Grimaldi Buick-Opel, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 15, 1973

202 N.L.R.B. 436 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

436 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Grimaldi Buick-Opel, Inc. and International Associa-
tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO and Mechanics Motor City Lodge No.
698 of the International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO. Cases
7-CA-9464(1) and 7-CA-9464(2)
March 15, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
On November 1, 1972, Administrative Law Judge
Benjamin K. Blackburn issued the attached Decision
in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed a
motion to stay the Order of the Administrative Law
Judge and the General Counsel filed an opposition to
the Respondent's motion.' Thereupon, the Respon-
dent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the
General Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a sup-
porting brief, and the Respondent filed a brief in
answer to the General Counsel's cross-exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions, cross-
exceptions, and briefs and has decided to affirm the
rulings, findings,2 and conclusions, except as modi-
fied herein,3 of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board.adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Grimaldi Buick-Opel, Inc., Water-
ford, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in said
recommended Order.
1 We hereby deny the Respondent's motion to stay the Order of the
Administrative Law Judge since the appropriate way to seek relief
therefrom is to file exceptions thereto pursuant to the Board's Rules and
Regulations.
2 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board 's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect . Standard Dry Wall
Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3). We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
3 The Administrative Law Judge found, and we agree, that the
Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and ( 1) of the Act by ( 1) threatening to sell
the business if its employees persisted in their union activities and (2) by
promising benefits to its employees to induce them to abandon a strike
called by their collective-bargaining representative . We do not, however,
agree with the conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge that an
independent 8(a)(1) finding based , on the foregoing conduct of the
Respondent is unnecessary . We find that it will effectuate the purposes of
the Act to make an independent 8(aXI) finding based upon the said
conduct, and we hereby do so.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BENJAMIN K. BLACKBURN, Administrative Law Judge:
The charge in Case 7-CA-9464(l) was filed on April 13,
1972,1 in Case 7-CA-9464(2), on April 17. The consolidat-
ed complaint was issued on May 30. The hearing was held
on July 24, 25, and 26 in Detroit, Michigan. The principal
issue litigated was whether Lodge 698 had ceased to
represent a majority of Respondent's service department
employees by March 14 so that Respondent's activities on
and after that date, which would otherwise constitute
refusals to bargain, were not illegal . For the - reasons set
forth below, I find Respondent violated Section 8(aX5) and
(1) of the Act.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of
oral argument and briefs, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a Michigan corporation, is engaged in the
automobile business in the township of Waterford,
Michigan. During 1971, a representative period, Respon-
dent's gross revenue from the sale of new and used
automobiles and related products and from services
performed on new and used automobiles exceeded
$500,000. During the same year, it purchased goods and
materials valued in excess of $50,000 which were shipped
directly to its place of business in Waterford, Michigan,
from suppliers located outside the State of Michigan.
Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
The Charging Parties are labor organizations within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Credibility
The only significant credibility conflict in the record
involves precisely when Joseph Martin, business agent for
Lodge 698, and Philip Swartz, steward in the unit of
Respondent's employees represented by Lodge 698, visited
Anthony O. Grimaldi, Respondent's owner, at his office in
early March and what was said at that time. Martin and
Swartz placed the visit on March 8 or 9, after receipt of
Martin's March 6 telegram to Frederick Colombo, Grimal-
di's attorney, in which Martin set a March 10 strike
deadline. Grimaldi placed it before receipt of the telegram.
More importantly, Martin and Swartz testified that
Grimaldi said he would telephone Colombo and arrange a
negotiating session for 2 p.m. on March 14. Grimaldi
' Dates are 1972 unless otherwise indicated.
202 NLRB No. 59
GRIMALDI BUICK -OPEL, INC.
testified Martin said he would call Colombo to arrange a
meeting and no specific date or time was mentioned.
Grimaldi's testimony on direct was:
He [Martin ] had come to my office-it seems to me
that it was sometime in March. He was visiting with
Mr. Swartz, and he said that he was going to set up a
meeting with you [Colombo]. He was going to call and
set up a meeting . And that was it. We never set a date
or anything like that.
On cross , it went like this:
Q. Then you said he came to your office in March.
This is prior to the strike?
A. Yes.
Q. How soon prior to the strike , do you recall?
A. Around March 1st.
Q. Was this before you received the telegram?
A. Yes.
Q. At that time what did Mr. Martin tell you?
What did he say to you?
A. I told him at the meeting we were having a very
difficult time financially , economically , and as a matter
of fact Mr. Swartz was in the office with him and he
said that it doesn 't matter to us any way, Grimaldi, if
you are out of business , whoever 'takes over, we will
assume your contract, they will take over your contract,
and he said he was demanding that we have another
meeting , and I said I would get in touch with Mr.
Colombo and set it up at his convenience, because Mr.
Colombo is a very busy man, and that is the last I
heard of him until I received the telegram which
telegram said unless you sign the contract , we will
strike, no negotiations , no offer , just either sign the
contract or strike , and at that point there was nothing
more I could do.
While the latter portion does concede Grimaldi said "I
would get in touch with Mr. Colombo and set it [the
meeting] up at his convenience ," its main thrust is still that
Lodge 698's effort to arrange a meeting in March proved
abortive through no fault of his. This tendency of Grimaldi
to tailor his testimony to fit Respondent 's case is found at
several other points in the record. For example , Grimaldi
testified that Martin stopped by his office in January and
talked about arranging a meeting . On direct, Grimaldi
said:
Q. [Martin] came by your place of business?
A. Yes. And he asked for a meeting.
Q. And asked for a negotiating meeting?
A. Yes'
Q. What did you say?
A. I told him I would give it to my attorney, and
see if we could make arrangements for a meeting.
On cross , he said:
Q.
him.
I am asking you, Mr. Grimaldi, what you told
A. Told Martin?
Q. Yes, in January 1972. What did you tell him?
A. Set up a meeting with Colombo.
Q. That he would set up a meeting with Colombo?
A. Yes.
This time , between direct and cross , the initiative for
contacting Colombo shifted from Grimaldi to Martin.
437
Again , Grimaldi 's testimony on the question of good-
faith doubt of majority makes an interesting pattern.
Colombo sent a letter dated May 5 to Martin in which he
cited the facts that more employees had remained at work
than had struck on March 21 , that the certification year
had ended on November 5, 1971, without agreement on a
contract , and that Lodge 698 had not requested a meeting
with Respondent between November 5, 1971, and March 6
as grounds for Respondent 's good-faith doubt of Lodge
698's majority . This is the earliest document in which
Respondent raises such a doubt . On direct , Grimaldi
testified that he discussed with Colombo the fact that some
employees had not gone on strike only after Colombo
received a letter from Martin dated May 4 in which Martin
requested a negotiating meeting on May 9. The clear
import of the record as it stood at that moment was that
Respondent had not questioned Lodge 698 's majority until
May 5 . However, on cross-examination, Grimaldi's testi-
mony followed a devious path . He first 'could not
remember whether he expressed such a doubt to Martin
when Martin came to his office either in January or in
March . Then he changed his mind about the March visit,
answering a question about what he said on the subject
thus:
I told them [Martin and Swartz] there were complete
-there were more employees than what was there in
1970, many different mechanics and many different
people.
However, when counsel for the General Counsel pressed
Grimaldi by asking "when he [Martin ] said he wanted to
negotiate, did you tell him he did not represent a majority
of the employees?" Grimaldi's answer was "No."
Primarily because of inconsistencies such as these, I have
credited Martin and Swartz over Grimaldi . I have also
taken into consideration the fact that Martin 's calling off
the strike he had scheduled for March 10 only makes sense
if he talked to Grimaldi after announcing that deadline
and received an assurance from Grimaldi that a meeting
would be arranged with Colombo, Respondent 's chief
negotiator, without delay.
B. Facts
1. Background
The Regional Director for Region 7 certified District
Lodge No. 60 of the International Association of Machin-
ists and Aerospace Workers , AFL-CIO, on November 5,
1970, as collective-bargaining representative of a unit of:
all mechanics , helpers , apprentices , washers , lube men,
porters, new car prep men, and parts men employed by
[Respondent] at its 550 Oakland Avenue , Pontiac
facility ; but excluding bodymen and painters employed
by [Respondent ] at its 900 Oakland Avenue, Pontiac
body shop , office clerical employees , professional
employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act.
(The complaint alleges , and the answer admits , that Lodge
698 was certified on November 5, 1970. The discrepancy
between Lodge 60 and Lodge 698 is not explained in the
record .) Certification followed a consent election held on
October 23, 1970, in Grimaldi Buick-Opel, Inc., Case
438 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
7-RC-10154, in which seven votes were cast for the
Petitioner , none was cast against , and two challenged
ballots were not determinative . (The tally of ballots issued
in Case 7-RC-10154 on October 23, 1970, is inaccurate in
that it fails to show the 2 challenged ballots. The mistake
occurs again in the Regional Director 's report on Respon-
dent 's objections and certification which issued on Novem-
ber 5, 1970.) In September 1971 Respondent consolidated
its operations at 2225 Dixie Highway in Waterford.
Bargaining sessions were held on March 31 , May 5 and
25, and June 25, 1971, in the office of Frederick Colombo,
Respondent 's counsel . Colombo acted as chief negotiator
for Respondent , Joseph Martin for Lodge 698. At the last
meeting, Lodge 698 rejected an offer from Respondent,
notwithstanding Grimaldi 's plea that he could not afford
to offer more . Among the many economic issues open
when the June 25, 1971, meeting broke up was 1970
vacation pay. In 1970, because of depressed business
conditions caused by a General Motors strike , Respondent
had failed to give its employees their customary vacation
pay. It paid as usual in 1971. By early 1972, there were still
three members of the unit represented by Lodge
698-Philip Swartz, Melvin Rassier , and Kenneth Reger
-in Respondent's employ whom Respondent owed
vacation pay for 1970. (William Borland , Respondent's
service manager , was also still owed his 1970 vacation pay.)
Grimaldi' s offer was to pay the money for 1970 in July
1972.
Martin visited Grimaldi at Grimaldi's office sometime in
January 1972 and asked Grimaldi for a meeting in order to
resume negotiations . Grimaldi said he would contact
Colombo to make the necessary arrangements . A little
later , apparently in February, Grimaldi bumped into
Martin in a restaurant . Martin said that he was getting
ready for a meeting with Colombo and Grimaldi.
When the events which gave rise to this case took place,
beginning in early March 1972, eight of Respondent's
employees were members of Lodge 698 . They were all
seven of Respondent 's mechanics , Philip Swartz, Melvin
Rassier , Kenneth Reger , Thomas Rassier , Douglas Kem-
per, Larry Bolton , and Burt Sola , and William Parker, a
parts department employee.
2 Events preceding the March 21 strike
Martin called a meeting of Gnmaldi's employees who
were members of Lodge 698 at a restaurant near Respon-
dent 's place of business in late February. It was conducted
by Ron Mascot, another business agent , and attended by
all of the member -employees except Bolton . Lodge 698's
failure to get a contract with Respondent was discussed. A
strike vote was taken . The result was six to one in favor of
striking. The lone dissenter was Swartz.
As a result of the strike vote , Martin sent a telegram to
Colombo on March 6 which read:
IF NO AGREEMENT IS REACHED BY 5 P .M. FRIDAY
MARCH 10 A STRIKE SHALL COMMENCE AT THAT TIME.
On March 8 or 9 Martin , accompanied by Swartz, Lodge
698's steward , visited Grimaldi in his office . After some
discussion , Grimaldi said he would call Colombo and
arrange for a negotiating meeting at 2 p.m. on March 14.
Martin and Swartz went from Grimaldi' s office to
Respondent 's shop.. Martin explained to the mechanics
that negotiations would resume on March 14 and recom-
mended the strike scheduled for March 10 be called off.
The mechanics agreed . Grimaldi did not call Colombo to
arrange a meeting . No strike began on March 10.
Martin telephoned Colombo on March 13 and asked
about the meeting scheduled for the next day. Colombo
expressed surprise and said that Grimaldi had not called
him. He said he would check with Grimaldi . Martin called
Colombo again on March 14 . Colombo said he had been
unable to reach Grimaldi.
Meanwhile , on the morning of March 14, Grimaldi
summoned Philip Swartz , Melvin Rassier , and Kenneth
Reger to a meeting in an office in the parts department.
William Borland, the service manager , was also present.
Grimaldi discussed Respondent 's economic situation. He
told the men that he had been looking into a retirement
plan for them in which they could invest up to 10 percent
of their earnings , and, if they would bear with Respondent,
something could be worked out in the future . He told them
1972 vacation pay would be paid in July and 1970 in
January 1973 . When Swartz asked Grimaldi if he was
going to the negotiating meeting scheduled for that
afternoon, Grimaldi replied that he knew of no meeting.
When Swartz asked whether Grimaldi was going to sign a
union contract , Grimaldi replied there was no way he
could do so.
Respondent 's employees who were members of Lodge
698 met again on the evemng of March 16 at the home of
Melvin Rassier . Martin presided . The only absentee was
William Parker . Grimaldi's and Borland 's meeting with
Swartz, Rassier , and Reger on the morning of March 14
and Respondent's failure to meet for negotiations on the
afternoon of March 14 as promised by Grimaldi were
discussed . Martin said it was hopeless to continue to try to
bargain with Respondent and called for another strike
vote . This time , the vote was unanimous.
On March 20 Grimaldi got into a conversation with
Reger about Respondent 's inability to afford a union. He
told Reger that, if the men insisted on being represented by
a union , he would start over with a new crew and they
would have nothing.
3. The March 21 strike and events which
followed
All seven of the mechamcs and helpers who belonged to
Lodge 698 walked out of the shop on strike at noon on
March 21 . Parker did not strike , nor did any of Respon-
dent's employees who were not members of Lodge 698.
The strikers began picketing Respondent 's shop. The
picketing lasted approximately 10 weeks.
Sometime between March 21 and March 31 Grimaldi
came to the picket line and asked Swartz if he could have a
meeting with the men , adding that it was just with the men
and not the Union. Swartz said yes, provided two of them
participated. Swartz and Melvin Rassier went into the
building with Grimaldi . Borland was also present in the
discussion that ensued . Gnmaldi urged the men to give up
the strike and return to work . As on March 14 , he held out
as inducements a pension plan as soon as Respondent
could afford one and prompt payment of the overdue 1970
GRIMALDI BUICK-OPEL, INC.
vacation pay to those who were entitled to it . This time, he
promised payment in July rather than in January 1973.
When Swartz asked if Grimaldi was going to sign a union
contract , Grimaldi replied that he was not.
On March 31 Swartz and Rassier again went into the
building under similar circumstances to talk to Grimaldi
and Borland . (Apparently, although the record is not clear,
Borland came to the picket line and invited them in on this
occasion .) This time, however , Swartz and Rassier had
barely gotten inside the door when Swartz asked Grimaldi
if he was going to sign a union contract and Grimaldi
replied no . Swartz declared the "meeting" adjourned, and
he and Rassier turned on their heels and walked out.
During the early days of the picketing, both Grimaldi
and Borland talked to one or more of the men on the
picket line at various times in efforts to get them to return
to work. On several of these occasions , they said that
Respondent would not enter into a union contract. They
offered the men any contracts they wanted so long as they
were private contracts with the men individually and not a
contract with Lodge 698 . On at least one occasion,
Grimaldi said he would sell the place before he would ever
give into the Union. (To the degree that Grimaldi's
testimony about these poststrike meetings and conversa-
tions is in conflict with the testimony of Philip Swartz,
Melvin Rassier , Kenneth Reger , and Douglas Kemper, I
do not credit Grimaldi. Grimaldi's denials are far out-
weighed by his admissions that Swartz and Rassier were
invited into the building once , that he did talk to the men
on the picket line in an effort to persuade them to return to
work, and that he did offer them their 1970 vacation pay in
July to induce them to return . Borland did not testify.)
On May 4 Martin sent a letter to Colombo which read:
This letter is a request to meet with you on Tuesday,
May 9 at 10:00 A.M. for the purpose of negotiating a
contract between Grimaldi Buick-Opel, Inc. and
Mechanics ' Motor City Lodge #698. Please call and
confirm this meeting as soon as possible.
Also, this letter is to inform you that on Wednesday,
May 3, the members rejected the Company proposals.
(The reference to company proposals in the second
paragraph is unexplained in the record . There is no
indication in the record of any negotiations between
Respondent and the Union after June 25, 1971. Grimaldi
did testify that meeting ended with the understanding that
the Union would again take his offer to the men .) Colombo
replied as follows in a letter to Martin dated May 5:
This letter is to acknowledge your request to meet
for the purpose of negotiating a contract between
Grimaldi Buick-Opel, Inc. and Mechanics ' Motor City
Lodge No. 698 on Tuesday, May 9th at 10:00 A.M.
Certain employees from Grimaldi Buick left their
jobs, removed their tools and in several instances began
to picket the premises of Grimaldi Buick as of March
21, 1972 . Six employees who were classified as
mechanics were included in this group. At the same
time nine other employees who were employed in the
following job classification : parts countermen, parts
truck drivers and new car wash man, remained on the
job and have continued to work during the time that
the mechanics have been picketing Grimaldi Buick.
439
In light of the fact that the certification issued by the
National Labor Relations Board was dated November
5, 1970, and because of the further fact that no contract
was agreed to on or before November 5, 1971, and
because of the further fact that the union failed and
neglected to request any meeting with the company's
management between November 5, 1971 and March 6,
1972, and finally, because of the fact that nine
employees have now remained on their jobs while six
other employees have been picketing the company's
premises , the management of Grimaldi Buick has a
good faith doubt that your union represents the
majority of its employees as the bargaining representa-
tive of the service department at Grimaldi Buick.
In light of the fact that the company 's management
now has this good faith doubt as to your representing a
majority of its service department employees we must
respectfully deny your request for the proposed
meeting to be held on May 9, 1972.
On July 6 Martin sent a letter to Grimaldi which read:
Please be advised that as of July 5, 1972 the
following employees are requesting reinstatement in
your employ at Grimaldi Buick-Opel, Inc.:
Larry Bolton
Doug Kempen [sic ] Ken Rieger [sic] Mel Rassier
Tom Rassier Phil Swartz Burt Sola
Colombo replied as follows in a letter to Martin dated July
10:
This letter is to advise you that the undersigned
represents Grimaldi Buick-Opel , Inc. Our clients have
referred your letter of July 6 , 1972 requesting the
reinstatement of the following employees to me for
reply:
Larry Bolton
Doug Kempen [sic]
Ken Rieger [sic] Mel Rassier Tom Rassier Phil
Swartz Burt Sola
Our clients have authorized me to advise you that
they are willing to reinstate the aforesaid employees
upon the following conditions:
1. That the company receive a written uncondition-
al offer to return to work, and
2. That all of the aforesaid employees report to
William J. Borland , Service Manager , on Monday, July
17, 1972 at 8:30 A.M.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
1. Majority
a. The issue
The Union's certification year expired on November 5,
1971. The earliest unfair labor practice alleged in the
complaint is a refusal to bargain predicated on Grimaldi's
and Borland 's bypassing the union to bargain directly with
employees on March 14 , 1972. If Respondent is under any
440 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
continuing obligation to bargain with the Union as a result
of the certification it received in November 1970, it must,
in fact, have represented a majority of employees on
March 14 in a unit of Respondent's mechanics, helpers,
apprentices, washers, lube men, porters, new car prep men,
and parts men, excluding body shop employees, office
clerical employees, professional employees, guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act. Terrell Machine Compa-
ny, 173 NLRB 1480. The fact, as emphasized by the
General Counsel, that Respondent, in the person of
Anthony Grimaldi, did not question Lodge 698's majority
until early May, when he first discussed numbers of
striking and nonstriking employees with his attorney, is not
dispositive of the principal issue. Here, unlike the usual
case in which an employer, following the end of a
certification year, advances a good-faith doubt of the
Union's continuing majority based on objective data as a
defense to a refusal-to-bargain allegation, the major
defense advanced by Respondent is a contention that
Lodge 698 did not, in fact, represent a majority of unit
employees when it is accused of having violated its duty to
bargain, that is, on and after March 14. In other words,
Respondent has undertaken to rebut the presumption that
a union's majority continues beyond the end of the
certification year. Whether it has succeeded is susceptible
of precise measurements for here, unlike cases which
involve such principles as new employees presumed to
support a union in the same proportion as old or failure to
join in a strike not proving a lack of adherence to a union,
the General Counsel does not contend that any unit
employees other than the eight Lodge 698 members who
participated in the two strike votes desired representation
by Lodge 698. Rather, the issue is how many employees
were in the unit on the crucial date.
The parties stipulated at the hearing that 11 employees
were in the unit in early 1972, namely, the 7 mechanics
who struck on March 21 plus William Parker, David
Bredow, James Looper, and Bennie Smith. They were in
dispute as to seven others; namely, Johnny Craft, William
Hunt, Timothy Donovan, Clyde Linwood, Jack Freeman,
Wayne Facca, and Marvin Johnson. (Respondent initially
claimed that Raymond Arnold, a part-time porter, should
be included in the unit. However, it ultimately stipulated
that he was a casual employee.) Marvin Johnson began
working for Respondent as a used-car porter on March 25
and was no longer working for Respondent at the time of
the hearing. Because he was not employed by Respondent
on March 14, the day on which Respondent first violated
Section 8(a)(5) if it was, in fact, under a duty to bargain
with Lodge 698, I find that he was not working in the unit
at any time relevant to this case. As to the others, the issue
as to the first five named above is, in essence, whether they
were regular or irregular part-time employees on March 14.
As to Wayne Facca, the issue is whether he was a
supervisory or managerial employee on March 14.
b. The part-time employees
Johnny Craft, William Hunt, Timothy Donovan, Clyde
Linwood, and Jack Freeman had in common the fact that
they were paid by Respondent out of petty cash and did
not appear on the regular payroll. No deductions for
withholding or social security were made from their wages.
Clyde Linwood and Jack Freeman had in common the fact
that, unlike the other three, they were paid by the job.
David Bredow, who doubled as a parts driver and a porter,
and James Looper, a porter, were paid on the regular
payroll even though they worked only part time. (Bredow,
a former full-time employee, worked part time at his own
request.) Being on the regular payroll, Bredow and Looper
received overtime pay. The General Counsel conceded that
they were regular part-time employees.
Craft, Hunt, and Donovan were classified by Respon-
dent as porters, that is, they performed janitorial services
around Respondent' s premises , including the service area
where the mechanics worked, and washed and polished
cars. Craft and Hunt worked on a day-to-day basis
beginning, in each case, in 1969. Craft received $1.75 per
hour; Hunt, $2. Both were still employed at the time of the
hearing. Donovan, a high school senior in the 1971-2
school year, worked after school and on Saturdays on a
day-to-day basis when his school activities permitted. He
began working for Respondent in 1970 and had worked at
least one summer prior to the period relevant to this case.
He did not work between Saturday, March 4, and
Thursday, March 16, because he went with his high school
class on its senior trip during this period. His last day of
employment was Thursday, March 16. (Respondent's
records, which are in evidence, do not corroborate
Grimaldi's testimony that the one day which Donovan
worked following his return from his class trip came after
the strike began on March 21. Despite this discrepancy, I
do not doubt Grimaldi 's statement that Donovan ceased
working in March because of his parents' concern about
the picket line at Respondent's premises.)
Respondent's time and pay records for the last calendar
quarter of 1971 and the first calendar quarter of 1972
covering Craft, Hunt, Donovan, Linwood, and Freeman
were introduced into evidence. The records for David
Bredow and James Looper for the last 8 full weekly pay
periods in the first quarter of 1972 were also introduced.
The following tabulations show the amount of time worked
by Bredow, Looper, Craft, Hunt, and Donovan. The figure
before the dash represents the number of hours worked
during the week in question; the figure after, the number of
days during the week on which those hours were worked.
Linwood and Freeman are not included in these tabula-
tions because Respondent's records as to them are not
translatable into hours and days worked.
Last quarter of 1971:
Week ending Craft Hunt Donovan
10 6 7 25--3
10/13 37--5 8--2
10/20 36,5_5 6--2
10/27 46.5--6
11/3 40,5--6 15--2
11/10 32.75--6
11/17 41.5--6
11/24 8--2
12/1 12.5--2
12/8 5.25--1 35--5
12/15 14--2 39.5--6
12/22 8.5--1 37.75--6
12/29 39--5
GRIMALDI BUICK-OPEL, INC. 441
(In addition to the timecards and notes from which these checks which show that Donovan received $26.25 during
figures are culled , the record contains a canceled check the week ending October 6 , •1971, $31.50 during the week
which shows that Craft received $53.60 from Respondent ending November 3, 1971, and $84 .75 during the week
during the week ending December 22, 1971, and canceled ending November 24, 1971.) First quarter of 1972:
Week ending Wed ., Bredow Looper Craft Hunt Donovan
1/5/72 4.5-2 18-2
1/12 4.75-1 21.5-5
1/19 17-3 13.75--3
1/26 25-5 11.5-3
2/2 23.5-4 12--3
2/9 27-3 23.25-3 21.25-4 11.5--3
2/16 32.75--4 38-5 2.25--1 12-2 19.5-2
2/23 18.5-2 48-5 20.25--4 10.75-3 7-1
3/1 16.5-2 22-4 4.5-1 4-1 16.5-2
3/8 25.5-3 14-3 2.25-1 7.5-1
3/15 24.25-3 32--5 14-3 12.5-2
3/22 24--3 37-6 21.5-4 14.25-2 7.5-1
3/29 32 . 5-4 16.25--2 7.5-2 5-1
(In addition, the record contains canceled checks which for the only records produced with respect to them were
show that Donovan received $31.50 from Respondent canceled checks and petty cash vouchers of no particular
during the week ending January 12, $26:25 during the week probative value. Both were paid by the job, so the absence
ending January 16, $18 during the week ending February of timecards or similar records is not surprising.
9, and $17 during the week ending March 15.) Clyde Linwood was (and still is) a car cleanup man, paid
Porters are specifically included in the unit description at the rate of $12 for each used car and $4 or $6, depending
established as appropriate for Respondent's employees in on how dirty it was, for each new car he worked on. He
Case 7-RC-10154. The only meaningful distinction which worked intermittently for Respondent in this capacity over
can be drawn on this record between porter Looper on the several years. The most recent period began in early 1972.
one hand and porters Craft, Hunt, and Donovan on the (Some of his absences were due to a heart condition.) He
other is the fact that Looper is included on the regular worked on a day-to-day basis, using Respondent's equip-
payroll and thus qualifies for overtime pay while Craft, ment and materials and sometimes was helped by his wife,
Hunt, and Donovan are not. Anthony Grimaldi's explana- who shampooed upholstery. He received no additional
tion for this distinction is that he considers Looper "regular compensation when his wife helped him. On days when
time" because he works "three days a week the same as there were no cars to clean he did not work. He did not
Mr. Bredow." A comparison of Looper's figures in the work from mid-March until mid-April because of a dip in
table above with those of Craft, Hunt, and Donovan for Respondent's used car sales caused by the strike.
the same 8 pay periods corroborates this distinction. New-car prep men are specifically included in the unit
Looper averaged more than 30 hours and more than 4 days description, and there is no evidence of any other employee
in each of the 7 weeks he worked from February 3 through who might be said to hold that job classification. However,
March 29. (His failure to work during the week ending that is not dispositive of the issue for Grimaldi described
March 8 is unexplained in the record.) Comparable figures Linwood's job as "used car clean up man." The canceled
are more than 13 hours and nearly 3 days for Craft, more checks and petty cash vouchers made out to Linwood
than 9 hours and nearly 2 days for Hunt, and more than 11 which are in evidence do show that he received various
hours and less than 1- 1/2 days for Donovan. However, sums of money ranging from a low of $40 to a high of $151
Donovan's work during this period was sporadic, due, no in each of the 5 weeks from February 10 through March
doubt, to the'prior claim his schoolwork had on his time , 15. However, there is no basis for determining when and
while Craft and Hunt worked each week. Grimaldi did not how long he worked for Respondent in earning these sums.
use the phrase "regular time" in the sense that the word Relying primarily on Grimaldi's admission that Clyde
"regular" is employed by the Board when distinguishing Linwood worked only when used or new cars were
between regular part-time and casual or irregular part-time available to be worked on, I conclude that he was an
employees for purposes of unit placement. Thus, the fact irregular part-time employee.
that Craft and Hunt averaged less than 3 days a week Grimaldi described Jack Freeman as a helper, a job
during this period does not serve to distinguish them from classification which is included in the unit description, and
Looper. The sporadic nature of Donovan's employment testified that he was a part-time employee who was paid
does. I conclude, therefore, that Johnny Craft and William not by the hour but by the jobs he performed. The
Hunt were regular part-time employees of Respondent on canceled checks and petty cash vouchers which were
March 14 and that Timothy Donovan was an irregular introduced into evidence with respect to him show that he
part-time employee. received money from Respondent each week from the
Apparently Respondent kept no records of the days or week ending Wednesday, February 9, to the week ending
hours which Clyde Linwood and Jack Freeman worked, Wednesday, March 29, with the exception of the week
442 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ending March 8 . The sums varied from a low of $5 to a
high of $135. One voucher dated March 1 for $25 bears the
notation "Advance-on painting picture ." This points up
Freeman 's unique status as an employee of Respondent.
Freeman is the son of an old friend of Grimaldi. A
college art student , he dropped out of school for a
semester , apparently in order to earn money so that he
could return to school . He was hired by Grimaldi as a
salesman around the first of February . (Respondent's
salesmen work on commission . Although they are not
mentioned in the unit description , they were obviously
intended to be excluded by the parties to Case
7-RC-10154 when they entered into a consent -election
agreement .) After a short time , he was transferred to the
bodyshop . Sometime later he was transferred to the service
department . Somewhere along the way Grimaldi discov-
ered that Freeman was an artist . He purchased from
Freeman a large wooden sculpture and commissioned him
to paint a picture , both at undisclosed prices. Both art
objects were intended as decorations for Respondent's
premises . Freeman last worked for Respondent during the
week ending March 23. His principle duty after his transfer
to the service area was polishing cars. However , he spent
the last 2 weeks before his departure finishing the wooden
sculpture he had sold to Grimaldi by polishing it with a
power tool borrowed from the bodyshop and starting on
the picture Grimaldi had commissioned.
As in the case of Linwood, there is no basis in the record
for determining on what days and for how many hours
Freeman worked for Respondent . In fact , the records of
payments to him which were introduced are even less
useful than those which relate to Linwood , for there is no
way of telling how much of the money Freeman received
from Respondent represented wages and how much
represented the purchase price of his art. I conclude,
therefore , that Jack Freeman was also an irregular part-
time employee . Moreover, since the artwork he was doing
on and after March 14 was not unit work , I conclude that
he lacked a community of interest with unit employees for
that additional reason at the time relevant to this
proceeding.
c. Wayne Facca
On March 14 Wayne Facca had the title of assistant
parts manager. The parts manager , a supervisor within the
meaning of the Act, was Denny Richmond . The only other
employees in the parts department were William Parker,
the parts driver , and David Bredow . Facca's duties were
those of a counterman , that is, he handed out parts to
Respondent 's mechanics , sold them to customers, and
handled the paperwork incidental to this function. In
connection with the latter duty, prior to March 8 he filled
out and signed purchase orders, the same as Richmond
and William Borland , the service manager. On March 8
Grimaldi ended his authority to do so because of a dispute
over Facca ' s using a purchase order to get a part needed
for repair of his brother 's car, apparently at a discount.
(Facca's authority was restored when he became parts
manager on the departure of Richmond in June .) Freeman
told Parker and Bredow where to go for pickups and
.deliveries of parts. He gave them chores to do in the parts
department when they were not driving . His duties and
responsibilities were essentially the same from his hire
through the penod relevant to this proceeding.
Facca was hired to work at Respondent 's 550 Oakland
Avenue location in December 1970. He started soon after
the departure of Mel Price , parts manager , and James
Wheatley, assistant parts - manager . (Wheatley initially
voted a challenged ballot in the October 23 , 1970, election
in Case 7-RC-10154 because his name did not appear on
the eligibility list furnished by Respondent . However,
before the count the parties to the election agreed that he
was eligible . Consequently , his ballot was opened and
counted at that time .) Grimaldi told Facca, when hired,
that he was in charge of the parts department at 550
Oakland Avenue and that his title was assistant parts
manager. William Parker also worked in the parts
department at that location . Denny Richmond , whose title
was parts manager , and David Bredow worked in the parts
department at Respondent 's 900 Oakland Avenue location.
When Respondent moved all its operations to 2225 Dixie
Highway in September 1971, the relationship of Richmond
as parts manager to Facca as assistant parts manager
continued . Facca was told at that time that Richmond was
in charge . Facca was promoted to parts manager when
Richmond left in June 1972.
Facca was originally hourly paid . He became a salaried
employee around the middle of 1971 , receiving a $10-per-
week raise . When the move to Dixie Highway took place,
he received an additional $5 raise to $ 140 per week and a
1-percent commission on sales as an incentive plan.
Richmond was also placed on an incentive plan. His salary
was approximately $180 per week . Parker and Bredow
were hourly paid.
The General Counsel contends that Facca was either a
supervisor within the meaning of the Act or a managerial
employee . For the former position , he relies on Facca's
relationship to Parker and Bredow . For the latter, he relies
primarily on Facca's authority to pledge Respondent's
credit by signing purchase orders. Neither position has
merit . The directions Facca gave to Parker and Bredow
during the relevant period were routine in nature and did
not require the exercise of any independent judgment.
Facca's authority to sign purchase orders , even if he had
possessed it on March 14, is one customarily possessed by
parts department countermen in this industry and did not,
standing alone , so identify his interests with those of
Respondent and separate them from the interests of unit
employees as to make him a managerial employee. I
conclude , therefore , that Wayne Facca was neither a
supervisor within the meaning of the Act nor a managerial
employee within the meaning ascribed to that term by the
Board during the relevant period.
d. Summary
Because they were porters employed on a regular part-
time basis, Johnny Craft and William Hunt must be
included in the unit of employees as of March 14. Because
he was neither a supervisor nor a managerial employee but
a rank-and-file parts man, Wayne Facca must be included,
too. Because , on the other hand , each was an irregular
part-time porter or helper , as the case may be , Timothy
GRIMALDI BUICK -OPEL, INC. 443
Donovan , Clyde Linwood , and Jack Freeman must be
excluded . As a result, 3 employees must be added to the 11
the parties agree were in the unit , for a total of 14. Lodge
698 numbered 8 of these 14 men among its members at all
times relevant . Therefore , there is no merit to Respondent's
principal defense that it was not obliged to bargain with
Lodge 698 on and after March 14 because Lodge 698 did
not, in fact , represent a majority of the employees in the
bargaining unit . (In their brief , counsel for the General
Counsel elected to discuss only Freeman and Linwood
among the disputed part-time employees , including Craft,
Hunt , and Donovan in the unit . I am gratified that their
posthearing analysis of the record as to Craft and Hunt
agreed with mine . If their inclusion of Donovan is taken as
a concession that outranks my finding that he should be
excluded , the result is the same . The unit simply expands to
15 employees , 8 of whom were represented by Lodge 698.)
2. Respondent's other defenses
The complaint alleges Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and ( 1) of the Act by (1) bypassing Lodge 698 to
bargain individually with employees on and after March
14; (2) soliciting striking employees to return to work with
promises of individual contracts on and after March 21,
and (3) refusing to meet with Lodge 698 for purposes of
collective bargaining on and after May 5 . Number one, of
course , refers to Grimaldi 's and Borland 's meeting with
Philip Swartz , Melvin Rassier , and Kenneth Reger on the
morning of March 14 , as well as the meetings held with
employees during the strike . Number two refers to
Grimaldi 's and Borland 's efforts to persuade strikers to
return to work . Number three refers to Frederick Colom-
bo's letter of May 5 to Joseph Martin . Respondent
contends in its answer that Lodge 698 forfeited its
bargaining rights because it made no effort to negotiate
from the time bargaining was broken off in June 1971 until
March 1972 . It also contends in its answer that it had a
good-faith doubt of Lodge 698 's majority . It contends in its
brief that , since Swartz was among the employees Grimaldi
and Borland talked to on March 14 , Respondent did not
bypass Lodge 698 on that occasion because , in dealing
with Swartz, it was dealing with Lodge 698 's recognized
agent . None of these defenses has merit . However long the
interval between a union 's demands , an employer 's duty to
bargain remains unless and until it demonstrates the
existence of a good-faith doubt of the union 's continued
majority status, Kentucky News, Inc., 165 NLRB 777.
Respondent , in the person of Grimaldi , had no reasonable
basis for a good-faith doubt of Lodge 698 's majority at any
time . On March 14 the strike which Colombo's letter of
May 5 relied on as providing a reasonable basis for a good-
faith doubt had not yet taken place . From March 21 until
Colombo undertook to answer Martin's May 4 request for
a meeting , Grimaldi had no doubt, for he did not think
about numbers of strikers versus numbers of nonstrikers
until Colombo raised the subject with him. Even if
Grimaldi's mistaken belief, as of May 5, that unit
employees who had not struck outnumbered those who
had can be said to have provided a reasonable basis for a
good-faith doubt of Lodge 698 's majority , it was too late
for such a defense to be valid . By that time Respondent
had been guilty of refusing to bargain with Lodge 698 in
violation of the Act for nearly 2 months . As to Swartz'
alleged status as agent of Lodge 698 , it is obvious from
Grimaldi's plea on March 14 , that the men bear with him,
that his intent was to deal with Swartz as an individual
employee to be wooed , like Rassier and Reger , away from
Lodge 698 and not as the personification of the Union.
Since all of the defenses advanced by Respondent to justify
its admitted refusal to meet and bargain with Lodge 698
are without merit , I find that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act on and after March 14, 1972, by
bypassing their collective-bargaining representative to
bargain directly and individually with its employees, by
threatening its employees with reprisals and promising
them benefits , including individual contracts , to induce
them to abandon a strike called by their collective-
bargaining representative, and by refusing to recognize and
bargain with the collective-bargaining representative se-
lected by a majority of its employees in an appropriate
unit.
The complaint also alleges independent violations of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in that Respondent coercively
interrogated its employees , threatened them, and promised
them benefits . There is no evidence in the record that
Respondent coercively interrogated its employees. The
threat to sell the business and the promises of benefit
which were made on the picket line were violative of
Section 8(a)(5) as well as Section 8 (a)(1), thus a finding of
an independent violation of Section 8(a)(l) by that activity
is not necessary . However , on the basis of Kenneth Reger's
undisputed testimony about his conversation with Grimal-
di on March 20 , I find that Respondent threatened its
employees with discharge if they persisted in their union
activities.
The strike which began on March 21 was caused , at least
in substantial part , by Grimaldi's and Borland's activities
on the morning of March 14 when they attempted to
bargain individually with Swartz, Rassier , and Reger. It
was, therefore , an unfair labor practice strike from its
inception.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact , and upon the entire
record in this case , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Grimaldi Buick-Opel, Inc ., is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers , AFL-CIO, and its Mechanics Motor City
Lodge No. 698 are labor organizations within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All mechanics, helpers , apprentices , washers, lube
men, porters , new car prep men, and parts men employed
by Respondent at its automobile sales and service facility
in Waterford, Michigan , excluding bodymen and painters
employed in its bodyshop, salesmen , office clerical employ-
ees, professional employees , guards, and supervisors as
defined in the Act , are a unit appropriate for the purpose
of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b)
of the Act.
4. At all times since November 5, 1970, Lodge 698 has
444 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
been and is now the representative for the purpose of
collective bargaining of the employees in the unit described
above within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By on and after March 14, 1972, bypassing their
collective-bargaining representative to bargain directly
with its employees, threatening its employees with reprisals
and promising them benefits, including individual con-
tracts, to induce them to abandon a strike called by their
collective-bargaining representative, and refusing to recog-
nize and bargain with the collective-bargaining representa-
tive selected by a majority of its employees in the unit
described above, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
6. By threatening its employees on March 20, 1972,
with discharge if they persisted in their union activities,
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
8. The allegation of the consolidated complaint, that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act on or about
March 16, 1972, by Anthony O. Grimaldi's coercive
interrogation of its employees concerning their own and
their fellow employees' union activities and desires, has not
been sustained.
THE REMEDY
In order to effectuate the policies of the Act, I will
recommend that Respondent cease and desist from the
unfair labor practices found and, upon request, bargain
with Local 698, and, if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a signed agreement. With
respect to the reinstatement rights of the seven mechanics
as unfair labor practice strikers, the July exchange of
letters between Martin and Colombo suggests some dispute
about whether Martin's letter of July 6 was, in fact, an
unconditional application to return to work. However, the
bare letters are the only evidence in the record about what
happened in July. Therefore, I will not attempt to resolve
that issue, if, in fact, there is an issue. Instead, I will simply
recommend that, upon application, Respondent offer the
strikers reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs
no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and
privileges, and make them whole for any earnings lost by
reason of Respondent's refusal, if any, to reinstate them
during the period beginning 5 days after the date on which
they apply for reinstatement and ending on the date of
Respondent's offer. Backpay will be computed on a
quarterly basis, plus interest at 6 percent per annum, as
prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289,
and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. By
couching my recommendation in this form, I leave to the
compliance stage such questions as whether Martin's July 6
letter was, in fact, an unconditional offer to return to work
on behalf of all the strikers and what happened on July 17.
In view of Anthony Grimaldi's demonstrated proclivity
to interfere with the Section 7 rights of his employees by
2 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
refusing to bargain with their collective-bargaining repre-
sentative and dealing directly with them (Superior Rambler,
150 NLRB 1264), I will recommend a broad rather than a
narrow order.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record in this proceeding, and pursuant to
Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following
recommended: 2
ORDER
Grimaldi Buick-Opel, Inc., its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to recognize and bargain with Mechanics
Motor City Lodge No. 698 of the International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its em-
ployees in the unit found appropriate herein.
(b) Bypassing their collective-bargaining representative
to bargain directly with its employees.
(c) Threatening its employees with discharge or other
reprisals if they persist in their union activities, including a
strike called by their collective-bargaining representative.
(d) Promising its employees benefits to induce them to
abandon a strike called by their collective-bargaining
representative.
(e) In any manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Mechanics
Motor City Lodge No. 698 of the International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, as the
exclusive representative of the employees in the unit found
appropriate herein and, if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Upon their application offer Philip Swartz, Melvin
Rassier, Kenneth Reger, Thomas Rassier, Douglas Kem-
per, Larry Bolton, and Burt Sola reinstatement to their
former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or
other rights and privileges, and make them whole in the
manner set forth above.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this recommended Order.
(d) Notify immediately the above-named individuals, if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States,
of the right to full reinstatement, upon application after
discharge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the
Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training
and Service Act.
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
GRIMALDI BUICK-OPEL, INC. 445
(e) Post at its premises in Waterford, Michigan, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 3 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 7, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by it immediate-
ly upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith .4
IT Is ALSO ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed
insofar as it alleges Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act on or about March 16, 1972, by Anthony O.
Grimaldi's coercive interrogation of its employees concern-
ing their own and their. fellow employees' union activities
and desires.
3 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
4 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read:
"Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writing, within 20 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board having found, after a
trial, that we violated Federal law by refusing to bargain
with your union and bypassing it in order to deal
individually with you, we hereby notify you that:
The National Labor Relations Act gives all employees
these rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or help unions
To bargain collectively through a representa-
tive of their own choosing
To act together for collective bargaining or
other aid or protection
To refrain from any or all of these things.
WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize and bargain with
Mechanics Motor City Lodge No. 698 of the Interna-
tional Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers, AFL-CIO, as your exclusive collective-bargaining
representative.
WE WILL NOT bypass your collective-bargaining
representative to bargain directly with you.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with discharge or other
reprisals if you persist 'in your union activities,
including a strike called by your collective- bargaining
representative.
WE WILL NOT promise you benefits to induce you to
abandon a strike called by your collective-bargaining
representative.
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with you or
attempt to restrain or coerce you in the exercise of the
above rights.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with
Mechanics Motor City Lodge No. 698 of the Interna-
tional Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers, AFL-CIO, as your exclusive representative and, if
any understanding is reached, embody it in a signed
agreement. The unit appropriate for such bargaining is:
All mechanics, helpers, apprentices, washers, lube
men, porters, new car prep men, and parts men
employed at our automobile sales and service
facility in Waterford, Michigan, excluding body-
men and painters employed in our body shop,
salesmen , office clerical employees, professional
employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
WE WILL, upon their application, offer Philip Swartz,
Melvin Rassier, Kenneth Reger, Thomas Rassier,
Douglas Kemper, Larry Bolton, and Burt Sola rein-
statement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer
exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without
prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privi-
leges, and make them whole for any earnings they lose
in the event we fail to offer them reinstatement within 5
days after their unconditional application to return to
work.
Dated By
GRIMALDI BUICK-OPEL, INC.
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
We will notify immediately the above-named individuals, if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States,
of the right to full reinstatement , upon application after
discharge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the
Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training
and Service Act.
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 500
Book Building, 1249 Washington Boulevard, Detroit,
Michigan 48226, Telephone 313-226-3200.