Google Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 28, 2020

14080448 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 28, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/080,448 11/14/2013 Karen Yao 16113-4602001 4722
26192 7590 02/28/2020
FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
PO BOX 1022
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55440-1022
EXAMINER
TOKARCZYK, CHRISTOPHER B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3622
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/28/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PATDOCTC@fr.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte KAREN YAO and SHU NIU
____________

Appeal 2019-002548
Application 14/080,4481
Technology Center 3600
_______________

Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, HUNG H. BUI, and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.

BUI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1–5, 9–12, and 19–23, which are all
the claims pending in the application. Claims 6–8 and 13–18 are cancelled.
Appeal Br. 21–29 (Claims App.). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.2

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant(s)” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. The real party in interest is Google LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
2 Our Decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”) filed
August 22, 2018; Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed February 4, 2019;
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) mailed December 14, 2018; Final Office
Action (“Final Act.”) mailed March 20, 2018; and original Specification
(“Spec.”) filed November 14, 2013.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s Invention
Appellant’s invention relates to “selective advertising” (Spec. 1:11)
and “an advertising management system [shown in Figure 1] to facilitate the
sale and purchase of online advertising opportunities between publishers and
advertisers.” (Spec. 5:21–23). Figure 1 is reproduced below:

Appellant’s Figure 1 shows advertising management system 102 including
campaign management system 116, advertising serving system 120, and
reporting system 122 to facilitate the sale and purchase of advertising
opportunities between publishers 106 and advertisers 110 (Spec. 6:10–13).
Campaign management system 116 “provides user interfaces for
advertisers (e.g., using advertiser devices 112) to define advertising
campaigns and ad groups, submit advertising content, and specify various
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targeting and/or ad placement criteria for the advertising content in each
advertising campaign and/or ad group.” (Spec. 6:14–17).
According to Appellant, “[c]onstructing an advertising campaign can
be a time-consuming task, as advertisers often take great care in specifying
features of their campaigns” or adding “new features and capabilities that an
advertiser can use in new campaigns” (Spec. 1:28–29). However, “new
features result in changes that are not backwards-compatible with existing
campaigns” (Spec. 2:1–2). As such, Appellant proposes “a feature
management user interface” as part of campaign management system 116 to
facilitate an “on-demand conversion of [particular] campaign entities stored
in a first format [e.g., a legacy format] to a second format [e.g., new or
updated format] within a workflow” so that “the user is not required to
update all of the campaign entities from the first format to the second format
all at once, nor is the user required to suspend the workflow and initiate
another separate workflow to update the campaign entities.” (Spec. 3:23–31,
9:13–25). “For example, in the case of sitelink extensions [of a campaign
entity], which are multiple links to a site shown [] a search result or
advertisement that link to certain pages in addition to the landing page of the
search result or the advertisement,” “an advertiser may not want to update all
sitelink extensions when creating a new campaign that can use [only] the
updated extensions” (Spec. 4:28–5:1, 10:17–30).
Representative Claim
Claims 1, 9, and 19 are independent. Representative claim 1 is
reproduced below:
1. A system comprising:
a data processing apparatus including one or more computers;
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a computer storage system storing instructions that when executed by
data processing apparatus cause the data processing apparatus to perform
actions comprising:
accessing, through a content item management system, content item
management data that includes a plurality of sitelink extensions that are each
used by multiple different content item campaigns for distributing content
items over a network;
providing, to a user device, instructions that cause the user device to
perform operations comprising:
displaying a feature management user interface in which a
set of sitelink extensions that are available for use in a particular
content item campaign are displayed in a first visualization
format and are selectable within the feature management user
interface, wherein at least a first portion of the set of sitelink
extensions available for use in the particular content item
campaign are stored in a first data format that supports a
particular set of features that each provide a particular content
item management or visualization functionality, and are
represented in the first data format in the feature management
user interface, wherein the first portion of the set of sitelink
extensions stored in the first data format are being used in a
different content item campaign according to a first feature set
that is supported by a first sitelink version; and
in response to receiving a selection of a proper subset of
the set of sitelink extensions, the proper subset including a
particular sitelink extension that is selected for use in the
particular content item campaign according to a second feature
set that (i) is different from the first feature set, (ii) requires the
particular sitelink extension to be updated to a second data format
that is not supported by the first sitelink version and is different
from the first data format, and (iii) includes features that each
provide a particular content item management or visualization
functionality that is different from each of the features in the first
data format, causing the user device to send a request for an
update of only the proper subset of the set of sitelink extensions
and to display the particular sitelink extension in a second
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visualization format that is different from the first visualization
format; and
in response to receiving the update request updating only
the proper subset of the set of sitelink extensions to the second
data format while maintaining sitelink extensions from the set of
sitelink extensions that are not included in the proper subset in
the first data format, including updating the particular sitelink
extension by performing operations including:
generating, at the data processing apparatus, a new
version of the particular sitelink extension in the second data
format, that is different from the first data format, for use in the
particular content item campaign;
storing, in the content item management data, the
new version of the particular sitelink extension that is used by
the particular content item campaign; and
distributing content that includes the new version of
the particular sitelink extension in the particular content item
campaign according to the second feature set, while maintaining
sitelink extensions that are not included in the proper subset in
the first data format, and while the particular sitelink extension
continues to be used in the first data format by the different
content item campaign after updating the particular sitelink
extension to the new version of the particular sitelink extension.
Appeal Br. 21–22 (Claims App.).
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EXAMINER’S REJECTION3
(1) Claims 4, 12, 22, and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112
(pre-AIA), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description
requirement. Final Act. 2–3.
(2) Claims 1–5, 9–12, and 19–23 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final
Act. 3–7.
(3) Claims 1–5, 9–12, and 19–23 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Catalahana et al. (US
2012/0116895 A1; published May 10, 2012; “Catalahana”), Oldham et al.
(US 2009/0307188 A1; published Dec. 10, 2009; “Oldham”), and Neal et al.
(US 2008/0052140 A1; published Feb. 23, 2008; “Neal”). Final Act. 7–20.

ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 112, First Paragraph: Written Description
Claim 4 depends from claim 1, and further recite:
wherein the set of sitelink extensions include sitelinks that are
displayed with advertisements, and wherein updating the
particular sitelink comprises enabling additional features that are
not backwards compatible with the first format of the particular
sitelink extension, wherein the additional features include one of
reporting data on a per-sitelink basis or management of sitelinks
on a per-sitelink basis.

3 Claims 19–23 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed
invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter (i.e., transitory
propagating signals per se). Final Act. 3. However, the Examiner has
withdrawn the rejection (Ans. 3). As such, the 101 rejection of claims 19–
23 is no longer on appeal.
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Appeal Br. 23 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). Claims 12, 22, and 23
recite similar limitations.
In support of the § 112, first paragraph rejection of claims 4, 12, 22,
and 23, the Examiner finds the wherein clause “updating the particular
sitelink comprises enabling additional features that are not backwards
compatible with the first format of the particular sitelink extension” lacks
written description. Final Act. 2–3. In particular, the Examiner asserts “the
specification does not indicate any description of implementing a solution
for ‘updating the particular sitelink’ that ‘comprises enabling additional
features that are not backwards compatible with the first format of the
particular sitelink extension’ as claimed.” Final Act. 3.
Appellant argues the Specification describes a problem in existing
advertising management system, i.e.,
“when a new feature is introduced into the advertising
management system, advertisers may be required to migrate [all]
existing data to a new data format that supports the new feature
set. However, migration may not be backwards compatible, and
other infrastructure mechanisms may not fully support the new
features” (Spec. 9:13–25),

and provides a solution thereto, i.e.,
“a workflow that facilitates the on-demand updating of a
campaign entity from a first format (e.g., a legacy format)
that supports of first feature set to a second format (e.g., a
new or updated format) that supports a second feature set”
(Spec. 9:13–28)

via feature management user interfaces that support the processing and
management of campaign entities in both the first format and the second
format [shown in Figs. 2–5], including the workflow that “manages sitelink
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extensions so as to provide a solution for the problems of particular sitelink
versions not being backward compatible” (Spec. 10:17–30). Appeal Br. 6–
9.
In response, the Examiner takes the position that:
the teaching that a “second format that supports additional or
different features than are supported by sitelinks in a first format”
does not support enabling additional features that are not
backwards compatible with the first format of the particular
sitelink extension, because the disclosure does not provide the
missing link that “additional or different features than are
supported by sitelinks in a first format” are not backwards
compatible with sitelinks in a first format. For example, a newer
version of the sitelink could change the font color of all of the
text in the sitelink from a default black color to red. This new
version adds additional and different features than supported by
the previous version—i.e., the red font color—but this feature is
backwards compatible; the red text could have been rendered in
the previous version had that color been selected.

Ans. 4–5 (emphasis added).
We do not agree with the Examiner’s position. The written
description requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph only requires
Appellant to “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor
had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad
Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
“[T]he level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement
varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the
complexity and predictability of the relevant technology.” Id. However,
“the disclosure as originally filed does not have to provide in haec verba
support for the claimed subject matter at issue.” Purdue Pharma L.P. v.
Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In some cases,
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“drawings alone may provide a ‘written description’ of an invention as
required by § 112.” Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1565 (Fed.
Cir. 1991). Regardless, the disclosure must convey with reasonable clarity
to those skilled in the art that the inventor was in possession of the invention.
Id. at 1563–1564.
Here, Appellant has shown that there is sufficient structure and
description in the Specification as filed to support the limitation “updating
the particular sitelink comprises enabling additional features that are not
backwards compatible with the first format of the particular sitelink
extension” as recited in claims 4, 12, 22, and 23. For example, Figure 2
shows a feature management user interface that support the processing and
management of campaign entities, including sitelink extensions 206. Figure
2 is reproduced below with additional annotations for illustration.

