Gil, Alvaro E. et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardAug 30, 201914221723 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 30, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/221,723 03/21/2014 Alvaro E. Gil 20130255-US-NP/3019-3 1813 144650 7590 08/30/2019 Budzyn IP Law, LLC 120 Eagle Rock Avenue, Suite 328 East Hanover, NJ 07936 EXAMINER KING JR., JOSEPH W ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3696 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/30/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): Conduent.PatentDocketing@conduent.com lbudzyn@budzyn-ip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte ALVARO E. GIL, EDGAR A. BERNAL, and NATHAN GNANASAMBANDAM ____________ Appeal 2018-007772 Application 14/221,723 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before IRVIN E. BRANCH, ADAM J. PYONIN, and MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1, 4, 8–19, 22, and 26–33 which are all the pending claims. See App. Br. 5 and Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 Appellants identify Conduent Business Services, LLC as the real party in interest. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2018-007772 Application 14/221,723 2 Introduction Appellants describes the invention as “related to the field of loan risk assessment and the determination of risk associated with a plurality of loan accounts.” Spec. ¶ 1. “The invention is specifically directed towards . . . loan risk prediction via utilization of multiple algorithms to independently select features from a plurality of loan account histories X, the plurality of loan account histories containing variables x describing each loan account.” Id.; see also id. ¶ 5 (identifying “a need exists for loan risk prediction which facilitates assessment of future risk and other statistics regarding a plurality of loan account histories”). Claims 1, 19, and 33 are independent; claim 1 is representative: 1. A computer implemented method for loan risk prediction comprising: receiving by a computing device a plurality of loan account histories X relating to millions of loan accounts containing millions of variables x transmitted from a computerized database; utilizing by said computing device a plurality of algorithms to independently select features from said plurality of loan account histories X, the selected features being functions of the received variables x; grouping said selected features selected from said plurality of loan account histories X into a first data structure xf, applying by said computing device at least one voting algorithm to said selected features selected from said plurality of loan account histories X and grouping results into a second data structure xr, wherein the second data structure xr is used by the computing device to form a data structure Xr, said data structure Xr used to generate a linear model, the linear model indicating risk associated with each of said received plurality of loan account histories X on a periodic basis for a time period into the future; Appeal 2018-007772 Application 14/221,723 3 generating by the computing device a third data structure xl of nonlinear interaction terms from the second data structure xr; after generating by the computing device the third data structure xl, then generating by the computing device a fourth data structure xNL wherein xNL equals selectively one of xr U xl and x U xl; after generating by the computing device the fourth data structure xNL then executing a nonlinear model that selects features from the fourth data structure xNL to form a fifth data structure xNLR, wherein the fifth data structure xNLR is used to form a data structure XNLR by selecting first elements of X whose indices are in xNLR; and generating, using data structure XNLR, a nonlinear model y = f (XNLR), where f is a nonlinear function, the nonlinear model y indicating risk associated with each of said received plurality of loan account histories X; and calculating a risk for each of the loan accounts using the nonlinear model y on a periodic basis for a time period in the future. App. Br. 13–14 (Claims App’x) (formatting adjusted). The Rejection The Examiner rejected claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as ineligibly directed to a judicial exception. Final Act. 5–10. § 101 General Legal Framework and the USPTO Guidance An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Appeal 2018-007772 Application 14/221,723 4 In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal citation omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, Appeal 2018-007772 Application 14/221,723 5 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. In early 2019, the PTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look, in step one of the Alice/Mayo analysis, to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“prong one”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (“prong two”) (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).2 See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim adds “significantly more” under step two of the Alice/Mayo analysis, i.e., whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Our Analysis Appellants argue the independent claims together as a group and present no separate arguments for the dependent claims. App. Br. 5–12. We 2 All references to the MPEP are to the 9th Ed, Rev. 08.2017 (Jan. 2018). Appeal 2018-007772 Application 14/221,723 6 select claim 1 as representative of all claims for this appeal. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Alice/Mayo Step One, Guidance Step 2A, Prong One Under step 2A, prong one of the Guidance, we determine whether the claims recite a patent-ineligible concept. We must analyze the claim’s recitations in a way that is “[]tethered [to] the language of the claim[]” and, accordingly, we assess what the claim 1 recites at the same level of generality or abstraction expressed in the claim. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Claim 1 recites3 receiving “a plurality of loan account histories X relating to [numerous]4 loan accounts containing [numerous] variables x,” using “algorithms to independently select features from said plurality of loan 3 All quotes in this paragraph are from claim 1 and we omit all “computing device” and “data structure” limitations at this stage of our analysis (we consider them in our analysis under prong two of step 2A of the Guidance and under step two of the Alice/Mayo framework). We note Appellants describe “data structure” in the Specification as follows: A “data structure,” as discussed within the context of this patent application and related patent applications refers to a computer-based storage unit allowing for the storage of single or multiple types of data. The data structure may take the form of any computer-based storage unit functioning at any level of an OSI model, including computer files, .csv files, matrixes, a linked-list, arrays, tree structures, objects, variables, text files, SQL-databases or database entries, packets, frames, or any presently existing or after-arising equivalent. The “data structure” for the purposes defined herein can actually be one or multiple computer-storage units transmitted sequentially or in parallel. Spec. ¶ 24. 4 We substitute “numerous” for “millions of.” See infra note 6. Appeal 2018-007772 Application 14/221,723 7 account histories X, the selected features being functions of the received variables x,” “grouping said selected features selected from said plurality of loan account histories X,” applying a “voting algorithm to said selected features selected from said plurality of loan account histories X and grouping results into [] xr,” using xr “to generate a linear model, the linear model indicating risk associated with each of said received plurality of loan account histories X on a periodic basis for a time period into the future,” generating “nonlinear interaction terms from” xr, then “then generating . . . xNL wherein xNL equals selectively one of xr U xl and x U xl,” “then executing a nonlinear model that selects features from . . . xNL to form . . . xNLR, wherein . . . xNLR is used to form . . . XNLR by selecting first elements of X whose indices are in xNLR,” “generating, using [] XNLR, a nonlinear model y = f (XNLR), where f is a nonlinear function, the nonlinear model y indicating risk associated with each of said received plurality of loan account histories X,” “and calculating a risk for each of the loan accounts using the nonlinear model y on a periodic basis for a time period in the future.” In view of the foregoing, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites “calculating risk for various loan accounts, including the use of loan history data for numerous loan accounts and a voting algorithm to generate various data to perform the risk calculations.” Final Act. 4–5.5 Mitigating risk for loans is a fundamental economic practice. See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. 5 In view of the Specification (see supra note 3), we treat “data structure” as a computer-related term of art and consider it as a claim element in addition to the recited abstract idea under the analytical frameworks of Alice/Mayo and the Guidance. We note the Examiner’s determination of the abstract idea recited by claim 1 included “to generate various data structures” (emphasis added to highlight we omit “structures” from our determination). Appeal 2018-007772 Application 14/221,723 8 at 219–20 (concluding that using third parties to mediate settlement risk is a “fundamental economic practice”). Thus, claim 1 recites an idea for a fundamental economic practice in combination with a particular mathematical algorithm. “Adding one abstract idea . . . to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.” RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co. LTD., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017). In accordance with the Guidance, because fundamental economic practices are one of certain methods of organizing human activity that courts have determined to be abstract, and mathematical algorithms are abstract ideas in the category of mathematical concepts, we determine that claim 1, thus, recites an abstract idea. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Our analysis now proceeds to step 2A, prong two of the Guidance, to determine whether or not claim 1 integrates the recited idea into a practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Alice/Mayo Step One, Guidance Step 2A, Prong Two To determine whether the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, we identify whether there are “any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s)” and evaluate those elements to determine whether they integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (emphasis added); see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Here is claim 1, with the additional limitations beyond those that recite the abstract idea shown in italics— 1. A computer implemented method for loan risk prediction comprising: Appeal 2018-007772 Application 14/221,723 9 receiving by a computing device a plurality of loan account histories X relating to millions of 6 loan accounts containing millions of variables x transmitted from