Google Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 30, 2020

13864929 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 30, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/864,929 04/17/2013 Yoky Matsuoka 094021-0906069 4558
125802 7590 04/30/2020
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
Google LLC - Nest Labs, Inc.
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
SECK, ABABACAR
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2122
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/30/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com
googlepatentmail@kilpatricktownsend.com
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte YOKY MATSUOKA, EVAN J. FISHER, MARK MALHOTRA,
and MARK D. STEFANSKI
____________________

Appeal 2019-001062
Application 13/864,929
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before JOHNNY A. KUMAR, BETH Z. SHAW, and
JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges.

DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant 1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Non-Final
Rejection of claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction over the pending claims
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). See Ex parte Lemoine, 46 USPQ2d 1420, 1423
(BPAI 1994) (precedential).
We reverse.

1 Throughout this Decision, we use the word “Appellant” to refer to
“applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2017). Appellant identifies
Google LLC as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2019-001062
Application 13/864,929

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention generally relates to
“intelligent controllers that use sensor output and electronically stored
information to determine whether or not one of more types of entities are
present within an area, volume, or environment monitored by the intelligent
controllers.” Spec. 2:9–12. According to the Specification, an example
intelligent controller may be a smart (or intelligent) thermostat. See
Spec. 6:18. The intelligent controller (e.g., thermostat) may receive sensor
input and provide output control signals to a controlled entity (e.g., an
HVAC system). Spec. 9:19–21. In addition, a control schedule comprising
one or more setpoints may be used by the intelligent controller to provide
output control signals at designated times. See Spec. 9:21–25.
In a disclosed embodiment, the intelligent controller may also directly
or indirectly sense the presence of people within the controlled environment
and make adjustments to the control schedule based on such a determination.
Spec. 19:9–18. Moreover, if it has been determined that the environment is
on an away mode (i.e., no people are present), “rather than continuing to
respond to scheduled setpoints while in the no-presence state, the intelligent
controller may only selectively respond to such setpoints.” Spec. 35:32–
36:2. That is, while in an away mode, the intelligent controller may evaluate
scheduled setpoints in the control schedule and determine whether to carry
out the setpoint. Spec. 38:19–22, 40:13–15. As part of the determination as
to whether to carry out the setpoint, the intelligent controller may consider
historical probability-of-presence data, which may suggest an increasing
likelihood that a person will be returning to the environment. Spec. 41:8–12.
Appeal 2019-001062
Application 13/864,929

3
Claim 1 is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal and is
reproduced below with the disputed limitation emphasized in italics:
1. An intelligent controller that controls an energy-
consuming system that affects an environmental parameter
within a controlled environment, the intelligent controller
comprising:
a processor;
one or more sensors;
a memory that stores a control schedule comprising a
plurality of scheduled setpoints and cumulative historical
probability-of-presence data; and
instructions stored within the memory that, when executed
by the processor, controls the intelligent controller to:
determine, from output of one or more of the one or
more sensors, that no human being is present in the
controlled environment for a predetermined time interval;
in response to determining that no human being is
present in the controlled environment for the
predetermined time interval, enter an away mode of
operation where one or more environmental parameters
are maintained at levels that are more energy-efficient than
the scheduled setpoints; and
while operating in the away mode:
for each setpoint in the plurality of scheduled
setpoints in the control schedule that occurs while
operating in the away mode, determine, based at
least in part on the historical probability-of-
presence data, whether to carry out control
operations to affect the environmental parameter
using the energy-consuming system or whether to
ignore the setpoint.

Appeal 2019-001062
Application 13/864,929

4
The Examiner’s Rejections
1. Claims 1, 8, 9, and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Ehlers et al. (US 2004/0133314 A1; July 8, 2004)
(“Ehlers”); J. Lu et al., The Smart Thermostat: Using Occupancy Sensors to
Save Energy in Homes, ACM SenSys ’10 (2010) (“Lu”); and Hoeynck et al.
(US 2010/0025483 A1; Feb. 4, 2010) (“Hoeynck”). Non-Final Act. 3–9.
2. Claims 2, 5–7, 11–15, 17, and 20 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Ehlers, Lu, Hoeynck, and Imes
et al. (US 2011/0054710 A1; Mar. 3, 2011) (“Imes”). Non-Final Act. 9–15.
3. Claim 10 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Ehlers, Lu, Hoeynck, Imes, and Cahill et al. (US
2006/0239557 A1; Oct. 26, 2006) (“Cahill”). Non-Final Act. 16–17.
4. Claims 3, 4, 18, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Ehlers, Lu, Hoeynck, Imes, and Fadell et al. (US
8,510,255 B2; Aug. 13, 2013) (“Fadell”). Non-Final Act. 17–21.