Appellant’s Figure 2 shows a user interface supporting the update of sitelink
extensions of an advertising campaign.
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As explained by Appellant’s Specification, “sitelink extensions [for
advertisements] . . . are multiple links to a site shown . . . a search result or
advertisement that link to certain pages in addition to the landing page of the
search result or the advertisement” (Spec. 4:28–5:1, 10:17–30). When
sitelinks 206, shown in Figure 2, are selected by an advertiser for a new
advertising campaign, these sitelinks 206 may include “additional or
different features” that may not be backwards-compatible with existing
advertising campaigns and, as such, require “on-demand updating of a
campaign entity from a first format (e.g., a legacy format) that supports [a]
first feature set to a second format (e.g., a new or updated format) that
supports a second feature set” (Spec. 2:1–2, 5:12–14, 9:21–23).
Because examples of such campaign entities being updated from “a
first format (e.g., a legacy format) that supports [a] first feature set to a
second format (e.g., a new or updated format) that supports a second feature
set” includes “sitelink extensions,” we agree with Appellant that (1) a skilled
artisan would understand that the scope of claim 4 (updating a particular
sitelink extension, which is a type of campaign entity) is supported by the
specification as originally filed, and (2) Appellant has “reasonably
convey[ed] to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the
claimed subject matter as of the filing date.”
For these reasons, we do not sustain the § 112, first paragraph
rejection of claims 4, 12, 22, and 23 for failure to comply with the “written
description” requirement.

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35 U.S.C. § 101: Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
In support of the § 101 rejection of claims 1–5, 9–12, and 19–23, the
Examiner determines these claims recite “mental processes that can be
performed [][in the] human mind or by a human using a pen and paper,” and
include limitations such as:
“(i) accessing content item management data that includes a
plurality of sitelink extensions; (ii) that the sitelink extensions in
the set have different formats and versions (such as formats that
provide particular content item management or visualization
functionalities); (iii) receiving a selection of a proper subset of
the sitelink extensions; (iv) generating a new version of the
sitelink extension in a second format that is different than the first
format; and (v) storing new versions of the sitelink extension”

that are similar or analogous to the claims found by the Federal Circuit to be
an abstract idea in Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d
1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that the concept of “collecting
information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and
analysis” is an abstract idea). Final Act. 4–5.
The Examiner then determines additional elements (i.e., “data
processing apparatus,” “computer storage system,” “user interface,” and
“user device” recited in claim 1, “content item management system,” “user
interface,” and “user device” recited in claims 9 and 19), when analyzed
individually and as an ordered combination, do not amount to significantly
more than the abstract idea because these additional elements (1) are
“[g]eneric computer components recited as performing generic computer
functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities” and
(2) do not “improve[] the functioning of a computer or improves any other
technology.” Final Act. 5–6.
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Eligibility Framework
To determine whether claims are patent eligible under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, we apply the Supreme Court’s two-step framework articulated in
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). First, we determine
whether the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept: laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 216. If so, we
then proceed to the second step to consider the elements of the claims
“individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there
are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Id. at 217. In other words, the second step is to
“search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or combination of
elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at
218 (quotation marks omitted).
The Federal Circuit has described the Alice step-one inquiry as
looking at the “focus” of the claims, their “character as a whole,” and the
Alice step-two inquiry as looking more precisely at what the claim elements
add—whether they identify an “inventive concept” in the application of the
ineligible matter to which the claim is directed. See Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Internet
Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
In an effort to achieve clarity and consistency in how the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (the “Office”) applies the Supreme Court’s two-step
framework, the Office has published revised guidance interpreting governing
case law and establishing a prosecution framework for all patent-eligibility
analysis under Alice and 35 U.S.C. § 101 effective as of January 7, 2019.
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See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019); see also USPTO October 2019 Update: Subject Matter
Eligibility, 84 Fed. Reg. 55942–53 (Oct. 17, 2019) (Updating the guidance
promulgated in January 2019 with “examples as well as a discussion of
various issues raised by the public comments.”). “All USPTO personnel are,
as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the
guidance.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 51; see also October
2019 Update.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look under Alice step 1 or “Step 2A” to whether the claim recites:
(1) Prong One: any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., [i] mathematical concepts,
[ii] mental processes—concepts performed in the human
mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment,
opinion), or [iii] certain methods of organizing human
activity such as a fundamental economic practice or
managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions
between people); and

(2) Prong Two: additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–
(h)).4
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 51–52, 55, Revised Step 2A,
Prong One (Abstract Idea) and Prong Two (Integration into A Practical
Application). Only if a claim: (1) recites a judicial exception; and (2) does
not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then evaluate

4 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 08.2017
(rev. Jan. 2018).
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whether the claim provides an “inventive concept” under Alice step 2 or
“Step 2B.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56; see also Alice,
573 U.S. at 217–18. For example, we look to whether the claim:
1) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or

2) simply appends well-understood, routine, and conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a
high level of generality, to the judicial exception.

See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Alice/Mayo—Step 1 (Abstract Idea)
Step 2A–Prongs 1 and 2 identified in the Revised Guidance
Step 2A—Prong 1
Appellant argues “the claims are not directed to patent eligible subject
matter” because the “claims, unlike those at issue in Electric Power Group .
. . utilize an inventive technique for updating certain files, or sitelinks, while
not updating other files by providing ‘piecemeal, just-in-time updates as
needed’ instead of forcing users to ‘invoke[e] [sic] an update process
separate from a workflow for the new feature, resulting in an intuitive and
time-efficient user experience.’” Appeal Br. 9, 16.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. At the outset, we note
Appellant’s Specification and claims describe “selective advertising”
(Spec. 1:11) in the context of “an advertising management system [shown in
Figure 1] to facilitate the sale and purchase of online advertising
opportunities between publishers and advertisers.” (Spec. 5:21–23). User
interfaces are provided for an advertiser (e.g., using advertiser device 112)
“to define advertising campaigns and ad groups, submit advertising content,
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and specify various targeting and/or ad placement criteria for the advertising
content in each advertising campaign and/or ad group.” (Spec. 6:14–17).
According to Appellant, “[c]onstructing an advertising campaign can be a
time-consuming task, as advertisers often take great care in specifying
features of their campaigns” or adding “new features and capabilities that an
advertiser can use in new campaigns” (Spec. 1:28–29) that may not be
“backwards-compatible with existing campaigns” (Spec. 2:1–2). As such,
Appellant proposes “a feature management user interface” as part of
campaign management system 116 to facilitate an “on-demand conversion
of campaign entities stored in a first format [e.g., a legacy format] to a
second format [e.g., new or updated format] within a workflow” so that “the
user is not required to update all of the campaign entities from the first
format to the second format all at once, nor is the user required to suspend
the workflow and initiate another separate workflow to update the campaign
entities.” (Spec. 3:23–31, 9:13–25).
As correctly recognized by the Examiner, limitations of Appellant’s
claim 1, under their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite (1) “accessing .
. . content item management data that includes a plurality of sitelink
extensions . . . for distributing content items over a network”; (2) “displaying
. . . a set of sitelink extensions . . . in a first [data] format”; (3) “in response
to receiving a selection of a proper subset of [] sitelink extensions . . .
send[ing] a request for an update of only the proper subset of [] sitelink
extensions [] to display [] in a second [data] format”; (4) “generating . . . a
new version of the sitelink extension in the second data format, that is
different than the first data format”; (5) “storing . . . the new version of the
sitelink extension”; and (6) “distributing content that includes the new
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version of the particular sitelink extension in the particular content item
campaign” that are nothing more than a series of collecting (accessing),
analyzing (selecting and generating), and storing a new version of the
particular sitelink extension for distribution by an advertiser, which are
“mental processes” that could also be performed practically in the human
mind or by a human using a pen and paper (including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion), and therefore an abstract idea. Ans. 6–7; see
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[A] method that can be performed by human thought
alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101.”); see
also In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[M]ental
processes—or processes of human thinking—standing alone are not
patentable even if they have practical application.”); Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“Phenomena of nature, . . . mental processes, and
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of
scientific and technological work.” (emphasis added)). Additionally, mental
processes remain unpatentable even when automated to reduce the burden
on the user of what once could have been done with pen and paper.
CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be
unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the
holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
Information, as such, is intangible, and data analysis and algorithms
are also abstract ideas. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S.
437, 451 n.12 (2007); see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 218; Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 589, 594–95 (1978) (“Reasoning that an algorithm, or
mathematical formula, is like a law of nature, Benson applied the established
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rule that a law of nature cannot be the subject of a patent.”); Benson, 409
U.S. at 71–72. According to the Federal Circuit, “collecting information,
including when limited to particular content (which does not change its
character as information),” falls within the realm of abstract ideas. Elec.
Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353; see also e.g., Internet Patents Corp., 790
F.3d at 1346; OIP Techs. Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2015); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo
Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Digitech Image
Techs, LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2014); CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1370.
Likewise, “analyzing information by steps people go through in their
minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more,” is “essentially mental
processes within the abstract-idea category.” Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at
1353; see, e.g., In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613
(Fed. Cir. 2016); Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1351; SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced
Biological Labs., SA, 555 F. App’x 950, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Bancorp
Servs. L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (US), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278
(Fed. Cir. 2012); CyberSource Corp., 654 F.3d at 1372; SiRF Tech., Inc. v.
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Parker
v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 589–90; Benson, 409 U.S. at 67. That is, “[w]ithout
additional limitations, a process that employs mathematical algorithms to
manipulate existing information to generate additional information is not
patent eligible.” Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1350–51 (“Data in its ethereal,
non-physical form is simply information that does not fall under any of the
categories of eligible subject matter under section 101.”). And the Federal
Circuit has also recognized that merely presenting the results of abstract
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processes of collecting and analyzing information, without more (such as
identifying a particular tool for presentation), is abstract as an ancillary part
of such collection and analysis. See, e.g., Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at
1347; Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Alternatively, limitations of Appellant’s claim 1, when broadly
interpreted in light of Appellant’s Specification, also describe advertising
campaigns for distributing advertisements (content items including multiple
sitelink extensions used by different advertising campaigns) over a network.
For example, Appellant’s claim 1 recite (1) “accessing . . . content item
management data that includes a plurality of sitelink extensions . . . for
distributing content items over a network”; (2) “displaying . . . a set of
sitelink extensions . . . in a first [data] format”; (3) “in response to receiving
a selection of a proper subset of [] sitelink extensions . . . send[ing] a request
for an update of only the proper subset of [] sitelink extensions [] to display
[] in a second [data] format”; (4) “generating . . . a new version of the
sitelink extension in the second data format, that is different than the first
data format”; (5) “storing . . . the new version of the sitelink extension”; and
(6) “distributing [advertisement] content that includes the new version of the
particular sitelink extension in the particular content item campaign” that are
known business activities, especially in the context of an advertising
industry where an advertiser can create an advertising campaign with
features most effective to promote products/services to end users.
These limitations recite commercial or legal interactions (including
advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations)
and fundamental economic practices (including insurance and mitigating
risk) in our system of commerce, examples of “certain methods of
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organizing human activity” identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance, and
therefore the claim recites an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance
(Revised Step 2A, Prong One), 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (describing an abstract
idea category of “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity—
fundamental economic principles or practices . . . commercial or legal
interactions (including . . . advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations)”), 54. See Spec. 1:16–2:2, 2:22–31, 5:4–18,
9:13–28.
Such economic activities are squarely within the realm of abstract
ideas, including those identified by the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit as abstract ideas, such as, for example: (1) the risk hedging in Bilski
v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); (2) the intermediated settlement in Alice,
573 U.S. at 220; (3) verifying credit card transactions in CyberSource, 654
F.3d at 1370; (4) managing a stable value protected life insurance policy in
Bancorp Servs.; (5) guaranteeing transactions in buySAFE, Inc. v. Google,
Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014); (6) distributing products over the
Internet in Ultramercial; (7) determining a price of a product offered to a
purchasing organization in Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793
F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015); (8) pricing a product for sale in OIP Techs; (9)
delivering user-selected media content (i.e., targeted advertisement) to a
portable device in Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d
1266, 1269, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2016); and (10) taking orders from restaurant
customers in Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
The claimed updating a campaign entity including sitelink extensions in
various formats to reach potential customers is also a building block of
commerce and insurance and, like risk hedging and intermediated
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settlement, is an “abstract idea” beyond the scope of § 101. See Alice,
573 U.S. at 220.
Thus, under Step 2A, Prong One, we agree with the Examiner that
limitations (1)–(6) in Appellant’s claim 1 recite a series of mental processes
or a fundamental economic practice as identified in the 2019 Revised
Guidance, and thus, an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance (Revised
Step 2A, Prong One), 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 54.
Because the claims recite an abstract idea, we next proceed to Step 2A,
Prong Two of the Revised Guidance, to determine whether the claims
integrate the recited idea into a practical application). See Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
Step 2A—Prong 2 (Integration into Practical Application)
Under Step 2A, Prong Two of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we discern
no additional element (or combination of elements) recited in Appellant’s
claims 1, 9, or 19 that integrate(s) the judicial exception into a practical
application. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong
Two”).
For example, Appellant’s additional elements (i.e., “data processing
apparatus,” “computer storage system,” “user interface,” and “user device”
recited in claim 1, “content item management system,” “user interface,” and
“user device” recited in claims 9 and 19) do not (1) improve the functioning
of a computer or other technology, (2) are not applied with any particular
machine (except for generic computer components), (3) do not effect a
transformation of a particular article to a different state, and (4) are not
applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the
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claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
exception. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Appellant argues that (1) like the claims in McRO, “the claimed
subject matter ‘improves a computer or other technology’ and provides ‘a
particular solution to a problem or a particular way to achieve a desired
result’” (Appeal Br. 12–13), and (2) “[T]he claimed solution improves over
the prior art by providing the technical advantages of being able to update
only the sitelinks which have been specified for update by the user, and not
all sitelinks, some of which may utilize features that are not compatible with
the updated format or features.” (Appeal Br. 10). According to Appellant,
[t]his is an improvement over prior art systems because updating
all sitelinks may result in disrupting the experience of the user
while the claimed subject matter eliminates this problem and
allows users to “avail themselves of new features without
invoking an update process separate from a workflow for the new
feature, resulting in an intuitive and time-efficient user
experience” . . .

Here, the claims specifically recite a solution to a problem that
arises when updates to sitelink versions cause compatibility
issues with features utilized in the prior version. In other words,
the version update may prevent the use of some of the features
of the prior version, but continued use of those features in some
of the existing sitelinks may be desired. The solution is to
provide a mechanism for the old sitelink version to continue to
be used for those sitelinks that are to continue using the features
that are not compatible in the new version, while allowing other
sitelinks to be selectively updated to the new version.

Appeal Br. 10–11 (citing Spec. 3).
We agree with Appellant that the claimed invention provides a
solution to the potential problem of an advertising campaign for distributing
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advertisements over a network where sitelink advertising extensions are used
by an advertiser to construct a new advertising campaign. However, we are
not sufficiently persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the claimed solution
is aimed to improve the performance of computers or computer-related
technologies. Instead, Appellant’s claimed solution allows an advertiser to
construct and update an advertising campaign including sitelink extensions
more efficiently, whether updating “all of the campaign entities” or just a
particular campaign entity to save time to reach to customers.
As acknowledged by Appellant’s Specification, “all of the campaign
entities” can be updated by a conventional advertisement management
system “from [a] first [data] format to [a] second [data] format all at once”
(Spec. 3:25–27). However, “migrating all existing data . . . to the new
format may be time consuming for an advertiser” (Spec. 15–18) because
“there may be millions of campaign entities that could be updated”
(Spec. 11:4–5). Appellant’s solution is to provide “piecemeal, just-in-time
updates as needed” (Spec. 3:28–29), i.e., an on-demand updating of a
particular campaign entity (as opposed to all the available campaign entities)
from a first data format (e.g., a legacy format) to a second data format (e.g.,
a new or updated format). But whether the update of a campaign entity is
made wholesale or “piecemeal, just-in-time,”5 the update is part of a

5 Appellant’s proposed solution is predicated upon an understanding that
conventional advertisement management systems are highly complex and
include “millions of campaign entities that could be updated.” However, if
such advertisement management systems are brand new or are simpler with
only two advertisement campaigns, Appellant’s proposed solution would not
differ from these conventional advertisement management systems where
“all of the campaign entities” (i.e., a single campaign entity) could be
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workflow of the construction of an advertising campaign by an advertiser.
Thus, to the extent there is a solution, “it is an entrepreneurial, rather than a
technological one.” DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d
1245, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Using generic computing components (i.e., “data processing
apparatus,” “computer storage system,” “user interface,” and “user device”
recited in claim 1, “content item management system,” “user interface,” and
“user device” recited in claims 9 and 19) as a tool, for example, as shown in
Appellant’s Figures 1 and 8, to perform an abstract idea is insufficient to
show “integration into a practical application.” See MPEP § 2106.05(f).
Instead, these generic computing components are simply the “automation of
the fundamental economic concept [or mental steps],” OIP Techs., 788 F.3d
at 1362–63. “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation,” “does
not move into [§] 101 eligibility territory.” buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1354
(second alteration in original).
Furthermore, Appellant’s reliance on McRO is misplaced. For
example, McRO’s ’576 patent (U.S. Patent No. 6,307,576) describes
computer software for matching audio to a 3D animated mouth movement
to provide lip-synched animation. McRO’s claims contain: (i) specific
limitations regarding a set of rules that “define[] a morph weight set stream
as a function of phoneme sequence and times associated with said phoneme
sequence” to enable computers to produce “accurate and realistic lip
synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters” and, when
viewed as a whole, are directed to: (ii) a “technological improvement over

updated from a first data format to a second data format “all at once” (Spec.
3:25–27).
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the existing, manual 3–D animation techniques” that uses “limited rules in a
process specifically designed to achieve an improved technological result in
conventional industry practice.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am.
Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
In contrast to McRO, we do not agree with Appellant’s
characterization that the claims describe technological improvements or
provide specific improvements to the way computers operate. Instead,
Appellant’s claims describe constructing an advertising campaign having
sitelink extensions in different data formats and features for distribution over
a network and, in our view, do not make any specific improvement to the
underlying technology or the way computers operate.
For these reasons, we determine that: (1) Appellant’s “additional
elements” recited in claims 1, 9, and 19 do not integrate the recited judicial
exception into a practical application and, as such; and (2) Appellant’s
claims are directed to an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance (Revised
Step 2A, Prong Two), 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
Alice/Mayo—Step 2 (Inventive Concept)
Step 2B identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, only if a claim: (1) recites a
judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then (3) look to whether the claim adds a specific
limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood,
routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or, instead, it
simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. However, we
find no element or combination of elements recited in Appellant’s claims 1,
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9, and 19 that contain any “inventive concept” or add anything “significantly
more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible application.
Alice, 573 U.S. 208 at 221.
Appellant does not identify any specific limitation of claims 1, 9, and
19 beyond the judicial exception that is not “‘well-understood, routine,
conventional’ in the field” as per MPEP § 2106.05(d). Instead, Appellant
argues (1) “the combination of features recited by the claims are non-
conventional” (Appeal Br. 9); (2) “the present claims recite an ordered
combination of features beyond that which was “well-understood, routine,
[or] conventional” (Appeal Br. 11; Reply Br. 4); and (3) the claims “contain
an ‘inventive concept’ in their ordered combination of limitations sufficient
to satisfy the second step of the Supreme Court’s Alice test” (Appeal Br. 11–
12 (citing BASCOM Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827
F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
We do not agree. Contrary to Appellant’s arguments, there is no
evidence from the Specification to support any contention that Appellant’s
claimed “combination of features are non-conventional.” Appeal Br. 9, 11–
12). Mere attorney arguments and conclusory statements that are
unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. In re
Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re De Blauwe,
736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and Ex parte Belinne, No. 2009-004693,
slip op. at 7–8 (BPAI Aug. 10, 2009) (informative).
Likewise, Appellant’s claims are not analogous to the claims in
BASCOM. For example, BASCOM (U.S. Patent No. 5,987,606 (“BASCOM
’606 patent”)) describes a particular arrangement of filtering software at a
specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering
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features specific to each end user. The filtering software enables
individually customizable filtering at the remote ISP server by taking
advantage of the technical ability of the ISP server to identify individual
accounts and associate a request for Internet content with a specific
individual account. BASCOM ’606 patent, 4:35–38.
The Federal Circuit recognized that BASCOM’s installation of an
Internet content filter at a particular network location is “a technical
improvement over prior art ways of filtering such content” because such an
arrangement advantageously allows the Internet content filter to have “both
the benefits of a filter on a local computer and the benefits of a filter on the
ISP server” and “give[s] users the ability to customize filtering for their
individual network accounts.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350, 1352.
According to the Federal Circuit, BASCOM’s claims “do not preempt the use
of the abstract idea of filtering content on the Internet or on generic
computer components performing conventional activities.” Id. at 1352.
Instead, BASCOM’s claims “carve out a specific location for the filtering
system (a remote ISP server) and require the filtering system to give users
the ability to customize filtering for their individual network accounts.” Id.
As such, “an inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional and
non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces.” Id. at 1350.
In contrast to BASCOM, Appellant’s claims and Specification
describe constructing an advertising campaign, by an advertiser, having
sitelink extensions in different data formats and features for distribution over
a network. There is no evidence in the record to support the contention that
Appellant’s claimed system is provided with any non-conventional and non-
generic arrangement of known, conventional components similar to
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BASCOM. Likewise, there is no element or combination of elements recited
in Appellant’s claims 1, 9, and 19 that contain any “inventive concept” or
add anything “significantly more” to transform the abstract concept into a
patent-eligible application. Alice, 573 U.S. 208 at 221.
In Berkheimer, the Federal Circuit held that “[t]he patent eligibility
inquiry may contain underlying issues of fact.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881
F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First
Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The § 101
inquiry ‘may contain underlying factual issues.”’)). However, the Federal
Circuit also held that “[w]hen there is no genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether the claim element or claimed combination is well-
understood, routine, [and] conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant
field, this issue can be decided on summary judgment as a matter of law.”
Id. at 1368 (emphasis added). This qualification has been reiterated.
If there is a genuine dispute of material fact, Rule 56 requires that
summary judgment be denied. In Berkheimer, there was such a
genuine dispute for claims 4–7, but not for claims 1–3 and 9. . . .
[I]n accordance with Alice, we have repeatedly recognized the
absence of a genuine dispute as to eligibility for the many claims
that have been defended as involving an inventive concept based
merely on the idea of using existing computers or the Internet to
carry out conventional processes, with no alteration of computer
functionality.
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1371–73 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Order, On
Petition for rehearing en banc, May 31, 2018) (Moore, J., concurring); see
also Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 890 F.3d 1354,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“A factual allegation or dispute should not
automatically take the determination out of the court’s hands; rather, there
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needs to be justification for why additional evidence must be considered—
the default being a legal determination.”).
Here, the Specification indisputably shows that (1) the “data
processing apparatus,” the “computer storage system,” the “user interface,”
and the “user device” recited in claim 1, and the “content item management
system,” the “user interface,” and the “user device” recited in claims 9 and
19 were conventional and part of a known online advertising environment at
the time of filing. See Spec. 5:20–29, 14:14–32; Figures 1, 2, and 8; see also
Catalahana’s Figures 1, 2; Oldham’s Figures 2–3; Neal’s Figure 1.
Accordingly, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to the well-
understood, routine, or conventional nature of the computer components
used to construct an advertising campaign for distribution over a network as
claimed.
Moreover, Berkheimer is limited to Alice step 2 and is only applicable
after a determination is made that a patent claim is directed to an abstract
idea under Alice step 1. The question of whether a claim is directed to an
abstract idea under Alice step 1 is still a question of law. See, e.g., In re
Wang, 737 F. App’x 534, 535 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir.
2017); and Versata Dev. Grp., 793 F.3d at 1331 (“We review questions
concerning compliance with the doctrinal requirements of [section] 101 of
the Patent Act (and its constructions) as questions of law, without deference
to the trial forum.”). As previously discussed, we find the additional
elements beyond the abstract idea recited in Appellant’s claims 1, 9, and 19
(i.e., “data processing apparatus,” “computer storage system,” “user
interface,” and “user device” recited in claim 1, “content item management
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system,” “user interface,” and “user device” recited in claims 9 and 19) do
not transform the abstract idea into a patent eligible invention. As our
reviewing court has observed, “after Alice, there can remain no doubt:
recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise
ineligible claim patent-eligible.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1256 (citing
Alice, 573 U.S. at 222).
Finally, the law is clear that the claim element(s) to be considered
under Alice step 2 cannot be part of the abstract idea itself. Berkheimer, 890
F.3d at 1374 (Moore, J., concurring) (“Berkheimer . . . leave[s] untouched
the numerous cases from [the Federal Circuit] which have held claims
ineligible because the only alleged ‘inventive concept’ is the abstract idea.”);
BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(indicating same). “Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery
does not by itself satisfy the [section] 101 inquiry.” Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013).
Preemption
Lastly, Appellant argues “the claims do not pre-empt other techniques
that do not include the combination of features recited.” Appeal Br. 17.
We do not agree.
The lack of preemption is a factor to consider for patent eligibility, but
it is not by itself sufficient for patent eligibility. As the Federal Circuit
explicitly recognized, “the absence of complete preemption does not
demonstrate patent eligibility.” See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315 (quoting
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2015)); see also Ans. 11–12. Furthermore, “[w]here a patent’s claims are
deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter” under the
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Alice/Mayo framework, “preemption concerns are fully addressed and made
moot.” See Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379.
Because Appellant’s independent claims 1, 9, and 19 are directed to a
patent-ineligible abstract idea and do not recite an “inventive concept” or
provide a solution to a technical problem under the second step of the Alice
analysis, we sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of independent claims 1,
9, and 19, and their dependent claims 2–5, 10–12, and 20–23 not separately
argued.

35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejection
The Examiner, among other things, finds Catalahana teaches most
aspects of Appellant’s claimed subject matter, including the following
disputed limitations:
“wherein at least a first portion of the set of sitelink extensions
available for use in the particular content item campaign are
stored in a first data format that supports a particular set of
features that each provide a particular content item management
or visualization functionality,” and

“in response to receiving the update request updating only the
proper subset of the set of sitelink extensions to the second data
format while maintaining sitelink extensions from the set of
sitelink extensions that are not included in the proper subset in
the first data format, including updating the particular sitelink
extension by performing operations”

as recited in claims 1, 9, and 19. Final Act. 9–10 (citing Catalahana ¶¶ 27,
31–33, 38–40) (emphasis added).
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Catalahana teaches a system, shown in Figure 2, for creating a
marketing campaign with customized components. Catalahana’s Figure 2 is
reproduced below:

Catalahana’s Figure 2 show modular marketing campaign system 200
including marketing campaign component module 202 and customization
module 204. According to Catalahana, “[u]pon selection of a marketing
campaign component, the user may customize the selected marketing
campaign component, such as by inserting text, modifying a font style, font
color, adding graphics, and/or the like.” Catalahana ¶ 6. In particular,
“a user may select various components to create a customized
marketing campaign, such as by dragging and dropping the
desired components onto a template. The desired components
may then be customized, such as for text, font style, font color,
background color, and the like.”

Catalahana ¶ 27.
For instance, if Company A generally uses the colors blue, gray,
white and red as its standard company colors for marketing and
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advertising, a user having the third access level might be able to
customize the color customization parameter within these preset
bounds (e.g., may use only blue, gray, white, and red, and/or
various shades thereof) when customizing components.

Catalahana ¶ 31; see also Catalahana ¶¶ 32–35, 40.
The Examiner has broadly interpreted (1) Appellant’s claimed
“particular set of features” to encompass Catalahana’s customized “text, font
style, font color, background color” and (2) Appellant’s claimed “sitelink
extensions . . . stored in a first data format” and later updated into “a second
data format that is different from the first data format” to encompass “user
changes a component’s font style, font color, graphics color, etc.” Ans. 9.
We do not agree. During prosecution, claim terms are given their
broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. In re
Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369, (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under
the rule of broadest reasonable interpretation, claim terms are given their
ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary
skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech.,
Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). However, “the broadest-
construction rubric . . . does not give the PTO an unfettered license to
interpret claims to embrace anything remotely related to the claimed
invention,” but “[r]ather, claims should always be read in light of the
specification and teachings in the underlying patent application.” In re
Suitco Surface Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Schriber-
Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 217 (1940) (“The claims
of a patent are always to be read or interpreted in light of its
specifications.”)).
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First, nowhere in Catalahana is there any disclosure of Appellant’s
claimed “sitelink extensions.” As defined by Appellant’s Specification,
“sitelink extensions [of a campaign entity]” are “multiple links to a site
shown below a search result or advertisement that link to certain pages in
addition to the landing page of the search result or the advertisement” and
“new feature set for [these] sitelinks may provide flexibility in managing
sitelinks,” including, for example, “more detailed reporting than available
for an existing feature set, and so on.” (Spec. 4:28–5:1). These “sitelink
extensions” cannot be broadly interpreted to encompass Catalahana’s
customized components of a marketing campaign, such as “text, font style,
background color, and the like.” Second, the ordinary and customary
meaning of Appellant’s claimed “first data format” and “second data
format” refer to a particular format for representing sitelink extensions and,
as such, cannot be broadly interpreted to encompass the changing of a font’s
color, as alleged by the Examiner (Ans. 9).
As secondary references, Oldham and Neal do not cure the
deficiencies of Catalahana to arrive at Appellant’s claimed invention. Thus,
for these reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
independent claims 1, 9, and 19, and claims 4, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 18, 20, and
21 dependent therefrom. Appeal Br. 20.

CONCLUSION6
On the record before us, we conclude Appellant has not demonstrated
the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–5, 9–12, and 19–23 under

6 In the event of further prosecution, the Examiner is invited to review
independent claims 1, 9, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for lack of written
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35 U.S.C. § 101, but has demonstrated the Examiner erred in rejecting (1)
claims 4, 12, 22, and 23 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for
lack of written description, and (2) claims 1–5, 9–12, and 19–23 under
35 U.S.C. § 103. As such, we AFFIRM the Examiner’s 101 rejection of
claims 1–5, 9–12, and 19–23, but REVERSE the Examiner’s rejection of (1)
claims 4, 12, 22, and 23 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, and
(2) claims 1–5, 9–12, and 19–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103..

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. §  Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–5, 9–12, 19–23 101  Eligibility 1–5, 9–12,
19–23

4, 12, 22, 23 112, 1st
paragraph
Written
Description
4, 12, 22,
23
1–5, 9–12, 19–23 103 Catalahana,
Oldham, Neal
1–5, 9–12,
19–23
Overall
Outcome
1–5, 9–12,
19–23

support and enablement for several limitations added during prosecution,
including (1) how an update request is received, “while maintaining sitelink
extensions from the set of sitelink extensions that are not included in the
proper subset in the first data format, including updating the particular
sitelink extension by performing operations” and (2) how content is
distributed with “a new version of the particular sitelink extension,” “while
maintaining sitelink extensions that are not included in the proper subset in
the first data format, and while the particular sitelink extension continues to
be used in the first data format by the different content item campaign after
updating the particular sitelink extension to the new version of the particular
sitelink extension.”
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Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with
respect to each claim on appeal, the Examiner’s decision is affirmed. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED