Glen Raven Silk Mills, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 6, 1952

101 N.L.R.B. 239 (N.L.R.B. 1952)

GLEN RAVEN SILK MILLS, INC. 239
Appendix A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees regarding their union affiliations,
memberships, or sympathies or those of their coworkers, or warn or threaten
our employees with economic reprisals because of union membership or
activities or in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our em-
ployees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join or assist AWNING & TENT WORKERS AND DECORATORS
LOCAL No. 39, affiliated with UPHOLSTERERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH
AMERICA, A. F. L., or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, or to refrain from any and all of such activities except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in
Section 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act.
All our employees are free to become or remain members of the above-named
union or any other labor organization except to the extent that this right may be
affected by an agreement in conformity with Section 8 (a) (3) of the amended
Act.
H. WENZEL TENT & DUCK COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated --------------------- By ---------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title),
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof , and must not
be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(GLEN RAVEN SILK MILLS , INC. and UNITED TExTILE WORKERS OF
AMERICA, AFL. Case No. 11-C.4-288. November 6, 1962
Decision and Order
On March 19, 1952, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter-
mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions to the Intermediate Report.
The Board' has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
' Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act , the Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three -member panel [ Chairman Herzog and
Members Styles and Peterson].
101 NLRB No. 62.
240 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Intermediate Report, the Respondent's exceptions, and the entire rec-
ord in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommendations of the Trial Examiner with the following modifications-
and additions.
1. The Trial Examiner stated, in the case of Huskins, that, upon
the establishment by the General Counsel of a prima facie case of illegal
discrimination, the Respondent was required to produce "overwhelm-
ing evidence" that Huskins was in fact discharged for cause. In
every case, a violation of the Act must be proved by the General
Counsel by the preponderance of the evidence and, insofar as the Trial
Examiner's statement implies the contrary, we do not adopt it. How-
ever, like the Trial Examiner, we find that the preponderance of
the evidence does in fact establish that Huskins was discharged for
discriminatory reasons, and not for inefficiency, as alleged by the
Respondent, and we find that the Respondent thereby violated Section
8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act.
2. After weighing all the relevant evidence in the cases of Boone
and Wilson, we find upon the preponderance of the evidence, in agree-
ment with the Trial Examiner, that the Respondent discharged them
for union activity, in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the
Act?
3. The Trial Examiner found that the promulgation and enforce-
ment of the Respondent's rule against the distribution of literature "on
Company property" (including the area adjacent to the plant), unless
approved by management, interfered with, restrained, and coerced the
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act. We agree,
and find, that the Respondent thereby violated Section 8 ( a) (1) of
the Act. In so finding, we do not mean to hold that an employer may
not adopt a nondiscriminatory rule against the distribution of litera-
ture in the plant proper, even during the employees' nonworking timer
in the interest of keeping the plant clean and orderly.8
Order
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)•
of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Glen Raven Silk Mills,
Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
' We do not , however, adopt the Trial Examiner 's statement that the preceding discharges
of Huskins and Boone , in themselves , established a "prima facie" case of discrimination
against Wilson.
E Colonial Shirt Corporation , 96 NLRB 711 ; Monolith Portland Cement Co ., 94 NLRB-
1358.
GLEN RAVEN SILK MILLS, INC. 241
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in United Textile Workers of
America, AFL, or in any other labor organization of its employees,
by discriminatorily refusing to hire, or discharging or refusing to
reinstate any of them, or by discriminating in any other manner in
regard to their hire, tenure of employment, or any term or condition
of employment.
(b) Promulgating or enforcing any discriminatory rule prohibiting
its employees from engaging in reasonable union activities on com-
pany property on their own time, or in any other manner interfering
with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the right
to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist
United Textile Workers of America, AFL, or any other labor organi-
zation, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring mem-
bership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as au-
thorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, as guaranteed in Section 7
thereof.
2. Take the following affirmative action which we find will effectuate
the policies of the Act :
(a) Offer to Sam A. Huskins and Perry Boone immediate and full
reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions
without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges.
(b) Make whole the above-named individuals in the manner set
forth in section V of the Intermediate Report entitled "The Remedy."
(c) Make whole Martha B. Wilson, administratrix of the estate of-
Clifton Wilson, in the manner set forth in the section entitled "The
Remedy."
(d) Upon request, make available to the Board or its agents for ex-
amination and copying all payroll records, social security payment
records, time cards, personnel records and reports, and all other rec-
ords necessary to analyze the amounts of back pay due under this
Order.
(e) Post at its plant in Burnsville, North Carolina, copies of the
notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix A." 4 Copies of such
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Eleventh
Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's authorized
representative, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days there-
4 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words.
"Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order."
242 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
after, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for the Eleventh Region, in
writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
Appendix A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in UNITED TEXTILE
WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL, or in any other labor organization of
our employees, by refusing to hire, by discharging any of our
employees, or in any other manner discriminating in regard to
their hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of
their employment.
WE WILL NOT promulgate or enforce any rule prohibiting our
employees from engaging in reasonable union activities on com-
pany property on their own time.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self- organi-
zation, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, ar
to refrain from any or all such activities.
WE WILL make whole Sam A. Huskins and Perry Boone for
any loss of pay they may have suffered as a result of the discrimi-
nation against them and offer them immediate and full reinstate-
ment to their former or substantially equivalent positions without
prejudice to any seniority or other rights and privileges.
WE WILL make whole the estate of Clifton Wilson for any loss
of pay and insurance benefits suffered as a result of our discrimi-
nation against him.
All our employees are free to become or remain members of the
above-named union or any other labor organization except to the ex-
tent that this right may be affected by an agreement in conformity
with Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. We will not discriminate in regard
to the hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of em-
GLEN RAVEN BILK MILLS, INC. 243
ployment because of membership in or activity on behalf of any such
labor organization.
GLEN RAVEN SILK MILLS, INC.,
Employer
By ---------------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
Dated --------------------
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Intermediate Report
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charges having been duly filed and served, a complaint and notice of hearing
thereon having been issued and served by the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board, and an answer having been filed by the above-named
Company, herein called the Respondent, a hearing involving allegations of
unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act, was held
in Burnsville, North Carolina, on February 6 and 7, 1952, before the undersigned
Trial Examiner.
In substance the complaint alleges and the answer denies that the Respondent:
(1) Discriminatorily and to discourage union membership discharged employees
Sam Huskins, Perry Boone, and Clifton Wilson; and (2) by said discharges and
other conduct interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exer-
cise of rights guaranteed by the Act.
At the hearing General Counsel and the Respondent were represented, were
afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross- examine witnesses,
to introduce evidence pertinent to the issues, to argue orally upon the record,
and to file briefs and proposed findings and conclusions. No brief has been
received.
Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses,
the Trial Examiner makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is a North Carolina corporation, with its principal place of
business at Glen Raven, North Carolina. It is engaged in manufacturing, proc-
essing, and selling of synthetic fabrics, such as nylon and rayon, at its plants
in North Carolina, including its plant at Burnsville.
At its Burnsville plant, with which this proceeding is concerned, the Re-
spondent annually buys materials and supplies valued at more than $1,000,000,
of which more than 90 percent is received from points outside North Carolina.
Its annual sales are valued at more than $1,000,000, of which more than 90
percent is shipped from Burnsville to points outside North Carolina.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Textile Workers of America, AFL, herein called the Union, is a labor
organization admitting to membership employees of the Respondent.
242305-53-17
244 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The "no-distribution" rule
By visiting workers at their homes and by distributing handbills near the plant,
a union representative began organizing the Respondent 's employees in October
1950.
According to the unchallenged testimony of this union organizer , while near
the plant in October someone whom he identified only as a man declaring him-
self to be a supervisor told him he "wished" he would not distribute handbills
there and said he "would like" to have him "move off the company property."
In February 1951, the same witness testified , he and another union representative,
upon visiting the plant , discovered that a wire fence had been erected around
the property and "no trespass " signs had been posted . On that occasion, also,
Plant Manager M . C. Ramm told them that he had managed plants for 30 years
without labor troubles and "wanted " none there ; and said further that he
"wished" they would not give out "Union literature" there. Also in the spring
of 1951, according to the testimony of Overseer Charles Black , a management
representative , the Respondent promulgated a rule in the plant stating , in effect:
The distribution of written or printed matter of any description on Com-
pany property , unless approved by the management , is forbidden.
The Trial Examiner is of the opinion that evidence is insufficient to support
allegations of the complaint to the effect that by erecting the fence and other coer-
cion management prohibited union representatives from distributing literature
in the "area in front of and near the entrance " to the plant . Ramm's state-
ment to the organizers reveals, however , in the absence of any credible ex-
planation by the Respondent , the real reason for the contemporaneous promul-
gation of the "no-distribution " rule in the plant . Management 's true motive was
to prohibit employees ' activity of this nature even on their own time. Strict
observance of this regulation would require an employee to obtain management
approval , thereby revealing possible union adherence , before passing to or re-
ceiving from another employee a union card , during his lunch period or before
work , anywhere within the considerable area of company grounds outside the
plant. Promulgation and enforcement of the above-quoted rule interfered with,
restrained , and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the
Act. Its maintenance constitutes continuing restraint and coercion.
B. The discharge of Sam A. Huskins
Credible and unrefuted evidence establishes and the Trial Examiner finds
that Huskins was one of two workers, here involved , who obtained union appli-
cation cards from the organizer, solicited signatures at the plant , and returned
them to the organizer. ( The other employee was Clifton Wilson , whose later
discharge is discussed below.)
Huskins was a sweeper , and performed other tasks requiring general movement
throughout the plant. His supervisors were Second Hand Albert Silvers and
Overseer Walter Brown . He was hired in early May 1949 and was summarily
discharged , without warning, on December 8, 1950 , a few days after joining the
Union and beginning actively to solicit others to join.
Huskins applied for membership on the day Silvers , according to the latter's
own testimony , asked him for a union card. Huskins denied having one. Silvers
countered , "Don't tell me a damn lie, I know you have." The employee then said
GLEN RAVEN SILK MILLS, INC. 245
that if that was the way he felt about it, he would sign one before the day was
over.'
Shortly after this incident employee Thomas Terrell, in the presence of em-
ployee Stuart Taylor, said to Overseer Brown, "I guess you know Sam Huskins
is passing out union cards." Brown replied, "Well, I can't fire him for that, but
I can think of a hundred other reasons for firing him." 2
Brown as a witness admitted that before December 8 he had heard "rumors"
of Huskins' leadership in and activity on behalf of the Union and, he further
said, "I had heard people say that Sam was working for the Union."
On December 8 Huskins was called into Brown's office. Silvers was there and,
said, "we have got to lay you off." Huskins asked why ; Silvers answered, "not-
keeping the job up." Huskins asked in what respect, Silvers replied, "you have
just quit sweeping under the machines." Huskins reminded the other that he
had stopped such sweeping at the second hand's own order. "Did I tell you that?"
said Silvers. ". . . if I told you that I didn't mean to." During further
discussion on this point Brown interrupted and said there were "other excuses
besides that," and accused the employee of loafing in the plant, and smoking
,,at the incinerator" and on the outside of the plant. Huskins said, "If you will
just come clean with it and tell the truth it ain't no fault with my work, you're
laying me off for ; it is because of my Union activities." Brown then said he
"could make dozens of different excuses," and gave Huskins his pay check, al-
ready made out in full.'
It is clear, and the Trial Examiner finds, that (1) by December 8 Brown and
Silvers were aware of Huskins' union activities, and (2) by Brown's statement
to Terrell he declared an intent to discharge Huskins, actually for union activity
but using "a hundred other reasons" as pretexts.
It is likewise plain that General Counsel adduced ample evidence to establish
a prima facie case of illegal discrimination, which must stand in the absence of
overwhelming evidence that Huskins was, in fact, discharged for legal cause.
Affirmative reasons advanced by Brown and Silvers, as well as their testimony
relating to them, are confusing, contradictory and fall far short of being per-
suasive. In quick summary of the former's testimony, it would appear that Hus-
kins had not been "a good worker to begin with,"-more than a year and a half
earlier, and that although he, Ramm, and Silvers had discussed firing the employee
"several months" before December, he did not discharge him because, he said, "I
try to practice the Golden Rule," and did not take such action until December
8, when Silvers caught him smoking outside the plant, at a point admittedly
covered by no rule and where bath he and Silvers often had smoked. Silvers, as
a witness, also said Huskins "was unsatisfactory" as a worker during "the whole
time" of employment, but that he never recommended dismissal until December S.
Although both Brown and Silvers claimed that the decision to fire the employee
1 The finding rests upon Huskins' credible testimony, and Silvers' admission that he did
ask for a union card . The latter's denial that he heard Huskins make the final remark is
not credited.
2 This finding rests upon the credible and straightforward testimony of Taylor, at the
time of the hearing serving in the U. S. Air Force. The Trial Examiner, having observed
them on the stand , does not credit the denials of Brown and Terrell. Brown's denial, in
fact, although repeatedly solicited by counsel, was as repeatedly qualified by "not to my
knowledge," and on cross-examination he said, "I would not bet my neck on it, but I
would bet a couple of dollars on it."
3 Huskins' credible account of the discharge interview, upon which the findings rest, is
uncontradicted in the main. Brown did not deny having told the employee he "could
make dozens of different excuses." As to Huskins' reason Silvers said, "I think he stated
It pretty fair."
246 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
was precipitated by a smoking incident, which Huskins credibly denies having
occurred, Silvers testified that he told him only that he was being let go for "in-
efficiency," and declared that smoking was not mentioned by him. "Inefficiency,"
also, is the reason claimed on Huskins' termination slip.
No reasonable explanation was offered by the Respondent for claiming "ineffi-
ciency" as the cause when, if Silvers and Brown are to be believed, the discharge
was because the former had caught the employee smoking outside the plant.
The Trial Examiner finds no merit in the sundry reasons advanced which,
the Respondent claims, "in accumulation" brought about the discharge . The real
cause is revealed further in Huskins' credible account of a meeting with Silvers,
soon after the discharge, when the employee came back to the plant for his bonus.
With reference to the discharge Silvers told him, "what the hell else can you
expect when the Company knows that you are working against the Company and
for the Union"
The Trial Examiner concludes and finds, on the preponderance of credible evi-
dence, that Huskins was discriminatorily discharged on December 8 to discourage
union membership and activity, thereby interfering with, restraining, and coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act.
C. The discharge of Perry 5 Boone
There is no evidence of further organizational efforts in the plant, after Hus-
kins' discharge in December, until the following February, when an organizer
made another visit to the property. As noted above, employee Clifton Wilson
then assisted the organizer. It is undisputed that employees Perry Boone and
Wilson acted as a "team," as Boone described it; Wilson providing Boone with
cards and the latter getting signatures and then returning them. Indeed, a wit-
ness called by the Respondent, employee Norris Masters, corroborated the fact
that Boone gave him several union cards in the plant.
Boone was hired in June 1949 as a cloth cutter or doffer. He was thereafter
transferred successively to better paying jobs, hanging warps and then to a
tying-in machine. He received increases in pay. During the last week or 10
days of his employment he was again doffing cloth, having been transferred
temporarily upon returning from a short illness. On March 10, 1951, he was
summarily discharged by his immediate supervisor, Jay Deyton, although it is
undisputed that only a week before that date he had been openly complimented
by Overseer Carter, Deyton's superior, who promised him another raise and
said, "Boone, you do your work as well as anybody I ever had."
Events leading up to the dismissal and bearing upon General Counsel's allega-
tion that it was caused by his union activity are, briefly summarized , as follows.
A few days before March 10 and in line of duty Boone went to the cloth room,
where Wilson worked, to get certain rolls. As he leaned over to pick up rolls
near Wilson he told the other he had some signed union cards in his back
pocket. Wilson reached down and took them. When Boone looked up he found
Overseer Charles Black watching them, only 3 feet away. The cards, dis-
tinctively red-bordered and printed in blue on white, were plainly visible and
identifiable to Black at this short distance, and despite Black's denial the Trial
Examiner is convinced and finds that he witnessed the exchange and concluded
that they were union cards
4 Although Silvers at first denied making this statement , he later admitted the occasion,
a conversation about the discharge, and said that he did not "recall exactly what I said."
5 The official reporter erroneously listed Perry Boone as "Harry" Boone. The Trial
Examiner accordingly orders the transcript corrected in this respect.
Although Black was not Boone 's supervisor , he claimed that he watched the employee
when in his department , on one occasion for 22 minutes , and even reported to Boone's
GLEN RAVEN SILK MILLS, INC . 247
Two days later, when Boone went on an errand to the supply room, employee
Masters asked him if he had any union cards . Boone took some from his pocket
and passed them to Masters through the opening in the supply room partition.
As Boone turned away, Deyton, his supervisor , was standing directly behind
him, on the same side of the paneling, watching him. The Trial Examiner is
convinced and finds, despite Deyton's denial, that he saw the passing of union
cards by Boone.
Immediately after these incidents Deyton began watching Boone closely at
his work. Just before the end of the shift on March 10 Deyton came to looms
from which Boone took off cloth, inspected a few of them, and then told the
employee he did not need him any more. Boone asked why, and Deyton made
no reply. Boone said he would find out. He searched for Overseer Carter, but
was unable to locate him and went on home. A few days later Boone came back
for his pay and was given a termination slip, made out 2 days after the discharge,
which stated that he had been laid off "Involuntarily. After several reprimands
employee continued to be inefficient in his work."
Under the surrounding circumstance, evidence as to which is undisputed, in-
cluding the illegal rule which Black admitted became effective at about this
time, prohibiting the passing of any printed matter not approved by management,
and including the fact that Overseer Carter had complimented Boone only a
few days before the discharge, the Trial Examiner considers that General Counsel
established a prima facie case of illegal discrimination as to Boone.
In main support of its claim that inefficiency, and not union activity, was the
real reason for Boone's discharge, the Respondent had as its chief witnesses
Deyton, who dismissed the employee, and Coy Ballew, who had been a super-
visor over Boone when he worked on a tying-in machine before his transfer back
to cloth doffing. If Deyton and Ballew are to be believed, Boone was not only
inefficient but wholly useless as an employee, and the unanswered question arises
as to why the Respondent so long retained on its payroll one who was plainly a
costly liability. Ballew, for example, testified that during the 4 or 5 weeks
Boone was under him, "every warp he worked on he made a mess of it." Ac-
cording to Deyton, when Boone returned to the doffing job, from which he had
long before been promoted, he "was very poor at it," and he "got after him"
six times "or more" in the last few days for "leaving these cut marks pass with-
out cutting the cloth, and getting the cloth dirty . . . not cleaning the reeds
. . . not pulling those lint balls through the reeds," and "leaving the job so bad."
Also according to Deyton, on March 10 "we made up a list" of "fifteen or twenty"
things found wrong with Boone's work that day. As to this alleged "list,"
which was not produced at the hearing, Deyton's testimony is so confused and
contradictory as to cast grave doubt upon his credibility on other matters as
well. On direct examination he said "we" made up the list of things found
wrong during Boone's final shift ; on cross-examination, after first admitting that
he made the list, he said he did not prepare it, but that the second-shift doffer
made it and gave it to him, after which he "talked to Boone about it." The
second-shift doffer did not take over the looms until 4 o'clock, after Boone had
been discharged. Had this employee made up a list of things found wrong after
reporting on the job, reason is defied to believe that Deyton had any list before 4
o'clock or talked to Boone about it before the discharge.
In any event, the other doffer, as a witness for the Respondent, readily ad-
mitted that he had "had some of the same trouble" as had Boone, in letting
supervisor quite a few times , that Boone was telling too much to his employees. Even
if a fraction of this extravagant claim is credited ( extravagant because except when first
hired Boone was on this job only a week or 10 days ) it is unreasonable to believe he did not
see Wilson and Boone together when only 8 feet away.
248 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
"cut marks" go by-Deyton's chief criticism of Boone. He was not discharged.
Another witness called by the Respondent, a weaver, also testified that doffers
commonly missed "cut marks." Thus, even if much of Deyton's testimony were
to be given face value, discrimination as between doffers is established.
The Trial Examiner is convinced that no credible or substantial evidence
supports the Respondent's claim that Boone was dismissed for "inefficiency." The
uncontradicted fact remains that Overseer Carter, a few days before, had coin-
plimented Boone and promised him another raise-significant gestures refuting
the claim of inefficiency.
Upon the preponderance of credible evidence the Trial Examiner concludes
and finds that the real reason for Boone's discharge was his union activity.
His discriminatory dismissal was designed to discourage union membership and
interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by the Act.
D. The discharge of Clifton Wilson'
Clifton Wilson was hired in December 1949 a He was discharged by 01 erseer
Black on April 5, 1951. During most if not all of his employment, so far as the
record shows, he worked under Black as a utility man.
It is established by the unrefuted testimony of Boone and a union representa-
tive that Wilson became an active leader in the union movement sometime after
the discharge of Huskins, and that he helped the organizer distribute handbills
at the plant. Other employees testified credibly and the Trial Examiner finds
that shortly before his discharge Wilson wore a union button openly in the plant
and solicited membership in the organization. As found above, early in March
Black saw him remove union cards from Boone's pocket. Black, as a witness,
admitted that he had called Wilson's attention to the "no-distribution" rule. The
Trial Examiner concludes and finds that before April 5, 1951, Black was well
aware of Wilson's active leadership among employees on behalf of the Union.
In view of the preceding discriminatory discharges of Huskins and Boone, the
Trial Examiner is of the opinion that General Counsel established a prima facie
case supporting his allegation of similarly illegal treatment of Wilson.
The Respondent placed in evidence Wilson's termination slip, upon which it
is stated that the employee was laid off on April 5 for the reasons : "Reprimanded
several times for inefficiency, loitering and talking to other workers while on the
job, carelessness in handling company property, absenteeism."
No supporting evidence was offered as to the claim of absenteeism, casting
grave doubt upon the merit of all other reasons, as well, appearing on the docu-
ment. Nor did Black, who discharged Wilson, testify as to a single instance of
"loitering and talking to other workers while on the job." As to Wilson's work,
which Black said was "unsatisfactory a little less than half the time when
he first went there," but "got worse" before the discharge, his only answer to
his counsel's specific question "What was wrong with it?" was as follows :
Well, some days he would do pretty fair work, and other days he didn't seem
to want to do anything. I could instruct him in the morning how to do a
certain job or to do some work. Sometimes he would do that work right all
I Except where specifically noted, no finding in this section rests solely upon affidavits
executed before a Board agent by Wilson on April 21 and 24, 1951 , shortly after his
discharge on April 5 and several weeks before he died on July 2, 1951.
8 The date of hiring is based upon a statement in one of the affidavits. Counsel for the
Respondent was requested to bring forward, from company records, such information but
counsel, unquestionably by oversight, failed to do so.
GLEN RAVEN SILK MILLS, INC . 249
day, and sometimes by afternoon he would be doing the work wrong or
backwards from the way it should be.
This vague answer gives weak factual support to Black's abstract claim of
unsatisfactory work or inefficiency.
Black testified as to three items which might be considered to be "carelessness
in handling company property." Once, he said, Wilson "tore up some cloth on
the shearing machine," but he did not testify as to when it happened, he admitted
that shearing was not the employee's regular job, and he did not claim that he
reprimanded or even criticized Wilson for it. On another occasion Wilson
knocked a hole in the wall trying to remove cloth from a cloth mandril or roller.
Black admitted that all he knew about it was what he was told, and he could
not recall when it happened! Nor did he testify that he reprimanded Wilson
for it. On a third occasion, according to Black, he saw Wilson break a steel
shaft of a roll by bitting it on the floor. He said he "got after" Wilson for this,
but what he said is not revealed, and he admitted that it occurred "possibly a
couple of months before his discharge."
The single event cited by Black, as near the date of discharge, occurred on
April 4. Black said he found Wilson using an adding machine at a time when
the packer wanted to use it. According to his testimony the overseer went to
Wilson, said that the girls were supposed to add their own yardage, and told
him to go about his regular work. Also according to Black, Wilson "said
something like `if you don't like my work why don't you send me home?'" Black
did not send him home , however , until the next day, when he discharged him.
Black's testimony reveals no incident from that of April 4 until the discharge,
at which time he said he told Wilson that he "had no personal ill feelings to-
ward him." It is reasonable to believe that if Black had been perturbed by Wil-
son's challenge, he would have accepted it on the spot, and fired him on April 4.
In view of the many and varied claims made by the Respondent on the ter-
mination slip, most of which lack any evidential support, the Trial Examiner is
unable to find merit in any or all of them, including the incident of April 4, as
persuasive and real reasons for Wilson's dismissal. They were pretexts and
afterthoughts.
The real reason, the Trial Examiner concludes and finds, for the discharge
was his union leadership and activity. His discriminatory discharge interfered
with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by
the Act.
The complaint, as amended, alleges and the parties stipulated that until his
discharge Wilson held two insurance policies, one with face value of $500 and
the other of $1,000, both having been issued to him as a result of a master,
group insurance policy taken out by the Respondent for its employees.
Wilson died on July 2, 1951, as a result of an automobile accident.
By its discriminatory discharge of Wilson, and removing him from the pay-
roll, the Respondent effectively deprived Wilson of rights and privileges con-
tained in said policies. General Counsel contends that the Respondent's lia-
bility is a continuing one and that it, and not the insurance company, is liable
to the widow, Martha B. Wilson, as beneficiary, for the face value of the policies.
The Trial Examiner so finds.30 Deducted from such total, however, should be
the amount of such insurance premiums which would normally have been de-
ducted by the Respondent from his pay, between April 5, 1951, and July 2, 1951.
Y Other witnesses said it occurred a month or two before April 5.
10 Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Asheville , N. C., 97 NLRB 151.
250 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in
connection with its operations described in section I, above, have a close, in-
timate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, the
Trial Examiner will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It has been found that the Respondent has discriminated in regard to the
hire and tenure of employment of Sam A. Huskins, Perry Boone, and Clifton
Wilson. It will be recommended that the Respondent offer to Huskins and Boone
immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent
positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and
that they be made whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason
of the discrimination against them, by payment to each of them of a sum of
money equal to that which he normally would have earned as wages from the
date of discrimination to the date of offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings"
during such period. The back pay shall be computed in the manner established
by the Board, and the Respondent shall make available to the Board payroll and
other records to facilitate the checking of the amount due." Also the Respondent
shall make whole Mrs. Martha B. Wilson, administratix of the estate of Clifton
Wilson, deceased, for any deprivation or loss she may have suffered by reason
of the Respondent's discrimination against Wilson by (1) payment to her of a
sum of money equivalent to the amount Wilson would normally have earned as
wages from the date of his discharge to the date of his decease, less his net
earnings during said period; and (2) payment to her of a sum of money
equivalent to the amount of bonuses, emoluments, and insurance or other death
benefits, to which she would have been entitled but for Wilson's discharge,
deducting therefrom the amount of any bonuses, emoluments, or insurance or
other death benefits heretofore paid or now payable to her as a result of
Wilson's employment elsewhere subsequent to his discharge, and also deducting
therefrom the amount of insurance premiums the Respondent would normally
have deducted from Wilson's pay from April 5 to July 2, 1951.
The character and scope of the unfair labor practices engaged in indicate an
intent to defeat self-organization of the employees. It will therefore be rec-
ommended that the Respondent cease and desist from in any manner interfering
with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
by the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case, the Trial Examiner makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. United Textile Workers of America, AFL, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Sam
A. Huskins, Perry Boone, and Clifton Wilson, thereby discouraging membership
11 Crossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440.
12 F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289.
NEW JERSEY NATURAL GAS COMPANY 251
In the Union, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining , and coercing its employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)
(1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.]
NEW JERSEY NATURAL GAS COMPANY slid INTERNATIONAL BROTHER-
HOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL, PETITIONER. Case No. 4-RC-
1612. November 6,1952
Decision and Direction of Elections
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before Eugene M. Levine, hearing
officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from
prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed."
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Members Houston, Murdock, and Styles].
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent certain em-
ployees of the Employer.
3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa-
tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section
9 (c) (1) andSection 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
On June 3, 1952,2 the Employer acquired the gas properties of the
New Jersey Central Power and Light Company. Until shortly be-
fore that date the Employer was known as the County Gas Company,
and under that name has bargained with the Intervenor, Utility Co-
Workers Association, on the basis of 2 units certified by the Board in
, In its brief the Employer objected that the hearing officer had not permitted it to
introduce evidence tending to prove that supervisors had been active "in creating peti-
tioner 's local union ." In denying the Employer 's request to cross-examine union witnesses
on this subject , the hearing officer ruled that the Employer should make the witness its
own. He then suggested that the matter be taken up by brief . Although reiterating this
occurrence at the hearing and requesting a dismissal of the petition or a further hearing
on this ground , the Employer has made no attempt in its brief to elaborate on its bare
contention at the hearing. At no time has it indicated that it had affirmative evidence to
offer on this subject . Consequently we deny its motion.
2 The actual contract of purchase was made December 3, 1951.
101 NLRB No. 61.