ANALYSIS2
Appellant disputes the Examiner’s finding the Lu, alone or in
combination with the other cited references, teaches or suggests determining,
based at least in part on historical probability-of-presence data, whether to
carry out or ignore each scheduled setpoint in a control schedule while the
intelligent controller is operating in an away mode. Appeal Br. 15–16;

2 Throughout this Decision, we have considered the Appeal Brief, filed
May 29, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); the Reply Brief, filed November 19, 2018
(“Reply Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer, mailed September 18, 2018 (“Ans.”);
and the Non-Final Office Action, mailed March 28, 2018 (“Non-Final
Act.”), from which this Appeal is taken.
Appeal 2019-001062
Application 13/864,929

5
Reply Br. 2–3; see also Non-Final Act. 4–5. In particular, Appellant argues
that Lu merely uses historical occupancy data and a Hidden Markov Model
(HMM) to determine whether to transition into an away mode, but once Lu
has transitioned to the away mode, Lu does not use historical probability-of-
presence data to determine whether to carry out a scheduled setpoint.
Appeal Br. 14–16, Reply Br. 2–3.
Lu generally describes a smart thermostat that uses occupancy sensors
to control an HVAC system. See Lu § 2. According to Lu, the house is
conditioned to a setpoint temperature when the occupants are at home and
active, but changes to a setback temperature when the occupants are away or
asleep. Lu § 2. Further, Lu describes a goal of the smart thermostat is to
turn off the HVAC system when the occupants have left the house, use a
deep setback temperature, and preheat immediately prior to the return of the
occupants. See Lu, Fig. 2. Lu uses a Hidden Markov Model to estimate
whether the home is in one of three states—i.e., away, active, or sleep. Lu
§ 3.2. “Once the system detects a state transition with high probability, it
responds by switching the temperature setpoint appropriately.” Lu § 3.2.
Historical occupancy times are used by the HMM to estimate current
occupancy. Lu § 3.2. When Lu determines the house is in an away state,
the system turns the HVAC system off. Lu § 3.2. Further, Lu describes the
use of a deep setback temperature when the house is unoccupied (i.e., in the
away state). Lu § 3.4.
In addition, Lu describes an approach for turning the HVAC system
on. Lu § 3.3. Lu describes an approach for determining whether and when
to preheat the house. Lu § 3.3. Lu notes that occupant arrival times are not
Appeal 2019-001062
Application 13/864,929

6
known, but uses historical occupancy patterns to determine a time when it is
most efficient to preheat the house. Lu § 3.3.
Moreover, Lu contrasts its smart thermostat with a programmable
thermostat. See Lu §§ 1 (explaining programmable thermostats are too
difficult for users to use efficiently), 5.1 (noting that programmable
thermostats do not react to occupancy at all and, as such, they were not used
in Lu’s evaluation).
Based on our review of Lu, we agree with Appellant that it does not
appear Lu uses historical occupancy patterns (i.e., probability-of-presence
data) to determine whether to carry out a scheduled setpoint in a control
schedule while operating in the away state. Lu does not describe using a
control schedule (such as with a programmable thermostat) comprising
scheduled setpoints. Rather, Lu describes using historical occupancy
patterns to determine a time to preheat the house. In addition, it is not clear
from the Examiner’s proposed combination of Lu’s smart thermostat with
the scheduled setpoints of Ehlers (see Non-Final Act. 5) that there would be
a determination using historical probability-of-presence data of whether to
carry out a scheduled setpoint while operating in the away mode.
For the reasons discussed supra, we find Appellant’s arguments
persuasive. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claim 1. For similar reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of independent claim 16, which recites commensurate limitations.
Additionally, we note the Examiner does not rely on the other references to
teach or suggest the disputed limitation discussed above. Accordingly, we
do not sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 2–15 and 17–20, which
depend directly or indirectly therefrom.
Appeal 2019-001062
Application 13/864,929

7
CONCLUSION
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103.

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 8, 9, 16 103 Ehlers, Lu,
Hoeynck
1, 8, 9, 16
2, 5–7, 11–
15, 17, 20
103 Ehlers, Lu,
Hoeynck, Imes
2, 5–7,
11–15,
17, 20
10 103 Ehlers, Lu,
Hoeynck, Imes,
Cahill
10
3, 4, 18, 19 103 Ehlers, Lu,
Hoeynck, Imes,
Fadell
3, 4, 18,
19
Overall
Outcome
1–20

REVERSED