Google Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 30, 2020

14802016 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 30, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/802,016 07/17/2015 Chetan Parshottam Bhadricha GGL-1013 1768
100462 7590 09/30/2020
Dority & Manning P.A. and Google LLC
Post Office Box 1449
Greenville, SC 29602
EXAMINER
MALLEY SR., DANIEL P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3648
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/30/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
usdocketing@dority-manning.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CHETAN PARSHOTTAM BHADRICHA,
ALEXANDER VARSHAVSKY, and STEFANO MAGGIOLO
____________

Appeal 2020-000298
Application 14/802,016
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before EDWARD A. BROWN, MICHAEL J. FITZPATRICK, and
BRANDON J. WARNER, Administrative Patent Judges.

BROWN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1–4, 6–15, 17, 19, and 20.2 We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Google LLC as the real party in interest.
Appeal Br. 3.
2 Claims 5, 16, and 18 have been cancelled. Appeal Br. (Claims App.);
Advisory Act. 2 (Amdt. After Final Act. cancelling claims 16 and 18
entered).
Appeal 2020-000298
Application 14/802,016

2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s disclosure “relates generally to determining a context
associated with a user based on observed beacon devices and, more
particularly, to inferring user context based on a comparison of location data
to detected beacon device data.” Spec. ¶ 1.
Claims 1, 19, and 20 are independent claims. Claim 1 illustrates the
claimed subject matter and is reproduced below with reference letters added
in brackets.
1. A computer-implemented method of determining user
context, the method comprising:
[A] receiving, by one or more computing devices,
location information associated with a user device, wherein the
user device is associated with a user and the location
information includes one or more geographical locations of the
user device at one or more time periods;
[B] detecting, by the one or more computing devices,
first beacon data and second beacon data broadcast by a first set
of beacon devices and a second set of beacon devices
respectively;
[C] determining, by the one or more computing devices,
whether the first beacon data and the second beacon data are
different;
[D] responsive to the first beacon data and the second
beacon data being different, determining, by the one or more
computing devices, based in part on the location information, a
speed of the user device during the one or more time periods in
which the location data is received and the first set of beacon
devices and the second set of beacon devices are detected;
[E] determining, by the one or more computing devices, a
context associated with the user based at least in part on a
correspondence of the speed of the user device to at least one of
a plurality of profiles associated with a corresponding plurality
of scheduled routes comprising one or more locations traveled
using a particular mode of transportation; and
Appeal 2020-000298
Application 14/802,016

3
[F] providing for display, by the one or more computing
devices, one or more notifications associated with the
determined context.
Appeal Br. 16 (Claims App.).

REJECTIONS ON APPEAL3
Claims 1, 2, 8, 10–13, 17, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Westerinen (US 2010/0317371 A1, published
Dec. 16, 2010) and Kuhn (US 2012/0185419 A1, published July 19, 2012).4
Claims 3, 4, and 6 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Westerinen, Kuhn, and Rose (US 2016/0065722 A1, published Mar. 3,
2016).
Claims 3, 4, and 6 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Westerinen, Kuhn, and Kulikov (US 2016/0353245 A1, published Dec.
1, 2016).
Claims 7, 9, 14, and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Westerinen, Kuhn, and Ben-Akiva (US 2015/0198722 A1,
issued July 16, 2015).

3 Appellant notes that the Final Office Action includes a rejection under 35
U.S.C. § 112(b), which lists claims 1–4 and 6–20 in the rejection heading,
but only addresses claims 16 and 18 in the substance of the rejection.
Appeal Br. 5; see id. n.1; Final Act. 4–5. The listing of claims other than
claims 16 and 18 in the heading appears to be a typographical error. As
claims 16 and 18 have been cancelled, we understand that the following
rejections are moot: claim 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a); claims 16 and 18
under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b); and claim 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over
Westerinen, Kuhn, and Hategan (US 2013/0184007 A1, published July 18,
2013). Final Act. 3–5, 17.
4 The rejection heading also lists since-cancelled claim 16. Final Act. 6.
Appeal 2020-000298
Application 14/802,016

4
ANALYSIS
Obviousness over Westerinen and Kuhn
(Claims 1, 2, 8, 10–13, 17, 19, and 20)
Claims 1, 2, 8, 10–13, and 17
The Examiner finds that Westerinen discloses most limitations of
claim 1. Final Act. 6–10. Particularly, the Examiner finds that Westerinen
discloses limitations A–D and F, but, as for limitation E, only does not
disclose that the routes are “scheduled routes comprising one or more
locations traveled using a particular mode of transportation.” Id. at 9 (citing
Westerinen ¶¶ 3, 4, 36–59, 61, 67, 79–89, 97, Figs. 1–4, 6–13). The
Examiner relies on Kuhn as teaching this requirement of limitation E. Id. at
9–10 (citing Kuhn ¶¶ 19–21, 23–25, 32–35, 41–48, Figs. 1–3). Namely, the
Examiner finds that Kuhn teaches:
a mobile device . . . configured to determine a user’s behavioral
context based on detecting a user profile (from a plurality of
dynamic user profiles) when sensed parameters match one of
the profiles stored in the device; wherein certain profiles
correspond to traveling by bus, train, boat, airplane and other
such scheduled routes; wherein one of the parameters used for
matching profiles associated with scheduled routes is velocity
(speed).
Id. at 10. The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art to apply Kuhn’s teachings to Westerinen to provide a
method “configured to dynamically determine contextual changes associated
with a user based on changes associated with sensors disposed on the user’s
mobile device.” Id. (citing Kuhn ¶¶ 9–12).
Appellant contends that Westerinen and Kuhn do not teach or suggest
limitation E. Appeal Br. 8. According to Appellant, Kuhn merely describes
Appeal 2020-000298
Application 14/802,016

5
identifying a current user behavior based at least in part on “sensed
indicators,” but fails to teach or suggest “‘correspondence of the speed of the
user device to at least one of a plurality of profiles associated with a
corresponding plurality of scheduled routes comprising one or more
locations traveled using a particular mode of transportation,’” as recited
in limitation E. Id. at 9 (citing Kuhn ¶ 19) (hereafter also “correspondence
requirement”). Appellant contends that the “‘estimated route of travel of the
mobile device’ sensed indicator” and the “‘one or more schedule files’
sensed indicator,” as described in Kuhn, fail to teach or suggest the
correspondence requirement. Id. at 10 (citing Kuhn ¶¶ 31, 44, 59).
Appellant concedes that Kuhn describes “‘a dynamic user profile may
indicate that a user may be driving or riding in a particular automobile
and/or other type of vehicle or transportation mechanism (e.g., bus, train,
boat, airplane, etc.),’” but Appellant asserts, “Kuhn simply describes ‘a
dynamic user profile’ that is associated with some ‘current inferable user
behavior context.’” Id. at 10–11 (citing Kuhn ¶ 23). As for the Examiner’s
finding that Kuhn discloses “that ‘one of the parameters used for matching
profiles associated with scheduled routes is velocity (speed),’” Appellant
asserts, “in describing the obtainment of velocity relative to the movement
of the mobile device Kuhn merely describes obtaining information about the
mobile device itself,” which also does not teach or suggest the
correspondence requirement. Id. at 11 (citing Final Act. 10, quoting
Kuhn ¶ 35).
In response, the Examiner maintains that Kuhn teaches limitation E.
Ans. 5. As for the recitation in limitation E that “‘context associated with
the user [is] based at least in part on a correspondence of the speed of the
Appeal 2020-000298
Application 14/802,016

6
user device to at least one of a plurality of profiles,’” the Examiner
references the following description in Kuhn:
At example block 304, mobile device 102 may determine
whether a dynamic user profile 220, which is indicative of a
current inferable user behavior context, is to transition from a
first state to a second state based, at least in part, on one or
more sensed indicators 224. For example, at block 304, a
mobile device 102 may determine whether one or more sensed
indicators sufficiently “match” one or more stored patterns or
models of behavior previously associated with one or more
states 222. . . .
Ans. 6 (quoting Kuhn ¶ 45, citing Kuhn ¶ 25, Fig. 3). The Examiner
explains that, because Kuhn teaches that velocity (speed) is a sensed
indicator, “it follows that the mobile device determines whether a velocity
indicator sufficiently matches one or more stored patterns or models of
behavior when determining a state of the dynamic user profile indicative of
user context.” Id. (citing Kuhn ¶ 35). In the Reply Brief, Appellant does not
apprise us of error in this explanation.
As for the recitation in limitation E that “at least one of a plurality of
profiles [is] associated with a corresponding plurality of scheduled routes
comprising one or more locations traveled using a particular mode of
transportation,” the Examiner quotes the following description in Kuhn:
“. . . a dynamic user profile may have different states
depending, at least in part, on differences relating to one or
more user activities. For example, a user activity of driving an
automobile may be associated with different states. For
example, a dynamic user profile may indicate that a user may
be commuting to or from work as a first state, to or from a
child’s school as a second state, to a hospital (e.g., for an
emergency, appointment, etc.) as a third state, to a particular
destination (e.g., second home, vacation spot, etc.) as a fourth
state, etc. In certain instances, for example, one or more states
Appeal 2020-000298
Application 14/802,016

7
of a dynamic user profile may indicate that a user may be
driving or riding in a particular automobile and/or other type
of vehicle or transportation mechanism (e.g., bus, train, boat,
airplane, etc.) . . .”
Ans. 7 (quoting Kuhn ¶ 23). Additionally, the Examiner points out that
Kuhn discloses:
“. . . a dynamic user profile may have different states
depending on periods of time associated with a scheduled,
planned, or otherwise identifiable or reoccurring event, such as,
e.g., a workday, a lunch break, a meal time, a weekend, a
vacation day, a holiday, a birthday, an exercise class, an
appointment, a commute time, a religious service, an arrival or
departure time, a theater or game time, hours of operation of a
[point of interest] POI, a particular starting or ending time
relating to an event or object, and/or the like or some
combination thereof.”
Id. (quoting Kuhn ¶ 24).
Regarding the disclosure in paragraph 23 of Kuhn, Appellant again
acknowledges that “such a dynamic user profile ‘may indicate that a user
may be driving or riding in a particular automobile and/or other type of
vehicle or transportation mechanism,’” but contends that neither the
“‘dynamic user profile’” nor the “states” are described as “scheduled
routes,” let alone as teaching or suggesting
“determining . . . a context associated with the user based at
least in part on a correspondence of the speed of the user device
to at least one of a plurality of profiles associated with a
corresponding plurality of scheduled routes comprising one
or more locations traveled using a particular mode of
transportation.”
Reply Br. 2–3 (quoting claim 1).
Appellant further contends that the disclosure in paragraph 24 of
Kuhn merely describes a “‘dynamic user profile’ that includes various states
Appeal 2020-000298
Application 14/802,016

8
that depend on periods of time associated with ‘a scheduled, planned, or
otherwise identifiable or reoccurring event.’” Reply Br. 3. Appellant
contends that the described “‘event[s]’” do not disclose or suggest the
claimed “‘scheduled routes’” and the exemplary different states of a
dynamic user profile described in Kuhn simply include a variety of different
events, none of which teaches or suggests the same “determining” as
discussed above in regard to the description in paragraph 23 of Kuhn. Id.
Appellant’s contentions are unpersuasive. Initially, we note limitation
E does not limit the mode of transportation to a particular mode, and does
not require the scheduled routes to necessarily include more than one
location. As discussed, the Examiner finds that Kuhn teaches sensing the
velocity (and thus, the speed and direction) of a user device (and thus, a user
carrying the device), and finds that the sensed velocity is a “sensed
indicator.” Ans. 6. Appellant does not apprise us of error in this finding.
The Examiner also finds that Kuhn teaches that the mobile device may
determine whether a sensed indicator sufficiently matches a stored pattern of
behavior associated with one or more states. Ans. 6. This teaching is not
expressly limited to a certain behavior or to certain state(s). Appellant does
not persuade us that this teaching does not encompass user device velocity
as a sensed indicator. As described in paragraph 23 of Kuhn, one or more
states of a dynamic user profile may indicate that a user may be driving or
riding in a particular mode of transportation mechanism, such as an
automobile, bus, train, boat, or airplane. Buses, trains, and airplanes, for
example, would reasonably be expected to operate with “scheduled routes
comprising one or locations traveled using [that] particular mode of
transportation,” as claimed. Further, these exemplary modes of
Appeal 2020-000298
Application 14/802,016

9
transportation would reasonably be expected to have different “scheduled
routes” to or between different locations, and/or to or between the same
location(s) at different times. And paragraph 24 of Kuhn describes that a
dynamic user profile may have different states associated with a scheduled
event, such as a commute time, an arrival or departure time, and/or a
particular starting or ending time. Bus, train, and airplane routes, for
example, would reasonably be expected to have scheduled arrival and
departure times at locations, and/or particular starting and ending times, and
thus, be “scheduled routes.”
As pointed out by the Examiner, “a proper analysis requires that a
prior art reference be considered in its entirety, i.e., as a whole.” Ans. 5
(citing Allied Erecting v. Genesis Attachments, 825 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2016)). Accordingly, even if no single paragraph of Kuhn cited by the
Examiner discloses every feature of limitation E, that alone would not
persuade us that Kuhn fails to sufficiently teach or suggest this limitation.
The Examiner has properly relied on Kuhn in its entirety. Additionally, the
Examiner finds that Westerinen teaches most aspects of limitation E.
Appellant does not apprise us of error in this finding. To the extent
Appellant is contending that Kuhn or Westerinen must provide explicit
disclosure as to limitation E, we disagree. An Examiner is not required to
“seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the
challenged claim.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).
Rather, in an obviousness analysis, an Examiner is to consider not only the
express disclosures of the applied references, but also the “inferences and
creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id.
Appeal 2020-000298
Application 14/802,016

10
For these reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 as unpatentable
over Westerinen and Kuhn. Appellant relies on the dependency of claims 2,
8, 10–13, and 17 from claim 1 for patentability. Appeal Br. 13–14.
Accordingly, we also sustain the rejection of claims 2, 8, 10–13, and 17 for
the same reasons as claim 1.
Claim 19
Claim 19 is directed to a computing system. Appeal Br. 19–20.
Appellant contends that claim 19 is patentable over Westerinen and Kuhn
merely for reasons similar to those discussed for claim 1. Appeal Br. 11–12.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 19 as unpatentable over
Westerinen and Kuhn for reasons similar to those for claim 1.
Claim 20
Claim 20 is directed to one or more tangible non-transitory computer-
readable media. Appeal Br. 20. Appellant contends that claim 20 is
patentable over Westerinen and Kuhn merely for reasons similar to those
discussed for claim 1. Appeal Br. 12–13. Accordingly, we sustain the
rejection of claim 20 as unpatentable over Westerinen and Kuhn for reasons
similar to those for claim 1.

Obviousness over Westerinen, Kuhn, and Rose or Kulikov
(Claims 3, 4, and 6)
Obviousness over Westerinen, Kuhn, and Ben-Akiva
(Claims 7, 9, 14, and 15)
Appellant contends that dependent claims 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 14, and 15 are
patentable for the same reasons argued for parent claim 1, and further
contends that Rose, Kulikov, and Ben-Akiva each fail to cure the deficiency
Appeal 2020-000298
Application 14/802,016

11
in the rejection of claim 1. Appeal Br. 14–15. As Appellant does not
apprise us of error in the rejection of claim 1, we thus sustain the rejections
of claims 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 14, and 15 for reasons similar to those for claim 1.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 8, 10–
13, 17, 19, 20
103 Westerinen, Kuhn 1, 2, 8, 10–
13, 17, 19,
20

3, 4, 6 103 Westerinen, Kuhn,
Rose
3, 4, 6
3, 4, 6 103 Westerinen, Kuhn,
Kulikov
3, 4, 6
7, 9, 14, 15 103 Westerinen, Kuhn,
Ben-Akiva
7, 9, 14, 15
Overall
Outcome
1–4, 6–15,
17, 19, 20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED