Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 26, 1971

190 N.L.R.B. 84 (N.L.R.B. 1971)

84 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company Highway Trans-
portation Department and International Union,
United Automobile , Aerospace & Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America , UAW. Case 10-CA-
8284
April 26, 1971
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS BROWN
AND JENKINS
On November 30, 1970, Trial Examiner John F.
Funke issued his Decision in the above-entitled pro-
ceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the at-
tached Trial Examiner's Decision. He further recom-
mended that other allegations in the complaint be dis-
missed. Thereafter, the Charging Party and the
General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers
in connection with this case to a three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Ex-
aminer made at the hearing and finds that no prejudi-
cial error was committed. The rulings are hereby
affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision, the exceptions and supporting
briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations
of the Trial Examiner only to the extent that they are
consistent with the following.
We find, in agreement with the Trial Examiner, that
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
unlawfully threatening its employees with reprisals for
engaging in protected union activity in the following
manner and circumstances:'
The Respondent is engaged in providing tire check-
ing and changing services for the Greyhound Bus Lines
at the latter's Atlanta, Georgia, garage. The Respon-
dent's five employees at the Greyhound facility are
under the direction and control of James F. Porter who,
as the Trial Examiner found, is a supervisor within the
meaning of the Act. Porter is responsible to E. D.
Tracy, the Respondent's district field manager.
In December 1970, the Respondent in order to ac-
commodate the needs of Greyhound agreed to change
the existing two-shift schedules and to initiate 24-hour
coverage, providing for roughly 3 equal shifts, 7 days
a week. On December 22, when he became aware of the
' The Respondent has not excepted to these findings.
190 NLRB No. 15
new work schedule, employee John Jennings com-
plained to Porter, explaining the hardships of working
the third shift. Richard Dobbs, another employee,
joined the conversation and complained to Porter
about the unilateral manner in which the Respondent
had decided to alter working hours without consulting
the employees. Receiving no satisfaction, Dobbs then
told Porter that he was going to seek union representa-
tion because the employees needed a union in order to
"have a say-so as to what hours we would work."
Porter, according to the credited and uncontradicted
testimony of Dobbs and Jennings, then replied that if
the employees selected a union to represent them the
Respondent would require them to punch a timeclock
and pay their own insurance. Also, Porter declared that
with the advent of the Union, employees would no
longer be permitted to make up work previously
missed. We agree with the Trial Examiner that the
Respondent thereby interfered with its employees' Sec-
tion 7 rights in a manner proscribed by Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
The Trial Examiner further found that the Respond-
ent did not violate Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by
discharging Dobbs. The Charging Party and the Gen-
eral Counsel have filed exceptions to this finding. We
find merit in these exceptions.
Approximately a month after the December 22,
1969, incident, discussed above, in which the Respond-
ent threatened reprisals for engaging in protected ac-
tivities, the Respondent once again had occasion to
change the employees' working hours and shift assign-
ments. On January 26, Dobbs was ordered by Porter to
work from 10:30 p.m. to 6 a.m., the third shift. Once
again Dobbs complained to Porter about the unilateral
manner in which the work schedules were initiated and
implemented and, as before, told Porter that the em-
ployees needed union representation and that he "was
going to try to get a union in that place." Dobbs further
stated that he planned to take up the matter of shift
changes with District Field Manager E. D. Tracy, Por-
ter's superior.
On the following day, Dobbs went to Tracy's office
to make known his complaints concerning Porter's
schedule changes, to which Tracy replied that that was
Porter's business. When Dobbs mentioned that under
the circumstances the employees needed a union,
Tracy, in Dobbs' words, "said that his recollection
[was] that I had some trouble with [a] union on one of
my previous jobs." Dobbs acknowledged that he could
be discharged for his union activities, but that he would
not resign-as Tracy suggested-and would not aban-
don his efforts because he "was going to try to make it
better for the next guy that was hired there." Although
he was present and was called to testify, Tracy did not
deny the above statements attributed to him by Dobbs.
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY
Two days later, on January 29, Dobbs went to the
Charging Party's office, contacted a union representa-
tive, and procured from him several authorization
cards and pamphlets. In the course of the next few days
Dobbs discussed the Union with his fellow employees
and obtained authorization card signatures from all but
one of them and returned the cards to the union agent.
As stated above, Dobbs was discharged on February
9, but he did not become aware of the discharge until
February 11, his next scheduled workday, when Porter
informed him that he no longer was employed by the
Respondent. When Dobbs asked for an explanation,
Porter replied that he had been discharged for "lack of
cooperation." When asked for details, Porter answered
"this is all I got" and produced an office mailogram,
dated February 9, signed by Tracy and addressed to
Porter stating, "[a]fter talking to you this morning we
are in agreement with your thought that Mr. Dobbs
should be discharged due to his lack of cooperation
with you and with Greyhound supervisors and his atti-
tude in general as regards his work." Porter added that
but for his "attitude" Dobbs could have been the best
man in the system and that "he hated to see it happen."
The only direct evidence the Respondent offered
concerning Dobbs' alleged deficiencies comes from
Tracy who testified that in major part the discharge was
occasioned by complaints from Greyhound supervi-
sors. In this regard, Respondent produced a letter
dated January 30, addressed to Porter from Greyhound
Garage Superintendent J. W. Carter relating that
Dobbs, at a time unspecified, was observed talking for
an hour with Greyhound employees when he should
have been changing tires on a bus which was eventually
removed from the schedule, and that the Respondent
should take "whatever action necessary to correct" this
situation. Although asked at several points in his tes-
timony, Carter could not recall when this incident oc-
curred. On the other hand, Dobbs testified that he was
aware that sometime before his January 26 discussion
with Porter about forming a union, discussed above,
Carter had some complaint about his work and was
writing a memo to Porter, but that Porter assured him
that the whole matter had been settled. From the
record it appears that the Respondent itself had no
complaints with Dobbs' work performance and as
grounds for the discharge relied almost wholly upon
Carter's letter to Porter about a matter which, accord-
ing to Dobbs' uncontradicted testimony, "had been
taken care of' by Porter at least 2 weeks before the
discharge. Aside from Carter's letter, Tracy admitted
that the Respondent had only `=minor" complaints
about Dobbs. Indeed, Dobbs testified that except for
one incident shortly after transferring to the Respon-
85
dent's Atlanta facility he had never been reprimanded
before being notified of his discharge.'
Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the man-
ner in which the discharge was handled require careful
scrutiny. Tracy testified that whenever Greyhound had
complaints about the Respondent's employees the mat-
ter was referred to Porter who in turn discussed the
matter with the employee involved in an effort to "get
it straightened out." Furthermore, Tracy made it clear
that when disciplinary action as serious as discharge
was contemplated it was part of Porter's duties as a
supervisor to speak to the employee involved and "he
usually smoothe[d] out the problems." Therefore, as
Porter did not testify and as Tracy had no further
recollection on the matter, the record contains no evi-
dence that, consistent with its usual practice, Dobbs
was informed of alleged derelictions unless it is as-
sumed, as Dobbs testified, that the Respondent through
Porter had called Dobbs' attention to a complaint
Carter had made but which was "taken care of' by
Porter several weeks before the termination.
Unlike the Trial Examiner, we find that the evidence,
considered in its totality, presents a strong prima facie
case to support the allegations in the complaint. As
detailed above, Dobbs took an active part in presenting
to the Respondent employees' dissatisfaction with the
newly initiated work schedules and on three separate
occasions advised the Respondent that the employees
needed a union to represent them and that he person-
ally would attempt to form one. At the outset, the
Respondent sought to discourage such an effort by
threats of economic reprisal. Nevertheless, Dobbs per-
sisted and became the major proponent for unioniza-
tion of the employees. Within a few days after contact-
ing the Union, distributing authorization cards,
soliciting support for the Union, and returning to the
Union cards signed by a majority of the employees,
Dobbs was terminated in a manner we must conclude
constituted further evidence of the Respondent's un-
lawful motivation. Thus, even if we assume that the
letter of complaint written by Carter was not already
settled weeks before Dobbs' termination, the Respond-
ent, in acting upon that complaint and imposing disci-
plinary action, failed to do so in accord with its estab-
lished practice of notifying the employee of his
derelictions, extending to him an opportunity to defend
himself and attempting to settle differences especially
where, as in Dobbs' situation, disciplinary discharge
was contemplated.
' There was another incident occurring 3 weeks before the discharge
where Carter apparently complained about Dobbs' failure to service a Grey-
hound bus while it was being spray painted in the garage, but, as Dobbs
explained, he had informed Porter of the circumstances and the fact that he
was nauseated by the paint fumes and was told by Porter that he could leave
work early. Carter did not deny that Dobbs' absence on January 22 was
excused.
86 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Upon a consideration of all the evidence presented,
we find that the General Counsel has made out a prima
facie case which imposed upon the Respondent the
duty of going forward with the evidence and giving an
adequate explanation of the discharge . The Respondent
offered insufficient evidence to dissipate the unfavora-
ble inferences to be drawn from the General Counsel's
evidence.' Accordingly, we find that the Respondent's
discharge of Dobbs on February 9, 1970, was moti-
vated not by the reasons stated but by its hostility to his
union activities as the prime union proponent as alleged
in the complaint, and that the Respondent thereby vi-
olated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
3. By telling its employees that they would have to
punch a timeclock , pay for their own insurance, and
would not be able to make up for lost time if the Union
came in, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
4. By discriminatorily discharging Richard Dobbs,
the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in un-
fair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
ORDER
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices in addition to those found
by the Trial Examiner , we shall order it to cease and
desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Unlike the Trial Examiner, we have found that the
Respondent discharged Richard Dobbs in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Accordingly, we
shall order that Dobbs be offered immediate and full
reinstatement to his former position or, if that position
no longer exists , to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and
privileges, and be made whole for any loss of pay suff-
ered by reason of the discrimination against him. Loss
of pay shall be computed as prescribed in F W. Wool-
worth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and interest on such
backpay shall be computed at 6 percent per annum in
accordance with Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716. We shall also order that the Respondent
make available to the Board , upon request, payroll and
other records in order to facilitate the checking of the
amounts of backpay due.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce and in a business affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, UAW, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
' As noted in the Trial Examiner 's Decision , Porter was present through-
out the proceeding but was not called as a witness and no reason for his
failure to testify was offered . As Porter was in a position to refute much of
Dobbs ' testimony , if it were inaccurate, we may under the circumstances
infer that the testimony would be unfavorable to the defense of the Respon-
dent's discharge of Dobbs. Monahan Ford Corporation of Flushing, 173
NLRB No. 37; United Mineral & Chemical Corporation, 155 NLRB 1390.
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended , the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Company Highway Transportation De-
partment , Atlanta , Georgia, its officers , agents, succes-
sors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Telling its employees they would have to punch
a timeclock , pay their own insurance , and would not be
able to make up for lost time if the Union came in.
(b) Discouraging membership in International Un-
ion, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America, UAW, or any other la-
bor organization , by discharging or otherwise
discriminating against employees in regard to their hire
or tenure of employment or any other condition of
employment.
(c) In any other manner interfering with , restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights to
self-organization , to form , join , or assist labor organiza-
tions , to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing , and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any
and all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Richard Dobbs immediate and full rein-
statement to his former position or, if that position no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and
privileges.
(b) Notify immediately the above-named individual,
if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States, of the right to full reinstatement, upon applica-
tion after discharge from the Armed Forces, in accord-
ance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal
Military Training and Service Act.
(c) Make whole the above-named employee, in the
manner set forth in the section herein entitled "The
Remedy," for any loss of pay and benefits he may have
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY
suffered by reason of the Respondent's discrimination
against him.
(d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records and other data necessary to give effect
to the backpay requirement.
(e) Post at its places of business in Atlanta, Georgia,
including the tire shop operated by it in the Greyhound
terminal, copies of the attached notice marked "Ap-
pendix."' Copies of said notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 10, after being duly
signed by Respondent's authorized representative,
shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days there-
after, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasona-
ble steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.
In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT tell our employees that they will
have to punch a timeclock if the Union comes in.
WE WILL NOT tell our employees they will have
to pay for their insurance if the Union comes in.
WE WILL NOT tell our employees they will not
be able to make up for time lost if the Union comes
in.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Inter-
national Union, United Automobile, Aerospace &
Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
UAW, or any other labor organization of our em-
ployees, nor will we in any other manner discrimi-
nate against them with respect to their hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of
their employment.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exer-
cise of their rights to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activi-
87
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from
any and all such activities.
WE WILL offer to Richard Dobbs immediate
and full reinstatement to his former position or, if
that position no longer exists , to a substantially
equivalent position , without prejudice to his seni-
ority or other rights and privileges and make him
whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by
reason of our discrimination against him.
GOODYEAR TIRE &
RUBBER COMPANY
HIGHWAY
TRANSPORTATION
DEPARTMENT
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
We will notify immediately the above-named in-
dividual, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of
the United States, of the right to full reinstatement,
upon application after discharge from the Armed
Forces, in accordance with the Selective Service Act
and the Universal Military Training and Service Act.
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance
with its provisions may be directed to the Board's
Office, Peachtree Building, Room 701, 730 Peachtree
Street NE., Atlanta, Georgia 30308, Telephone 404-
526-5760.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN F. FUNKE, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge filed
April 13, 1970, by International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
UAW, herein UAW, against Goodyear Tire & Rubber Com-
pany, herein the Respondent, the General Counsel issued
complaint alleging Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the Act by threatening its employees with reprisals if
the UAW was successful and by discharging Richard O.
Dobbs because of his membership in and activity on behalf
of the UAW.
The answer of Respondent denied the commission of any
unfair labor practices.
This proceeding with the General Counsel and the Re-
spondent represented, was heard by me at Atlanta, Georgia,
on October 26, 1970. At the conclusion of the hearing the
parties were given leave to file briefs. No briefs were received.
Upon the entire record in this case and from my observa-
tion of the witnesses while testifying, I make the following:
88 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find the
Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The UAW is a labor organization within the meaning of
the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
1. Violations of Section 8(a)(1)
Richard O. Dobbs, a former employee of Respondent and
the alleged discriminatee in the case, testified that in Decem-
ber 1969, he went to his supervisor, J. M. Porter, and com-
plained about shift changes. At this time Porter was one of
five employees working at the Greyhound garage for Good-
year where they were engaged in changing tires on the Grey-
hound buses. Porter was in charge of this group. Dobbs told
Porter the employees needed a union and was told by Porter
that if they had a union they would have to punch a time-
clock, pay their own insurance, and could not make up a day
lost because they were out. This testimony was corroborated
by that of John B. Jennings, a former employee who had been
employed by the Respondent at that time and who overheard
the conversation. Porter did not testify.'
2. Violations of Section 8(a)(3)
Dobbs testified that he was the sole pusher for the UAW
at the Greyhound shop and that he first contacted the Al-
liance for Labor Action and tried to get cards signed by the
other employees at coffeebreak.' He also contacted a Mr.
Chamlee of the UAW, who gave him authorization cards and
testified that four of the five employees signed the cards. After
his conversation with Porter in December Dobbs complained
again on January 26 about schedule changes and told Porter
he was going to see E.D. Tracy, district field manager for
Respondent, whose office was on the other side of town. He
complained to Tracy about shift changes and told him they
needed a union to let them know when they were going to
work. Tracy told him Porter was running the Greyhound
operation and that he had nothing to do with it.
On February 11 Dobbs reported for work at 1 p.m. and was
met by Porter who said he wanted to speak to him. Porter
then told him that as of last Monday (February 9) he did not
work there anymore and, when asked for a reason, was told
it was because of Dobbs' attitude toward Greyhound officials.
He then showed Dobbs a copy of a piece of writing which
read, according to Dobbs, "In regards to your request that
Richard O. Dobbs be discharged, it is hereby granted." It was
signed by E. D. Tracy. That summarizes his discharge inter-
view.
Prior to this discharge (the date is not fixed) Dobbs testified
that Porter told him that Jon W. Carter, superintendent for
Greyhound, was going to write a letter to Goodyear, presum-
ably complaining of Dobbs' work, but that he (Porter) had
taken care of it. Dobbs never saw this letter nor was any other
explanation given him.
' I find Porter a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. He was the sole
person in charge of the Greyhound operation. According to Jennings, Porter
trained him in the job, was in charge of shipping and receiving, checked his
time slip, scheduled the work, and gave him permission to take time off when
he requested it. This testimony was corroborated by Dobbs who also tes-
tified that Porter was the one that handled their grievances.
2 Dobbs testified that he went to the Alliance on January 29.
Dobbs testified to one run-in with Carter. On January 22
the shop was being spray painted and the fumes were bother-
ing Dobbs who reported it to Porter. Porter told him to go
home and he did, suffering from nausea. The next day Carter
asked him why he had refused to work and Dobbs told him
he had not refused to work but that the fumes made him sick
and the shop was unsafe at the time. Carter then told him he
had heard Dobbs was not getting along with other people at
Greyhound and that the next time he would bar him from
Greyhound property. Dobbs told him to put it in writing,
which ended the conversation.
For the Respondent, Tracy testified that Dobbs was dis-
charged in February because they had had several complaints
from foremen working for Carter concerning Dobbs and had
received a letter from Carter on January 30 complaining of
him.' At that time Goodyear had a man in training for the
tire shop and it was felt that its relations with Greyhound
were deteriorating because of Dobbs. It was determined to
fire Dobbs at this time but to hold him until the trainee
completed his training.
John Carter testified concerning the events leading to the
letter of January 30 and its attachment' as follows:
A. Well, it was complaints that I was receiving from
my supervisors about this employee, which they had
documented and handed in to me. One thing, I mean
stopping employees from working was one of the main
things that I was concerned about; and then on one
occasion I observed the employee when he was outside
talking outside and had the tire room, for which he was
responsible for, tied up. We had a bus come in on a
schedule that we had to pull because he had not com-
pleted the job he was on, and which I think he could
have done during the time he was talking. This is the
main thing that I came across.
3. Conclusions as to Section 8(a)(1)
Since Porter did not appear as a witness' and Dobbs gave
every indication of being a credible witness, I credit his tes-
timony as to conversation with Porter on or about December
26, 1969. In that conversation Porter told him that if the
Union came in they would have to punch a timeclock, pay for
their own insurance, and would not be able to make up for
time lost. Each of these statements I regard as a threat of
reprisal against the employees for selecting a union to repre-
sent them and a violation of Section 8(a)(1).
4. Conclusions as to Section 8(a)(3)
The simplest conclusion to be drawn from the record in
this case is that no firm conclusion may be drawn. The evi-
dence is equally scant to support a discriminatory motive or
to support a lawful discharge for cause. The credible tes-
timony of Dobbs is that he was a good employee for a period
since October 1967. In December 1969, he complained to
Porter about shift changes and mentioned the need for a
union, a complaint and a need he mentioned again to Tracy
on January 27.
On February 9 he was discharged allegedly because of
complaints received from Carter of Greyhound, complaints
supported by the testimony of Carter. It is not for the exam-
iner or the Board to measure the gravity of the penalty against
that of the offense. With little else for guidance I would find
that the General Counsel has not sustained his burden of
' Resp. Exh. 2.
' The attachments were excluded as hearsay.
' Porter was present in the hearing room during the hearing.
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY 89
proof, a finding which finds some support in the following
factors:
(a) There is no evidence of animus or hostility on the part
of Respondent toward the Union.'
(b) The unit w4s microscopic in size compared to the over-
all operations of the Respondent and therefore void of impact
upon its overall labor policy.
(c) The discharge was provoked, not by Porter, who was
aware of Dobbs' prounion sentiments, but by the complaints
of a third party not presumably interested in Dobbs' senti-
ments but only in the job performance on the part of Re-
spondent and its tire shop employees.
In short I find Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act by its discharge of Dobbs.
6 The remarks of Porter, a minor supervisor, found to have been in viola-
tion of the Act were directed to what he thought would be the unfavorable
consequences of unionization There was no expression of antiunion com-
pany policy and the opinion appears to have been a personal one.
IV THE REMEDY
Having found Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor
practices it will be recommended that it cease and desist from
the same and take certain affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By telling its employees that they would have to punch
a timeclock , pay for their own insurance , and would not be
able to make up for lost time if the Union came in, Respond-
ent violated Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act.
2. Respondent did not violate Section 8 (a)(3) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]