entitle to reinstatement even though such action may necessitate
the termination of replacement employees, I find that Respon-
dent’s December 27 letter constitutes notification of discharge.
That action by Respondent constitutes an additional violation of
provision of Section 8 of the Act.
General Counsel alleged that the striking employees
made an unconditional offer to return to work on
November 15, 1996, and Respondent has refused to
reinstate those employees:
The parties stipulated that Respondent received letters signed
by 40 of the employees alleged in paragraph 16(a) of the com-
plaint excluding Ella Mae Davis, Francisco Abreu, Frederick
Meradin, and Raymond Smith within 2 weeks of November 15,
1996. Each letter included a phone number where the respective
employee could be reached.
The parties stipulated that Respondent received similar letters
from Ella Mae Davis within 2 weeks of November 26; from
Francisco Abreu within 2 weeks of December 2; and from Fre-
derick Meradin within 2 weeks of November 16, 1996. The
parties stipulated that Respondent received an unconditional offer
to return to work by letter from Raymond Smith no later than
August 7, 1997. Those letters included the following (GC Exh.
20):

Pursuant to my rights under federal law, I hereby request
to return to work; I make this request without preconditions.
As shown above striking employees received a letter
from Respondent dated December 27, 1996:
You went out on strike effective September 27th, pursu-
ant to the economic position of your union at the bargaining
table. We encouraged you not to strike, but to continue
working. We offered you the opportunity to continue in
your job despite the economic impasse between the union
and the hotel. You struck anyway and have been on strike
ever since. We hired permanent replacements for you and
other strikers, since we had to operate the hotel.
While these permanent replacements are still working at
the hotel in each of the positions of the strikers, there will be
a few positions for which we will hire new employees.
If you wish to apply for a position of Room Attendant,
please apply between the hours of 9:00 am and 4:00 pm,
Monday through Thursday, in the Human Resources office.
As is the case with other applicants, you are not authorized
to visit other areas of the hotel while you are applying for a
position.
Please note that this is a brand new position subject to
all conditions of new employment.

Around the middle of July 1997, Feliza Ryland received an-
other letter from Respondent:

You went out on strike effective September 27th, pursu-
ant to the economic position of your union at the bargaining
table. We encouraged you not to strike, but to continue
working. We offered you the opportunity to continue work-
ing. We offered you the opportunity to continue in your job
despite the economic impasse between the union and the ho-
tel. You struck anyway and have been on strike ever since.
We hired permanent replacements for you and other strik-
ers, since we had to operate the hotel.
GROSVENOR RESORT 631
Our records reflect that your permanent replacement has
left and you will be considered on a priority re-hire basis for
a new opening in that classification as it becomes available.
However, you must apply for that position within a reason-
able time once it is available or we will be forced to con-
sider other applicants to fill the opening.
If you wish to apply and be considered for a newly
open position, please apply between the hours of 9:00 am
and 4:00 pm, Monday through Thursday, in the Human Re-
source office. As is the case with other applicants, you are
not authorized to visit other areas of the hotel while you are
applying for a position.
Please note that this is a brand new position subject to
all conditions of new employment.

The parties stipulated into evidence similar letters received by
Louis Preval, Therese Josaphat, and Flor Javier (see GC Exh.
32).
The parties stipulated that bargaining unit jobs have not
changed; that Respondent has continued to do some hiring in
actual bargaining unit; and there may be some positions for
which there was no hiring, since November 1996.
Findings
Credibility
As shown, I credit the above evidence including stipulations of
the parties and testimony of Feliza Ryland.
Conclusions
As shown above Respondent’s December 27 letter was mailed
by Respondent after most of the striking employees’ submitted
unconditional offers around November 15, 1996. Respondent
advised the strikers in that letter of their permanent replacement
and that it would consider them only for new positions. In view
of the fact that unfair labor practice strikers are entitled to rein-
statement even though such action may necessitate the termina-
tion of replacement employees, I find that Respondent’s Decem-
ber 27 letter constitutes notification of discharge.
Respondent refused to reinstate the striking employees for a
substantial period after the November and December uncondi-
tional offers to return to work. Finally, as shown above, later in
1997, Respondent offered possible re-employment to the strikers,
on its assertion that their replacements had left the hotel’s em-
ploy. The positions offered were new positions subject to all
conditions of new employment. Respondent’s offer did not
comply with its requirement to reinstate unfair labor practice
strikers. I find that the striking employees made unconditional
offers to return to work and that Respondent refused to reinstate
those employees.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Grosvenor Orlando Associates, Ltd. d/b/a the Grosvenor
Resort is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 55,
AFL–CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent by threatening its employee that there was no
contract with its employees’ exclusive collective-bargaining
agent and that it could unilaterally make changes in wages, hours,
and working conditions; by prohibiting its employee from dis-
cussing the Union during work and by threatening its employee
with being sent home or fined because the employee talked to
another employee about the Union; by discriminatorily prohibit-
ing its employee from wearing a union baseball cap; by threaten-
ing its employee that the employee could not picket, that the
employee would be considered a striker and replaced and recalled
at Respondent’s discretion after picketing; and by promising its
employee that it had instituted a unilateral change by scheduling
work by seniority and planning to grant $3 bonus for cleaning
rooms in excess of 15 each day; engaged in activity violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. Respondent, by bargaining in bad faith with Hotel Employ-
ees & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 55, AFL–CIO, as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its employees in
the following appropriate bargaining unit; by prematurely declar-
ing an impasse in collective-bargaining negotiations with the
Union; and by unilaterally changing wages, hours, and terms and
conditions of employment at a time when the parties had not
reached impasse; engaged in activity violative of Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the Act:

All housekeeping employees, bellpersons, cashiers, conven-
tion setup employees, lounge employees, dining room em-
ployees, pool bar and grill employees, kitchen department
employees, room service employees, banquet employees,
servi-bar employees, and maintenance department employ-
ees, but excluding casual employees, guards, and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.

5. Respondent by discharging the following employees be-
cause of their unfair labor practice strike has engaged in conduct
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act:

Andres Alvarez Robert Baity
Rosetta Brown Hector Caban
Gilberto Caranza Dorothy Collier
Ella Mae Davis Lindsey Day
Carlos Delgado Enoch Deneus
Oslaine Desir Aida Febles
Maria Gillaspie Deborah Goodman
Israel Hernandez Lidia Hernandez
Maria Hernandez Betty Jackson
Mollie Jackson Jules Josaphat
Therese Josaphat Dorzelia Joseph
Marie Laguerre Paul Leblanc
Adisseau Louisius Martin Malagon
Lourdes Matos Frederick Meradin
eborah Montgomery Chaeirable Ovince
Joseph Paschal Louis Preval
Marie Quevedo Earl Rankin
Isidro Rodriquez Feleza Ryland
Andriana Sepulueda Raymond Smith
Flor Javier CleofasViscaine
MargaritaJimenez Flossie Williams
Francisco Abrell Norma Jiminez

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 632
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor prac-
tices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist
therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
In view of my finding that Respondent has discharged and re-
fused to reinstate the below named employees upon their uncon-
ditional offer to return to work following their unfair labor prac-
tice strike, I order Respondent to offer each of them, immediate
and full reinstatement to their former positions or, if any of those
positions no longer exist, to a substantially similar position, dis-
placing if necessary, employees hired since on or about Septem-
ber 27, 1996, without prejudice to their rights and privileges pre-
viously enjoyed, and to make each whole for all loss of wages or
other benefits, caused by its failure to reinstate each employee
immediately upon that employee’s unconditional offer to return
to work:

Andres Alvarez Robert Baity
Rosetta Brown Hector Caban
Gilberto Caranza Dorothy Collier
Ella Mae Davis Lindsey Day
Carlos Delgado Enoch Deneus
Oslaine Desir Aida Febles
Maria Gillaspie Deborah Goodman
Israel Hernandez Lidia Hernandez
Maria Hernandez Betty Jackson
Mollie Jackson Jules Josaphat
Therese Josaphat Dorzelia Joseph
Marie Laguerre Paul Leblanc
Adisseau Louisius Martin Malagon
Lourdes Matos Frederick Meradin
Deborah Montgomery Chaeirable Ovince
Joseph Paschal Louis Preval
Marie Quevedo Earl Rankin
Isidro Rodriquez Feleza Ryland
Andriana Sepulueda Raymond Smith
Flor Javier CleofasViscaine
MargaritaJimenez Flossie Williams
Francisco Abrell Norma Jiminez

I order Respondent, upon request by the Union, to rescind its
unlawful unilateral changes in wages, hours, and terms and con-
ditions of employment and to immediately bargain in good faith
with Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 55,
AFL–CIO, as the exclusive collective-bargaining agent for the
below described bargaining unit:

All housekeeping employees, bellpersons, cashiers, conven-
tion setup employees, lounge employees, dining room em-
ployees, pool bar and grill employees, kitchen department
employees, room service employees, banquet employees,
servi-bar employees, and maintenance department employ-
ees, but excluding casual employees, guards, and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act

[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]