a computerized database; utilizing by said computing device a plurality of algorithms to independently select features from said plurality of loan account histories X, the selected features being functions of the received variables x; grouping said selected features selected from said plurality of loan account histories X into a first data structure xf, applying by said computing device at least one voting algorithm to said selected features selected from said plurality of loan account histories X and grouping results into a second data structure xr, wherein the second data structure xr is used by the computing device to form a data structure Xr, said data structure Xr used to generate a linear model, the linear model indicating risk associated with each of said received plurality of loan account histories X on a periodic basis for a time period into the future; generating by the computing device a third data structure xl of nonlinear interaction terms from the second data structure xr; after generating by the computing device the third data structure xl, then generating by the computing device a fourth data structure xNL wherein xNL equals selectively one of xr U xl and x U xl; after generating by the computing device the fourth data structure xNL then executing a nonlinear model that selects 6 Appellants specifically argue that the quantitative aspect of “allow[ing] for processing of ‘millions of loan accounts containing millions of variables’” demonstrates the invention constitutes an improvement in computing. Reply Br. 3. Regarding claim scope related to “millions of,” as recited, we note claim 1 recites receiving “a plurality” of loan account histories (i.e., two or more) and that these histories relate to millions of loan accounts containing millions of variables x. Appeal 2018-007772 Application 14/221,723 10 features from the fourth data structure xNL to form a fifth data structure xNLR, wherein the fifth data structure xNLR is used to form a data structure XNLR by selecting first elements of X whose indices are in xNLR; and generating, using data structure XNLR, a nonlinear model y = f (XNLR), where f is a nonlinear function, the nonlinear model y indicating risk associated with each of said received plurality of loan account histories X; and calculating a risk for each of the loan accounts using the nonlinear model y on a periodic basis for a time period in the future. Beyond the claim limitations reciting the abstract ideas for calculating loan risk predictions using a particular mathematical algorithm, claim 1 recites computer and data processing limitations: “computer implemented,” “by a computing device,” “a computerized database,” and several “data structure” limitations for computer storage of variable data. Claim 1 also includes a numerical limitation that the loan histories are related to “millions of” loan accounts that contain millions of variables. Reciting requirements for a large number (i.e., millions of) variables does not constitute improving any underlying technology (ordinarily skilled artisans have long understood that computers routinely handle millions of variables). Thus, claim 1’s computer-related and numerical limitations amount to little more than instructions to carry out the abstract idea using a computer, and do not serve to integrate the recited abstract idea of “calculating risk for various loan accounts, including the use of loan history data for numerous loan accounts and a voting algorithm to generate various data to perform the risk calculations idea” into a practical application. In other words, these technological recitations add specificity to the claim and limit its use to computer technology, but none of these computer limitations serves to Appeal 2018-007772 Application 14/221,723 11 improve a technology or technical field. Instead, the technological recitations constitute routine uses of technology to automate the underlying method of calculating risk for numerous loan accounts. Thus, claim 1 does not recite any additional elements that constitute an improvement to “the functioning of the computer itself” or “‘any other technology or technical field.’” See MPEP § 2106.05(a) (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 225). Neither do these limitations qualify as applying the judicial exception with “a particular machine,” because these components provide their conventional functions and require no more than general purpose equipment. See MPEP § 2106.05(b); see also Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716– 17 (Fed. Cir. 2014); SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In order for the addition of a machine to impose a meaningful limit on the scope of a claim, it must play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly.”). The Supreme Court has “rejected the argument that ‘implement[ing] a principle in some specific fashion’ will ‘automatically fal[l] within the patentable subject matter of § 101.