Gerald M. Elliott, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 6, 2000
01971226 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 6, 2000)

01971226

03-06-2000

Gerald M. Elliott, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Gerald M. Elliott v. United States Postal Service

01971226

March 6, 2000

Gerald M. Elliott, )

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01971226

) Agency No. 4H-370-1046-96

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

On November 25, 1996, Gerald M. Elliott (hereinafter referred to as

complainant) filed a timely appeal from the October 25, 1996, final

decision of the United States Postal Service (hereinafter referred to as

the agency) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of

1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �621 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of

1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c). The appeal is timely filed

(see 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402(a)))<1> and is accepted in accordance

with EEOC Order No. 960, as amended. For the reasons that follow,

the agency's decision is AFFIRMED.

The issue presented in this appeal is whether the complainant has proven,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency discriminated

against him on the bases of race (white), sex, disability (mental,

service-related nervous condition), and age (DOB 2-13-46) with regard

to certain terms and conditions of work.

Complainant filed his formal complaint on January 27, 1996, alleging that

agency managers: (a) directed him to provide medical justification in

support of his sick leave on December 14, 1995, and (b) on December 18,

1995, harassed him, e.g., that he was working too slow, was taking a

long break, and was denied union representation. After an investigation,

the agency advised complainant that he could request a hearing before an

EEOC Administrative Judge or an immediate final agency decision (FAD),

but complainant did not respond. The agency issued its FAD, finding

no discrimination.

The record shows that complainant began his employment with the agency

in September 1994 as a PTF carrier. In approximately March-April 1995,

he was awarded a new route but was informed in December 1995 that his

performance was unsatisfactory, that numerous customer complaints had

been filed, and that his safety record was poor. He contended that black

carriers were given sufficient time to learn their routes and assistance

in delivering their routes when necessary, while he was not. In addition,

complainant claimed that agency managers knew of his disability, since

he had included that information on his application and taken sick leave.

Agency managers contended that complainant was given sufficient time

and training over eight months to learn his route, that he failed to

do so or perform in a satisfactory manner, and that these matters were

discussed with him in a professional manner. Also, the agency cited

previous disciplinary actions against complainant for poor performance

and numerous customer complaints regarding his conduct and performance.

In addition, one manager (S1) explained that he was instructed to bring

in medical justification for his absence when he left work on sick leave

without completing his route. The record contains examples of medical

excuses from other employees provided upon request by supervisors.

Also, agency managers denied knowledge of his disability.

Generally, discrimination claims are examined under the tripartite

analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003

(1st Cir. 1979). Complainant must first establish a prima facie

case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The agency offers rebuttal to appellant's inference

of discrimination by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for its action(s). Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); see U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors

v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-716 (1983). Once the agency has met its

burden, the complainant bears the ultimate burden to persuade the fact

finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered by the

agency were not the true reasons for its actions but rather were a pretext

for discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502

(1993). Under the ADEA, the complainant must show that his age was a

determining factor in the agency's decision, that is, considerations

of age made a difference in the agency's action. Hazen Paper Company

v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (age had "a role in the process

and a determinative influence on the outcome").

Here, agency managers stated that complainant was afforded sufficient

time and training over eight months to learn his route, that he failed

to do so or perform in a satisfactory manner, and that these matters

were discussed with him in a professional manner. Also, S1 stated that,

because complainant left work without completing his route, he was asked

to support his sick leave. We find that the agency has articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

The burden now returns to complainant to demonstrate that the agency's

reasons were a pretext for discrimination or based on prohibited

considerations. Complainant has not presented any evidence in support

of his contentions nor shown that he was singled out on the basis of

his race or sex or that his age was a factor in the agency's actions.

Neither the record herein nor complainant has demonstrated that the

agency's reason for its action was pretextual, that is, based on a

prohibited factor such as race, sex or age or was grounded in racial,

sexual, or age animus. We find therefore that the agency did not

discriminate against complainant on the bases of race, sex, or age.

Nor do we find that the incidents as alleged by complainant rise to the

level of harassment.

Finally, we address appellant's claim of discrimination based on

disability. As a threshold matter, complainant must show that he is a

person with a disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.<2>

This is defined as one who has, has a record of having, or is regarded

as having an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life

activities.<3> 29 C.F.R. �1630.2(g). Major life activities include

caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,

speaking, breathing, learning, and working. 29 C.F.R. �1630.2(i). There

is nothing in the record showing that complainant has, has a record of,

or was regarded as having an impairment of any kind. We find therefore

that the agency did not discriminate against him based on disability.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the agency's decision was proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1199)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS

OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See

64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. �1614.405). All requests and arguments must be

submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the

absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed

timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration

of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. �1614.604).

The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the

other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 6, 2000

Date Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that

the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

_________________________ __________________________

1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to

all Federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the

administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the

revised regulations found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable,

in deciding the present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be

found at the Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.

2The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination

by federal employees or applicants for employment. Since that time,

the ADA regulations set out at 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 apply to complaints

of disability discrimination. These regulations can be found on EEOC's

website: WWW.EEOC.GOV.

3See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S.Ct. 2162 (1999); Sutton

v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel

Service, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2133 (1999).