Gold Kist, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 27, 2004

341 N.L.R.B. 1040 (N.L.R.B. 2004)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1040
Gold Kist, Inc. and United Food and Commercial
Workers Union, Local 1996, AFL–CIO. Case
12–CA–21196, 12–CA–21213, and 12–RC–8553
May 27, 2004
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, SCHAUMBER, AND WALSH
On October 15, 2001, Administrative Law Judge
George Carson II issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
General Counsel filed an answering brief and cross-
exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions1 and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified.3
1. More closely monitoring union activity
In mid-September 2000,4 employee Brenda Preston
passed out union leaflets at the Respondent’s plant gate
during shift change. During the first week of October,
her supervisor, Eric Mady, approached her while she was
working and told her that he was watching every move
that she was making. He added that he had not seen her
at work on a previous day. Preston replied that she had
left early because of a doctor’s appointment. Mady re-
peated that he had his eye on her and that he was watch-
ing every move that she made. Based on Mady’s state-
ments, the judge found, and we agree, that the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by more closely

1 There are no exceptions regarding the complaint allegations that
the judge dismissed or the election objections that he overruled.
2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility
findings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance
of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Stan-
dard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d
Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis
for reversing the findings.
3 In sec. II,C,5 of his decision, the judge found that the Respondent
violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening the withdrawal of an
existing condition of employment if the employees selected the Union
as their bargaining representative. The judge, however, failed to include
this violation in his conclusions of law, recommended Order, or notice
to employees. The General Counsel has excepted to this failure. We
grant the General Counsel’s exception and amend the judge’s conclu-
sions of law, modify the recommended Order, and provide a new notice
to employees to rectify the judge’s inadvertent omissions. We also
modify the judge’s recommended Order to include the revised records
preservation provision set forth in our decision in Ferguson Electric
Co., 335 NLRB 15 (2001).
4 All dates are in 2000, unless otherwise indicated.
monitoring employees who had engaged in union activ-
ity.
The Respondent contends that the judge erred in find-
ing that Mady himself had observed Preston pass out
union leaflets at the plant gate. Preston testified that
Mady had passed within 16 feet of her when she was
passing out leaflets. The judge found that Mady did not
deny observing Preston passing out leaflets. The judge
erred in this finding, as Mady, in his testimony, did deny
observing Preston passing out leaflets. The judge’s error
is inconsequential, however, as Mady need not have per-
sonally seen Preston distributing leaflets for his subse-
quent statements to her to be unlawful. Rather, as Preston
publicly engaged in distribution of union leaflets at the
plant gate during shift change in mid-September, her
open union activity would have been easily observable
by the Respondent’s supervisors and managers at that
time, which was prior to early October, when Mady
made the statements in issue.5
2. Threats of the inevitability of strikes and strike
violence
We affirm the judge’s finding that the Respondent
unlawfully threatened its employees with the inevitability
of strikes and strike violence if they chose to be repre-
sented by the Union.
a. Facts
Respondent Corporate Manager of Labor Relations
Bruce Crawford conducted a series of formal meetings
with the employees held in the plant conference room
during the week before the representation election. Re-
spondent Plant Manager Chris Johnson attended each of
these meetings. In earlier meetings, Crawford had told
the employees that the Union thrives on hostility and that
in order for the Union to justify its existence, it had to
drive a wedge between management and the employees.
In the meetings during the week before the election,
Crawford told the employees that strikes were the Un-
ion’s only weapon to win the Respondent’s agreement to
the Union’s proposals, and that violence was likely to
occur during a strike.
A video was shown in the meetings during the week
before the election. It showed violence that occurred
during a strike called by the Union 11 years before at the
Respondent’s Trussville, Alabama plant. The video also
included a dramatic reenactment of the violence that had
been produced and shown by a local television station.
The video included a picture of a bullet hole in a car,
5 See Enjo Contracting Co., 340 NLRB No. 162 (2003) (employee
Clayton’s open union activity right outside the shop, at a nearby coffee
shop, and while sitting in car across the street from the shop would be
easily observable by employer’s supervisors and managers).
341 NLRB No. 135
GOLD KIST, INC. 1041
accompanied by the sound of a gunshot. While showing
the video, Crawford pointed out to the employees in the
meeting that the employees in the video were throwing
rocks at a bus and trying to cut its tires. The video also
included the sound of the rocks hitting the bus.
After showing the video, Crawford showed the em-
ployees slides. The slides showed a car with a bullet
hole in it, a bus with shattered windows, and a young
man with a bandage on his neck. Another slide said:

BARGAINING RESULT?
Reach an agreement on terms acceptable to the Com-
pany.
Union walks away and leaves.
Union calls STRIKE!

Another slide said:

UFCW STRIKE
Will it happen here??
Make sure it does not happen to you –
Vote NO union
Vote NO union strikes!!

Around the same time as these meetings, the Respon-
dent put up posters in the plant: on the doors, in the em-
ployee break room and also near the time clocks. The
posters measured approximately 28” by 24.” One poster
showed some of the slides from the meeting: the car with
the bullet holes, a man holding a baseball bat in a batting
stance, the man with the bandaged neck, and the school
bus with the shattered windows. The message across the
top of the poster was:

UFCW UNION STRIKE
AT TRUSSVILLE, AL PLANT

The pictures in the poster were annotated “BULLET
HOLES IN CARS;” “SHATTERED WINDSHIELDS;”
and “WOMAN SHOT WHILE RIDING TO WORK.” The
message at the bottom of the poster was:

VOTE NO VIOLENT STRIKES
VOTE NO UNION!

Another poster said that the Union had struck five
other Respondent plants, that two of them were now
closed, and that in return for striking, the employees got:
“Lost paychecks. Violence (Acid on cars. Windshields
shattered. Cars shot into. Woman shot.) Some employees
lost their jobs.” The message at the bottom of the poster
was:
Don’t let it happen here.
VOTE NO UNION!
b. Analysis and conclusion
It is a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act for an
employer to warn employees that there will be strikes
and violence if they choose to be represented by a union.
Garry Mfg. Co., 242 NLRB 539, 542 (1979), enfd. 630
F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1980). There, in a flyer entitled “It
Could Happen Here,” the employer unlawfully warned
the employees about strikes and strike violence if the
union won election. Specifically, the flyer listed several
instances of violence as reported in local newspapers and
warned the employees: “If you want the threat of strikes
and violence and constant turmoil in our plant, vote for
District 65.” In Grove Valve & Regulator Co., 262
NLRB 285 (1982), the employer violated Section 8(a)(1)
by warning its employees that strikes were inevitable.
Specifically, the employer told the employees that it
thought that the risk of a strike and job loss, or plant re-
location, was especially real because the employer’s
wages and benefits were already so good.
Here, the Respondent clearly created a reasonable im-
pression in the minds of its employees that if they elected
to be represented by the Union a strike was inevitable,
and that it was likely to be a violent one. Indeed, Craw-
ford expressly told the employees that a strike was the
Union’s only weapon to win the Respondent’s agreement
to the Union’s proposals, and that such a strike was
likely to be violent. Moreover, in support of the im-
planted notion that a strike was inevitable if the Union
won the election, Crawford told the employees that the
Union thrives on hostility and that it could justify its ex-
istence only by driving a wedge between the Respondent
and its employees.
To further implant the idea that a strike was inevitable,
one of the Respondent’s slides informed the employees
that if the Union were unable to win the Respondent’s
agreement to a contract— “on terms acceptable to the
Company” –—then the Union would either abandon the
employees (“walk away and leave”) or “call [a]
STRIKE!”
To reinforce the expectation that such a strike would,
in turn, be violent, the Respondent showed the employ-
ees video footage of violence during a union strike at one
of the Respondent’s other plants 11 years earlier, and
postvideo slides and posters showing a car with bullet
holes, the bus with shattered windows, the man with a
bandaged neck, and a man with a baseball bat. To but-
tress the threat of strike violence conveyed by the video,
the slides, and the posters, the Respondent annotated the
posters with descriptions of the pictures and with a refer-
ence to a “WOMAN SHOT WHILE RIDING TO
WORK,” not pictured on the poster. And in another
poster, the Respondent told the employees that in return

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1042
for striking, employees represented by the Union at other
Respondent plants got, inter alia, “Violence (Acid on
cars. Windshields shattered. Cars shot into. Woman
shot.).”
It is clear from the above conduct that the Respondent
created a reasonable impression of the inevitability of a
violent strike if the employees selected the Union as their
bargaining agent. The Respondent was not attempting
properly to influence the employees to the Respondent’s
view by reason, but rather was aggressively appealing to
the employees’ predictable and understandable fear of a
strike and violence. The judge found, and we agree, that
by doing so the Respondent interfered with, restrained,
and coerced its employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, and therefore vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By soliciting grievances and promising to remedy
them in order to dissuade employees from supporting the
Union, by threatening the loss of benefits and the inevi-
tability of strikes and strike violence if employees se-
lected the Union as their collective-bargaining represen-
tative, by more closely monitoring and restricting the
movement of prounion employees, by threatening that
other employers would refuse to hire employees because
of their union activities, and by threatening the with-
drawal of an existing condition of employment if the
employees selected the Union as their bargaining repre-
sentative, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. By depriving employee Brenda Preston of overtime
work the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified and orders that the Respondent, Gold Kist, Inc.,
Douglas, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order as
modified.
1. Insert the following as paragraph 1(f) and reletter
the subsequent paragraphs.
“(f) Threatening the withdrawal of an existing condi-
tion of employment if the employees selected the Union
as their bargaining representative.”
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(b).
“(b) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel re-
cords and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic
form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.”
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist any union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT solicit your grievances and promise to
remedy them in order to dissuade you from supporting
the Union.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with the loss of benefits or
that strikes and strike violence are inevitable if you select
the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local
1996, AFL–CIO, or any other labor organization as your
collective-bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT more closely monitor and restrict the
movement of prounion employees.
WE WILL NOT threaten that other employers would re-
fuse to hire you because of your union activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten to withdraw existing conditions
of employment if you select the Union as your bargain-
ing representative.
WE WILL NOT deprive you of overtime because you
support the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL make Brenda Preston whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of our
discrimination against her.
GOLD KIST, INC.

GOLD KIST, INC. 1043
George S. Aude and Evelyn M. Korschgen, Esqs., for the Gen-
eral Counsel.
Thomas T. Hodges and Glenn L. Spencer, Esqs., for the Re-
spondent.
Lesley Troope, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEORGE CARSON II, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Douglas, Georgia, on July 23 through 25 and Au-
gust 14 through 16, 2001,1 pursuant to a consolidated com-
plaint that issued on May 31, 2001.2 The complaint, as
amended, alleges various violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act and the discriminatory reduction of overtime of Brenda
Preston in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. On
June 6, 2001, the Regional Director issued an order that di-
rected a hearing on objections in Case 12–RC–8553 and con-
solidated that case for hearing with the unfair labor practice
cases. Respondent’s answer denies all violations of the Act. I
find, with certain exceptions, that the Respondent did violate
the Act as alleged in the complaint.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel, the Respondent, and the Charging
Party, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, Gold Kist, Inc. (the Company), is a Georgia
corporation engaged in the business of poultry processing at
various locations including its plant at Douglas, Georgia, from
which it annually sells and ships products valued in excess of
$50,000 directly to customers located outside the State of
Georgia. The Respondent admits, and I find and conclude, that
it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
The Respondent admits, and I find and conclude, that United
Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 1996, AFL–CIO
(the Union) is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
At the Company’s Douglas processing plant, poultry is
slaughtered, cleaned, cooled, and processed by the approxi-
mately 1200 employees who work at the plant. The plant man-
ager is Chris Johnson, a position he had held since September
1999. In November, the Company employed approximately 900
employees with additional labor provided by 300 employees of
Staffmate, a temporary agency.

1 All dates are in 2000, unless otherwise indicated.
2 The charge in Case 12–CA–21196 was filed on November 16, and
the charge in Case 12–CA–21213 was filed on December 11. Both
charges were amended on May 1, 2001.
The Union began organizational activity in Douglas in the
summer of 2000. In July, Plant Manager Johnson learned that a
representative of the Union was staying at a local motel.
On September 14, the Company advised all employees by
letter that prices for chicken had depressed the market, that
managers’ salaries were going to be reduced, and that employee
pay increases were being suspended “until earnings return to
acceptable levels.” Employees were also advised that their
share of medical insurance premiums was being raised and
benefits were being reduced.
The representation petition was filed on September 27. A
Stipulated Election Agreement was approved on October 5.
Staffmate employees were not included in the appropriate unit.
Thereafter, the Company held a series of meetings with its em-
ployees. The election was held on November 8. The tally of
ballots reflected that the Union received 345 votes whereas 523
employees voted for no representation.
The complaint alleges that, at the company meetings, com-
pany officials solicited grievances and impliedly promised to
remedy them if the employees did not vote for the Union,
threatened a loss of benefits if employees voted for the Union,
and threatened the inevitability of strikes, strike violence, and
job loss. Certain posters that were put up after these meetings
are alleged to have reiterated the threats. A video shown to
Spanish-speaking employees is alleged to have threatened those
employees that, if there were a strike, employees would lose
their jobs. At the final meetings prior to the election, Division
Manager Carlyle Ragans is alleged to have promised a wage
increase if the employees voted against the Union.
The complaint also alleges 8(a)(1) violations not connected
to the meetings and one 8(a)(3) violation, the reduction of over-
time assigned to employee Brenda Preston.
This decision shall address the allegations arising from the
meetings and posters, the remaining 8(a)(1) complaint allega-
tions, the 8(a)(3) allegation relating to Preston’s overtime, and
the objections to the election that are not coextensive with any
complaint allegation, in that order.
B. The Meetings, Posters, and Spanish-Language Video
1. Facts
Beginning on October 11, the Company began holding a se-
ries of meetings with employees in the plant conference room.
Thirty or more employees were typically present at each of
these meetings, which were held over a period of 4 weeks, and
some 20 to 25 meetings were held each week so that company
officials could address the more than 900 unit employees. Four
of these meetings each week were for Spanish-speaking em-
ployees. The chief spokesperson at these meetings was Bruce
Crawford, former corporate manager of labor relations for Gold
Kist. Plant Manager Chris Johnson was present at each of these
meetings, although he would sometimes have to leave to attend
to matters in the plant. Occasionally other supervisors or man-
agers would be present.
At the first series of meetings, held on October 11, 12, and
13, Johnson spoke about the upcoming election, informed the
employees who would be eligible to vote, and introduced
Crawford and explained who he was. Crawford then gave a

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1044
brief overview of the issues that he would be addressing over
the next 3 weeks: union dues, collective bargaining, and strikes.
The second series of meetings, conducted between October
17 and 20, dealt with the amount of union dues and salaries of
union officials. Employee Loretta McLean recalls that, at the
session she attended, an employee asked Crawford how much
he made and that Crawford replied, “My salary is not here to be
discussed.”
At the third series of meetings, held on October 24 through
27, Crawford explained the process of collective bargaining. A
video was shown. Crawford projected overhead transparencies
comparing the benefits of employees at Douglas with a Gold
Kist unionized facility in Live Oak, Florida. The benefits at
Douglas were superior to those at Live Oak.
The fourth series of meetings, conducted from October 31
through November 3, dealt with strikes. A video was shown
depicting strike violence during the course of a strike at the
Gold Kist plant in Trussville, Alabama. The video included
local news reports that had been edited to include the sound of
a gun being fired when the camera showed what appeared to be
a bullet hole in a vehicle. After the video, Crawford projected
overhead transparencies that included a picture of a car with
what appeared to be a bullet hole in it, a picture of a bus with
shattered windows, and a picture of a young man with a ban-
dage on his neck under his left ear.
A fifth series of meetings was held on November 6 and 7.
These meetings involved larger numbers of employees in order
to address as many employees as possible in as few meetings as
possible. Division Manager Carlyle Ragans was present and
spoke, as did Johnson and Crawford. Employee Eddie Parker
recalls asking Johnson if there was anything the Union could
“do for [us],” and Crawford replied, “Absolutely nothing.”
Both Johnson and Crawford acknowledged that, at each
meeting, they summarized the substance of the remarks they
had made at previous meetings. This acknowledgement ac-
counts for the uncertainty of various witnesses concerning
whether an alleged comment heard during the meeting they
attended was made at the second, third, or fourth series of meet-
ings. Crawford acknowledged that, even though strikes were
not the subject of the first 3 weeks of meetings, strikes were
“briefly talked about” in each of the meetings and that he in-
formed the employees that “it was a possibility of strikes any-
time you had to bargain, that that was the Union’s only weapon
to made the Company agree to what they wanted.”
Johnson admitted that at all the meetings, except the ones
held on November 6 and 7, there would be between 10 and 20
minutes at the end for discussion. “I asked for questions or
comments or concerns.” At some meetings “we’d have to basi-
cally drag it out of someone to get anything out of them. [At]
[o]thers, we didn’t have enough time to take them all . . . .”
Johnson gave examples of concerns raised by employees in-
cluding bathroom breaks and payroll matters. He noted that
“[q]uite a bit of the concerns and comments were directed to-
ward our human resources department in that people didn’t feel
like they could go to our human resources manager and talk to
him. He wouldn’t work with them and deal with them.” John-
son reported these concerns to Division Manager Carlyle
Ragans, to whom the human resources manager reported, and
the employment of the human resources manager ended after
the first or second week of meetings. Johnson requested Ragans
to send former Human Resources Manager George Crawford to
Douglas, and Ragans did so. At the last meetings, on November
6 and 7, Johnson made it a point to tell the employees that he
had asked Ragans to bring Crawford in after the things he,
Johnson, “was learning” at the meetings, and that George
Crawford was “going to be very instrumental” in choosing the
next human resources manager.
At one meeting, Johnson did not recall which, some employ-
ees questioned why union advocate Brenda Preston was permit-
ted to walk through their department. Thereafter, Preston was
directed not to do so.
Jose Ponce attended a meeting with Hispanic employees at
which several of those employees reported to Johnson that they
were receiving abuse from their supervisors, “[t]hey had been
humiliated.” Johnson “made a commitment to pay more atten-
tion to the problems of the Hispanic employees. He promised
that, if the Union did not come in, that each month he would
have a . . . special meeting with the Hispanic employees to talk
about their needs and address their concerns.” Johnson further
stated that, if the Union did come in, “he would have nothing to
do with the employees because you would have to have your
dealings . . . through the Union.” Johnson did not deny making
the foregoing statements.
Employee Loretta McLean, after the meeting on November
6, at which there had not been a discussion period, approached
Johnson regarding having trouble getting off of her line to go to
the bathroom. Johnson stated that he would check on it for her.
The following day, Tuesday, Johnson came by her line and
asked her how everything was going.
Employee Diane Mizell recalled that, at the third meeting
she attended, employees were complaining to Johnson regard-
ing the manner in which supervisors talked to them and differ-
ent jobs to which they did not get assigned. Johnson responded
that he “wasn’t aware that all of that was going on and if we
would just give him a chance to straighten things out . . . that
his door would be open for us anytime that we wanted to talk.”
Employee Hattie Deese testified that she raised the matter of
seniority with Johnson regarding getting a better job in the
plant. Johnson did not respond directly to her but said that “a
lot of things were going on that he didn’t know about and that
he would make our job better.”
Employee Oliver Hemphill recalls employees raising con-
cerns regarding breaks and what they perceived as unfair treat-
ment by supervisors. Johnson stated that he was going to look
into those problems.
At the final series of meetings on November 6 and 7, John-
son stated that he had been unaware of the problems brought up
at the meetings, “whether it’s from me having my head stuck in
the sand, or whatever,” and that he now knew what he needed
to change, that he could not “correct what happened in the past,
but I can work on the present, and we’re dedicated to making
that happen.”
Regarding wages and benefits, Employee McLean testified
that Crawford referred to a “green book” and stated that “once
the union c[a]me in that we would lose our health benefits,
pension, and the life insurance.” On cross examination she

GOLD KIST, INC. 1045
acknowledged that employees at Douglas have no pension
benefits. Johnson identified the green book as Agristats, a book
used in the industry, and testified that he used this book to cite
wage comparisons.
Employee Brenda Preston recalled that, when Crawford pro-
jected an overhead transparency that stated that bargaining was
a two way street, he stated, “If the Union came in . . . we would
go down.” She then testified that he also said, “If the Union
c[a]me in our pay rate will go down too,” and that he said this
in all of the meetings.
Hispanic employee Jose Ponce understands some English.
Although he attended three of the five meetings held with
Spanish-speaking employees, Ponce testified that he listened to
Johnson in English, not the translator. At the second meeting,
which he attended with his wife, Ponce did not recall Crawford
saying anything. He recalled Johnson stating that, if the Union
came in, “things would go backwards and we would be below
where we are now.” When asked to elaborate upon this on cross
examination, Ponce testified that Johnson stated that the em-
ployees had good wages and, “if the Union comes in, we won’t
have the same benefits because the Union will decide what we
will get . . . [and] the Union is only trying to benefit itself.” In
further testimony, Ponce acknowledged that Johnson stated that
“it was possible that once the Union negotiated with the Com-
pany that there would be an increase in wages.”
Employee Elsa Ponce, wife of Jose Ponce, has no facility in
English. She attended two meetings. In the first, she recalls that
Marcella Acosta, an employee in the human relations depart-
ment who translated at the meetings of Spanish speaking em-
ployees, translated for Crawford and stated, if the Union came
in, “our wages would be reduced . . . insurance rates would go
up, and the benefits would go down.” On cross examination she
stated that union officials earned a high wage “and that’s why
they would have to reduce our wage.” E. Ponce recalled that the
cost of insurance for employees at Douglas increased and that
benefits had been reduced after the election. In fact, the em-
ployees had been advised of the increase in cost and reduction
of benefits effective on October 1, by letter dated September
14.
The employees noted above who testified to direct state-
ments relating to loss of wages and benefits heard exactly what
the Company wanted them to hear. Notwithstanding what the
employees believed they had heard, there is no probative evi-
dence that the statements to which the employees testified were
actually made. Rather, the employees testified to the impression
with which they were left after the Company’s presentations.
Careful review of the testimony reflects that none of the state-
ments are mutually corroborative. McLean testified to loss of
pensions, a benefit the employees do not enjoy. Preston initially
testified that Crawford stated “[W]e would go down,” and then
added that he also said “[W]ages would do down.” She did not
mention benefits. Although Jose Ponce initially testified that
Johnson said “[W]e would be below where we are now,” he
later acknowledged that he also said “[I]t was possible . . . there
would be an increase in wages.” Elsa Ponce, who attended this
same meeting, reported no statement relating to being “below
what we are now,” but recalled hearing that “our wages would
be reduced.” She placed this statement in the context of pay-
ment of high salaries to union officials. No employee corrobo-
rated her testimony relating to insurance and it appears that she
simply confused the Company’s September 14 announcement
with a comment in the presentation.
The Company’s presentation during the third series of meet-
ings cited data from selected union contracts, all of which re-
flected wages and benefits inferior to those at Douglas. Al-
though, as I have found, none of the explicit statements to
which the employees testified were made, loss of benefits was
implicit in the presentation. Counsel for the General Counsel
questioned Crawford regarding the specific content of his re-
marks and Crawford responded as follows:

Q. [W]hat did you tell the employees regarding bar-
gaining?
A. Well, my theme was in bargaining everything is ne-
gotiable, and that it’s a give-and-take process and that it’s
a two-way street. You give up something to get something
and vice versa, and that it can be risky to employees be-
cause no one knows how bargaining will turn out. Neither
the Company or the Union knows what we’re going to
come out with.
Q. And during your speeches to employees, did you
tell them that they could end up with greater benefits than
they had previously?
A. Yes, that was a possibility. They could stay the
same. They could get more, or they could come out with
less.
Q. And what examples did you give employees of
greater benefits they could get as a result of bargaining?
A. Well, for instance, if the union wanted to give up
something that would save us some money, something else
could be enhanced.
Q. Well, apart from giving up something, were there
any examples given where the union did give up some-
thing but were able to achieve an increase in benefits as a
result of bargaining?
A. Not that I recall, no.
Q. Now, . . . isn’t it true that you told employees that
the only way the Union would be able to get something for
you is if they gave up something that you already had?
A. Yes.
. . . .
Q. During your presentation to employees, you showed
them the Live Oak benefits. And isn’t it true you told them
that if the Union gets in here, there’s no reason to believe
that the company is going to give them anything more than
what the employees received at Live Oak?
A. I—yes.
. . . .
Q. Isn’t it true that the theme that was presented to
employees during your presentations was that if the Union
comes in, that they would have to put you on strike be-
cause the benefits you are getting are greater than those
that are at other unionized plants?
A. No, that wasn’t the theme. All I said was that a
strike is a possible outcome of bargaining.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1046
Notwithstanding this answer, Crawford admitted that he in-
formed the employees that a strike was “the Union’s only
weapon to make the Company agree to what they wanted.”
Although Crawford was aware that the Union had obtained a
first contract without a strike at the Company’s Carrolton,
Georgia plant, he acknowledged that he did not mention Carrol-
ton “other than it was a bargaining unit.”
Following the third series of meetings, the Company posted
22-by-28-inch posters comparing wages and benefits at Doug-
las and selected other Gold Kist plants with the caption “Don’t
Settle For Less . . . Vote NO UNION.” Another poster compar-
ing insurance benefits at Douglas and the Gold Kist plant at
Live Oak, bears the caption “Don’t Risk Your Insurance . . .
Vote NO UNION.”
At the fourth series of meetings, Crawford projected an
overhead transparency entitled “Bargaining Result” that states
three options: “Reach an agreement on terms acceptable to the
Company; Union walks away and leaves; STRIKE!”
Regarding strikes, employee Mizell recalled that Crawford
used the overhead projector to show pictures of damage to ve-
hicles and of an injured person at the Trussville, Alabama plant.
She testified that Crawford then stated that “this could happen
to us.”
Employee Preston recalled that Crawford stated that the Un-
ion could cause employees to go on strike, but she corrected
him stating that the employees “have to make that decision.” As
he was showing the pictures Crawford stated, “Don’t let this
happen. . . to you.”
Employee Oliver Hemphill recalls that Crawford stated that,
if the union came in, “it could get very ugly. It could become a
riot, violence cold break out, stuff like that.”
Employee Nestor Galvez, who testified through an inter-
preter, attended meetings with Spanish-speaking employees.
Unlike employee Ponce, who understood what Johnson was
saying in English, Galvez relied upon the translation. He re-
called hearing that, “if they went on strike, the company had to
continue working [and would] . . . hire some other employee[s],
and by them going on strike, they were going to be laid off or
be fired.” He acknowledged that he also heard that, if they went
on strike “the strikers would be replaced.” Counsel for the Gen-
eral Counsel urges me to draw an adverse inference since the
Respondent did not call Acosta, the interpreter, to testify. I
decline to do so. No other employee testified that Johnson ever
used the word fired. In the absence of corroboration, I find that
Galvez’ reference to “laid off or fired,” was his conclusion
regarding the status of replaced employees.
Jose Ponce testified that, after the strike video was shown,
Johnson informed the employees that they needed to be “really
careful; that there could be a lot of consequences. We could
lose our work, our family, our home, our car. Elsa Ponce, who
relied upon what the interpreter said, testified that these com-
ments were made as consequences of a strike “because you
wouldn’t be able to work.”
The Spanish-language video, when addressing strikes, notes
that “workers who go on strike for economic reasons can be
permanently replaced.” Review of the transcript of the video
reveals no unlawful threat of job loss in the content of the
video, and neither the General Counsel nor the Charging Party
cite any alleged unlawful threat in their briefs.
Following the fourth week of meetings, the Company posted
22-by-28-inch posters that reproduced several of the pictures
shown at the meetings, including two of cars with a bullet hole,
the bus with shattered windows, and the young man with the
bandage on his neck under his left ear. Lest any employee fail
to notice, the statement “bulletholes in cars” is printed between
the pictures of the cars with arrows on the picture pointing out
the bullet holes. The caption on this poster is “Vote NO Violent
Strikes, Vote NO UNION.” Another poster lists five Gold Kist
plants at which strikes had occurred and asks what the employ-
ees got for striking. The question is answered as follows: “Lost
paychecks. Violence (Acid on cars. Windshields shattered. Cars
shot into. Woman shot.) Some employees lost their jobs.” This
poster bears the following caption: Don’t let it happen here.
VOTE NO UNION.” Johnson did not testify when this poster
was first posted, but employee McLean recalled that it was
posted for 2 weeks beginning the second week of October.
Employee Eddie Parker recalled that three of the strike violence
pictures, a car with a bullet hole, the bus with shattered win-
dows, and the injured young man were displayed in a locked
glass bulletin board with the caption “Don’t let this happen” the
days immediately prior to the election. Employee Diane Mizell,
who also testified to seeing these pictures, stated in an affidavit
that the caption was not present on the day of the election.
Johnson did not deny that the pictures were posted in the glass
bulletin board. He was asked “[I]f the pictures . . . were posted
. . . with the words “Don’t let this happen to you,” and he re-
sponded, “No, they were not.” Although both Johnson and
Crawford denied specifically stating that a strike was inevitable
or “Don’t let this happen,” it is undisputed that the poster refer-
ring to acid on cars, windshields shattered, etc., bore the cap-
tion “Don’t let it happen here.”
At the final group of meetings, on November 6 and 7, imme-
diately before introducing Bruce Crawford to explain the elec-
tion procedure, Johnson stated that he wanted to thank the em-
ployees, “especially . . . the people who voiced their opinions,
. . . it helped me a great deal, not only about what’s going on in
the plant, but about myself and what I need to change. . . . Now
whether it’s from me having my head stuck in the sand, or
whatever I wasn’t aware of, I can’t correct what happened in
the past, but I can work on the present, and we’re dedicated to
making that happen.”
Crawford explained the election procedure, noting the pres-
ence of observers, and the checking off of names on the voting
list. He then introduced Division Manager Carlyle Ragans.
Ragans referred to the economic challenges of the poultry
industry and stated that he could “not stand up here and prom-
ise you a wage increase, or promise you anything else until we
get this election on the Union out of the way Wednesday. And
I’m not going to do that, in no way am I going to violate any
rules. But I can tell you this, that I consider myself a fair per-
son, and I believe in rewarding people that have done a good
job during tough times, and those that have helped bring about
success in this Company.” Ragans continued, stating:

GOLD KIST, INC. 1047
Chris Johnson has my, has my backing 100%. He made some
big commitments to y’all this morning. . . . He wants to do
what’s right. He wants to see that everyone here is treated
fairly and with respect. And I’m here as his supervisor to tell
you that I support that commitment 100% And I intend to see
that not only Chris, but we both live up to that commitment.
He’s not going to let you down, and I’m not going to let you
down.

Johnson concluded the meeting. He asked the employees to
vote no and then stated:

A vote no will give us the opportunity to continue to work on
the things that we’ve been working on the last several weeks.
We’ll get these personnel issues behind us. We’ll get supervi-
sors and managers doing what’s right, and where they need to
be. A vote no will mean a lot to me personally. I feel that a
vote no [will] tell me that you have confidence in me to get
this straightened out. Fourteen months ago, Carlyle had the
confidence to bring me back here to get this plant straightened
out financially. We’ve gone from number 12 out of 12 to
number 6.3 It took 14 months to make that happen. It will not
take very long to straighten out personnelwise. I’m dedicated
to make sure that happens. I pledge to you I’ll do everything
in my power, I will do what needs to be done to make these
things happen, and I would appreciate your support on
Wednesday.

Employees Loretta McLean, Diane Mizell, and Oliver
Hemphill testified that the meetings held during the weeks prior
to the election were the first occasion in which employees had
been permitted to participate in an open forum and raise their
concerns with management. Hemphill acknowledged that he
had attended safety meetings that had been instructional in
nature, not an open forum. Johnson testified that he had insti-
tuted what he referred to as “harmony sessions” shortly after he
became plant manager in September 1999, but there was no
announcement to employees that these had been instituted.
Those sessions were held once each month for about 12 em-
ployees from each shift. Respondent’s witness, employee Alice
Nutt, testified that the employees would have pizza and some-
thing to drink and would discuss “what we could do to improve
our company, . . . work areas, safety, things that we considered
safety hazards or . . . occasionally morale amongst the employ-
ees.” On cross examination Nutt acknowledged that
“[b]asically that’s what it was, safety.” Nutt admitted that the
first time she heard the term “harmony session” was the week
before this hearing when the attorney asked her about harmony
sessions. Nutt testified that she did not understand “because I
didn’t never hear it called that before.” Even if matters other
than safety were occasionally raised at these meetings with a
limited number of employees, an employer may not rely on
such past practice if it “significantly alters its past manner and

3 The parties stipulated to the accuracy of a transcript of a tape of
this meeting except for the number Johnson used at this point. I listened
to the tape in the presence of all parties and found that he stated that the
Douglas plant had improved to number 6. The parties stipulated that, on
the tape of another meeting, he said that the Douglas plant had im-
proved to number 2.
methods of solicitation [of grievances] during the union cam-
paign.” House of Raeford Farms, 308 NLRB 568, 569 (1992).
2. Analysis and concluding findings
The complaint alleges that Plant Manager Johnson solicited
grievances and impliedly promised to remedy them. Johnson
admits that during the discussion period following the meet-
ings, he “asked for . . . concerns,” and sometimes would have to
“drag it out of someone.” In these meetings, Johnson learned
that the human resources manager had not been responsive to
employee concerns, and the manager was replaced. When
Johnson leaned that Hispanic employees felt “humiliated” he
promised to meet with them once a month. When employees
complained about union adherent Preston walking through their
department, Johnson put a stop to it. Thereafter, on various
occasions, he informed the employees that he “wasn’t aware
that all of that was going on” and asked for “a chance to
straighten things out,” a litany he repeated on November 6 and
7, when he stated that his head had been in the sand.
Respondent argues that Johnson made no specific promise
regarding “how he would straighten things out,” and that his
agreement to meet with Hispanic employees was only an
agreement “to listen.” Contrary to this argument, I find that
Respondent’s agreement to listen was, standing alone, a com-
mitment, a promise, to become more responsive to the concerns
of these employees. Ponce’s testimony is undenied that Johnson
agreed, if the Union was rejected, that he would have a monthly
meeting with the Hispanic employees “to talk about their needs
and address their concerns.” The absence of a specific promise
is not dispositive of this allegation. The appropriate inquiry is
whether, under all the circumstances, Respondent’s actions
implied that employees’ complaints would be addressed if they
rejected the Union. Johnson, in his closing remarks on Novem-
ber 6 and 7, asked for the opportunity “to continue to work on
the things that we’ve been working on the last several weeks,”
i.e., the grievances that he had elicited during the discussion
periods following the Respondent’s antiunion presentations. In
so doing, Johnson clearly implied that “management would
react favorably to the underlying problems that gave impetus to
the organization drive.” Kinney Drugs, 314 NLRB 296, 299
(1994).4 Although Ragans asserted that he could make no
promises, he referred to the “commitments” that Johnson had
made, noting that Johnson wanted “to see that everyone here is
treated fairly and with respect,” a specific concern raised at the
meetings, and stated that he supported Johnson’s commitments
100 percent. I find that the Respondent solicited grievances
from its employees and, by its actions regarding the human
relations manager, agreement to meet with its Hispanic em-
ployees to address their concerns, and commitment “to continue
to work on the things that we’ve been working on the last sev-
eral weeks,” implied that it would remedy employees’ griev-
ances if they rejected the Union and, in so doing, the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Reno Hilton, 319
NLRB 1154, 1156 (1995).
4 This case was remanded to the Board, but the relevant finding was
not disturbed. Kinney Drugs, Inc. v. NLRB, 74 F.3d 1419 (2d Cir.
1996).

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1048
The complaint alleges that, on various dates prior to the No-
vember 8 election, Crawford threatened a loss of benefits if
employees voted for the Union. I have found no explicit threat
of reduction of benefits, but Crawford’s presentation unmis-
takably conveyed the impression that, if the employees selected
the Union, they would not be as well off. Crawford admitted
that he informed the employees that “the only way the Union
would be able to get something for you is if they gave up some-
thing that you already had,” and that he further told the em-
ployees that, “if the Union gets in here, there’s no reason to
believe that the Company is going to give them anything more
than what the employees received at Live Oak.” The overhead
projections and posters reflect that wages and benefits at Live
Oak were inferior to those at Douglas.
The complaint further alleges that, at the company meetings,
on various dates prior to the November 8 election, Johnson and
Crawford threatened employees with the inevitability of strikes,
strike violence, and job loss.
At the fourth series of meetings, at which Johnson was pre-
sent, Crawford projected the overhead transparency entitled
“Bargaining Result” that states three options: “Reach an
agreement on terms acceptable to the Company; Union walks
away and leaves; STRIKE!”
Crawford showed a video, augmented with the sound effect
of a gun being fired, that depicted damage to property and an
injured person. Following the video, he projected overhead
transparencies that showed property damage and an injured
young man. Since the second week in October, the Respondent
had posted a poster referring to “Lost paychecks. Violence
(Acid on cars. Windshields shattered. Cars shot into. Woman
shot.) Some employees lost their jobs.” The poster concludes,
“Don’t let it happen here. VOTE NO UNION.” These written
references to violence were made explicit at the fourth series of
meetings by the video and pictures. Thereafter the Respondent
posted the same photographs it had presented at the meetings
on posters and in a locked bulletin board: bullet holes in cars, a
bus with shattered windows, and a young man with a bandage
on his neck under his left ear. Whether the “Don’t let it happen
here” caption that employee Parker recalled was printed with
the pictures or whether Johnson or Crawford said this during a
meeting is immaterial. The Respondent had already published
that message to all employees, suggesting that selection of the
Union was synonymous with violent strikes and that the only
way to avoid this was to “VOTE NO.” See Singer Co., 160
NLRB 765, 784–785 (1961).
The foregoing evidence establishes that the employees were
presented with a Hobson’s choice: Accept a reduction in bene-
fits or strike. The Respondent’s brief argues that Board prece-
dent permits an employer to discuss the uncertainty of bargain-
ing. I agree. Here, however, the Respondent’s former manager
of labor relations advised the employees that there was no rea-
son to believe that the Company would give “anything more
than what the employees receive at Live Oak,” and, if the par-
ties did not agree to terms acceptable to the Company, the Un-
ion had two options, it could “walk away” or strike. Crawford
never informed the employees that the Company and Union had
agreed to an initial contract at Carrolton, Georgia, without a
strike. He did not mention that “minds can be changed by dis-
cussion, and that skilled, rational, cogent argument can produce
change without the necessity for striking.” Amerace Corp., 217
NLRB 850, 852 (1975). He cited two options, walk away or
strike.
As in Riley-Beaird, Inc., 253 NLRB 660, 673 (1980), I find
that the Respondent’s coupling its recitation relating to reduc-
tion of benefits with the alternative of the Union walking away
or striking constituted a threat to reduce benefits. In this case,
as in that case, the threat to insist upon reduction in benefits
was “more that a recitation of a right, it is a threat to use reduc-
tion as an instrumentality to rid itself of the Union.” Ibid. The
Respondent made this explicit when it noted that, if the Union
did not accept terms acceptable to the Company, the only op-
tion it had, other than strike, was to “walk away.”
Having informed the employees that the Company would not
give more than the employees received at Live Oak, the Re-
spondent turned to the specter of a strike. The Respondent de-
termined that the video relating to the strike at Trussville, Ala-
bama, was insufficient to deliver its message, so it also pro-
jected overhead transparencies depicting damage and injury at
Trussville. In further communications, the Respondent posted
the same pictures that had been projected, including the nota-
tion “bulletholes” with arrows on the pictures denoting the
damage. In these circumstance, the language of the Board in
Ideal Baking Co. of Tennessee, Inc., 143 NLRB 546, 552
(1963) is instructive:

This unremitting effort on the part of the Respondent to im-
press upon the employees the dangers inherent in their selec-
tion of the Union as their bargaining agent, particularly the
danger of job loss, followed up by the baleful representation
of the prospect of violence, physical injury, and property
damage as the ordinary result of voting for the Union in the
election, was not an attempt to influence the employees by
reason, but was an appeal to fear. Indeed, Respondent’s entire
preelection campaign was intimidatory in nature, and intended
to convey the threat of job loss and physical violence should
[the] Union win the election.

The Respondent threatened reduction of benefits to the level
at Live Oak or a strike. Strikes repeatedly were portrayed as
involving violence, thereby playing upon employee fears. See
Louisburg Sportswear Co., 173 NLRB 678, 692 (1968), and
The Singer Co., supra. By threatening the inevitability of a
violent strike the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1).
There is no probative evidence of an unlawful threat of job
loss, only statements relating to permanent replacement an
economic strikers and to the inability of striking employees to
pay bills. Thus, although the Respondent threatened the inevi-
tability of a violent strike if the employees did not accept the
reduction of their benefits to the level of Live Oak, I recom-
mend that the portion of the allegation relating to job loss be
dismissed.
The Spanish-language video contains no unlawful state-
ments. I recommend that the allegation that the video threat-
ened job loss as a result of a strike be dismissed. See Flamingo
Hilton-Laughlin, 324 NLRB 72, 103 (1997).
Division Manager Carlyle Ragans’ remarks do not promise a
wage increase. I recommend that this allegation be dismissed.

GOLD KIST, INC. 1049
C. The Remaining 8(a)(1) Allegations
1. Creation of the impression of surveillance
In mid-September, when employee Brenda Preston was pass-
ing out union leaflets at the plant gate, her supervisor, Eric
Mady, passed within 16 feet of her. During the first week of
October, Mady approached Preston as she was working and
stated that “he was watching my every move I was making.”
He then commented that he had not seen her at work “the other
day.” Preston responded that she had to leave early because of a
doctor’s appointment. Mady repeated that he had his eyes on
her and stated “I am watching you every move you make.”
Mady acknowledged informing Preston that he was going to
be “checking up on her” at the time he assigned her the job of
scooping dry ice. He testified that he had made similar com-
ments to employee Linda Robertson who had been assigned the
ice scooping job prior to Preston but was unable to keep up.
Mady testified that this was prior to his learning of Preston’s
union sympathies. He explained that the work flow on Pre-
ston’s job was “sometimes . . . real light” and that he did not
want her to “abuse some of the freedom that came with that
position.”
Robertson did not testify. Mady placed no date upon his ac-
knowledged comments to Preston, testifying that it was when
she was assigned the position of scooping dry ice, “sometime in
2000.” He did not deny observing Preston handing out union
literature at the gate. Although Mady testified that he told Pre-
ston that he would be “checking up on her,” he did not deny
stating that he was “watching . . . every move” she was making.
I credit Preston and find that Mady informed her that he was
watching her every move after he had observed her handing out
union literature. Contrary to the complaint allegation, I do not
find that this comment establishes that the Respondent created
an impression of surveillance of employee union activity. There
is no evidence that Preston engaged in union activity when she
should have been working and her handing out union literature
at the gate was not covert. Rather, Mady’s comment advised
union adherent Preston that the Respondent was more closely
monitoring her. More closely monitoring employees who have
engaged in union activity violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
General Fabrications Corp., 328 NLRB 1114, 1126 (1999).
Confirmation that Respondent was more closely monitoring
Preston is established by Plant Manager Johnson’s testimony
that Mady “caught” Preston in another department.
2. Restriction of movement
The plant at Douglas is roughly divided into two sections,
the section where poultry is slaughtered and cleaned, and the
section where the poultry is processed after being chilled. The
former section is informally referred to as the “hot side;” the
latter section is referred to as the “cold side.” For more than 5
years, Preston had reported to her various work stations at the
rear of the cold side of the plant by walking in a straight line
from the timeclock, through the hot side, and then turning left
into the rear of the plant on the cold side. A diagram confirms
that she could have turned left at the timeclock, entered the cold
side, and walked through the cold side to her work area. Al-
though Preston referred to her route as a “shortcut,” she ac-
knowledged that it took longer to get to her work area by walk-
ing though the cold side only because she had to avoid “fork-
lifts and stuff” and because of employees wanting “to talk to
me.”
In early October, Supervisor Mady called employee Preston
off of her job and took her to the area when an office was being
constructed. He informed Preston not to “go back through the
main line,” referring to the hot side. Preston asked what she had
done, and Mady repeated, “Just don’t go back through the main
line.” Preston explained that she had been doing so for more
than 5 years and asked why “all of a sudden” he did not want
her going that way. Mady stated that he did not want any trou-
ble and that he would have to write her up if she did so.
Mady acknowledged that he was aware that employees cut
through the hot side but that the supervisors on the hot side did
not like it because it distracted their employees. The only su-
pervisor Mady identified who had specifically complained was
Wayne Register. Mady claimed that he “tried not to allow it”
and that, since employees were supposed to remain in their
work area, it was “the rule of thumb.” Mady testified that, if he
noticed someone cutting through, he would “mention it,” but
the only employee he identified as having spoken to in this
regard was Preston. He did this after Plant Manager Johnson
informed him that, during the meetings, he heard that some of
Mady’s employees were cutting through the hot side. Mady
testified that Johnson did not name any employee.
Johnson testified that, during the discussion period following
one of the meetings, some employees asked him why Preston
was allowed to walk through “first process and second proc-
ess,” the hot side, “when no one else was allowed to.” Johnson
told them that he would check on it. That afternoon or the fol-
lowing morning he told Mady that “he had some employees
going through . . . [the hot side] and he needed to put a stop to
it.” Johnson denied mentioning Preston’s name. Thereafter,
Johnson testified that Mady informed him “that he caught—he
found Ms. Preston to be walking though there, and he told her
that she couldn’t do that.”
There is no evidence of any plant rule or United States De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA) regulation restricting employ-
ees in a food processing plant to specific departments.
Although Preston places her conversation with Mady in the
first week of October, I find that the conversation did not occur
until after October 11, after the Respondent began its antiunion
meetings. I find it incredible that Johnson would not mention
Preston by name to Mady since, according to his testimony, she
was specifically named by the employees who complained that
she was waling through their department “when no one else
was allowed to.” Johnson’s slip of tongue that Mady informed
him that he “caught . . . Ms. Preston,” suggests that Johnson did
identify Preston and confirms that Mady, consistent with his
prior conversation with Preston, was watching her every move.
The Respondent presented no explanation, much less a credible
explanation, as to how one employee walking to her work sta-
tion at the beginning of a shift could distract employees who
were also reporting to work to their work stations. Supervisor
Register did not testify. As already discussed, Johnson’s actions
establish the Respondent’s willingness to respond to employee
grievances raised at the antiunion meetings in its effort to dis-

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1050
suade them from supporting the Union. The Respondent, by
restricting the movement of prounion employee Preston, vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. Threat of plant closure
Employee Preston testified that Supervisor Angie Acorn, at
the vending machine in the breakroom sometime in October,
stated that she did not want the Union because the Company
was having financial problems. Preston initially testified that
Acorn asked if she was for the Union, but she thereafter modi-
fied this testimony, stating that Acorn said that she “hoped that
I’m not” for the Union. Preston told her that she was for the
Union. According to Preston, Acorn then stated that “we didn’t
need a union in because if it came up in here it was going to
cause the place to shut down.” There is no complaint allegation
of interrogation.
Angie Acorn (now Angie Acorn Meeks) denied Preston’s
version of the conversation. She recalled that Preston asked her
when the employees were going to get a raise and that she gave
Preston the same response she gave to “everybody,” stating, “I
don’t know when we’re going to get a raise. The company is in
a financial bind right now. I’m just glad that we still have a
job.” Meeks acknowledged that she followed this comment by
stating that she did not “feel like the Union is what we need in
this plant,” that everyone “needed to work together to get the
Company back to number one.”
Acorn acknowledged that her former mother-in-law had
worked in a plant that was unionized and had closed, but she
testified that she did not mention this to Preston. When testify-
ing as a witness for the General Counsel, Preston was asked by
counsel for the General Counsel whether Acorn made any ref-
erence to her former mother-in-law, and Preston responded that
she did not. Thus, whatever the basis for counsel’s inquiry,
there is no evidence that Acorn’s former mother-in-law was
mentioned in the conversation.
Although Preston was, basically, a credible witness, she was
uncertain with regard to dates and inclined to state her impres-
sions, as when she testified that Crawford made a comment
regarding employees’ pay rates going down in all of the meet-
ings. No other witness attributed to Crawford a statement re-
garding loss of wages in all of the meetings.
Acorn was totally credible. Her response to Preston’s inquiry
regarding when employees might expect a raise, the same re-
sponse she gave to “everybody,” concluded with the statement
that she was “just glad to have a job.” Whether Preston misun-
derstood the response or interpreted it to be a suggestion that if
the employees selected the Union she would not have a job is
immaterial. I credit Acorn. I recommend that this allegation be
dismissed.
4. Threat of refusal to hire
On Sunday afternoon, November 5, Chris Johnson appeared
on a radio call-in show on station WOKA-AM, a local radio
station with a Spanish format. A transcript, the accuracy of
which all parties stipulated, of the broadcast reveals that the
radio host received a call regarding how, if the Union came in,
it would affect “totally everybody.” She asked Johnson to
comment on that. Johnson responded as follows [* denotes
break in which Johnson’s comments were translated into Span-
ish.]:

Yes, I have one comment. An employee made a point to me
last week,* something that I never though of.* They made the
comment that, well if Gold Kist does vote the Union in* and I
quit my job because of it,* its going to be very hard for me to
get a job anywhere else in Douglas.* Because on my resume
it will have my last employer was Gold Kist and these other
industries don’t want people who will, would, possibly bring
a union into their work place.* It would be against the law for
that company to ask you what your affiliation was with the
Union, whether you wanted it or not.* So they may not be
willing to take a chance on you.

No party contended that the translation into Spanish was in-
accurate. Johnson acknowledged that at least seven or eight
Spanish speaking employees commented to him the following
day that they had heard the broadcast.
Johnson, although purportedly repeating the “point” made by
an unidentified employee, cited no objective evidence that
“other industries don’t want people who will, would, possibly
bring a union into their workplace.” His statement that “they
may not be willing to take a chance on you,” is speculation, not
objective fact. Johnson’s comment was not based upon objec-
tive evidence. It was a threat that other employers would not
hire former employees of the Douglas plant if it were union-
ized. See UBX International, 321 NLRB 446, 452 (1996). In
making this threat, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
5. Promise of benefit
On the day of the election, about 3:30 or 4 p.m., Unit Man-
ager David Kirby approached employee Hattie Deese and
asked, “Do you have your mind made up what you’re going to
do?” Deese responded that her mind was made up. Kirby then
stated that, “if the Union come in, I can’t make your job better.
. . . But if the Union don’t come in, your job will be better.”
Kirby testified that, when the flow of defective chickens in-
creased in Deese’s work area, he had provided additional help
on that line which made Deese’s job easier, i.e., “better.” Deese
was not recalled to dispute this testimony which is consistent
with assuring smooth production.
The complaint does not allege interrogation. Kirby admits
speaking with Deese on the day of the election. He did not deny
asking Deese if her mind was made up, but he recounted a con-
versation that does not contain that question. He testified that
Deese asked if he would “be able to supply the help in that
position where she was at” and that he said, “Yes,” noting that
the election would not affect how he would handle that process.
He then testified that he informed Deese of his experience in a
union facility where “I had to work through a shop steward.”
Kirby’s testimony became contradictory on cross examina-
tion when he denied that Deese had ever expressed a need for
additional help. Thereafter, he again acknowledged that Deese
had asked for help by repeating that she asked if he was “still
going to be able to supply help back there.” He again asserted
that he had responded, “Yes.” Kirby admitted that he also ex-
pressed to Deese “that my experience with the union was that

GOLD KIST, INC. 1051
the shop steward was going to be present if she had any com-
plaints.” This acknowledgment is consistent with Deese’s tes-
timony that Kirby stated that, “if the Union come in, I can’t
make your job better.”
I credit Deese. Although the complaint alleges that the Re-
spondent promised to make Deese’s job better (easier) if the
employees rejected the Union, the probative evidence estab-
lishes that the Respondent had provided assistance to Deese
when she had needed it, and that Kirby told her that this would
continue, that “if the Union don’t come in, your job will be
better,” but then threatening her that “if the Union come in, I
can’t make your job better.” Thus, rather than promising a new
benefit, Kirby threatened the withdrawal of an existing condi-
tion of employment if the employees selected the Union in
order to dissuade employees from supporting the Union in vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
D. The Reduction of Overtime of Brenda Preston
1. Facts
In the 35 weeks prior to September 1, Preston worked an av-
erage of 5.46 hours of overtime per week. Some weeks she
worked no overtime. During 1 week in June she worked 16.8
hours of overtime. In the 17 weeks after September 1, Preston
worked a total of 16.2 hours of overtime. It appears that 8 of
those hours were for working on Labor Day.
Preston testified that, about the first week of October, Lead-
man James Clark informed her that he could not let her work
overtime any more, that “his supervisor had come to him and
told him not to let me work over.” In what Preston recalled as a
second conversation, Clark informed her that the supervisor
knew she was engaging in union activity, that she was being
watched, and “to be careful.” He noted that Adolph Paulk was
one of “them,” the supervisors.
Leadman Clark confirmed that he informed Preston that she
could not work overtime on the direct order of Unit Manager
David Kirby, who denied knowing Preston. According to Clark,
Kirby told him, “Don’t use the girl that you been keeping over
there. Don’t keep her anymore.” He assumed Kirby was refer-
ring to Preston since she regularly worked overtime in the area
“over there” to which Kirby had referred, “that’s the spot she
usually worked at when she was on the line.” Clark testified
that he knew of Preston’s involvement with the Union and as-
sumed that was the reason she could not work overtime. He
testified that this was his personal assessment and that he there-
fore told Preston, at the same time he informed her that he
could not use her anymore, “Be careful. Do things right. Don’t
. . . get in no trouble. You may be being watched.” He denied
mentioning Supervisor Paulk.
Thereafter, Clark testified that he was directed by his super-
visor, Corey Colson, to cut back on overtime. The only other
employees that Clark specifically identified as being affected
were a Hispanic employee whose name he did not know and
employee Betty Shaw.
Kirby testified that he was simply carrying out an order of
Plant Manager Johnson. He did not mention his conversation
with Clark, testifying only that he informed his subordinates
that all overtime was to be cut out, even if this meant “closing
down a vital operation that needed to be staffed on second
shift.” I find that testimony incredible. It defies any logic re-
garding maintaining production, and it is refuted by documen-
tary evidence revealing that overtime continued to be worked in
all departments. A memorandum for Johnson dated August 17,
requested only that unit mangers inform him of how much
overtime they needed to budget.
Johnson testified that he needed to cut costs, that cutting
overtime was one way to do that. Leadman Clark testified that
he was aware of three employees, Preston, Shaw, and the His-
panic lady, who had regularly worked overtime. The Respon-
dent introduced the overtime records of several employees
some of whom, according to Johnson and contrary to Kirby,
had to work overtime to perform critical functions, and the
records of employees Darlene Alls, JoAnn Edwards, and Mae
Carter whose overtime was cut. The records of Shaw and the
Hispanic lady were not introduced. When Preston was ques-
tioned regarding other employees she knew who had ceased
working overtime, she explained that employee Clara Ross quit
working overtime because she got a part-time job and that em-
ployee Tracy Smith stopped in order “to take care of her kids.”
Neither Alls, Edwards, nor Carter testified; thus the record does
not establish the circumstances regarding the cessation of their
overtime.
The General Counsel introduced records showing overtime
by department. Johnson acknowledged that there was no way to
tell in which department a particular employee worked over-
time, the overtime credited to the employee reflects the em-
ployee’s assigned department. There was no diminution in the
overtime charged to department 143, the department to which
Preston had been assigned in August. The July figure, 1737, is
the lowest of the 6-month period of July through December.
The August figure of 2063, the month in which Johnson issued
his memorandum, is lower than the September figure of 2473
hours; however, it appears that employees who worked on La-
bor Day were paid overtime which may have affected that fig-
ure. The October figure is 1910, November is 2103, and De-
cember is 2551. Turning to the overall figures for all depart-
ment, the total number of overtime hours worked each month at
the plant, rounded to the nearest 100, in the year 2000, were as
follows:

January 33,000 July 8,700
February 10,100 August 11,200
March 13, 900 September 18,400
April 8, 900 October 7,800
May 13, 800 November 12,500
June 25,600 December 10,200

As the foregoing figures reveal, over the entire year the over-
time average was 13,350 per month. The months of January,
June, and September appear to be aberrations. Fewer than
10,000 hours of overtime were worked in April and July, prior
to Johnson’s memorandum of August 18. After the memoran-
dum, overtime fell below 10,000 hours only in October.
2. Analysis and concluding findings
In assessing the evidence under the analytical framework of
Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st
Cir. 1981), I find that Preston engaged in union activity and that

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1052
the Respondent was aware of that activity. Preston placed her
conversation with Clark in the first week of October.5 The Re-
spondent, in its brief, states that Preston’s overtime was re-
duced “beginning the week ending September 22.” This would
have been after she leafleted at the plant gate in mid-
September. Regardless of whether the reduction in overtime
occurred in late September or early October, Preston’s union
activity, as confirmed by Clark’s testimony, was common
knowledge. The Respondent’s animus is established by the
8(a)(1) violations found herein. The elimination of Preston’s
overtime was an adverse action affecting her terms and condi-
tions of employment. The General Counsel established a prima
facie case.
The Respondent adduced no probative evidence that Pre-
ston’s overtime would have been eliminated in the absence of
her union activity. Kirby did not explain why he singled out
one employee, which he did when he informed Clark: “Don’t
use the girl that you been keeping over there.” The Respondent
did not present the timesheets of the two other employees who
Clark testified had regularly received overtime. The records of
overtime for department 143, the department to which Preston
was assigned, reflect no reduction in overtime after August.
The overall plant figures do not support Unit Manager Kirby’s
assertion that he would close down a vital operation rather than
authorize overtime on second shift.
Leadman Clark assumed that the Respondent’s actions were
prompted by Preston’s union activity and warned her to be
careful. Clark’s statements to Preston are not attributable to the
Respondent since he is not a supervisor, and he testified that
that no supervisor stated that Preston’s union activity was the
reason for the action, that he simply made that assumption.
Even though Clark’s statements to Preston are not attributable
to the Respondent, I find that his assumption was well founded.
The General Counsel presented a prima facie case and the Re-
spondent has not established by probative evidence that it
would have taken the same action in the absence of Preston’s
union activity. I find that by eliminating the overtime of Preston
because of her union activity the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
E. The Objections to the Election
The Petitioner filed objections to the election, many of which
are coextensive with the allegations of the complaint. The Peti-
tioner urges that I also find certain conduct that is not coexten-
sive with any complaint allegation to be objectionable.

5 Although Preston had only 8 hours of overtime in September, ap-
parently for working on Labor Day, the absence of overtime the other 3
weeks in September does not contradict her testimony that Clark spoke
to her during the first week of October. There were several weeks that
Preston worked no overtime, including 3 consecutive weeks at the end
of June and beginning of July. Neither Clark nor Kirby placed a date on
their conversation.
1. Objection 5 [from page 3]: Threat of deportation6
The only evidence proffered in support of this objection was
the testimony of Jose Ponce who testified he overheard Super-
visor Tonya Gifford state to a group of Hispanic employees that
“you better not vote for the Union or you’re being shipped back
to Mexico, immigration can come for you and ship you back to
Mexico.” Ponce did not place himself in the group of employ-
ees being threatened. No employee from the group testified.
Gifford denied the threat. In the absence of corroboration of
Ponce of the threat that Gifford credibly denied making, I rec-
ommend that this Objection be overruled.
2. Objection 6 [from page 3]: Interrogation
The Petitioner alleges two instances of interrogation. The
first is based upon Preston’s initial testimony that Supervisor
Acorn asked if she was for the Union. Preston modified this
testimony, stating that Acorn stated that she hoped Preston was
not for the Union, but Preston disabused her of any such hope
by stating that she was for the Union. I have not credited Pre-
ston’s account of this conversation and I find that no coercive
interrogation occurred.
The second instance arises from the conversation in which
Deese states that Kirby asked her, “Do you have your mind
made up what you’re going to do?” There is no mention of the
Union or the election in the question. Kirby could have been
referring to when Deese intended to go to supper. Deese re-
sponded that “the Lord’s and my mind’s made up.”
I am mindful that immediately after this colloquy Kirby
threatened Deese with loss of a benefit, the help he provided
when the flow of chickens increased, if the employees selected
the Union. Nevertheless, I cannot speculate with regard to
Kirby’s intent when he asked a question that made no mention
of the Union, the Employer’s antiunion meetings, or the up-
coming election. Similarly, I cannot speculate with regard to
Deese’s innocuous reply that revealed absolutely nothing about
her union sympathies and could have related to the television
show that she intended to watch that evening. Neither of the
foregoing incidents were alleged in the complaint. I recommend
that this objection be overruled.
3. Objection 12: Informed employees of acts of violence
On November 6, employee Preston heard from her nephew
that there had been a physical altercation between Union Rep-
resentative Eric Taylor and the son of the owner of Staffmate,
the company that provided temporary labor to Gold Kist. On
November 7, while walking to the nurse’s station, Preston
overheard Johnson, the owner of Staffmate, and his son, dis-
cussing that the son had hit Taylor and laughing. Preston testi-
fied to no specific comments in the conversation, noting that
she was “way off distant.” No evidence was presented concern-
ing the altercation. The record does not reflect how the alterca-
tion occurred and whether it related to the Union, a sports team,
or some other issue. The Petitioner argues that this “dissemina-
tion of information of physical assaults” when coupled with the
6 The Objections are misnumbered, containing on p. 2 Objections 3,
4, 5, and the beginning of 6 relating to a threat of refusal to hire. Page
3 contains the remainder of Objection 6 from p. 2, a separate Objection
4 and 5, and an Objection 6 relating to interrogation.

GOLD KIST, INC. 1053
Respondent’s threats of strike related violence destroyed the
laboratory conditions necessary for a fair election.
In the absence of any evidence relating to the subject of the
altercation, the manner in which it became physical, and the
culpability of either party, I have no basis upon which I can
make a finding. Preston’s overhearing from a distance a por-
tion of a discussion about an altercation that she had learned
about from her nephew does not constitute objectionable con-
duct by the Employer. I recommend that this objection be over-
ruled.
4. Objection 14: Use of ballot replicas
At the final meetings with employees on November 6 and 7,
a facsimile of a ballot was projected on the overhead projector
with the “NO” box marked with an X. There is dispute as to
whether the facsimile was a crude facsimile with the words
“Secret Ballot” and a “Yes” and “No” box as reflected by Re-
spondent’s Exhibit 16 or a more sophisticated facsimile, bear-
ing the words United States Government, National Labor Rela-
tions Board, Official Secret Ballot, as reflected by General
Counsel’s Exhibit 3A. Assuming that it was the latter ballot, I
note that the Petitioner on this facsimile is identified as “The
UFCW Union.” Consistent with established Board practice, I
am certain that the actual ballot correctly identified the Peti-
tioner as United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local
1996, AFL–CIO.
The Petitioner, citing 3-Day Blinds, 299 NLRB 110 (1990),
argues that the “altered official NLRB ballot . . . constitutes
objectionable conduct.” 3-Day Blinds involved the distribution
of facsimile ballots that the petitioner therein argued gave em-
ployees the impression that the Board favored the employer.
The Board noted that the altered ballot did not, on its face,
identify the source. The Board stated that it would, therefore,
examine “the nature and contents of the material in order to
determine whether the document had a tendency to mislead
employees into believing that the Board favors one party over
the other . . .[and it would consider] extrinsic evidence.” Id. at
111. In the instant case there was no document. An overhead
transparency was projected in the same manner as numerous
other transparencies had been similarly presented by the Em-
ployer in its antiunion campaign. Notwithstanding the absence
of any identification on the transparencies, I am satisfied that
any employee seeing the transparency, not a document, would
make no assumption that the Board had any involvement in
what was clearly the Employer’s antiunion presentation. I rec-
ommend that this objection be overruled.
I have found that, after the petition was filed and prior to the
election, the Respondent engaged in violations of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. This conduct parallels various objec-
tions to the election filed by the Union. Objection 1 alleges the
solicitation of grievances with an implied promise to remedy
them, Objection 3 alleges discrimination against prounion em-
ployees, Objection 4 [from page 2] alleges threats of loss of
benefits, Objection 4 [from page 3] alleges the threat of inevi-
tability of strikes and strike violence),7 Objection 5 [from page

7 Even if I had found no 8(a)(1) violation, the Employer’s creation of
an atmosphere of fear constitutes objectionable conduct. Fred Wilkin-
son Assoc., 297 NLRB 737 (1990).
2] alleges the restriction of movement of prounion employees,
Objection 6 [from page 2] alleges the threat of refusal to hire by
other employers, and Objection 15 alleges other acts and con-
duct which would include the more closely monitoring of
prounion employees.
I find that the foregoing violations of the Act that occurred
during the critical preelection period and correspond to the
Union’s objections interfered with the employees’ free choice
of representation and that that the election must be set aside and
a new election held.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By soliciting grievances and promising to remedy them in
order to dissuade employees from supporting the Union, by
threatening the loss of benefits and the inevitability of strikes
and strike violence if employees selected the Union as their
collective-bargaining representative, by more closely monitor-
ing and restricting the movement of prounion employees, and
by threatening that other employers would refuse to hire em-
ployees because of their union activities, the Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. By depriving Brenda Preston of overtime work the Re-
spondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) and Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent having discriminatorily deprived Brenda
Preston of overtime work, it must make her whole for any loss
of earnings and other benefits, computed on a quarterly basis
from September 18, 2000, until her overtime assignments are
restored, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289
(1950), plus interest as computed in New Horizons for the Re-
tarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
The Charging Party, citing Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., 318
NLRB 470 (1995), has requested extraordinary remedies, in-
cluding the reading of the notice, identifying current employ-
ees, and access. In that case the Board found “numerous, perva-
sive, and outrageous” violations of the Act. The violations
herein are significant and affected the entire unit, but they are
not of the same character as the more than 40 independent vio-
lations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and multiple discharges
found Fieldcrest Cannon. I agree that the notice posting should
be in both English and Spanish. I deny the request for other
nontraditional remedies.
The Respondent must post an appropriate notice. In view of
the diversity of the work force, I recommend that the notice be
translated into Spanish.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended8
8 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1054
ORDER
The Respondent, Gold Kist, Inc., Douglas, Georgia, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Soliciting grievances and promising to remedy them in
order to dissuade employees from supporting United Food and
Commercial Workers Union, Local 1996, AFL–CIO.
(b) Threatening the loss of benefits if employees select the
Union as their collective-bargaining representative.
(c) Threatening the inevitability of strikes and strike violence
if employees select the Union as their collective-bargaining
representative.
(d) More closely monitoring and restricting the movement of
prounion employees.
(e) Threatening that other employers would refuse to hire
employees because of their union activities.
(f) Depriving prounion employees of overtime work.
(g) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Make Brenda Preston whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against
her in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the deci-
sion.
(b) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available
to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards, per-
sonnel records and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of the records if stored in electronic form, nec-
essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of
this Order.

Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility at Douglas, Georgia, copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix.”9 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 12, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since September 18, 2000.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as
it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election is set aside and Case
12–RC–8553 is severed from Cases 12–CA–21196 and 12–
CA–21231 and remanded to the Regional Director to conduct a
second election when she deems the circumstances permit a
free choice.

9 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”