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 222 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 593). Claim 1 further does not effect a particular transformation of the recited articles, which are simply used for their ordinary purposes, nor does it add any other meaningful (technological) limitations, i.e., limitations beyond simply “linking the use” of the abstract idea to generic technology. See MPEP § 2106.05 (c), (e)–(f); see also id. at (g)–(h) (use of well-known limitations beyond the judicially excepted matter constitutes “insignificant extra-solution activity” (g) and claim limitations “merely indicating a field Appeal 2018-007772 Application 14/221,723 12 of use or technological environment in which to apply a judicial exception do not amount to significantly more” (h)). Accordingly, because the recited judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application, the Examiner did not err in determining claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Thus, we proceed to step two of the Alice/ Mayo analysis (step 2B of the Guidance). Alice/Mayo Step Two; Guidance Step 2B In step two of the Alice/Mayo analysis, we consider whether there are additional limitations that, individually or as an ordered combination, ensure the claims amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73, 77–79). As stated in the Guidance, many of the considerations to determine whether the claims amount to “significantly more” under step two of the Alice framework are already considered as part of determining whether the judicial exception has been integrated into a practical application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Thus, at this point of our analysis, we determine if claim 1 adds a specific limitation, or combination of limitations, that is not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field; or whether, in addition to the recited judicial exception, they recite only well-understood, routine, conventional activities at a high level of generality. Id. Here, Appellants’ claims do not recite specific limitations (or a combination of limitations) that are beyond what was well-understood, routine, and conventional. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that beyond the limitations for the judicial exception, the technological limitations recited in the independent claims constitute the use of technology that was well known to those of ordinary skill prior to the invention. Final Act. 9–11; Appeal 2018-007772 Application 14/221,723 13 see also Ans. 4–6. The disclosure in Appellants’ Specification of the claimed technological features is at a generic level. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 1, 6– 14, 23–24, 41–42. There is no discussion of any special functionality or considerations for a technological aspect of any technological component recited in the independent claims. Appellants contend claim 1 “provides an improvement in computing.” App. Br. 7; see also id. at 6–10 (arguing claim 1 is akin to the patent-eligible claim-at-issue in Amdocs7 and not akin to the patent-ineligible claim-at-issue in FairWarning8). This argument is unpersuasive. Unlike the high-level or generic technological terms in Appellants’ claim 1, the claim at issue in Amdocs included a specifically defined term claim term—“enhance”—which the Federal Circuit defined “as meaning ‘to apply a number of field enhancements in a distributed fashion.’” 841 F.3d at 1300. The court further “took care to note,” in the context of the claim term “enhance,” that “‘distributed’ means that the network usage records are processed close to their sources before being transmitted to a centralized manager,” and the claim term “enhance” specifically requires “‘in a distributed fashion’ and the ‘close to the source’ of network information requirements.” Id. In other words, the claim at issue in Amdocs included a narrow, defined technological term. Appellants’ claim 1, on the other hand, includes no narrow technological limitations. Appellants do not persuade us the Examiner errs in determining claim 1 is more akin to the claim at issue in 7 Amdocs (Israel) Limited v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 8 FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appeal 2018-007772 Application 14/221,723 14 FairWarning and other cases determining the claim(s) at issue to be patent ineligible. See Ans. 4–5; see also Final Act. 9–11. Appellants further contend “[t]he subject invention relies on multiple creations of data structures which result in transformation of data.” App. Br. 11 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 31, 33 for the proposition that “[i]n all, it is clear that data is transformed with the subject invention”). For authority, Appellants cite the Federal Circuit decision In re Bilski: “Sufficient transformation occurs in data when ‘the nature of the data has been changed such that it has a different function or is suitable for a different use.’” App. Br. 10 (citing 545 F.3d 943, 962–63 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (noting “cited by Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010)”). This is unpersuasive.9 Certainly, claims that create particular data structures may be patent-eligible. See, e.g., Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339. Here, however, the recited data structures are generic computer storage for holding data generated by the recited abstract algorithm. See Spec. ¶ 24. In other words, claim 1’s multiple recitations of first, second, third, etc. data structures amount to mere instructions to implement the recited abstract algorithm using generic computer technology. Conclusion Thus, Appellants do not persuade us the Examiner erred, and we sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims 1, 4, 8–19, 22, and 26– 33, and. In doing so, as consistent with our discussion above, we adopt the Examiner’s findings and reasons as set forth in the Final Office Action from which this appeal is taken and as set forth in the Answer. 9 We note the quoted language that Appellants attribute to In re Bilski does not appear at the cited location (or elsewhere) in that case. Appeal 2018-007772 Application 14/221,723 15 DECISION We affirm the rejection of claims 1, 4, 8–19, 22, and 26–33 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation