01a40627
03-10-2005
Geraldine McReynolds, Complainant, v. Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary, Department of Transportation (Federal Aviation Administration), Agency.
Geraldine McReynolds v. Department of Transportation
01A40627
March 10, 2005
.
Geraldine McReynolds,
Complainant,
v.
Norman Y. Mineta,
Secretary,
Department of Transportation
(Federal Aviation Administration),
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A40627
Agency No. DOT-6-99-6012
Hearing No. 340-99-4068X
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's September 30,
2003 final decision concerning her complaint of unlawful employment
discrimination, brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., Section
501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended,
29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The Commission
accepts the appeal. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
During the relevant time, complainant was employed as a GS-12 Program
Analyst at the agency's Desert Management Office, Palmdale, California.
On September 29, 1998, complainant initiated EEO counseling and filed
a formal complaint on November 3, 1998. Therein, complainant claimed
discrimination on the bases of race (African-American), disability
(bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome), and age (D.O.B. 5/22/34) when her
supervisor (S) refused to provide her with a reasonable accommodation
for her disability.
Specifically, complainant claimed that as of May 1998, S knew of
her disability, but ignored her many requests for accommodations,
supported by multiple medical evaluations of her condition, which set
forth her limitations and need for physical restrictions. Complainant
claimed that because she continued to work with no accommodations (to
include considerable typing), her carpel tunnel disorder worsened and
required bilateral surgery in September and October 1998. Complainant
further claimed that when she returned to work after her surgery, in
November 1998, S still refused to provide her with accommodations.
Complainant stated that this purported refusal resulted in a re-injury
to her wrists, and a prolonged absence, from November 20, 1998 to July
19, 1999. Complainant indicated that the agency thereafter provided her
with effective accommodations, to include different job duties and new
assistive equipment, to include voice software to eliminate the need
for typing. Complainant claimed that S refused to provide her with
reasonable accommodations during the time at issue because she was not
part of a favored office clique, from which she was excluded because of
her race and age.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of her
right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) or
alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant
requested a hearing. However, the AJ determined that complainant's
request was late, so the hearing request was denied, and the case was
remanded to the agency to issue a final decision.
In its final decision, the agency found that complainant failed to
establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination because she
presented insufficient evidence to show that she was an individual with
a disability under the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, the agency
determined that complainant failed to show that her carpel tunnel disorder
substantially limited her in a major life activity. In particular,
in reviewing her medical documentation, the agency determined that
the reports were prepared by different medical professionals and
that they reflected vague and inconsistent physical restrictions,
many of which were unrelated to a wrist impairment. The agency also
noted that complainant submitted documentation regarding a mental
impairment, but again found that the information failed to demonstrate
that it substantially limited a major life activity. Additionally,
the agency found that complainant was not "regarded" as an individual
with a disability, nor did she have a record of having a disability,
such that the agency had no liability under the Rehabilitation Act.
Notwithstanding the above determination, the agency found that the agency
nonetheless provided complainant with effective accommodations for her
carpel tunnel impairment. In particular, the agency found that S allowed
complainant to self- manage her work so as not to cause additional injury.
The agency noted S's testimony that he worked together with complainant,
that it was decided she would do less typing, and wear wrist braces.
The agency found that complainant claimed that S's statements were
false, but that she provided no evidence to support this contention.
Additionally, the agency found that record showed that S permitted
complainant to use considerable leave due to her impairment, and that she
was not penalized for doing so. Regarding reassignment, the agency found
that S testified that there were few positions having limited writing or
typing, but that he offered to reassign complainant to another position.
The agency found that complainant acknowledged that this occurred,
but that complainant declined the offer of reassignment.
Next, the agency found that complainant failed to establish a prima
facie case of race or age discrimination, finding that she presented no
comparative evidence, nor any other evidence to establish an inference
of race or age discrimination. Even assuming arguendo that complainant
established a prima facie case of race and age discrimination, the agency
found that S presented legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for his
actions. Specifically, the agency found that S attempted to accommodate
complainant's carpel tunnel disorder despite the vague and non-specific
requests from her medical providers. The agency found that complainant
failed to show that this reason was a pretext for discrimination.
In this regard, the agency instead found that the record confirmed that
the medical restriction requests submitted by complainant were vague,
but that management provided complainant with leave, an opportunity to
self-manage her workload, and an opportunity for reassignment.
Based on the above findings and analysis, the agency concluded that
complainant failed to prevail in her discrimination claims.
On appeal, as an initial matter, complainant avers that she should be
afforded a hearing. Complainant argues that her attorney was to blame for
the late hearing request, and that everything she herself submitted to the
AJ was timely. Additionally, complainant disputes the agency's findings,
and in particular argues that S treated her in a "cold hearted" manner
regarding her disability, and provided absolutely no accommodations during
the time at issue. Complainant asserts that S provided false testimony,
and that all testimony supporting the agency must be viewed as biased.
Denial of Hearing Request
After careful review, we find that the record confirms that complainant's
attorney submitted her request for a hearing, and that the AJ properly
determined that the request was late, and properly remanded the case to
the agency to issue a final decision. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.108(f).
Race and Age Discrimination
Applying the standards set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973); and Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979)
(requiring a showing that age was a determinative factor, in the sense
that "but for" age, complainant would not have been subject to the adverse
action at issue), to the extent that complainant's claim may be viewed as
one of disparate treatment, the Commission agrees with the agency that
complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of race and/or age
discrimination. The Commission determines that complainant contends
that only members of a favored office clique, which excludes African-
American and older employees, are provided disability accommodations
without undue delay. Upon review, the Commission determines that
the record contains testimony that management does not have a bias
against older or African-American workers. Therefore, we find that no
evidence of animus toward complainant because of her race and/or age,
nor any other evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could draw an
inference of discrimination. See Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567,576 (1978). Accordingly, we concur with the agency's
finding of no discrimination on the basis of race and/or age.
Reasonable Accommodation Claim
For the purposes of this decision, the Commission will presume, without
so finding, that complainant is an individual with a disability. See 29
C.F.R. � 1630.2(g); 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(m).
Here, despite complainant's contentions to the contrary, we find that
the record shows that upon learning of her carpel tunnel disorder,
S complied with the Commission's regulations and guidelines, as set
forth above. Specifically, we find that S engaged in the interactive
process when he reviewed complainant's medical documentation, and had
conversations with complainant regarding her limitations. Moreover,
based on our review of the medical evidence of record, we find that
the various medical reports submitted by complainant contain brief,
generalized references to her limitations relating to her carpel tunnel
disorder, and provide no detailed restrictions based on the functions of
complainant's position, such as how much and/or how often she could type.
Nonetheless, the record shows that S recognized the need for complainant
to avoid repetitive motion, such as excessive typing, and instructed
her to manage her work-load so as to spread out and/or limit typing.
We also find credible S's testimony that because he was uncertain about
complainant's limitations, he generally advised her not to work to the
point where she would cause herself further pain or injury. Additionally,
we find that the record shows that S permitted complainant to use as much
leave as requested, due to her carpel tunnel symptoms and treatment,
without any adverse consequences. We also find the agency provided
complainant with a "curved," presumably ergonomic, keyboard and �mouse�
for use during the time in question, and upon her return in July 1999,
provided her with voice software which eliminated the need for typing
altogether.
Therefore, under the circumstances of this case, where complainant's
work-place restrictions were not clearly communicated to S by either
complainant or her medical providers, we find that the accommodations
provided to complainant during the time at issue satisfied the
requirements of the Rehabilitation Act.
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, we AFFIRM the agency's
final decision.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court
appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you
to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security.
See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �
2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��
791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole
discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not
extend your time in which to
file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be
filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right
to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
March 10, 2005
__________________
Date